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Following the lead of Theda Skocpol, Jacob Hacker and other neo-institutionalists, 
this dissertation draws attention to the private and voluntary components of America’s 
mixed systems of social insurance and health care provision.  What distinguishes my 
approach is a closer view of institutional politics and policies, as well as an emphasis 
on their reciprocal connections with the larger political process.  Drawing on the 
extensive administrative archives of the nation’s oldest medical center, Columbia-
Presbyterian Medical Center in New York, I reconstruct and analyze some of the 
formative moments of the American health care system.  Two broad conclusions 
concerning American health care politics emerge from my analysis.  First, academic 
medical centers, as well as private health care institutions more generally, make 
policies and shape health care politics.  Thus, private institutions are policy-makers, in 
a very real sense.  Second, private institutions of health care provision have 
participated in the making of health care policy not as monolithic, autonomous 
institutions but as internally contested and externally invested organizations.  On the 
basis of my research, I propose a new theoretical framework which brings into view 
the organizational and social dimensions of health care politics that have been 
previously overlooked.  The framework builds on two theoretical approaches – the 
neo-Durkheimian theory of micro-classes and the theory of intersectionality – to 
reveal a coherent set of political subjects and structures involved in health care 
politics.  Central to this framework is a concept of ‘institutional class positions,’ which 
 links the mechanisms of bureaucratic power and occupational control with the effects 
of gendered and racialized systems of inequality to produce an integrated, dynamic 
understanding of institutional processes.  I show that the organizational and social 
structures which shape these positions have far-reaching political effects, indicating 
the limits and possibilities of health care reform in the predominantly private 
framework of health care provision. 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Olena Mykolayivna Prokopovych was born and raised in Chernihiv, Ukraine.  She 
attended Chernihiv Secondary School No. 29 and graduated with a Gold Medal.  She 
was among the first few students from the former Soviet Union to independently apply 
and matriculate to an American institution of higher education.  Olena was admitted 
and offered full scholarship to attend six top-rated liberal arts colleges.  She chose to 
attend Williams College where she majored in Political Science and Economics and 
graduated Cum Laude with Honors in Political Science.  Her honors thesis in political 
theory was entitled Game, Power, Pleasure in the Works of Michel Foucault.  For her 
graduate studies, Olena attended Cornell University where she studied political theory 
and American politics.   
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Many people have helped me complete this dissertation.  First and foremost, I thank 
the chair of my dissertation committee, Dr. Richard F. Bensel, for his keen intellectual 
guidance, tireless help, and steady encouragement.  A demanding teacher and an 
exacting scholar, Dr. Bensel inspired my interest in political economy and the 
institutions of the state and civil society.  He was also the best dissertation adviser a 
graduate student could wish for.  Not only did Dr. Bensel meticulously comment on 
each page of my writing but he helped me tremendously in making crucial connections 
between my own research and the broader scholarship on American social politics and 
policy.  To Dr. Theodore Lowi, a beloved teacher and adviser, I owe a debt of 
gratitude for illuminating the study of American politics and policy with unmatched 
intellectual and philosophical vigor and for setting a shining example of academic life.  
To Dr. M. Elizabeth Sanders I am deeply thankful for a solid introduction to American 
Political Development, steady encouragement, and much valuable advice.  I am also 
grateful to Dr. Anna Marie Smith, who served as an independent reader at my defense, 
for her thorough reading, many valuable comments, and crucial advice for improving 
my theoretical framework. 
Mr. Stephen Novak, Head of Archives & Special Collections at Columbia 
University’s Augustus C. Long Health Sciences Library, fulfilled hundreds of research 
and retrieval requests, all while sharing much of his vast knowledge of the history of 
Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center and American medicine and health care more 
generally.  I am grateful to Tina Slater and Laurie Coon, the current and former 
Graduate Field Assistants in the Department of Government at Cornell University, for 
their kind help with countless steps on the long road from enrollment to defense.   
 v 
I thank my parents, grandparents and all other members of my loud, outspoken, 
and deeply empathetic family for developing my fundamental abilities to think, feel, 
speak, and write.  Bravely and selflessly, my mother set me upon the journey across 
languages, cultures, and borders.  From my father I have inherited priceless gifts of 
musicality, intellectual curiosity combined with modesty, and generous respect for 
traditions, large and small.  My late maternal grandmother will always be my strongest 
link to my family, my homeland, history, and the past.  I am deeply grateful to my 
aunts, uncles, cousins, step-father, beloved late grandparents, and god-parents for 
making our small family seem large. 
I thank my parents-in-law for their financial support, advice and 
encouragement.  My closest friends in graduate school – Juliet Hooker, Megan 
Thomas, and Katherine Gordy – provided unforgettable companionship.  Natalia 
Nechyporenko, Deinya Phenix, Yulia Chentsova-Dutton, and Katherine Gordy are 
dear friends who have supported me through all these years, no matter how many time 
zones between our locations and years between our visits.  During the last year of 
writing, I was lucky to have Laura Landolt and Susannah Walker as those rare 
colleagues who become real friends.  Many other generous friends and wonderful 
teachers have helped me get to this point and, while too numerous to name, are 
gratefully remembered. 
Above all, I thank my husband, David M. Tang, for being there for me every 
step of the way and for bringing the very best into my life.  Pastry chef extraordinaire, 
knowledgeable music guide, fantastic entertainment manager, successful lawyer, and 
simply the sweetest, most loving partner, he made it possible for me to endure this 
trial. 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Biographical Sketch.................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................iv 
List of Figures............................................................................................................ vii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................ viii 
1.   Introduction ............................................................................................................1 
2.   Institutional Class Positions: Applying Intersectionality and  
Micro-Class Approach to the Study of Private Health Care Politics ...................31 
3.   Between the University and the Market: The ‘Full-Time’  
Struggle, 1910-1926 .............................................................................................74 
4.   Building the First Medical Center: Conflicts over Physical Space 
and Institutional Purpose, 1922-1945.................................................................138 
5.   In A Class of Their Own: Women and Minorities in Medical  
School Admissions and Education, 1891-1980..................................................193 
6.   Confronting Labor: The Struggle for Unionization of Health  
Care Workers, 1958-1976 ..................................................................................287 
7.   Organizational Politics of Voluntary Reform: The Community 
Health Planning Initiative, 1970-1976 ...............................................................371 
8.   The New (Institutional) Class Struggle: Academic Medical  
Centers and American Health Care Politics .......................................................446 
Works Cited ..............................................................................................................477 
 
 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
1.1. Comparative Levels and Sources of Welfare Spending, 1997 ...........................4 
1.2. Comparative Levels and Sources of Welfare Spending, 2000 ...........................6 
1.3. Neglected Field of Political Science Scholarship on Welfare Provision ...........8 
7.1. Original Organizational Schema for Columbia’s Community  
Health Planning Initiative Proposed by Dr. Canfield.....................................380 
7.2. Revised Organizational Schema for Columbia’s Community  
Health Planning Initiative Intended to Attenuate the Conflict  
Between Drs. Canfield and Lythcott ..............................................................383 
7.3. Final Organizational Form of Columbia’s Community Health  
Planning Initiative ..........................................................................................398 
 
 viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
1.1. Institutional Class Positions – Examples and Sources .....................................28 
2.1. Three Approaches to Categories within the Intersectionality Paradigm ..........71 
4.1. Number of Hospital Beds by Specialty at the Columbia-Presbyterian  
Medical Center, 1937 .....................................................................................176 
4.2. Clinical Instruction of Columbia’s Medical Students Conducted  
Outside of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, 1937 .......................179 
5.1. Women Graduates of the Columbia University’s College of  
Physicians and Surgeons, 1921-1941.............................................................222 
5.2. Proportion of Jewish Students Enrolled at Columbia  
University’s College of Physicians and Surgeons, 1920-1946:  
Internal Institutional Claims...........................................................................250 
5.3. Minority First-Year Medical School Enrollment at Columbia  
University and Nationwide, 1968-1976 .........................................................279 
6.1. Results of the First Union Elections at Columbia University’s  
College of Physicians and Surgeons, June 27, 1969 ......................................336 
6.2. Results of the Run-Off Union Elections at Columbia University’s  
College of Physicians and Surgeons, September 3, 1969 ..............................337 
7.1. Inventory of Health Care Problems Rated in Terms of Importance,  
Vulnerability to Improvement, and Suitability as Potential Projects  
for Columbia’s Community Health Planning Initiative, 1971 .......................402 
8.1. Immediate Salience of Class, Race, Gender, Occupational Division,  
and Organizational Hierarchy in Five Cases of Intra-Organizational  
Politics and Policy-Making ............................................................................454 
 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
General Problematic 
For most of its history, the American health care system has been dominated 
by private rather than public actors and by professional, rather than political 
ideologies, whereas American political science has focused on their opposites.  During 
the first seven decades of the twentieth century, when American political science was 
quite at home in the study of the private social interests, its practitioners were 
nonetheless entranced by the general view that the realm of medicine and health care 
was characterized by professional considerations, rather than politics.  After the veil of 
professional neutrality has been lifted, political science has abandoned the private 
sphere in favor of a near exclusive focus on the institutions of the state.  Although 
shedding much needed light on newly expanded government involvement in health 
care, the discipline still ignores the proverbial elephant in the room – the private 
institutions and structures of health care provision. 
Recent political developments – such as the Clinton administration’s campaign 
to create a national health insurance program, as well as George W. Bush’s effort to 
privatize Social Security – have contributed to a growing awareness of the analytical 
blind spot created by the exclusive focus on public institutions and programs.  A 
crucial question at the center of these developments is the type and extent of social 
protection that should be publicly provided.  Although this basic political question is 
not really new, political science has only recently begun to change its focus and 
concepts in a way that captures the centrality of the public/private split.  For decades, 
students of welfare concentrated almost exclusively on the public programs of social 
provision and the public institutions which delivered them.  All the while, private 
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institutions and instruments of social provision were left in the shade.  In fact, the very 
concept of the ‘welfare state’ captures this bias in favor of public institutions and 
programs of social provision.1  
Nevertheless, during the past two decades there has emerged a growing 
literature challenging the exclusive focus on public welfare programs.  In the mid-
1980s, a study by Beth Stevens and a volume edited by Martin Rein and Lee 
Rainwater broached the topic of the mixed public/private regime of welfare 
provision.2  The new conceptual turn was soon buttressed by several authoritative 
analyses of comparative welfare regimes.3  In 1997, Christopher Howard contributed a 
brilliant study, entitled The Hidden Welfare State, which examined an extensive array 
of tax mechanisms which create a network of welfare for a host of unexpected 
recipients, from home-owners to business firms.  In 2001, Marie Gottschalk published 
The Shadow Welfare State, addressing the general problematic from a somewhat 
different direction – to investigate the role of business and labor unions in the shaping 
of the American system of health insurance.  A year after that, Jacob Hacker came out 
with a very successful reaffirmation of this new trend, under the title of The Divided 
                                                 
 
1
 A few years ago, in fact, I came across an attempt to coin a related concept of the ‘health care state.’  
[Michael Moran, Governing the Health Care State: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Germany (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999)].  This, in my view, was 
not a helpful move, at least for the analysis of the American health care system, which gives a very 
large role to non-state actors. 
2
 Beth Stevens, Complementing the Welfare State: The Development of Private Pension, Health 
Insurance and Other Employee Benefits in The United States (Geneva: International Labor Office, 
1986); Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, eds., Public/Private Interplay in Social Protection: A 
Comparative Study (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1986). 
3
 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1990); Sven Steinmo, Taxation & Democracy: Swedish, British, and American 
Approaches to Financing the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Michael Katz 
and Christoph Sachsse, eds., The Mixed Economy of Social Welfare: Public/Private Relations in 
England, Germany and the US, 1870s-1930s, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996). 
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Welfare State, in which he provides a comparative view of the public/private divide in 
retirement security and health care insurance.4 
The central argument proposed by this stream of scholarship is that an 
exclusive focus on the public programs of social provision is both incomplete and 
misleading.  It is incomplete because it ignores the fact that a very sizable portion of 
social provision, upon which American citizens rely, is provided by private institutions 
and programs.  It is misleading because it does not take into account that the political 
fate of public social provision is inextricably linked to these institutions and programs 
of private social provision, and vice versa.   
Even the most cursory look at social spending data gives a good idea of why it 
is so important to examine both public and private sides of social provision, 
particularly in studying the United States.  The top chart in Figure 1.1 gives a 
comparison of public welfare spending as a percent of GDP across twelve developed 
nations.  We notice that the United States significantly lags its counterparts in Europe, 
North America and Australia.  If we compare total – both public and private – 
spending on social welfare, we see that the United States is one of a group of states, 
along with Australia, Canada and United Kingdom, which have liberal welfare 
regimes.  Looking at the bottom chart, we see that the crucial distinction between the 
United States and the rest of the group is the portion of social spending which is 
provided by the private sector.  In 1997, 36% of total social spending originated in the 
private sector and this proportion has probably increased in recent years.  Even 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Other notable works in this vein were: Neil Gilbert and Barbara Gilbert, The Enabling State: Modern 
Welfare Capitalism in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Steven A. Sass, The Promise 
of Private Pensions: The First Hundred Years (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); 
Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw, and Philip L. Harvey, America’s Misunderstood Welfare State: 
Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Michael Katz, The Price of 
Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State (New York: Henry Holt, 2001). 
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Figure 1.1. Comparative Levels and Sources of Welfare Spending, 1997.  Source: 
Calculated from Willem Adema, “Net Social Expenditure,” 2nd Edition, Labour 
Market and Social Policy – Occasional Papers No. 52 (Paris: OECD, 2001), p. 13. 
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compared to other heavy private spenders – like Canada and Australia – the United 
States looks markedly different. 
Looking at health care expenditures only in Figure 1.2, we can see once again 
how important it is to look at both public and private social provision.  In terms of 
public expenditure alone, the United States seems to be spending almost as much as 
Italy, Japan, Australia, and Canada.  This is actually somewhat surprising given that 
the United States, unlike these other nations, does not possess a universal public health 
care system.  In terms of total spending, the picture is even more interesting since 
America comes out a clear leader.  This certainly helps explain why the United States 
is the world leader in medicine and medical technology, although not why such heavy 
expenditure fails to secure health care benefits for all groups in society, comparable to 
more equitable delivery in other nations.  Again, the most revealing picture emerges 
when we look at the relative shares of public and private health care spending.  Here 
too, the United States has no peers.  More health care spending is financed privately 
than publicly. 
For most of American history, medicine and health care have been 
predominantly provided by households, private medical practitioners, and voluntary 
hospitals, with local and state governments maintaining supplemental institutions for 
the most destitute and least desirable patients.  In the early twentieth century, 
American medicine has been reorganized around academic medical centers by a 
largely private coalition of corporate philanthropists and professional elites, while 
public health care has been tightly circumscribed within a limited sphere of influence.  
By the end of World War II, the drive for public health insurance has been largely 
deflected by the rapid spread of voluntary, employment-based coverage.  Despite 
enormous and rapidly growing commitments of public resources to biomedical 
research, hospital construction, and other health care needs after WWII, the direct 
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Figure 1.2. Comparative Levels and Sources of Welfare Spending, 2000.  Source: 
Calculated from OECD Health Data 2004, 1st Edition (Paris: OECD, 2004). 
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public role in health care peaked with the creation of Medicare and Medicaid 
programs in the 1960s.   
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, most Americans remain covered 
by private, employment-based insurance, most health care production remains in the 
hands of private institutions and businesses, and the number of people un- and under-
insured is growing.  In sum, the United States has not succeeded in enlarging the 
sphere of public interest within the health care sector since the 1960s.  It is thus not 
surprising that the history of health care policy can be read as one of repeated failure 
to extend coverage to the most vulnerable.  In fact, most recent trends point toward 
reprivatization and even recommercialization of medicine and health care.  On the 
private side, however, there has been no lack of creative innovation in which most 
health care policy has been laid down in and by the private sphere.  The predominantly 
private character of American health care system helps explain why, with few notable 
exceptions, the study of health care has been relegated to disciplines – sociology, 
history, etc. – more comfortable with studying power relations outside of the public 
sphere.   
Political scientists nevertheless ignore the private side of health care politics at 
their own peril because, according to their own prevailing theories, we may be well be 
stuck with this predominantly private system for a long time to come.  In addition to 
the sheer size of the private side of American health care system, there are several 
other reasons why it should be closely studied.  First, American health care in the last 
three decades has been characterized by a notable movement toward 
recommercialization and a deeper privatization of institutional structures and services.  
Second, this movement has coincided with a ‘conservative resurgence’ in the 
American political arena and ‘the turn against government’ in the broader cultural 
  8 
sphere.5  Lastly, the ensemble of private health care institutions which have flourished 
in this country are the product of classic processes of path dependence, policy 
feedback, and critical juncture and are thus theoretically quite interesting.  All three 
characteristics have been articulated in recent political science scholarship. 
Figure 1.3 classifies the scholarship on social provision in accordance with two 
criteria: (1) whether its primary focus is on public or private sphere of welfare 
provision and (2) whether it primarily studies welfare programs and policies or 
institutions that formulate and carry out these programs and policies.  In political 
science, most of the research is concentrated on the public sphere (the darker shaded 
areas) with a small but growing minority of studies concerned with policies and 
programs in the private sphere (the lighter shaded area).   
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Figure 1.3. Neglected Field of Political Science Scholarship on Welfare Provision. 
 
                                                 
 
5
 Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Health Care Reform and the Turn Against Government (New York: 
W.W. Norton: 1996). 
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Few if any studies are centrally concerned with private institutions involved in welfare 
provision (the unshaded area in Figure 1.3).  Studies with this focus are predominantly 
conducted by the scholars in other social science disciplines, notably history and 
sociology.  While exploring the roots of this ‘division of labor’ is beyond the scope of 
this investigation, its consequences can be easily envisaged.  Bracketing off private 
institutions is a source of bias.  Private institutions – in the economy and in the civil 
society – are important and enduring parts of the American polity, no less important 
than the institutions of government.  It is the polity – in this broader definition – and 
not simply government which is a proper subject of analysis for political science.  
Neglecting to study private institutions involved in any type of political processes 
excludes distinctive actors, systems, and dynamics imminent in the private sphere that 
are important contributors to public policy decisions.  Among these are legal 
frameworks, economic realities, and cultural practices that are fundamentally 
determinative in our social world.6   
When political scientists have turned their (albeit limited) attention to private 
health care institutions, they have failed to deeply explore the elaboration and change 
in the policy positions of these institutions, to note dissent and conflict within their 
ranks beyond the most basic structural cleavages, and to report efforts to ‘engage’ 
these institutions or their subgroups in policy dialogue.7  Even though observers have 
frequently attested to the head-spinning pace of structural change in the arena of health 
care politics, in the final analysis, few scholars evinced real interest in the positions of 
these private players.  As Theda Skocpol puzzlingly admitted in her fascinating 
                                                 
 
6
 This set of assumptions is generally shared by the field of political economy.  See, for example, James 
A. Caporaso and David P. Levine, Theories of Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
7
 See, for example, Jacob Hacker’s treatment of private health care interests in The Divided Health Care 
State, Chapter 5. 
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account of the Clinton administration’s attempt at health care reform, “[a]s [she saw] 
it, people mostly acted as one would expect, given their institutional locations, the 
political resources they had at their disposal (or not), and their ideas as one can see 
them in contemporaneous writings.”8  In general, the interests and politics of private 
health care institutions are more assumed than studied and few scholars have deeply 
analyzed the positions and actions these institutions have taken in particular political 
struggles.  In fact, however, we should be surprised with respect to the positions taken 
by the private sector actors in the most recent attempt at national insurance.  And we 
should certainly be amazed at the endogenous developments in the private health care 
sector in the past two decades.  And we would be, had we studied them. 
Dissatisfaction with prior studies of private health care politics led me to focus 
my project on clarifying the structures and dynamics of politics and policy-making 
within private medical institutions.  An extended list of scholarship – drawn from 
several disciplines of social science – has helped me generate a useful list of 
suppositions, hypotheses, and analytical frameworks with which to approach an 
otherwise seemingly random stream of archival data.  Paul Starr’s and Kenneth 
Ludmerer’s magisterial histories of American medicine and medical education are 
indispensable starting points for any research concerned with medicine and health 
care.9  In history, the works of Richard Brown, George Rosen, Charles Rosenberg and 
Rosemary Stevens have been tremendously helpful in suggesting a multi-faceted, 
                                                 
 
8
 Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Health Care Reform and the Turn Against Government (New York, 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. xiii. 
9
 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of A Sovereign Profession and 
The Making of A Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Kenneth M. Ludmerer, Learning to 
Heal: The Development of American Medical Education (New York: Basic Books, 1985) and Time to 
Heal: American Medical Education from the Turn of the Century to the Era of Managed Care (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
  11 
institutionally-grounded approach to stratification in health care settings.10  In 
sociology, the brilliant early study by Magali Sarfatti Larson served as an inspiring 
example of applying classical approaches to the problems of modern professional 
organizations.11  In political science, the works by Theodore Marmor, Theda Skocpol, 
Jacob Hacker, Lawrence Jacobs, James Morone, and Jill Quadagno provided much 
needed reassurance that health care politics is growing as a subject of our discipline’s 
attention.12  A host of excellent works focused on the large issues of public health 
provided invaluable reminders of what is at stake.13   
                                                 
 
10
 Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1979); George Rosen, The Structure of American Medical 
Practice, 1875-1941 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Charles E. Rosenberg, The 
Care of Strangers: The Rise of America’s Hospital System (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Rosemary 
Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).  
11
 Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977).  
12
 Theodore Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 2nd ed. (Aldine de Gruyter, 2000), Understanding 
Health Care Reform (Yale University Press, 1994) and Political Analysis and American Medical Care: 
Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton’s Health Security 
Effort and the Turn Against Government in U.S. Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996); Jacob S. 
Hacker, The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton’s Plan for Health Security (Princeton 
University Press, 1997), “Dismantling the Health Care State? Political Institutions, Public Policies, and 
the Comparative Politics of Health Reform,” British Journal of Political Science 34 (October 2004): 
693-724; James A. Morone and Lawrence R. Jacobs, eds., Healthy, Wealthy, & Fair: Health Care and 
the Good Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Health of 
Nations: Public Opinion and the Making of American and British Health Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993); Jill Quadagno, One Nation, Uninsured: Why the U.S. Has No National Health 
Insurance (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
13
 Vicente Navarro, The Political Economy of Social Inequalities: Consequences for Health and Quality 
of Life (Amityville, NY: Baywood, 2002); Howard D. Waitzkin, The Second Sickness: Contradictions 
of Capitalist Health Care (New York: Free Press, 1983); Harry F. Downing, City Hospitals: The 
Undercare of the Underprivileged (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); D. Coburn, 
“Income Inequality, Social Cohesion and the Health Status of Populations: the Role of Neoliberalism,” 
Social Science and Medicine 51 (2000), pp. 135-146;  H. Graham, “Building an Inter-Disciplinary 
Science of Health Inequalities: The Example of Life Course Research,” Social Science and Medicine 55 
(2002) pp. 2005-2016;  M. Marmot, “Social Inequalities in Mortality” in Class and Health: Research 
and Longitudinal Data, ed. R. G. Wilkinson (London: Tavistock, 1986); G. Pappas, S. Queen, W. 
Hadden, G. Fisher, “The Increasing Disparity in Mortality Between Socioeconomic Groups in the 
United States, 1960 and 1986,” New England Journal of Medicine 329 (1993), pp. 103-109;  J. Hadley, 
Sicker and Poorer: Health Insurance, Health, and the Consequences for Work, Income, and Education 
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Aiming at micro- and meso-levels of the political struggle I chose to undertake 
a historical-interpretive case study of one of the oldest and largest medical centers in 
the nation. 
Topic and Question 
This dissertation is concerned with a category of health care institutions which 
political scientists have overlooked both as a class and a genus: private and voluntary 
institutions of health care provision.  Although those who have become aware of the 
singular extent and importance of our private welfare system have repeatedly called 
for closer study of these institutions, the response has been rather tepid.  My own 
approach harks back to the classical definition of politics proposed by Harold Lasswell 
as “who gets what, when, and how,” a definition which emerged before decades of 
narrowing focus on the formal political sphere and which is singularly fitting in 
government-weary American society.  By this definition, private and voluntary 
institutions have played a tremendously important and unmistakably political role in 
the shaping of our health care system.  From the powerful medical profession to 
university medical centers, from Blue Cross to HMOs, private institutions and 
programs have been the most extensive and dynamic elements of our health care 
system.  Their impact and consequences have been tremendous, defining the character 
of health care services, products, and programs for most Americans up to and 
including this very day.   
This study focuses on the category of mostly private institutions which have 
been practically and symbolically central to modern American health care: academic 
medical centers.  Academic medical centers (AMCs) is a typical name born by those 
institutions uniting university-affiliated medical schools with teaching hospitals.  As 
an institutional form, academic medical centers emerged during the early decades of 
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the twentieth-century and have been practically synonymous with modern American 
medicine.  In the words of historian Kenneth Ludmerer,  
No factor has been more important to the achievements of medical practice in 
the United States than the country’s medical schools and teaching hospitals (or 
academic health centers, as the joint institutions are typically called.)  Their 
importance lay in the education of the nation’s doctors, generation of new 
medical knowledge, introduction and evaluation of innovative clinical 
practices, and provision of the most sophisticated medical care available.14 
From the perspective of political science, these institutions may well be even more 
important than Ludmerer believes.  Earlier in the twentieth century, academic medical 
centers were at the center of the struggle to define the ways in which modern 
American medicine would be funded and organized.15  After the Second World War, 
these institutions became the main parties of the so-called science contract which 
marked the emergence of government as the main financing source of biomedical 
research.16  Throughout the past century, medical centers have been among the ‘main 
engines’ in the transformation of institutional organization of labor in medicine and 
health care.  During the 1960s and 70s, these institutions were the epicenters of 
struggles to unionize health care workers and efforts to solve the urban health care 
crisis.  At the dawn of the twenty-first century, academic medical centers are the 
weary survivors of the new stringency in both public and private financing and 
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perhaps, as some fear, (albeit half-hearted) participants in medicine’s 
recommercialization.17 
Historical and sociological studies of academic medical centers and related 
institutions suggest that these organizations have been home to a variety of both 
progressive and conservative agendas and of varying orientations toward pro-active 
and collective management of health care economy.  Yet existing explanations of the 
structure and dynamics of their politics inadequately account for the degree of 
diversity and conflict within them.  For example, a long-standing analytical 
perspective emphasizing professional sovereignty has lost its tremendous force in light 
of the spectacular reversals of fortune in the organizational cohesion and political 
power of the medical profession and provider institutions in the face of the managed 
care revolution.  Previous narratives of the rise and decline of the medical centers’ 
public character also strained credulity with respect to their benevolence.  Studies 
emphasizing the uniqueness of the voluntary non-profit form have not examined the 
durability of this quality in the face of the overall shift toward more corporate and 
market-based approaches. 
Method and Cases  
The historical part of my investigation employs a case study method.  Used in 
many classic and contemporary studies in political science, this method has recently 
received systematic methodological clarification which allows us to specify more 
rigorously some features of this research design.18  Following John Gerring, I define 
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case study as an intensive investigation of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of similar units.19  Contrary to common misconception, a 
case study is not an instance of an N=1 research design because such design 
constitutes a logical impossibility.  No logical inferences whatsoever can be drawn 
from an observation of a single phenomenon at a single point in time.  At the very 
least, case studies observe a single phenomenon over time.  More commonly, a case 
study uses one of three research designs: (1) examining variation in a single unit over 
time; (2) breaking down the primary unit into subunits and subjecting them to 
synchronic covariational analysis [synchronic within-unit variance] or (3) studying 
subunits both synchronically in time and across time [synchronic and diachronic 
within-unit variance].20 
The most common variety of case study analysis – a combination of temporal 
and within-unit variation – is a research design employed in my dissertation.  This 
type of investigation involves a change in level of analysis – as cases are drawn from 
phenomena within the primary unit – and thus requires some clarification.  The 
primary unit of my analysis is the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center (CPMC).  
The study of this single unit is undertaken with the view to understanding a broader 
class of units, i.e. all American private medical centers.21  The research design 
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involves “observation” and comparison of five within-unit cases, defined as historical 
instances of intense political struggle in which the CPMC was centrally involved, and 
compares them with each other.22  Furthermore, each of the five cases consists of 
multiple observations of the configuration and dynamic of the political struggle as it 
unfolded over time. 
As is often the case, my choice of case was dictated by reasons both scholarly 
and personal.  In retrospect, the choice of Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center 
could not have been more fortuitous.  The first institution of its kind in the nation, 
CPMC was centrally involved in some of the crucial struggles which shaped American 
academic medicine and its institutional policies have influenced the entire field of its 
sister institutions.  The Center’s location amidst America’s premier metropolis has 
placed it at the forefront of dealing with a host of decisive social crises of the past 
century, including immigration, discrimination, growing economic inequality and 
urban decay.  From amid the many interesting instances of institutional politics and 
policy-making, I chose five broadly relevant struggles, drawn from different periods of 
the Center’s history and bearing on different aspects of institutional structure.   
My first case, the subject of Chapter 3, focuses on one of the foundational 
moments in modern American medicine.  At issue was whether all of the medical 
school faculty – including those in clinical departments – should be required to hold 
‘full-time’ appointments, i.e. to forego all private practice and to devote all their time 
to research, teaching, and professional services in the teaching hospitals.  Although 
nominally confined to medical schools and their affiliated hospitals, the issue had 
profound consequences for the overall organization of health care provision in 
America.  One of the pivotal episodes in the struggle over the ‘full-time’ requirement 
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took place at Columbia-Presbyterian between 1910 and 1925 and nearly derailed the 
building of the nation’s first Medical Center.  The outcome of this conflict was path-
setting in at least two ways.  First, it set the policy for the entire field of academic 
medicine in the United States and, secondly, it had enormous implications for the 
course of future development of American medical centers and medicine as a whole. 
My second case, presented in Chapter 4, focuses on construction of the 
Medical Center and the first two decades of its institutional development.  Two of the 
most visible conflicts and compromises of the construction process concerned the 
outpatient department and the hospital accommodations for the so-called ‘semi-
private’ patients.  Their outcomes underscored how deeply the professional and 
organizational structure of academic medicine was implicated in the creation of 
differentiated patient services.  During the first two decades of its existence, the Center 
added several specialized hospitals to its site, while affiliating with a dozen other 
regional institutions.  Its relationship with public institutions was especially 
noteworthy, reflecting both familiar and changing division of labor in American 
medicine.  The pattern of institutional structure and relationships which emerged 
during this period was deeply informed by class, race and other salient social divisions 
among patients, as well as occupational and organizational hierarchies within the 
medical profession. 
My third case, presented in Chapter 5, reconstructs nearly a century of debates 
and developments surrounding the admission of women, racial minorities and 
members of ethno-religious and immigrant groups, viewed in the broader context of 
the Center’s employment structure and semi-professional training.  Analyzing the 
function of educating and employing physicians in terms of the reproduction of a 
particular segment of the professional middle class, I show that academic medical 
centers played an active role in constructing a class system that was simultaneously 
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divided by gender, race, and ethno-religious identity.  Comparing and contrasting the 
substantially different methods of discrimination practiced against women, African-
Americans, and Jewish and Catholic applicants, I emphasize both comprehensive and 
complex structures of inequality, in which exclusion is imposed by different 
institutions with regard to different groups.  Even when nominally included, the 
marginalized groups are relegated to the ‘class of their own.’ 
Chapter 6 presents my fourth case of institutional politics and policymaking.  
During the 1960s and early 1970s, New York City was the epicenter of a drive to 
unionize non-professional health care workers, a political struggle with far-reaching 
consequences for the nonprofit sector as a whole.  Although the conflict prompted a 
series of governmental interventions, the crucial battles took place at the level of 
individual institutions and their organized opponents.  As a result, the structure and 
politics of particular institutions played a significant role in shaping the course and 
outcome of the struggle.  Divergent dynamics involved in the unionization of non-
professional and semi-professional workers have been frequently noted in the analysis 
of this period, yet the differences within these groups were just as salient as those 
between them.  Some factors, which are usually considered unitary, had different and 
even contradictory effects in different contexts.  Gender, for instance, was one such 
multi-dimensional factor in the unionization struggle at Columbia-Presbyterian.  
Cleavages between the participants were not prefigured in the organizational and 
social structure of the Center, but were constructed in the process of struggle by the 
rhetorical and practical strategies of the rival organizations. 
My final case, presented in Chapter 7, focuses on the period between the early 
1960s and the mid-1970s, during which a cluster of issues under the rubric of 
‘community health planning’ dominated both public policy and private efforts to solve 
a health care crisis in the lower-class, minority neighborhoods.  Like the larger 
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movement, Columbia’s community health planning initiative was both short-lived and 
largely unsuccessful, even on its own terms.  I show that the fragmented, hierarchical, 
and insular structure of the Medical Center was largely responsible for the initiative’s 
failure.  Although limited and ultimately unsuccessful, the initiative’s engagement 
with community organizations and other hospitals, as well as its attempt at internal 
cross-departmental cooperation, point toward those factors which might potentially 
augment reflexive, socially-conscious institution-building.   
In all five cases, the issues involved in the Columbia-Presbyterian case also 
shaped policy and politics in many other medical centers and other health care 
institutions.  The origins and overall outcomes of these struggles are largely consistent 
with other broadly accepted historical accounts but the novel understanding of 
interests and divisions suggested by my work offers a new interpretation of their 
structural dynamics and political significance. 
Research Sources 
The primary research sources for my dissertation are held in the Archives and 
Special Collections of the Health Sciences Division of the Columbia University 
located in the Augustus C. Long Health Sciences Library, Columbia University, 701 
W. 168th Street, New York, NY.  As currently constituted, the Archives serve as the 
repository for the institutional records of Columbia University’s Health Sciences 
Division that are permanently retained because of their historical, legal, or evidential 
value.  The repository contains approximately 1,000 cubic feet of archival records 
spanning the period from 1791 to the present.  Although the collection includes 
materials from all four health science schools, records from the College of Physicians 
and Surgeons, Columbia University’s medical school, predominate.  While the 
repository does not serve as an official archive for Presbyterian Hospital (1868-1997, 
now part of New York-Presbyterian Hospital), the collection includes many 
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documents relating to that institution because of the close relationship between 
Columbia and Presbyterian, beginning with the creation of the Columbia-Presbyterian 
Medical Center in 1911.  The largest group of records, and the one most important for 
my research, comes from the Office of the Vice President for Health Sciences, 
containing 598 cubic feet of material and dating from the 1880s into the late 20th 
century.  Because the Office has oversight over all health sciences education at 
Columbia, its records are unusually comprehensive, documenting a wide range of 
issues pertaining to all health science schools, centers and institutes, as well as their 
clinical affiliates.  Most records are closed to outside researchers for twenty-five years, 
while a small portion of documents – notably the minutes of the Board – are sealed for 
seventy-five years. 
Several books pertaining to the history of Columbia-Presbyterian Medical 
Center and its member institutions were indispensably useful.  A volume written by 
the long-time member of the clinical staff, Dr. Albert R. Lamb, The Presbyterian 
Hospital and the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, 1868-1943 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1955) still remains the most comprehensive history of the 
institution.  An institutional monograph written by the long-time Dean of the medical 
school helped reconstruct the institution’s history through the late 1950s.23  Harold 
Speert’s The Sloane Hospital Chronicle: A History of the Department of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center (Philadelphia: F.A. 
Davis Company, 1963) usefully recounts the early history of Columbia Medical 
School.  Two early histories of Columbia-Presbyterian’s Schools of Nursing authored 
by its third director, Ms. Eleanor Lee, are essential sources on nursing education and 
hospital nursing, while a more recent history commissioned for the centennial of the 
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school and written by an outside author, Gary Goldberger, added a welcome critical 
perspective.24  Horace Coon’s Columbia: Colossus on the Hudson – a mid-century 
history of the University as a whole – provided a synoptic view of some of the broad 
institutional developments, including the politics of women’s admission to the various 
divisions of the University.25  A personal memoir by Nicholas Murray Butler, one of 
Columbia University’s most influential leaders, covers similar ground.26  General 
histories of American medicine and medical education which have informed my 
broader understanding and helped me formulate specific research problems are too 
numerous to mention here but are referenced where appropriate in my footnotes. 
Theoretical Framework 
While calls for greater attention to the private institutions of social provision 
have been made, the recent political science literature has not, by and large, delved 
very deeply into the structure and dynamics of politics that take place within these 
institutions.  More significantly, analytical tools for the study of these organizations 
remain inadequate, especially with respect to the structures of social division and 
conflict permeating their institutional spaces.   
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Both historical and sociological studies of American health care suggest that 
private, non-profit institutions of health care constitute elaborate systems of social 
division.  At the very least, academic medical centers, which typically comprise 
university-affiliated schools of health sciences and their clinical affiliates, encapsulate 
the following fields of organizational complexity: (1) an unequal division of 
professional and academic work; (2) fragmented professional and non-professional 
hierarchies; (3) discriminatory admission to the study in health sciences and 
professions; (4) wide variation in access to health care services and patient care 
quality; and (5) mixed systems of professional, bureaucratic, elite, and community 
governance.  These systems of institutionalized organizational division are thoroughly 
political, in that they determine who gets what, when, and how within the economies 
of health care constituted by academic medical centers.  More importantly, these 
systems compose institutional frameworks, within which the processes of struggle and 
change unfold.  Understanding both these structures and the struggles which they 
engender is a crucial task if we are to stay abreast of change within our privatized 
system of health care. 
The historical part of my project involved constructing – from archival and 
secondary sources – five episodes of political struggle involving the structures of 
institutional organization outlined above.  The theoretical aim of this undertaking was 
to elicit a common theoretical conceptualization of the processes which were involved 
in these struggles.  My question was primarily one of conceptual ‘vision.’  What do I 
see?  Who is acting?  How are the lines of conflict being drawn?  What differences 
and divisions are being constructed?  One early conclusion was that the structure of 
politics in the academic medical centers was not adequately explained by existing 
theories.  From the perspective of stratification theory (which emphasizes class, status, 
and ascriptive divisions), the groups which I saw acting were but fractions of primary 
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units, (i.e., class fractions, sub-groups within occupations, and groups emerging at the 
intersection of race, gender, class and other dimensions).  From the point of view of 
the organizational analysis (which emphasizes bureaucratic and institutional categories 
of structuration), what I saw most often were the socially differentiated sub-groups of 
bureaucratic and occupational units, as well as groups and interests emerging at the 
intersection of institutional boundaries.27 
My focus on a single organizational unit is well suited to the generation of a 
broad theory because case studies enjoy a natural advantage in research of an 
exploratory nature.28  In a typical fashion, my entry into this case study began with 
sifting through piles of seemingly random and unrelated data, the consideration of 
competing analytical perspectives, and even basic redefinition of the problem I faced.  
Yet, as Gerring so aptly puts it,  
[i]t is the very fuzziness of case studies that grant them a strong advantage in 
research at exploratory stages, for the single-unit study allows one to test a 
multitude of hypotheses in a rough-and-ready way.  The covariational 
relationships discovered among different elements of a single unit have a prima 
facie causal connection: they are all at the scene of the crime.  This is 
revelatory when one is at an early stage of analysis, for there is no identifiable 
suspect and the crime itself may be difficult to discern.29 
It is for this reason that case studies are commonly understood as ‘heuristic studies’ 
and ‘theory-building’ exercises.30  The painstaking single-case archival research 
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presented an ideal way to rethink the categories of difference which structure the intra-
organizational struggles within the health care field. 
The case study format is well fitted to the descriptive and categorizing 
inference which is a large part of the analytical work.  In social sciences, descriptive 
propositions are held together by the logic imminent in our language, including both 
ordinary and technical terms, their definitions, and their relations to other terms.  
Language, in this sense, provides a method that allows for consistent interpretations of 
the phenomenal world.  To describe is also to categorize, the latter involving either re-
creating or modifying the linguistic devices with which we conceptualize the world.31 
Both a realization of the need for a new theoretical framework and its 
articulation resulted from a close engagement with the particular facts of my case.  My 
research leads me to conclude that the primary lines of conflict and contestation 
systematically combined the following five dimensions of intra-organizational 
division: (1) occupational [location within the occupational division of labor]; (2) 
organizational [both as organization membership and as location within 
organizations]; (3) social class; (4) gender; and (5) race, including racial, ethnic, and 
ethno-religious divisions.  While these categories are not new, the social groupings 
which emerge at the intersection of these five divisions are only beginning to be 
recognized in the analytical vocabulary of social sciences.32   
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The conceptual framework developed in this dissertation builds on two 
theoretical approaches: the neo-Durkheimian theory of micro-classes and the theory of 
intersectionality.33  Advanced by David Grusky and his collaborators, the neo-
Durkheimian approach proceeds from the recognition that “scholars have over-
invested in the search for aggregate classes and under-invested in the study of more 
deeply institutionalized groupings at the disaggregate level.”34  It suggests that “class 
analysis should be ratcheted down to an analytic level where real social groupings (i.e. 
‘occupations’) form.”35  In general terms, the neo-Durkheimian approach requires that 
we disaggregate conventional ‘large-class’ categories and look instead for class-like 
effects at the micro-level of local organization.  The main rationale for dissaggregation 
is that “occupational categories are deeply embedded in the institutions of advanced 
industrialism, whereas aggregate classes are highly abstract constructs that have 
currency among academics more than workers, employers, or the state.”36  More 
realistic analyses of contemporary societies require “new micro-class models that go 
beyond big-class nominalism and exploit such local social organization as can be 
found.”37 
While the neo-Durkheimian approach presents a powerful case for 
disaggregation and attention to local organizational structures, its singular focus on 
occupations and occupational associations is not unproblematic.  Both particular 
occupations and the larger system of occupations are significantly structured and 
divided by multiple dimensions of difference, including race, gender, class, as well as 
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by the organizational structures of industries, employment, and education.  In my 
view, the better way to arrive at a disaggregated conception of social stratification is 
suggested by the theory of intersectionality.  Its central contention is that social 
inequality, as well as the socially constructed divisions upon which it builds, should 
not be perceived as a monolithic construct with one overriding logic.  Rather, they 
should be viewed as multidimensional and varied terrain constantly adapting to 
different contexts.  This terrain is structured by race, class, gender, sexuality, 
nationality, religion and other systems of social division which condition the life 
chances within both the empowered and disempowered groups.  Within this 
framework each hierarchical system is conceived as both partly autonomous and 
intersecting with others.  Within this structure of complex inequality, the manner and 
degree to which each dimension of difference shapes concrete social positions is 
highly varied.  Depending on historical, cultural, and institutional context, the 
intersecting systems may be organized and deployed in different ways and with 
different effects. 
For the purpose of the present project – which is concerned with the 
institutional politics of the academic medical centers – five dimensions of inequality 
are of central importance.  They are: (1) class, (2) gender, (3) race, (4) occupational 
divisions, and (5) organizational hierarchies.  This is not an exhaustive list of 
differences structuring the many areas in the health care field but the minimal set of 
specifications necessary to understand the historical material investigated in this 
dissertation.  My research shows that organizational politics were frequently 
articulated and structured in terms of divisions, interests, and strategies lying at the 
intersection of class, gender, racial, occupational and organizational dimensions of 
difference.  While frequently contingent and malleable, groups and interests that 
emerged at these intersections were not only quite meaningful to the actors, but also 
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grounded in institutions and organizations which cross-cut the field of academic 
medicine. 
In this dissertation I will use the term ‘institutional class positions’ to denote 
those varied and contingent positions emerging at the intersection of these five 
dimensions.  Derived from two distinct theoretical frameworks, the matrix of 
‘institutional class positions’ can be conceived as a field of conceptual vision which 
emerges when two analytical planes are superimposed on one another.  At one level, 
we have an organizational plane of stratification, ranging from forms which are 
institution-specific to those which characterize all institutions of academic medicine to 
the fundamental organizational principles of modern organizations and labor markets.   
On the other level, there is a social plane which encompasses class-based, gendered, 
racialized, etc. patterns of differentiation.  Here too, we find institution-specific 
arrangements, industry-wide patterns, and fundamental structures stretching across 
entire spheres of social and economic life.  When these two broad structuring planes 
are superimposed upon one another, we get a matrix of cells, or ‘institutional class 
positions,’ most of which are quite small and specific.  Table 1.1 gives several 
examples of concrete institutional class positions explored in my dissertation. 
Several points must be made about ‘institutional class positions’ at the outset.  
While organizational and social planes of structuration can be distinguished 
analytically, numerous studies of gender, race and class in organizational hierarchies 
and occupational division of labor have shown that in practice the two are deeply 
intertwined.  In a society stratified by class, gender, and race, organization of 
institutions and occupations is a gendered, racialized, and classed process.  That is 
why, the seemingly incongruent levels of analysis – the macro-level divisions of class, 
race, and gender versus the micro-level institutionally specific organizational and 
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occupational hierarchies – must be brought together into a single analytical 
framework. 
 
 
Table 1.1. Institutional Class Positions – Examples and Sources 
 
Example of an 
institutional class 
position 
Context in which this position 
was politically prominent 
Main positioning 
factors 
Discussed 
in chapter 
Clinical Faculty, 1910s Resisting and defeating the ‘full-
time’ requirement during the 
1910s 
Institutional, 
occupational, class, 
professional ideology 
3 
Young clinical faculty, 
1930s-1950s 
Emerged as a leading interest in 
the expansion of ‘semi-private’ 
patient facilities in the decades 
before and after WWII 
Age, class, 
occupational, 
organizational 
4 
Anesthesiologists in the 
1930s 
Formerly a nursing specialty, 
constituted a possible women’s 
professional niche, especially if 
entered from surgery 
Gender, organizational, 
occupational, class 
5 
Minority physicians, 
1910s-1970s 
Discriminatory practices in 
medical education, academic and 
clinical appointments 
Racial and ethno-
religious identity, class, 
professional 
organizations 
5 
Social workers, 1960s-
1970s 
Pioneering unionization drive at 
Presbyterian Hospital during the 
1970s 
Occupation, gender, 
race, class, professional 
organizations 
6 
Physicians in the out-
patient and emergency 
departments, 1970s 
Espoused most radical vision of 
urban health care reform, 
centered around ‘one-class care’ 
Age, class, 
occupational, 
organizational 
7 
 
While the general matrix of ‘institutional class positions’ is quite durable, 
specific ‘institutional class positions’ may be more or less transient.  The intersection 
of class, race, gender, occupation and organization structures most positions in the 
institutional terrain.  However, the practical salience and visibility of ‘institutional 
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class positions’ depend on whether they are articulated and activated by the processes 
of institutional change and conflict.   
Conclusions and Implications 
Two broad conclusions concerning American health care politics emerge from 
my work.  First, private institutions of health care provision have actively constructed 
the health care system.  They have been very important actors in the process of 
making those ‘policies’ which now characterize our regime of medicine and health 
care.  During the first half of the twentieth century, these institutions, as well as 
various other actors associated with them, played far more leading roles in shaping the 
system than did formal political actors.  In the second half of the past century, the 
power of academic medicine to shape the field of health care has declined as 
governments and corporations have increased their involvement.  Yet, this decline 
should not be seen so much as a loss of power but instead as the result of a growing 
interpenetration of different institutional players, an interpenetration that has steadily 
reduced the space for political maneuver for everyone involved.  The growing 
complexity and stalemate, therefore, have not resulted solely from the accommodating 
and incremental nature of political reform but also because of the enormous policy 
leadership of the private sector during the formative decades of the American health 
care system.  This leadership continues to this day, albeit in a more constrained form.  
If there was a simple way to sum up this thesis, it would be that private institutions are 
policy-makers, too.  Restricting the term ‘policy-maker’ to elected officials and 
executive agencies is a convention the usefulness of which has definite limits.   
Second, private institutions of health care provision have participated in the 
making of health care policy not as monolithic, autonomous institutions but as 
internally contested and externally invested organizations.  Academic medicine has 
not pursued simple or consistent policy goals throughout the century of health care 
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politics.  Instead, there has been much internal conflict about where and how academic 
medicine, as well as health care in general, should develop.  Multiple pressures and 
influences from outside of medical centers and academic medicine proper have also 
shaped the medical centers’ development.  My research suggests that this internal 
conflict and external influence is not easily comprehended with existing conceptual 
tools.  In order to see them correctly, we need to conceptualize the structures of what I 
call ‘institutional class positions,’ constructed by the twin processes of institutional 
organization and social division. 
Taken together, these findings suggest new ways of understanding the past and 
future of health care politics.  Past policies have not emerged consensually and, while 
academic medical centers remain part of a conservative, or at least cautious, provider 
coalition, it might be possible to decouple some of their internal constituencies and 
then to enlist them in more progressive health care reform.  If it is a broader coalition 
for the push for universal health insurance that we are looking for, there are a number 
of interests within academic medicine – from nurses to emergency care physicians to 
public health scholars to progressive administrators – which can be persuaded to join 
in efforts to steer our system in a more egalitarian, broadly beneficial direction.  If it is 
a more constructive, endogenous development of the non-profit medical sector we 
desire, there are flawed governance structures and underrepresented groups which can 
be engaged to make these institutions more socially-responsive.  In other words, 
whether we want to understand what has happened in health care politics or whether 
we want to do something about it, a closer look at the institutional politics of the 
private sector is a necessary first step.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CLASS POSITIONS:  
APPLYING INTERSECTIONALITY AND MICRO-CLASS APPROACH  
TO THE STUDY OF PRIVATE HEALTH CARE POLITICS 
Introduction 
It has been widely acknowledged that the study of social and political 
processes should consider multiple and intersecting dimensions of social structure.1  
Numerous studies have bolstered the argument that class, race, and gender – to name 
the most salient dimensions of inequality – are interacting “systems of domination that 
affect access to power and privileges, influence social relationships, construct 
                                                 
 
1
 Intersectionality as a conceptual approach is most directly rooted in the activism and scholarship by 
women of color.  Kimberlé Crenshaw was probably the first to employ the term itself in 
“Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” Chicago Law Forum (1989): 139-167, and 
“Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity, Politics and Violence Against Women of Color,” 
Stanford Law Review 43 (1991):1241-1299.  Some of the earliest academic works to advanced the 
general proposition of intersectionality are: Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, and Class (New York: 
Random House, 1981); Barbara Smith, ed., Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology (New York: 
Kitchen Table/Women of Color Press, 1983); Bonnie Thornton Dill, “Race, Class, and Gender: 
Prospects for an All-Inclusive Sisterhood,” Feminist Studies 9 (1983):129-50; bell hooks, Feminist 
Theory: From Margin to Center (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1984); Cherrie Moraga and Gloria 
Anzaldua, eds., This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Kitchen Table Press, 1984); Gloria Anzaldua, La Frontera/Borderlands: The New Mestizo (San 
Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987); Evelyn Nakano Glenn, “Racial Ethnic Woman’s Labor: The 
Intersection of Race, Gender and Class Oppression” in Hidden Aspects of Women’s Work, ed. Christine 
Bose et al (New York: Praeger, 1987); Deborah K. King, “Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Conscioussness: 
The Context of A Black Feminist Ideology” in Black Women in America, ed. M. R. Malson et al 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: 
Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” Feminist Review 30 (Autumn 1988), pp. 61-88; 
Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Boston: 
Beacon, 1988); Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the 
Politics of Empowerment (New York: Routledge Press, 1990). [Rose M. Brewer, “Theorizing Race, 
Class, and Gender: The New Intellectual Scholarship of Black Feminist Intellectuals and Black 
Women’s Labor” in Theorizing Black Feminisms: The Visionary Pragmatism of Black Women, ed. 
Stanley M. James and Abena P.A. Busia (New York: Routledge, 1993)].  W.E.B. DuBois, Frantz 
Fanon, Max Weber, as well as feminist theory, women’s studies, and post-structuralism more generally, 
may be considered as intellectual precursors and relations of the intersectional approach. 
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meanings, and shape people’s everyday experiences.”2  In the past, social scientists 
have often focused on a single dimension of stratification but such abstractions belied 
the multi-faceted nature of contemporary institutions, politics, and lived experiences. 
The recognition of the multidimensional and intersecting structure of modern 
sociopolitical processes has had a major impact on scholarship across the social 
sciences.  The intersectional approach gained particular currency in the study of 
institutional fields and practices, such as the legal system, the educational system, 
labor markets, and residential patterns.3  Students of health care and medicine have 
used the framework of intersectionality to study several issues, such as occupational 
structures and health disparities.4   
                                                 
 
2
 Esther Ngan-Ling Chow, “Introduction: Transforming Knowledgment: Race, Class, and Gender” in 
Race, Class, and Gender: Common Bonds, Different Voices (New York: Sage, 1996), p. xix.  Gender, 
race and class are most frequently correlated dimensions but, depending on a particular study, other 
factors – such as sexuality, ethnicity, region, religion, nativity, citizenship, disability, and age – have 
been included as well. 
3
 Joanne Belknap, The Invisible Woman: Gender, Crime, and Justice (Wadsworth Publishing, 2006); 
Carrie Yang Costello, Professional Identity Crisis: Race, Class, Gender, and Success at Professional 
Schools (Vanderbilt University Press: 2006); Richard Rothstein, Class and Schools: Using Social, 
Economic, and Educational Reform to Close the Black-White Achievement Gap (Economic Policy 
Institute, 2004); Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn, Miriam DeLone, The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity, 
and Crime in America (Wadsworth Publishing, 2003); Ann Arnett Ferguson, Bad Boys: Public Schools 
in the Making of Black Masculinity (University of Michigan Press, August 28, 2001); Gregg Barak, 
Jeanne Flavin, and Paul Leighton, Class, Race, Gender, and Crime: Social Realities of Justice in 
America (Roxbury Publishing Company: 2001); Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American 
Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Harvard University Press, 1998); Teresa 
Amott and Julie Matthaei, Race, Gender and Work: A Multi-Cultural Economic History of Women in 
the United States (South End Press, 1996). 
4
 Amy J. Schulz and Leith Mullings, eds., Gender, Race, Class and Health: Intersectional Approaches 
(Jossey-Bass, 2005); Nancy Krieger, ed., Embodying Inequality: Epidemiologic Perspectives (Baywood 
Publishing Company, 2004); Julian Tanner and Rhonda Cockerill, “Ideology and the Middle Class: The 
Influence of Work and Gender in the Health Care Professions,” Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
27, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 481-504; Tracey L. Adams, “Combining Gender, Class, and Race: 
Structuring Relations in the Ontario Dental Profession,” Gender and Society, Vol. 12, No. 5 (October 
1998), pp. 578-597; Shula Marks, “Divided Sisterhood: Race, Class, and Gender in the South African 
Nursing Profession,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1996), pp. 
386-388; Madonna Harrington Meyer, “Gender, Race, and the Distribution of Social Assistance: 
Medicaid Use among the Frail Elderly,” Gender and Society, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 8-28; 
Nona Y. Glazer, “‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place’: Women’s Professional Organizations in Nursing 
and Class, Racial, and Ethnic Inequalities,” Gender and Society, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 
351-372. 
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In this dissertation I apply the intersectional approach to analyze political 
processes within private health care organizations.  In doing so, I draw on the several 
important insights which have emerged from intersectional studies.  Class, race, 
gender and other categories of social division intersect to produce complex and multi-
faceted forms of identity, membership, inequality and exclusion.5  Complex inequality 
is both reflected and actively constructed in organizational and institutional 
structures.6  Groups emerging at the intersection of multiple dimensions of difference 
provide frequent bases for both political mobilization and disempowerment.7  
Divisions based in race, gender and class figure prominently as both strategic devices 
and concrete effects of politics and policy.8   
                                                 
 
5
 There is a large literature on these subjects, particularly in anthropology, sociology, history, and the 
humanities.  For intersectionality in the formation of political identities, see, for instance: Evelyn 
Nakano Glenn, Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor 
(Harvard University Press, 2002); Sonya O. Rose and Kathleen Canning, eds., Gender, Citizenships and 
Subjectivities (Blackwell Publishing, 2002); Barbara Hobson, ed., Gender and Citizenship in Transition 
(Routledge, 2000); Anthony W. Marx, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, 
South Africa (Cambridge University Press; 1998); Jennifer Hochchild, Race, Class and the Soul of the 
Nation (Princeton University Press, 1995). 
6
 See, for example, Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest inside 
the Church and Military (Princeton University Press, 1999); William M. Dugger, ed., Inequality: 
Radical Institutionalist Views on Race, Gender, Class, and Nation (Greenwood Press, 1996); Robert L. 
Nelson and William P. Bridges, Legalizing Gender Inequality: Courts, Markets and Unequal Pay for 
Women in America (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
7
 Kimberly Springer, Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations, 1968-1980 (Duke 
University Press, 2005); Benita Roth, Separate Roads to Feminism: Black, Chicana, and White 
Feminist Movements in America's Second Wave (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Sharon Kurtz, 
Workplace Justice: Organizing Multi-Identity Movements (University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Cathy 
Cohen, The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1999). 
8
 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-Century America (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005); Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: 
Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jill 
Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of 
Social Policy in United States (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1995); Gwendolyn Mink, The Wages of 
Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); 
Margaret Weir et al, eds., The Politics of Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988). 
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While enormously influential, the theory of intersectionality raises many new 
issues and questions.  The importance of gender, race, or class in determining 
individual situations and political structures may vary independently of the others.  
This variation is likely to depend on the specific topic studied, the questions posed, 
and the sociohistorical context.  That is, while gender, race and class all matter, the 
salience of one over another is an empirical question.  We must also consider the 
possibility of reinforcing yet contingent relationships between the different systems of 
stratification.  Are racialized subjects also gendered?  Is class system racialized?  Do 
women occupy separate and gendered class locations?  Always?  Sometimes?  How? 
One of the frequent criticisms leveled at the intersectional studies is the failure 
to specify and justify the particular definitions of intersecting dimensions.  Class, 
gender, and race have been and continue to be conceptualized in many different ways 
and, when we invoke any of them, it is not immediately clear how they are being 
defined.  Moreover, it cannot be assumed that these several terms can be seamlessly 
and unproblematically combined into a common conceptual framework.  After all, 
class, race, and gender have often been defined as separate and competing 
conceptualizations of social structure and politics.  Thus, defining the concepts and 
outlining their relationships with one another is an indispensable first step of 
intersectional analysis.  Depending on the subject and method of study, the key 
intersectional categories may have to be defined and related to each other in different 
ways.  
The organization of this chapter reflects the imperative to provide just such a 
conceptual foundation for an intersectional study.  I begin with the concept of class, as 
both the most contentious subject in the social sciences today and also the most under-
theorized dimension in the studies of intersectionality.  I argue that the neo-
Durkneimian concept of ‘micro-classes,’ proposed in the work of David Grusky and 
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his collaborators, is the best point of departure for a study concerned with intra-
institutional politics of complex professional organizations.  It is also, in my view, the 
most compatible with the intersectional approaches to the study of institutional and 
political processes. 
While very fruitful, the neo-Durkneimian perspective insufficiently questions 
the conflation of occupations and classes.  I argue that the effort to ‘disaggregate’ 
traditional class categories should proceed from the categories emerging at the 
intersection of occupational and class structures, rather than from occupations or 
occupational associations as such.  To the intersection of class and occupation, it is 
necessary to add a third dimension central to modern social structures: organizational 
rank or ‘organization,’ for short).  Distinguished and defined, the dimensions of class, 
occupation, and organization must ultimately be related to each other.  To do this, I 
draw on the studies of the middle class and the professions to offer a preliminary 
conceptual blueprint for my dissertation. 
In the second half of this chapter I tackle the concepts of gender and race.  
Arising as it did from the work of women of color, the concept of intersectionality has 
been particularly strong in theorizing the nexus of gender and race.  In regard to 
gender, then, I focus my attention on its relationship with the other three dimensions 
of my framework, namely, occupation, organization, and class.  The conceptualization 
of race, however, has been, if anything, too closely intertwined with, and frequently 
subordinated to, class and other structural principles.  My review of race theory 
focuses on those works which sharpen our understanding of race as an autonomous 
structuring principle.   
I conclude this chapter by recapitulating the five-dimensional analytical 
framework and propose the term ‘institutional class positions’ to designate those 
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identities, groups, and strategies that emerge at the intersection of occupation, 
organization, class, gender, and race. 
Class 
The concept of class has always been a contested idea.  In recent decades it 
came under a new round of attacks from those who believe classes have largely 
dissolved in contemporary societies and that class is no longer useful as a category of 
social and political analysis.  At the same time, many scholars have rushed to defend 
class, both as a continuing social reality and as an analytical tool.9  More interesting 
than the debate itself have been various recent efforts to rethink the concept of class 
from within the various traditions of class analysis.  An important aspect of this 
rethinking has been increasing eclecticism and hybridity of class analysis registered in 
the willingness of researchers to combine the elements of Marxist, Weberian and other 
distinct approaches.  There is also a growing recognition of the need for 
methodological pluralism within the class analytic enterprise.  An editor of a recent 
volume that brought together the advocates of neo-Marxist, neo-Weberian, neo-
Durkheimian, Bourdieuian, ‘rent-based’ and ‘post-class’ approaches concluded that 
different approaches have different strengths and that different concepts of class may 
be more or less suitable to particular analytical questions.  Thus, “[a] concept [of 
class] whose task is to help answer a question about broad historical variations in the 
social organization of inequality is likely to be defined quite differently from a concept 
                                                 
 
9
 See, for instance, Terry Nichols Clark and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Are Social Classes Dying?” 
International Sociology 6 (December 1991), pp. 397-410; Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, The Death 
of Class (London: Sage, 1996); Paul W. Kingston, The Classless Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2000); Terry Nichols Clark and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., The Breakdown of Class 
Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2001). 
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[of class] used to answer a relatively narrow questions about the subjective identity of 
individuals in contemporary society.”10 
Scholars of modern organizations and their politics have frequently noted the 
salience of class among other dimensions of structural inequality.  Conventional class 
theory, however, constructed class at a highly aggregate level that made it difficult to 
apply to the micro-politics of organizations.  The problem was especially acute in 
regard to those organizations which included sizable numbers of professions whose 
class location and character were far from clear.  For the purpose of research focused 
on the intra-institutional politics, a highly disaggregated concept of class is in order.  
The strongest case for conceptual disaggregation has been proposed by David Grusky 
and his collaborators.11  They view their approach as a neo-Durkneimian alternative to 
the ‘death of class’ thesis that points to “the persistence of class-like structuration at a 
more disaggregate level than class analysis have typically appreciated.”  Instead of 
abandoning class as an important dimension of social structuration, this approach 
insists that “the labor market is indeed organized into classes, albeit in a more detailed 
level than is conventionally allowed.”  The advantage of the resulting “micro-classes” 
is their greater realism: they are “embedded in the very fabric of society and are 
thereby meaningful not merely to social scientists but to the lay public as well.”12   
                                                 
 
10
 Erik Olin Wright, ed., Approaches to Class Analysis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 180. 
11
 David B. Grusky in collaboration with Gabriela Galescu, “Foundations of a Neo-Durkheimian Class 
Analysis” in Approaches to Class Analysis, ed. Erik Olin Wright (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); David B. Grusky and Jesper B. Sørensen, “Can Class Analysis Be Salvaged?,” 
American Journal of Sociology Vol. 103, No. 5 (1998), pp. 187-134, and “Are There Big Classes?,” in 
Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, 2nd ed., ed. David B. 
Grusky (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001); David B. Grusky and Kim A. Weeden, “Decomposition 
without Death: A Research Agenda for a New Class Analysis,” Acta Sociologica  44 (2001), pp. 203-
18; David B. Grusky, Kim A. Weeden, and Jesper B. Sørensen, “The Case for Realism in Class 
Analysis,” Political Power and Social Theory 14 (2000), pp. 291-305. 
12
 David B. Grusky with Gabriela Galescu, “Foundations of a Neo-Durkheimian Class Analysis,” pp. 
51-52. 
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Durkheim argued that occupational associations are destined to become the 
main organizational form “intercalated between the state and the individual,” 
supplanting both Marxian classes and other forms of intermediary organization.  For 
Grusky and his collaborators, this prediction has been largely borne out.  Industrial 
conflict at the macro-class level has indeed been contained, while “occupational 
groupings have emerged as the elementary building blocks of modern and postmodern 
labor markets.”13  Contemporary workers routinely represent their career aspirations in 
occupational terms, while professional and vocational schools are organized to train 
workers for occupationally defined skills, and employers construct and advertise jobs 
in terms of corresponding occupational designations.  This “occupationalization” of 
the labor market has been fueled by (1) a long-term growth in the size of the 
professional sector, (2) the rise of new quasi-professional occupations and their 
associations, (3) increasing use of licensing, certification, and similar devices, and (4) 
the strengthening of local labor unions.14   
Unlike other approaches attentive to occupations, the neo-Durkheimian 
perspective focuses on ‘detailed occupations’ and ‘occupational organizations,’ rather 
than on aggregates of occupational categories.  Pitched at this micro-level, occupations 
exhibit powerful structuring effects.   They tend to “act collectively on behalf of their 
interests, to defend their boundaries and thereby secure (partial) closure, to define 
lifestyles and consumption practices that are binding on members, and to become 
subjectively meaningful categories through which workers perceive themselves as 
well as others.”15 
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 Ibid., p. 61. 
14
 Ibid.   
15
 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
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While the shift toward a disaggregated concept of class is very promising, the 
particular conception of ‘micro-classes’ adopted from Durkheim unhelpfully conflates 
the occupational and class structures.16  On the one hand, Grusky and his co-authors 
assert that “occupations … behave precisely as class theorists have long thought 
aggregate classes should.”17  At the same time, occupational associations “crowd out 
or substitute for class formation of amore aggregate sort.”  Their rise is directly linked 
with the decline of ‘big classes’ insofar as they “undermine the unity of the working 
class” and “convince workers to regard occupational differences in remuneration 
(including those between big classes) as appropriate and acceptable.”  In fact, argue 
the authors, “ [i]f there is a class analytic theory of history in Durkheim, it is clearly 
one that emphasized the role of occupations in justifying inequality, making it 
palatable, and hence undermining the more spectacular theories of history that Marx 
and various neo-Marxians have advanced.”18  
Occupational associations are, thus, both ‘class-like’ and ‘anti-class.’  They 
both fulfill a range of functions conventionally ascribed to classes and, at the same 
time, supplant and suppress the formation of ‘large classes.’  In this analysis, 
occupational associations and class organizations are distinct and competing forms.  
‘Large classes’ may be fading as concrete historical groups, but class remains a valid 
analytical category.  In fact, it is only on the basis of the ‘traditional’ conception of 
class that Durkheim can critique occupational associations as masking and justifying 
inequality.  It is, thus, rather misleading to suggest that occupational associations 
                                                 
 
16
 The following limitations of Durkheimian theory are noted by Grusky and his collaborators: (1) 
occupational associations have not displaced all other competing associational forms; (2) occupational 
organizations have failed to emerge in some sectors; (3) there is much cross-national variation in the 
extent to which the labor market has become occupationalized.  In regard to the last point, while 
Germany and the United States fit into the Durkheimian model very well, Japan and, especially, 
Sweden, pose serious challenges to it. [Ibid., pp. 62-65.] 
17
 Ibid., p. 67. 
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 Ibid., p. 57. 
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replace classes in an analytical sense.  As proponents of the neo-Durkheimian class 
analysis admit, the occupational associations have not entirely supplanted other 
competing forms of social structuration.  In fact, they both exist in competition with 
other forms and exhibit internal tensions stemming from suppression of inequality and 
conflict within their own ranks.  In my view, the project of disaggregating class 
analysis is better positioned at the level of intersection between occupations and 
classes, rather than at the level of occupations only. 
Occupation 
The relationship between occupations and classes has long been a prominent 
question in the social sciences.  The dominant paradigm in post-war American social 
science – structural functionalism – theorized occupational stratification as a reflection 
of their functional importance resting on a broad social consensus regarding its 
legitimacy.  In this perspective, occupational differentiation supplanted both social 
classes and social conflicts arising from class division.19  Although the ‘functional-
consensual’ school often claimed Weberian roots, a different stream of Weberian 
scholarship rejected its basic presuppositions, arguing that the social organization at 
large and the occupational structure in particular were characterized by conflict rather 
than consensus and monopolization rather than functionality.20  In this view, the 
alleged moral consensus, which the consensual-functionalist scholarship gleaned from 
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 K. Davis and W. E. Moore, “Some Principles of Stratification,” American Sociological Review 10, 
pp. 242-249; P. Blau and O. D. Duncan, The American Occupational Structure (New York: John Wiley, 
1967); R. W. Hodge, P. M. Siegel and P. H. Rossi, “Occupational Prestige in the United States: 1925-
1963,” American Journal of Sociology 70 (1964), pp. 286-302; R. W. Hodge, D. J. Treiman and P. H. 
Rossi, “A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige” in Class, Status  and Power, ed. R. Bendix and 
S. M. Lipset, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1967). 
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 Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press 
1959); Michael Mann, “Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy,” American Sociological Review 35 
(1970), pp. 423-439; Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in 
Capitalist and Communist Societies (New York: Praeger, 1971) and Marxism and Class Theory: A 
Bourgeois Critique (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Anthony Giddens, The Class 
Structure of the Advanced Societies (London: Hutchison, 1973). 
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the consistent ranking of occupational prestige, indicated nothing more than a general 
awareness of occupational inequality, by no means equivalent to its endorsement.   
Despite their common rejection of the functionalist-consensual interpretation 
of occupational structure, Weberian and Marxist traditions of class analysis have 
nevertheless produced a broad range of theories relating occupation and class.  Some 
theorists have insisted on a sharp distinction between occupational and class 
structures, as divisions deriving from technical and social relations of production 
respectively.21  Other class theorists have tended toward the view of ‘occupations’ and 
‘classes’ as nearly identical categories of modern stratification.22  Neither of the two 
positions proved satisfactory.   
To equate occupations with classes is to uncritically accept the myth of 
economic and status homogeneity of occupations, a view which many professional 
organizations would like to promote.  Regardless of how one defines class position – 
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whether as life chances, combination of income, education, and wealth, or as a 
relationship to the means of production – it would be misleading to suggest that 
members of the same occupation necessarily belong to the same class.  Even in the 
case of such prestigious and selective professions as medicine and law, the differences 
in income and wealth among American physicians or lawyers point away from a 
presumptive equivalence between occupation and class position.  Occupational titles 
are not reliable indicators of capital and wealth ownership or of organizational 
position.  Equating class and occupational structures obscures relations of property 
and authority, which retain fundamental importance to the economic, political, and 
social balance of power.23  
The categorical distinction between occupations and classes cannot be 
sustained either.  During the early 20th century, the occupation of a ‘typist,’ for 
instance, had been clearly defined as a lower-middle class, white, unmarried female 
occupation.  In fact, the occupation may not have emerged at all as a separate work 
function, had not this particular social category of worker been available to fill it.24  To 
say that occupations are positions defined by the technical division of labor is 
tantamount to suggesting that some kind of system of technical rationality operates 
alongside and independently of the system of power relations.  On the contrary, most 
‘technical’ innovations in the division of labor crucially depended on the particular 
qualities of a given class structure.  For instance, occupations which emerged in 
various modern manufacturing industries, just as a system of factory labor as a whole, 
were premised on the decimation of small-holding peasantry and the rise, out of its 
ranks, of unskilled proletarian masses.  Most positions in the modern ‘technical’ 
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division of labor have been and continue to be profoundly shaped by the interests of 
the dominant class of capitalist employers.  Conversely, most occupations – whether 
through professional associations, trade unions, or both – have tried to influence their 
‘technical’ specification and organizational position in order to boost the socio-
economic standing of their members.25 
Some of the most productive work in theorizing the relationship between 
occupations and classes emerged from the studies of the professions and the middle 
class.26  Notably, mixed and eclectic approaches have become quite common in these 
areas of scholarship.27  An important step toward a non-reductive theorizing of modern 
professional-managerial class involved identification of the unique economic and 
institutional bases of its formation.  Economically productive knowledge, educational 
credentials and cultural capital more generally have been proposed as chief assets 
underwriting the social formation of the modern professional middle class, while the 
                                                 
 
25
 Althusser has succinctly expressed what I take to be an appropriate attitude of suspicion with regard 
to categorical distinction between occupation and class, arguing that “... there is no ‘technical division’ 
of labour except in the ideology of the ruling class: every ‘technical’ division, every ‘technical’ 
organization of labour, is the form and mask of a social (= class) division and organization of labour.” 
(Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)” in Mapping 
Ideology, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 1994; reprinted in translation from Louis Althusser, Essays 
on Ideology [London: Verso, 1984]), p. 137.)  This may be a bit too stark because it is not inconceivable 
that the development of technique may have some contingent degree of autonomy from principal 
structures of determination.  Nevertheless, both development and application of productive techniques 
are so closely intertwined with ‘non-technical’ interests of the powerful social actors as to make any 
clear-cut distinction quite impossible.  
26
 See, for example, Mike Savage et al, Property, Bureaucracy and Culture: Middle-Class Formation in 
Contemporary Britain (London: Routledge, 1992) and Anne Witz, Professions and Patriarchy 
(London: Routledge, 1992). 
27
 Comparing Marxist and Weberian approaches, Abercrombie and Urry noted that “[o]n the one hand, 
Marxists have been right to emphasize the increase in the degree to which professionals function for 
capital, as constitutive elements of the service class; yet on the other hand, Weberians have been correct 
to emphasize the distinctive market position of professionals which stems in part from their ability to 
regulate their particular knowledge-base.”  [Abercrombie and Urry, Capital, Labour and the New 
Middle Classes, p. 147.]  Turner argued likewise that “a satisfactory explanation of professionalization 
as an occupational strategy will come eventually to depend upon both Weberian and Marxist 
perspectives.”  [Bryan S. Turner, Medical Power and Social Knowledge (Sage, 1987) pp. 139-140.] 
  44 
modern system of higher education has been consistently identified as a central 
institutional mechanism of their appropriation and reproduction.28   
Larson’s 1977 study of professionalization developed one of the most cogent 
statements on the relationship between occupations and classes, which has been 
increasingly recognized as a crucial theoretical foundation for work in this area.29  For 
Larson, the rise of modern professions is inextricable from the larger process of 
emergence of a new system of social stratification.  Professions and professional 
ideologies arose as a part of the formation of the new, urban middle classes “whose 
identity was founded on the educational system and on their occupation in modern and 
typically bureaucratized work settings.”30  Stressing the organic connection between 
professional and middle-class identities, Larson argued that 
[i]n the Progressive Era, sectors of the intermediate class whose self-definition 
and self-esteem were increasingly based on occupation, and increasingly 
oriented toward national frames of reference, acquired something akin to class 
consciousness.  Professionalism was one expression of this consciousness.31 
At the same time, professional projects were implicated in a set of processes that went 
beyond the restructuring of the middle social strata.  Professionalization, for Larson, is 
a historical counterpart of proletarianization in a sense that, “[a]s the labor force tends 
to become totally subsumed under the formal relations of capitalist production, the real 
and the ideological privileges associated with ‘professionalism’ legitimize the class 
structure by introducing status differentials, status aspirations, and status mobility at 
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practically all levels of the occupational hierarchy.”32  Class and status interests have 
been closely intertwined in the professional projects of the new middle classes.  “The 
double nature of the professional project intertwines market and status orientations,” 
argued Larson, “and both tend toward monopoly – monopoly of opportunities for 
income in a market of services, on the one hand, and monopoly of status in an 
emerging occupational hierarchy, on the other.”  Both of these quests – for privileged 
class position and elevated social status – have found their principal institutional 
foundation in “the educational system.”33  
While stressing considerable gains in collective mobility achieved by many 
professional projects, Larson concluded that, ultimately, the modern professional 
became “a choice victim” of the ideology of its own success.  “Professionalism,” she 
stressed, “functions as a means for controlling large sectors of educated labor and for 
co-opting its elites.”  Even in a profession as powerful as medicine, Larson concluded, 
“the general measures of success and power ... tend to flow, ultimately, from outside, 
from the central power structure of society.”  The extent of material rewards and status 
honor, which professions secure for their members, often obscures substantial 
inequalities which persist within and among the professions.  For the lower rungs of 
professional workers “the individual freedom and control which professionals enjoy in 
and out of work is in part a mask: for themselves as well as for less privileged others, 
it helps to conceal collective powerlessness, subordination, and complicity.”34  
Institutional, as well as ideological, aspects of professionalism constitute a 
carefully calibrated structure of incentives and controls within and between 
occupations.  While crucial to the overall system of class relations, mechanisms of 
                                                 
 
32
 Ibid., p. 239. 
33
 Ibid., p. 79. 
34
 Ibid., pp. 225, 237, 236, 243. 
  46 
professional control and its attendant ideologies obviate the distinction between inter- 
and intra-class relations.  The same mechanisms which secure the compliance of 
junior and lower-level professionals operate within the larger field of occupational and 
class differentiation.  Conversely, the mechanisms, by which credentialed occupations 
separate themselves as a whole from non-credentialed labor, also secure internal 
differentiation among the credentialed strata.  The crucial structures which 
institutionalize and reproduce these mechanisms are modern organizations. 
Organization 
Another limitation of the neo-Durkheimian approach proposed by Grusky and 
his collaborators is its neglect of vertical organizational structures in which the 
majority of modern workers are employed.  The authors are not unaware of this 
problem.  In fact, they raise the question of whether, as postindustrialism evolves, 
vertical methods of control will continue to encroach on occupationally defined labor 
through task fusion, elaboration, and complication.  Their answer is that modern 
economic trends, including the growth of outsourcing, downsizing, and 
externalization, actually increase pressures to identify and affiliate with occupations 
rather than organizations.  But, again, this issue does not require an ‘either/or’ 
approach.  Occupational and organizational logics of social organization have been 
long intertwined and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.  
 The affinity between bureaucracy and professions was already apparent at the 
turn of the century: both were crucial to the process of economic rationalization and 
found their crucial source of legitimation in educational credentialism.  As Weber 
noted, the modern form of “examination for expertise,” which was rapidly becoming 
the primary method of appropriating bureaucratic positions, “is found also outside the 
strictly bureaucratic structures ... in the so-called ‘free’ professions of medicine and 
law.”  The common foundation, which organizational and professional monopolies 
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have in the modern system of education, fulfills an important ideological role.  The 
allegedly “open” educational system disguises class- and status-based monopolies in 
the appropriation of professional and bureaucratic positions with universalistic 
legitimations.  Although this “system of examinations means, or at least appears to 
mean, selection of the qualified from all social strata,” in actuality, it tends toward a 
form of monopolization, in which the propertied classes are favored.35  
In post-war social science, however, a distinction – even opposition – between 
professions and bureaucracy, rather than affinity, became the reigning paradigm.  At 
the most basic level, it has been conceived as a conflict between two opposing social 
imperatives: the impersonal, routinizing, and authoritarian world of bureaucracy, on 
the one hand, and the creative, sophisticated, and autonomous work of professionals, 
on the other.36  This antinomy between bureaucracy and professions raised many 
questions, since post-war growth of professionals in the labor force was almost 
entirely constituted by professionals who worked within large organizations or had 
organic connections to them. 
In a society saturated with large, bureaucratic organizations, the view of the 
professions as inherently anti-bureaucratic was bound to be dispelled sooner or later.  
As empirical studies of bureaucracies and professions challenged their ideal concepts, 
it became increasingly clear that the theorized opposition between them was based on 
a stereotyped view of bureaucratic organizations and a largely mythical conception of 
the “free” professions, which exaggerated the autonomy of its practitioners.  The 
majority of professionals are connected with bureaucratic organizations as employees, 
                                                 
 
35
 Weber, Economy and Society, quotes from pp. 999-1000, also see pp. 141, 306. 
36
 See, for example, Robert K. Merton, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,” Social Forces 17 
(1940), pp. 560-568; Alvin Gouldner, “Cosmopolitans and Locals,” Administrative Science Quarterly 2 
(1957-1958), pp. 281-306 and 444-480; Eliot Freidson and Buford Rhea, “Processes of Control in a 
Company of Equals,” in Medical Men and Their Work, ed. Eliot Freidson and Judith Lorber (Chicago: 
Aldine-Atherton, 1972). 
  48 
contractors, providers of services, or users of equipment or facilities.  Moreover, every 
profession which has successfully established its claim to expertise and control over 
selection and training of practitioners is also connected with the modern university, a 
bureaucratized institution in which a critical period of professional socialization takes 
place.  Although occupations are usually too loose and heterogeneous to be considered 
‘organizations,’ their projects of professionalization and collective mobility have been 
crucially bound with their organizational efforts.37  
In the case of many modern professions – such as accounting, social work, 
school-teaching, or nursing – the very professionalization was crucially dependent on 
the prior existence of organizations developing their particular field of work.  
Bureaucratization frequently promoted a rational organization of work, including the 
development of specialized expertise.  In turn, the bureaucratically-created specialists 
pushed for further development of their fields of expertise, striving to give them a 
measure of independence from particular employing organizations.  To succeed, 
professional projects originating within heteronomous organizations required the 
creation of external sources of certification and expertise, such as professional schools, 
associations, and state licensing boards, in order “to introduce into the career patterns 
of one organization checks that are administered by other organizations.”38  But 
modernization of older, independent professions was also crucially dependent on 
establishing the triple base resting on the relationship between external employing 
organizations, the modern university, and the state.  Modernization of the medical 
profession, for instance, is unthinkable without an ensemble of hospital, university, 
and state boards at its foundation.   
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The fact that bureaucratization of many functional activities directly stimulated 
the emergence of new professional tasks and, ultimately, professions, points to the fact 
that bureaucratic organizations and professional occupations rest on shared cognitive 
presuppositions.  As Larson noted, “both professions and bureaucracy rest on a certain 
measure of cognitive standardization, for both pretend to allocate people to work roles 
on the ‘rational’ basis of ‘objectively’ tested competence: ‘objectivity’ requires that 
the content of such tests be specific, specified, and homogeneous, as well as accessible 
in principle to ‘all who would care to learn.’”  While the possession of an independent 
cognitive base has been identified as a distinguishing characteristic of the professions, 
bureaucratic organization can also be seen as a cognitive field informing both a 
specific activity of modern administration and an organization of a broad range of 
other complex fields of work.  
Professions and organizations can also be seen as complementary modes of 
securing positions in the division of labor.  As Savage and his collaborators argue, 
professionalism is an attempt to translate cultural assets, systematized in a specific 
body of knowledge, into material rewards.  However, professional knowledge 
generated within the institutions of higher learning “needs to be transformed in the 
work situation to become useful practical knowledge.”  Large-scale organizations have 
proven to be “indispensable for translation of professional knowledge into status-
appropriate incomes.”  Organizational occupations, on the other hand, face the 
opposite challenge of broadening and generalizing their “organization-specific” 
knowledge so that it may be more easily transferred across different employing 
contexts.  Establishment of external means of training and certification is a primary 
way to achieve a higher degree of autonomy from particular employing organizations.  
Thus, “while unqualified workers in organizations pursue ‘professional projects’ to 
allow them a more secure base to perpetuate or develop their advantages, workers with 
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cultural assets pursue ‘organizational projects’ in order to find employment in specific 
organizations which allow their skills to earn rewards.”39  
The historical nexus between professionalism and corporate capitalist 
enterprise exposes yet another aspect of the relationship between occupational and 
organizational structures.  In his study of corporate capitalism, Chandler noted that the 
most dynamic and flexible among the emergent monopolistic corporations arrived 
independently at the same organizational innovation – the multidivisional structure – 
which gave these enterprises unprecedented capacity to use and accommodate expert 
and professional staff workers.40  Within this new, vast, and decentralized structure of 
capitalist production, professionalism, Larson argued, was not simply a culture to be 
accommodated; it also functioned as a critical mechanism of organizational control.  
Where hierarchical bureaucratic methods of control were incompatible with the 
autonomy required for innovative professional work, professionalism could function 
as a substitute system for making the use of professional discretion more predictable.  
Corporate and professional structures become, here, mutually supportive: “expertise is 
implicitly proposed as a legitimation for the hierarchical structure of authority of the 
modern organization; professionalism, in turn, functions as an internalized mechanism 
for the control of the subordinate expert.”  In such a structure, argued Larson, “[t]here 
need be no basic conflict between the professional expectation of autonomy ... and 
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large-scale bureaucratic organizations ... unless, of course, professionals are more 
interested in power than in autonomy of technique.”41   
Taken together, the analyses of the links between the professions, on the one 
hand, and the educational system and large-scale bureaucratic employing 
organizations, on the other, allowed Larson to formulate the relationship between 
occupational and organizational structures in a more general way.  She argued that: (1) 
“relations between professions and specific bureaucratic organizations are a most 
powerful determinant of stratification among professions and within professions” and 
(2) they constitute a crucial mechanism by which professions are incorporated into the 
structure of contemporary capitalism.42   
Economic and social status discrepancies among occupations are reflected in 
their relationship with the system of higher education.  Institutionalization of an 
occupation’s cognitive base within the modern university is a crucial benchmark on 
the path to professional status.  Unequal resources and prestige of the academic 
disciplines, however, reflect and perpetuate disparities between the professionals they 
train or support.  In addition to differences between professional disciplines, all of the 
units in the system of higher education – universities at large, their separate schools, 
and the departments within those schools – are themselves subject to rating in a 
recognized system of hierarchical prestige.  Even though all of these units offer 
standardized and certified programs of instruction, the importance of attending the 
more prestigious schools is clear to all.  As Larson noted, “in terms of social 
connections, and especially in terms of ideology, elite schools socialize their graduates 
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into an elite.”43  The system of higher education, with its multiple levels of prestige 
both between and within institutions,  
operates as a switchboard to the world of work, but as a switchboard that 
would, at the same time, determine the distance and the speed of the trains.  
The trains are different classes of colleges, universities, and professional 
schools at which the passengers arrive after having been filtered by a number 
of other switchboards.44  
The processes of professional stratification do not end with the completion of 
professional training but operate throughout the markets for professional services and 
at every stage of professional careers.  In the world of professional employment, 
organizations stratify occupations in two ways: through an internal hierarchy of jobs 
and through an external ranking of organizations.  First, various forms of hierarchical 
bureaucratic organization standardize and legitimize the inequality between individual 
professionals within employing organizations.  Secondly, dependence on 
heteronomous employing organizations creates a kind of ‘externally produced’ 
differentiation, which “stratifies the professions from the outside, pulling chosen 
professional institutions and chosen professionals toward the centers that control 
power and resources, while relegating others to marginality.”  With the decline of the 
free professional, intra-occupational inequality is increasingly bound with the rankings 
of organizations training and employing credentialed workers: “doctors are identified 
with their hospitals, lawyers, architects, and engineers with their firms, and every 
professional with his academic origins.”45  
In virtue of their dependence on capitalist enterprises, private organizations, 
and the state for the financing of training and research and the provision of 
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employment, professional occupations are firmly integrated into the larger power 
structure of society.  The network of training and employing organizations, which 
certify and validate educational credentials, demarcates credentialed from 
uncredentialed workers and further differentiates the levels of income and prestige 
among the credentialed workers.  The hierarchy of organizations and the hierarchy of 
positions within organizations establish a structure of occupational inequality.  The 
resulting ‘organization of organizations’ is the chief matrix of class positions and 
trajectories in a credentialed society.46   
Gender 
Although multiple and overlapping logics of differentiation are implicit in 
Larson’s framework, she does not address directly how other salient social divisions – 
such as those of gender and race – structure the institutional matrix of social 
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inequality.  Traditional approaches to the analysis of occupations, organization, and 
classes – whether of Marxist or Weberian inspiration – paid little attention to the 
question of structured race and gender inequality, leaving major ‘blind spots’ in our 
view of social stratification. 
The earliest studies of gender in the workplace focused on the problem of the 
so-called semi-professions of school-teaching, nursing, and social work in which 
women predominated.  According to Etzioni, the editor and contributor to one of the 
earliest studies, location within the bureaucratic organization and the predominance of 
women were the defining features of these occupations.  The largely female 
composition of the semi-professions’ membership, he argued, limited the capacity of 
these occupational groups to achieve the fully professional status.  The marginal 
position of school-teaching, nursing, social work and other typically female 
occupations stemmed from the low social status of women in general.47  Simpson and 
Simpson concurred that the subordinate position of the semi-professions in the 
occupational hierarchy was sealed by the attitudes and behaviors of their female 
membership. “A woman’s primary attachment is to the family role;” argued the 
authors, “women are therefore less intrinsically committed to work than men and less 
likely to maintain a high level of specialized knowledge.”  Typically sharing “the 
general cultural norm that women should defer to men,” women were both less able to 
wield authority and more willing to accept subordination.  In short, the semi-
professional female workers were willing subordinates, ideally suited to the role of 
“hand-maidens of a male occupation that has authority over them.”48  Etzioni’s overall 
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recommendation for the semi-professions was to renounce their “inauthentic 
aspirations” to the full professional status.49  
As with the professions, conventional approaches to the study of modern 
bureaucratic organizations gave little importance to the fact that the emergence and 
development of these structures proceeded along unmistakably gendered lines.  To be 
sure, the peculiar patterns of gender segregation within organizational hierarchies have 
been noted early.  In his classic study of the American middle classes, C. Wright 
Mills, for instance, was quite direct that the basic structure of white-collar 
bureaucracies is defined by gender and age: younger and feminine at the bottom of the 
pyramid and older and masculine toward the apex.50  Such awareness, however, did 
not prompt any serious rethinking of the conventional gender-blind theory of 
bureaucracy inherited from Weber.    
A serious interrogation of gender as a structuring principle of inequality had to 
await the political and academic upheaval of the ‘second wave’ feminism.51  The 
feminist scholarship of this period had early and formative encounters with the 
challenges of race, sexuality, post-colonialism, and class, producing a literature rich in 
intersecting perspectives on inequality.  Multidimensional vision emphasized in the 
feminist theory posed specific problems as well.  For students of stratification, the 
challenge was to disentangle the effect of gender, on the one hand, and class, power, 
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and authority, on the other.  This effort produced a range of different and even 
opposed conclusions. 
While highly critical of the prevailing “machismo theory of 
professionalization,” Frank Parkin concluded nevertheless that the focus on the gender 
composition of an occupation presents “the least promising point of departure” on the 
road toward understanding the success or failure of professionalization.  In his view, 
the heteronomous nature of the semi-professions – some of which have been “virtually 
the creation of bureaucracy” and all of which are tightly controlled by external 
bureaucratic organizations – was a more plausible explanation for their failure to 
achieve full autonomy and other attributes of the ‘real’ professions. The 
predominantly female composition of these occupations can then be understood as a 
result of a low appeal, which these bureaucratically controlled occupations hold for 
men, with the exception of their highest levels of authority.52  A similar argument was 
advanced by Lockwood who argued that “it is the position of an occupation within 
some hierarchy of authority that is decisive for its status and not the sex of the person 
who happens to be in it.”53  Both of these arguments, however, confound the 
individual and the group levels of analysis.  Of course, it is the position of the 
occupation and not the gender of the individual which determines the status of the 
incumbent.54  Gender may indeed not the best point of departure, as Parkin claimed, 
but only because the predominant gender of the occupation’s membership must first 
itself be explained in terms of historical struggles surrounding the construction of that 
occupational field and its multiple attributes.   
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Historical and, especially, comparative accounts of the emergence of such 
gendered professions as nursing and medicine, school-teaching and university-
teaching, psychology and psychiatry, to name just a few, clearly demonstrate that the 
relationship between the status and gender composition of the occupation has been 
typically one of continual, cyclical interaction.   During the second half of the 
nineteenth century, bourgeois men already had exclusive access to many institutional 
forms in modern society, like the university, professional associations, and the state 
which facilitated their monopolization of the higher echelons of professional and 
bureaucratic hierarchies.  While women have engaged in a struggle to directly 
challenge those barriers which excluded them from entry into the more prestigious, 
male-dominated professions of medicine, law, etc., in view of the odds, many have 
chosen to enter occupational fields with lower economic returns and greater external 
control, than not at all.  Effectively barred from entry into the most prestigious 
professions and organizational posts, women had to struggle for professionalization of 
other occupational activities.  It is through this continual feed-back between 
occupation’s desirability and the gender of its membership that the complex nature of 
modern occupational structure has been constructed.  
This complexity is well captured by Glazer and Slater in their study of 
women’s entrance into the professions in America between 1890 and 1940.  While 
acknowledging that, at the dawn of modern professionalism, middle- and upper-class 
men had a nearly exclusive access to those institutional forms in modern society (like 
the university, professional associations, and the state) which facilitated the 
monopolization of professional and bureaucratic hierarchies, they argue that middle-
class women also had distinctive social resources to gain a foothold in professional 
work, compared with their working-class sisters.  Thus, although the movement 
towards occupational professionalization occurred independently of women’s 
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interests, middle class women seized the emergence of modern professions as a 
moment of historical opportunity.55  
An inclination to reduce gender to other factors appeared in Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter’s pioneering study, Men and Women of the Corporation, which used the 
reconstructed Weberian perspective to look at the relationship between gender and 
organizational power.  In reaction to the prevailing behaviorist view of women as 
willing, ‘born-and-raised’ subordinates, Kanter argued that power differences, not 
gender differences, explain the divergent organizational experiences of men and 
women.   
the fate of women is inextricably bound up with organizational structure and 
processes in the same way that men’s life-at-work is shaped by them.  
Differences based on sex retreat into the background as the people-creating, 
behavior-shaping properties of organizational locations become clear.56  
In a manner reminiscent of Parkin’s critique of the ‘feminine’ theory of the semi-
professions, Kanter denies that there are any intrinsically different, gendered modes of 
behavior and orientation that account for the subordinate position of women in 
organizational hierarchies.  What look like innate gender differences, she insists, are 
really systematic differences of power between male and female occupants of 
hierarchical organizational positions.   
The implication of her analysis is that, should women be able to secure 
organizational power, their gender would become largely irrelevant.  At present, 
however, not only do men wield widely disproportionate organizational power but 
they also systematically exclude women from sharing in the sources and practices of 
power.  One of the principal ways in which women are excluded, while men are 
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included, into the circuits of organizational power is through the practices of 
homosociability among the male superordinates.  Since Kanter does not reject the 
Weberian view of bureaucratic organization as essentially rational, she sees 
homosociability as a largely rational response to the costs of knowledge and 
communication.  By limiting managerial positions to males, managers avoid the costs 
of communicating with those (female) others who are substantially unlike themselves 
and whom they do not as easily understand or ‘read.’57  A corollary of women’s 
exclusion from sharing in the organizational power is that their inclusion into modern 
organizations takes the form of subordination to male superiors. 
A sharp distinction Kanter draws between gender and power is helpful in that it 
allows us to see that organizational powerlessness is not limited to individuals of 
female gender but is a fact of (working) life for men in non- or lower-managerial 
positions.  As a result, Kanter’s argument leaves ample space for considering, 
alongside gender, the effects of class, race and other indices of social inequality and 
their inter-relationship with organizational hierarchies.  At the same time, her 
insistence that it is solely differences in power, rather than gender differences which 
account for systematic subordination of women within organizations is problematic. 
Like Parkin’s rejection of gender as an explanatory variable in the study of 
occupations, Kanter’s insistence on analyzing women’s organizational position in 
terms of power rather than gender may be seen as a reaction to bahaviorist view of 
women constructed in post-World War II social science.  Nevertheless, the categorical 
removal of gender as an analytical category is problematic.  Gender differences, which 
render women different and, therefore, more ‘costly’ to include in predominantly male 
managerial circles, are constructed both inside and outside of work organizations, both 
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before and after women enter organizational workplaces.  Women enter organizations 
as already gendered subjects and their intra-organizational subordination is only one 
link in the web of social relations of inequality in which both gender and 
organizational authority are only two of several major cleavages.  Systematic gender 
inequality within an organization is not reducible to internal organizational structure or 
power struggles.  It is fed by sources flowing from a terrain more extensive than any 
particular organizations or even the totality of formal organizations.  This is not to say 
that the structures of gender inequality within organizations simply reflect or 
reproduce some larger and hidden ur-structure of gender inequality.  Nevertheless, 
both their autonomy and their specificity are clearly relative vis-à-vis the larger socio-
historical forces. 
If Parkin and Kanter argued that the gender of occupations and organizational 
positions is a construct of other, more fundamental forces, other scholars 
conceptualized the relationship between (feminine) gender, on the one hand, and 
professional privilege and bureaucratic authority, on the other, as one of antinomy.  
Hearn, for example, has offered a radical redefinition of professionalization as a 
patriarchal process.58  His thesis is premised on the conceptualization of the substance 
of modern professional practice as functions that have been historically carried out in 
the private domain by female caregivers.   Modern professionalism is then seen as a 
process whereby men usurp activities that relate to emotional experiences, biological 
reproduction, and the reproduction of labour power and transfer them to the sphere of 
public institutions and market exchange.  Full professionalization indicates a complete 
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male dominance of an activity, whereas semi-professional status denotes partial male 
control.59   
In The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy, Kathy Ferguson presented a 
similar argument in regard to bureaucratization.  She argued that bureaucratic structure 
and discourse are fundamentally alien to, and oppressive of, women and urged women 
to seek alternative organized forms rather then their inclusion within male-inflected 
bureaucratic organizations.  For Ferguson, the male-dominated character of 
bureaucratic organization stems from the historical experience of men’s exclusive 
access to the public realm where both bureaucratic discourse and its institutional 
practices have evolved.  Women’s historical exclusion from the public realm has 
meant that bureaucratic discourse both expresses and perpetuates women’s marginality 
to the public realm.  Limited to the private realm, women, argues Ferguson, have 
developed a different and a submerged discourse stemming from female-dominated 
modes of action in the private realm.  Appropriately liberated from oppressive, 
masochistic and self-sacrificial modalities, this discourse can form a foundation for 
feminist alternative to bureaucratic rationality.60   
Although Hearn and Ferguson open up the possibility of theorizing 
professionalization and bureaucratization in relation to patriarchal processes, the 
manner in which they conflate professional and bureaucratic control with patriarchal 
power at a definitional level is problematic.  If professional and bureaucratic control is 
defined as patriarchal control, and professional and bureaucratic power as male power, 
it is impossible to account for women’s entrance into the professions and bureaucratic 
hierarchies other than as cases of masochism and/or co-optation.  It is obvious that 
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these approaches suffer from inattention to the issues of class and/or internal 
stratification within male-dominated professions and organizations.  Were they to 
attend to these questions, they would see that oppression and powerlessness apply to 
the lower rungs of male professionals and bureaucrats as well, and that women in the 
higher rungs of professional and bureaucratic structures are clearly privileged in 
relation to subordinate workers of either sex.   
A combined analysis of class and gender structures provides an important 
check on essentializing tendencies inherent in each undertaken separately.  The 
pioneering works in this undertaking proposed that the analysis of the relationship 
between gender and class must proceed from the framework which explores the 
intersection between two structuring principles, those of patriarchy and those of 
capitalism.61  A common thread running through various versions of the dual-systems 
analysis is the proposal to view class formation as in part based on gendered processes 
and, concomitantly, the formation of gendered collectivities as linked to class.   
An historic formation of the new middle class provides a good illustration of 
the possibilities, and challenges, of this approach.  The ‘new middle class’ has been 
variously understood to refer to those relatively advantaged, organizationally based 
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white-collar positions whose incumbents typically function in professional, 
managerial, and administrative capacities.  The unified definition of the ‘new middle 
class,’ however, systematically ran into considerable and evolving differences the 
various categories of white-collar workforce.  The main lines of internal 
differentiation have been frequently specified as those which divide: (1) the higher-
level professional and managerial functions, (2) the less prestigious professional and 
semi-professional occupations and the lower supervisory positions, and (3) the lower-
level administrative and service occupations. 
The fact that both of these boundaries – between the professional and semi-
professional positions and between both of the above and the routine white-collar 
work – are considerably gendered has not escaped notice of class theorists.  
Abercrombie and Urry, for instance, stressed both the proletarian and feminized 
character of routine white-collar work comprising the dual basis of its distinction from 
the core of the service class.  Goldthorpe, too, employed gender to designate the 
occupational profiles of the class sections.62  But what these authors do not sufficiently 
theorize is the corollary of the feminine character of the routine white-collar positions, 
namely, the masculine character of those managerial, administrative and managerial 
positions which constitute the core of the so-called service class and the patriarchal 
modes of their construction.  Indeed, as Anne Witz argued, existing attempts to 
specify the structural position and social formation of the new middle class have been 
significantly constrained by their failure to theorize explicitly their gendered aspect.63  
Historically, the bureaucratic career emerged as a gendered, male 
phenomenon, intimately linked with the ‘White Blouse Revolution,’ the employment 
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of large numbers of women in routine clerical work.  During the crucial 
developmental period of corporate bureaucracies, most organizations had strictly 
gendered structures, in which women and men were recruited into different grades of 
employment with different salary scales and promotion prospects.  Many 
organizations imposed marriage bars on their female workers, forcing them to retire on 
marriage and so to become full-time housewives.  The typical male career pattern, 
characterized by the anticipated and steady upward progression, was thus importantly 
premised on the fact that much routine work was carried out by women who were 
practically ineligible for promotion.  Women’s job ‘immobility’ substantially 
enhanced the promotion prospects of junior men.64  
The idea of the male career has rested on yet another assumption – the 
existence of a female ‘servicer’ expected to carry out a range of household, secretarial, 
and personal duties and so allowing a man to devote more time to his work.  As Acker 
argued, the supposedly gender-neutral places within modern occupational and 
organizational structures are quite explicitly gendered. 
In organizational logic, both jobs and hierarchies are abstract categories that 
have no occupants, no bodies, no gender. … [F]illing the abstract job is a 
disembodied worker who exists only for the work … The closest the 
disembodied worker doing the abstract job comes to a real worker is the male 
worker whose life centers on his fulltime, life-long job, while his wife or 
another woman takes care of his personal needs and his children. … The 
concept of ‘a job’ is thus implicitly a gendered concept, even though 
organizational logic presents it as gender neutral. ‘A job’ already contains the 
gender-based division of labor and the separation between the public and the 
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private sphere.  The concept of ‘a job’ assumes a particular gendered 
organization of domestic life and social production.65  
Thus, both modern corporate and bureaucratic organizations helped define women as 
both subordinate workers in white-collar hierarchies and dependent marital parties and 
drew upon it for their competitive advantages. 
Segregation of women in the lower rungs of white-collar hierarchies and their 
confinement to a primary domestic role point toward gendered patterns of location and 
movement within the overall division of labor.  An even stronger interpretation 
emerging from recent work is that gendered processes account not only for ‘staffing,’ 
but for the very creation of work roles.  As Rosemary Pringle argued in her study of 
the secretarial occupation, the very existence of particular jobs is rooted in gender 
inequality.  The job of a secretary, for example, is defined by the types of feminine 
traits which the female incumbents of these positions are presumed to have.  Similarly, 
Mike Savage argued that the boundary between professional and managerial positions 
within the structure of middle class employment has been explicitly constituted along 
gendered lines and that the creation of managerial cadres as a social grouping has been 
linked to their place in sustaining gendered forms of power.66  
A common conclusion emerging from these and other arguments is that 
occupational and organizational structures, as well as the social processes behind 
them, are gendered.  Whether we focus on occupations or on jobs, gendered structures 
provide key resources in the constitution of the modern division of labor.67   
Conversely, the modern division of labor is an important sphere in which gender 
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relations are institutionalized and enacted.  A tacit conceptualization of class positions 
in gendered terms, unsupported by an explicit specification of class-gender 
interrelationship, implies a failure to appreciate that the distinction between ‘people’ 
and ‘places’ is untenable.  Places are not formed through purely economic processes, 
as some theorists maintain, but are also shaped by sexist and racist structures and 
strategies.68   
Race 
As with gender, the classical studies of social inequality were either silent 
about race or dismissive of its pivotal and enduring significance in modern societies.  
Although European states were deeply engaged in imperialist conquest and oppressive 
racialization of the global East and South, the founding fathers of modern social 
sciences gave scant attention to the race-based inequality and oppression.69  The 
foundations for the systematic engagements with race and racism were laid by 
intellectuals from the oppressed groups engaged in the struggles against racism, 
colonialism, and anti-Semitism.70  While social scientists generally rejected biological 
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notions of race in favor of sociohistorical conceptions of racialization, their theories 
were not immune from subtler influences of racist ideologies.  Many 
conceptualizations of race and racism tended toward idealism and/or resuctionism.  A 
widespread approach to understanding racism defined it as a dogmatic set of beliefs 
about racial superiority or inferiority, thus situating the problem of race primarily in 
the realm of culture and ideology.71  Early sociological approaches viewed racial 
inequality as a variant ethnic difference, predicting a progressive process of 
accommodation and assimilation.72  Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars tended to 
subsume the question of race and racism under the problematic of class and 
capitalism, seeing racial inequality as either the legitimating ideology or the structural 
device of exploitation.73  The internal colonialism perspective equated the problem of 
racism with that of nationhood and colonialism.74  The idealist and reductive 
tendencies within earlier race theory have been increasingly criticized by those who 
favor more structural and historically specific accounts of racial inequality.   
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Contemporary debate on race has been grappling with the structural and 
cultural transformations which occurred since the Civil Rights era.  The end of the 
legalized forms of racial segregation and discrimination, the emergence of the black 
middle class, and the growing presence and notable successes of other minority groups 
coincided with continuing poverty, residential segregation, mass imprisonment, and 
racial backlash against African-Americans and other racialized minorities.  One of the 
prominent issues of contention in recent decades has been the question of the 
comparative significance of race and class in contemporary American society.  One 
side of this debate, most closely associated with the work of William Julius Wilson, 
argues that economic and class restructuring resulted in a declining importance of race 
in contemporary American society.75  In The Declining Significance of Race and The 
Truly Disadvantaged, Wilson argued that during the period after World War II the 
importance of race in determining social position has been eclipsed by the growing 
consolidation of class divisions in the economic sector.  The force of the Civil Rights 
movement compelled the American state to dismantle the discriminatory laws.  These 
achievements, however, mainly helped the African-American middle-class, while 
doing little to improve the deteriorating conditions of the growing black underclass.  
According to Wilson, the life chances of African-Americans are no longer primarily 
determined by race, but by economic class.   
Their opponents, exemplified by Michael Omi and Howard Winant, counter 
that recent changes have only reconstructed racial meanings and divisions, while also 
spurring a rise in racial tensions.76  The continuing significance of race can be 
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discerned in specific forms of racially charged attacks on welfare, affirmative action, 
and urban development.  With the elimination of legal racial barriers, the neo-
conservative forces in American politics have used the notions of colorblind society 
and reverse discrimination to block legislation aimed at improving the socio-economic 
position of minority populations.  This backlash took the form of cutbacks in welfare, 
affirmative action, education, health care, and other crucial programs.77  In this view, 
race continues to have an enormous significance in the United States. 
Whether one agrees with Wilson’s findings or not, one thing is clear: the logic 
and mechanisms of racialization must be more clearly specified and distinguished 
from other structuring mechanisms.78  The ‘racial formation’ perspective advanced by 
Omi and Winant, as well as the ‘racialized social systems’ thesis formulated by 
Bonilla-Silva, present some of the most promising efforts in this direction.79  Omi and 
Winant define racial formation as “the sociohistorical process by which racial 
categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed.”80  In societies 
characterized by racial formation, race is an organizing principle of social 
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relationships that operates both at micro and macro levels of social structuring.  ‘Race’ 
shapes both the individual identities and all spheres of social life.   
Bonilla-Silva defines racialized social systems as “societies in which 
economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured by the 
placement of actors in racial categories or races.”81  In these societies, both material 
and symbolic rewards are distributed in part along racial lines.  Racial structures are 
always hierarchical, with racial groups receiving different social and symbolic rewards 
at all levels.  The particular character of hierarchy and its elements is varies across 
time and space.  In general, however, “the more dissimilar the races’ life chances, the 
more racialized the social system.”82   
For Omi and Winant, ‘races’ are the outcome of the racialization process, 
which they define as “the extension of racial meanings to a previously racially 
unclassified relationships, social practice or group.”83  The construction of racial 
categories involves defining both ‘otherness’ and ‘sameness,’ as well as hierarchical 
ordering of their attributes.  Historically, the classification of groups in racial terms 
has been a highly political act associated with conquest, colonization, and 
enslavement.  Racialization may have initially stemmed from the interests of the 
political and economic elites, but once established they benefit all the members of the 
dominant race.  Although racialization is socially constructed, social relations between 
races become institutionalized at the level of structure as well as culture.  Racial 
ideologies, which emerge in racialized societies, are as real in their effects as racial 
relations they help reproduce. 
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What about other dimensions of inequality?  Racialization of social systems 
did not imply the displacement of other forms of oppression.  To the contrary, 
racialization occurred in social formations also structured by class and gender.  Hence, 
racial formations are intersected by other dimensions of inequality.  Which dimensions 
of inequality will be more salient is historically contingent and cannot be determined a 
priori.84  In a multidimensional social structure, racialized actors are also ‘classed’ and 
‘gendered.’  Conversely, both gender and class categories are racialized and the 
struggles based on gender and class differences typically include a racial component.  
Thus, racialization exerts independent effect within the framework of multiple 
structuration. 
Institutional Class Positions 
In a recent article, Leslie McCall has offered a useful classification of 
‘intersectional’ approaches according to their stance toward categories of social 
difference and inequality, as shown in Table 2.1.  
 
 
Table 2.1. Three Approaches to Categories within the Intersectionality Paradigm 
 
Inter-Categorical Complexity Intra-Categorical Complexity Anti-Categorical Complexity 
Requires that scholars 
provisionally adopt existing 
analytical categories to 
document relationships of 
inequality among social groups 
and changing configurations of 
inequality along multiple and 
conflicting dimensions. 
Maintains a critical stance 
toward categories and 
interrogates the boundary-
making and boundary-defining 
process itself, while 
acknowledging the stable and 
even durable relationships that 
social categories represent at 
any given point in time. 
Based on a methodology that 
deconstructs analytical 
categories.  Considers social 
life too irreducibly complex to 
make fixed categories anything 
but simplifying social fictions 
that produce inequalities in the 
process of producing 
differences. 
 
Source: Leslie McCall, “The Complexity of Intersectionality,” Signs, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Spring 2005), pp. 
1771-1800. 
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McCall points out that the type of intersectional approach adopted may stem 
not only from philosophical and epistemological considerations but also from the 
choice of method and question under investigation. The approach adopted in this 
dissertation lies somewhere in-between and outside of this classification.  Like 
practitioners of the inter-categorical approach I have provisionally adopted the five 
‘existing’ categories of analysis at the beginning of my research.  As I delved further 
into my investigation, the need to search for a newer and less established 
conceptualization of social division became quite pressing.  The reason why my 
approach cannot be squarely identified either within or between the three frameworks 
distinguished by McCall is because she differentiates approaches on the basis of their 
stance toward conventional and, I may add, ‘macro’ categories of social division.  
Implicit in all intersectional work, however, is the existence of ‘micro’ categories of 
social division and a different way to classify intersectional work may be in 
accordance with their conceptualization and stance toward these smaller and new 
categories of analysis. 
One thing that is clear is that the great diversity among the studies of 
intersectionality suggests that ‘intersectional’ frameworks can and must be tailored to 
the conceptual needs of the topic and method.  For the purpose of the present project – 
which is concerned with institutional politics of the academic medical centers – five 
dimensions of inequality are of central importance.  They are: (1) class, (2) gender, (3) 
race, (4) occupational divisions, and (5) organizational hierarchies.  This is not an 
exhaustive list of differences structuring the many areas in the health care field but the 
minimal set of specifications necessary to understand the historical material 
investigated in this dissertation.  My research shows that organizational politics are 
frequently articulated and structured in terms of divisions, interests, and strategies 
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lying at the intersection of class, gender, racial, occupational and organizational 
dimensions of difference.  While contingent and malleable, groups and interests that 
emerge at these intersections are not only quite meaningful to the actors, but also 
grounded in institutions and organizations which cross-cut the field of academic 
medicine.   
In this dissertation I will use the term ‘institutional class positions’ to denote 
those varied and contingent positions emerging at the intersection of all or most of 
these five dimensions.  The justification for this move is twofold.  On the one hand, 
the term serves as a convenient short-hand that minimizes the repetitive use of ‘class, 
race, gender, occupation and organization’ line.  On the other hand, it expresses the 
felt need for new terminology to refer to those multi-dimensional identities and 
structures that are suggested by the theory of intersectionality.  While naming and 
categorization are not unproblematic practices, the very term ‘intersectionality,’ as 
well as several related concepts such as ‘complex inequality,’ ‘multiple oppressions’ 
or ‘hybrid identities,’ are just such exercises in naming the new conceptual terrain.   
Why ‘institutional class positions’?  First, the concept of class has come under 
especially strong attack and is therefore in need of reinforcement.  Second, because of 
the recent attacks, defenses and rearticulations, class stands as the least entrenched and 
the most flexible concept.   It is not inconceivable that at this moment in history ‘class’ 
may emerge as the ultimate ‘empty space,’ ready to be imbued with new meanings 
commensurate with the contemporary structures of social stratification. 
 
  74 
CHAPTER 3 
 
BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND THE MARKET: 
THE ‘FULL-TIME’ STRUGGLE, 1910-1926 
Introduction 
Early sociology of the professions defined its object of study as antithetical, in 
several important aspects, to both classes and institutions.1  More recent scholarship 
criticized this view as closely aligned with the professions’ own ideological self-
presentation.2  Nevertheless, the old position persists in more subtle ways in new 
work, while theoretical analyses linking professions, institutions, and classes remain 
fragmented and few.  Similar challenges face social scientists studying the other two 
elements of the triad.  Class theory, whether of Marxist or Weberian inspiration, has 
had notable difficulties with integrating the phenomenon of the professions and 
institutions within which they work into a coherent theoretical framework.  The 
notable absence of class from the analytical arsenal of the institutionalist school of 
political science testifies to the ideological and cognitive obstacles to theorizing links 
between institutions, classes, and professions. 
Given the limited scope of this study it would be presumptuous to attempt to 
remedy this situation.  Nevertheless, the records documenting the role of the medical 
profession in the history of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center provide a rich 
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source of hypotheses regarding the links among the professions, institutions, and 
classes.  Particularly interesting in this regard is a conflict which unfolded around the 
so-called ‘full-time’ organization of the clinical departments and nearly derailed the 
entire project of the joint university medical center. 
The issue, which serves as a focus of this chapter, concerned the position of the 
joint professional and academic staffs within the new organizational matrix of the 
university medical center.  As early as the 1870s, those who wished to reorganize 
American medicine on a scientific foundation stressed the need to make medical 
research and teaching – whether separately or in combination – into viable 
occupations freed from the demands and distractions of private practice.  An important 
first step toward this end was the establishment of the full-time teaching and research 
positions in the basic medical sciences of anatomy, bacteriology, pathology, and 
physiology.3   
These new positions differed from the traditional form of professional practice 
in two important ways.  First, the occupants of these new positions did not sell their 
services directly to consumers, be they patients or students.  Rather, their teaching and 
research services were contracted by an intermediary institution and compensated 
from general university funds, consisting of student tuition and other, mostly 
philanthropic, financial support.  Thus, income of the full-time university physicians, 
which took the form of a university salary, was determined by the financial means and 
competitive standing of the appointing university or medical school.  Second, the 
various resources required for the professional work of the full-time professors – their 
‘means of production’ – were owned by two institutions: the university and the 
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teaching hospital.  As a result, the physician-scientist was structurally dependent on 
institutions and resources external to both the individual researchers and the medical 
profession as a whole.   
There was a considerable variation in ‘full-time’ salaries among the medical 
schools and geographical regions.  Overall, however, they were considerably lower 
than the private practice income derived by physicians of comparable professional 
standing or academic rank.  This state of things confirmed the widespread belief 
among physicians that, in addition to limiting their professional autonomy, any form 
of institutional employment would inevitably depress professional incomes.  Like 
other small entrepreneurs, American physicians felt threatened by the rapid growth of 
large organizations that began in earnest during the second half of the 19th century, 
signaling an economic transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism.  At the 
same time, the rise of corporate society also created new opportunities to raise the 
status of American medicine and the leaders of the profession adopted a proactive 
strategy of managing professional fortunes in the changing social order.  Stronger, 
more centralized professional organizations succeeded in establishing higher 
educational standards and thus limiting the number of practitioners.  The profession 
had also accepted the need to locate some elements of its practice within the 
framework of large institutions, most notably the university and the hospital.  The rise 
of the full-time university positions represented one such concession of the ‘free’ 
profession to the imperative of the new corporate order.   
The organizational and scientific revolutions which transformed Western 
medicine during the second half of the 19th century also greatly increased its value to 
society.  When the impact of these changes was finally fully felt on this side of the 
Atlantic, many influential segments of American public felt that the profession’s 
internal reforms fell far short of optimizing medicine’s social utility.  Some reformers, 
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particularly those outside of the medical profession, believed that the institution of 
private practice – which allowed physicians to transact their services directly with 
patients and to set their own fees – confined medicine’s benefits to the well-to-do.  It 
also diverted too much of professional talent away from the main promise of scientific 
medicine which lay in discovery and prevention of the fundamental causes of disease.  
One of the crucial steps in limiting what they saw as excessive ‘commercialism’ of the 
medical profession was to restrict or outright eliminate private practice among the 
medical school faculty by requiring them to serve on a full-time basis. 
This goal became the central policy of the two most powerful philanthropies – 
the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations – which chose medicine as a key area of 
investment.  Armed with millions of dollars, the foundations’ managers began to offer 
large grants to selected medical schools on the condition that they organize all of their 
departments – clinical as well as basic science – on a full-time basis.  While basic 
science departments had already been so organized at most leading institutions, 
reorganization of clinical departments presented significant challenges.  At that time, 
clinical professors operated on a traditional basis, devoting only part of their time to 
teaching and research.  The full-time proposal meant that they would have to choose 
either their academic posts or their often very lucrative private practices.   
The implementation of the foundations’ program proved difficult and there 
was much resistance at each institution which was invited to apply for the grants, as 
well as from the organized profession.  One of the pivotal episodes in the struggle to 
impose ‘full-time’ requirement on all university physicians took place at Columbia.  
The University badly needed the money to pay for its part of construction of the joint 
medical center but its clinical faculty vehemently opposed restrictions on their private 
practice.  So high were the stakes in this fight that it delayed the creation of the 
Medical Center by some thirteen years.  Far more importantly, the outcome of the 
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struggle which unfolded around Columbia-Presbyterian had far-reaching 
consequences for American medicine as a whole. 
A close inquiry into this episode in the history of American academic medicine 
yields several insights into the dynamic that has structured important features of the 
American health care system.  Contrary to several authoritative accounts of this 
period, the lines of conflict in this crucial struggle did not correspond to professional 
and institutional boundaries but instead cut across both of them.  Distinct positions 
that emerged during the ‘full-time’ dispute corresponded most closely to class and 
class-fractional divisions common to the middle social strata as a whole, rather than 
specific to particular institutional or professional enclaves.  However, both institutions 
and the professions played an integral part in defining material interests and providing 
ideological strategies available to the class and class-fractional groups involved in the 
conflict.  The main lines of cleavage paralleled the different levels of institutional 
dependence and integration characterizing the position of the various parties to the 
conflict.  While all of the combatants endeavored to frame their positions in broad 
professional terms, they reached for different elements of professional ideology.  At 
least three distinct ideological stances appeared in the context of the ‘full-time’ 
conflict and their adoption by the different parties to the struggle closely correlated 
with the degree of their occupational institutionalization.  In sum, institutional 
organization constituted the very essence of the class groups involved in the struggle, 
while professional discourses furnished their ideological instruments. 
The Reform of American Medicine and the Full-Time Plan 
On December 13, 1910, a prominent New York philanthropist, Edward S. 
Harkness, offered Presbyterian Hospital $1.3 million dollars if it agreed to affiliate 
with Columbia University’s Medical School in order that both institutions might rise 
to new heights of excellence in medical care, education, and research.  With the 
  79 
agreement of affiliation secured in the spring of 1911, the newly affiliated institutions 
faced two main challenges.  The first was to create a geographical union which meant, 
in effect, that both institutions had to be rebuilt on a common site.  The second 
challenge was to reorganize the staffs of the two institutions along the lines stipulated 
in the Harkness’ offer and the agreement of affiliation.  Seemingly distinct, these two 
issues became tightly intertwined in the process of creating the joint medical center 
and delayed its realization for over a decade.   
Although neither the Harkness’ proposal, nor the subsequent agreement 
between Columbia and Presbyterian defined the terms under which the jointly 
appointed staff may engage in private practice of medicine, the affiliation was deeply 
enmeshed in a larger movement to reform American medical education and, through 
it, medicine as a whole.  Harkness’ proposal to Presbyterian came less than a year after 
the publication of the famous “Flexner Report” on the state of American medical 
education.  The Report was secretly solicited by the reform-minded figures in the 
American Medical Association (AMA) who approached the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching about the matter in 1907.4  Actually, the Association 
was perfectly well informed about the state of American medical education, since only 
one year earlier its Council on Medical Education inspected and rated every one of the 
country’s 160 or so medical schools.  What was sought, then, was not a confirmation 
of what the Council already knew but the Carnegie Foundation’s image of 
disinterestedness and objectivity, as well as its potential to increase and direct 
philanthropic investment in medical education.  The president of the Carnegie 
Foundation, Henry S. Pritchett, decided that appointing a layman, rather than a 
physician to conduct the study would lend more credibility to its findings.  This 
                                                 
 
4
 E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979), pp. 151-152. 
  80 
decision meshed well with the Foundation’s view that professional schools ought to be 
better integrated into a broader system of secondary and higher education.  The 
Foundation found their man in Abraham Flexner, a professional educator 
recommended to Pritchett by his brother, Dr. Simon Flexner, Director of the 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.  To prepare for the study, Abraham 
Flexner read up on the history of medical education and went over the AMA’s own 
report on medical schools which he found reliable but rather cautious.5  He also visited 
his alma mater, the Johns Hopkins University, and met with the medical school’s 
leading faculty.  At the time, no other medical school expressed the new ideals of 
scientific medicine better than Hopkins and Flexner came away convinced that it 
represented a true standard of excellence against which all other medical schools 
should be judged. 
Over a year and half Flexner visited all one hundred fifty-five medical schools 
in the United States and Canada and produced an unsparingly critical report.  His 
overall conclusion was very much in agreement with the arguments that the leading 
medical reformers had advanced for several decades. “The country needs fewer and 
better doctors,” Flexner concluded, and “the way to get them better is to produce 
fewer.”6  Excessive number and poor training of American physicians were primarily 
due to overabundance of small ‘commercial’ medical schools.  Supported almost 
exclusively by the student fees, these schools were run for the sole benefit of their 
faculties, argued Flexner, and lacked even the most basic resources necessary for 
scientific education of the future practitioners.  Many in the medical profession 
recognized the need to restrict the number of medical graduates but as long as the 
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quality of medical education was largely unregulated, the temptation to derive the 
benefits of the proprietary medical education was hard for the individual doctors to 
resist.   
Proliferation of commercial medical schools drove both standards and tuition 
fees down, allowing lower-middle class and even some ambitious working class 
youths to acquire medical education.  Flexner reported that the schools were overrun 
by the “mass of unprepared youth … drawn out of industrial occupations into the 
study of medicine” and insisted that medical profession should be reserved for those 
who could afford “a liberal and disinterested education experience.”7  Flexner’s 
overall recommendations were drastic: the first-tier schools should be strengthened 
and reorganized on the Johns Hopkins model, a few of the second-tier schools should 
be raised to the same high standard, and the rest disbanded.  Out of the one hundred 
thirty one American schools then in existence, he recommended preserving only thirty 
one.8  Although Flexner was certainly not a puppet of the AMA, the main lines of his 
argument were surprisingly similar to the reform agenda of the profession’s leaders, or 
so it seemed shortly after its publication.  Medical elites have long argued that the 
number of doctors should be restricted if the individual members expected to make 
comfortable living from their chosen profession.  Purging the profession of the lower 
class elements to elevate its prestige was also a sentiment of the professional elite that 
much predated the Report. Nevertheless, both Flexner and his foundation sponsors had 
a broader aim than did the leaders of the medical profession.   The reform of medicine, 
as they saw it, was part of the larger process of social and economic rationalization 
which had arisen in response to the excesses of unrestricted competition.9  Its main 
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goal, thus, was to restructure medical education, research, and care in accordance with 
the principles of scientific method and corporate organization.  Reducing the number 
of medical schools was not an end in itself but a precondition for efficient use of 
resources that had to be invested if the quality of American medicine was to raised.  
The capital investment and operating support necessary to raise American medical 
education to the European standards would have to come from external sources but as 
long as medical education continued to be organized on a proprietary basis, such 
support was both unlikely and unwise. 
The leaders of the medical profession were aware that the costs of scientific 
medical education – which required laboratories, hospital affiliations, and salaried 
science faculty – were beyond the means of potential students and the medical 
profession.  States might be persuaded to increase their support of the state medical 
schools, but most schools were private institutions and for their support the medical 
profession had to look to the wealthy.  Medical reformers were aware of the danger 
that external funding might pose and argued that private philanthropic giving should 
be carefully directed by the profession itself.  In this, the AMA leaders considered the 
“Flexner Report” of great value.  So effective was the Report in fostering their aims 
that the AMA reformers hardly paused at Flexner’s assertion that “[t]he medical 
profession is an organ differentiated by society for its own highest purposes, not a 
business to be exploited by individuals according to their own fancy.”10  For the 
moment they were elated that medicine was finally becoming recognized as a vital 
societal function.  It was not too long, however, before the conflict between the 
ultimate aims of the medical profession and the corporate philanthropy would come to 
light. 
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After the publication of the Flexner’s study in 1910, Carnegie Foundation 
found itself the object of more criticism than it had expected.  While the Carnegie 
Foundation was defending itself from various attacks by the adversely affected 
physicians, two Rockefeller philanthropies – the General Education Board and the 
Rockefeller Foundation – were formulating their own strategy of involvement in 
medical reform.  In the spring of 1911, the key figure behind the Rockefeller 
philanthropies, Frederick T. Gates, invited Abraham Flexner to have a lunch with him.  
After complimenting Flexner on his Report, Gates casually asked what he would do if 
he had one million dollars to invest in improvement of American medical education.  
Without the slightest hesitation, Flexner replied that he would give it all to Johns 
Hopkins medical school.  This was precisely what Gates wanted to hear and he asked 
if Flexner would go to Baltimore on behalf of the Rockefeller philanthropies to 
explore the possibility of giving Johns Hopkins a grant of one million dollars.11  
The choice of the first recipient of the Rockefeller grant was not accidental, 
for, if there was one institution which served as a cradle of modern American 
medicine, Johns Hopkins would be it.  The University was founded in 1893 with the 
$7 million which the wealthy Baltimore merchant, Johns Hopkins, left in his will to 
build a hospital and a university.  The serendipitous union between the university and 
the hospital dictated by their founder’s will augured well for the success of its medical 
faculty and the leaders of the university seized an opportunity to create in Baltimore a 
center of medical research and teaching modeled after the leading European 
institutions.  In a radical departure from prevailing practice, the School established 
full-time salaried positions in basic sciences of anatomy, physiology, pathology, and 
pharmacology, the first positions of this kind in America.  A traditional professor of 
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medicine who devoted only part of his time to teaching earned most of his income 
from private practice and in the end-of-the-century Baltimore could count on making 
about $10,000 a year, while the salary for the new full-time positions at Hopkins was 
set at $3,000 to $4,000.  For Baltimore’s prominent physicians this was a bad bargain 
but for the aspiring young researchers recruited from far and wide this was a unique 
opportunity to escape the mundane business of house-calls and devote themselves to 
science.   
William Henry Welch was one such man.  After graduating from Yale, Welch 
wanted to be a tutor in Greek but, seeing few employment prospects, he reluctantly 
followed his father into medicine.  To his own surprise, Welch was soon completely 
enamored of his new field but what sparked his interest was laboratories and 
dissecting rooms, not bedside practice.  After post-graduate study in Europe, Welch 
landed in New York’s Bellevue Hospital where he established the first pathological 
laboratory in America.  Soon afterward he was invited by president Gilman to become 
one of the first full-time professors at Johns Hopkins and went on to become the dean 
of the medical school and one of the most influential figures in American medicine.   
Having accepted Gates’ assignment, Flexner promptly arranged a meeting with 
Dr. Welch and two other prominent members of Hopkins faculty, Drs. Franklin P. 
Mall and William S. Halsted.  Mall, who headed the department of anatomy and 
represented, in effect, the basic science faculty, dominated the meeting.  “If the school 
could get a sum of approximately $1 million,” he proclaimed, “there is only one thing 
that we ought to do with it – use every penny of its income for the purpose of placing 
upon a salary basis the heads and assistants in the leading clinical departments.”  That, 
Mall added, “is the great reform which needs now to be carried  through.”12  Like 
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many among the first generation of American medical researchers, Mall strongly 
believed that medicine should be a science devoted to discovery of biological causes 
of disease rather than an art of bedside hand-holding and feeble therapies.  Mall saw 
the question of full-time appointments in broad ideological terms.   The medical 
profession, he insisted, had to decide “which ‘G’ to worship – Gold or Glory.”  
Encouraged by Flexner’s visit, he concluded that “the day of reckoning [was] at 
hand.” 13  Like many of his colleagues in the science departments, Mall resented the 
disparities in the rewards that society bestowed upon those who labored to fight 
disease at its source and those who attended on the wealthy patients.  For Mall, placing 
the clinical professors on the full-time basis would accomplish two things.  First, it 
would equalize the material interests and institutional loyalty of all medical faculty.  
Second,  it would ensure maximum progress in the advancement of medical science.  
Mall’s ideas formed the core of Flexner’s report to the Rockefeller foundations and 
Gates communicated to Welch that, if he could persuade his faculty to institute full-
time appointments in all departments, a grant of $1.5 million was assured.   
The laboratory faculty at Johns Hopkins was unanimous in its backing of the 
plan but the clinical faculty was split.  Quite unexpectedly, Dr. Lewellys Barker, who 
was one of the earliest proponents of the full-time plan, now stood in the way of its 
implementation at Hopkins refusing to give up his lucrative practice.  Eventually, he 
was convinced to resign his professorship and become a “clinical professor” drawing 
small salary for his teaching but being able to spend most of his time in private 
practice.  To replace him the university lured Dr. Theodore Janeway away from his 
chairmanship of surgery at Columbia and his lucrative New York practice.  In the fall 
of 1913 Dean Welch finally had the support of the majority of the clinical professors 
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and Johns Hopkins became the first medical school organized entirely on the full-time 
principle. 
As the news of the Hopkins plan spread, the wave of outrage among the 
practicing physicians swelled and the AMA joined their side.  Driving the attacks was 
the realization that, if the Hopkins model spread, faculty appointments would no 
longer be a way to build lucrative private practice.  More importantly for the 
Association, the ‘full-time’ plan threatened to separate the medical faculty from the 
rest of the profession and transfer their loyalties to the universities.  Much of the 
rhetoric was, of course, couched in loftier terms.  Many prominent members of the 
clinical departments argued that the full-time system would ruin medicine as a caring 
profession.  Dr. William Osler, the renowned professor of medicine who taught at 
Hopkins until 1904, claimed that without private practice physicians would lose touch 
with the real practice of medicine and present poor examples for their students.  
Actually, the full-time plan did not mean that clinical professors would stop bedside 
practice but only that it would be restricted to the patients of the hospital affiliated 
with the medical school.  What the clinical faculty really stood to lose was contact 
with the upper- and middle-class patients.  To his credit, Janeway, who became 
dissatisfied with full-time after a while, was more honest on this issue.  Resigning his 
position in 1917, he wrote a widely publicized article admitting that, among other 
things, his disillusionment stemmed from the fact that he and his family were used to a 
higher standard of living than his full-time salary allowed.   
The all too obvious economic motivations of the concerted attacks on the full-
time plan only confirmed to the Rockefeller foundations the dangerous extent of 
commercialism in the medical profession and the need to uproot it.  “This practice of 
fixing his own price granted to American physicians by custom,” Gates wrote to the 
other foundation trustees, “is the greatest present American obstruction to the 
  87 
usefulness of the science of medicine.  For it confines the benefits of the science too 
largely to the rich, when it is the rightful inheritance of all the people alike, and the 
public health requires they have it.”14  The profession’s pecuniary interests not only 
tended to deprive the poor of adequate medical care but also favored treatment, rather 
than prevention of disease.  The problem, of course, went beyond the physician.  
Individual patients summoned a physician only when already sick and paid for 
curative rather than preventive measures.  Both medical research and prevention were 
public goods and even the large units of social and economic organization, such as 
corporations or state governments, were likely to underinvest in them.  Like many 
leading philanthropic managers of his generation, Gates insisted from the beginning of 
his career to its end that “the fundamental aim of medical science ought to be not 
primarily the cure but primarily the prevention of disease.”  He firmly believed that 
during the first quarter of the 20th century “sanitary science and preventive medicine” 
reduced sickness by half, citing support from census mortality rates, insurance 
industry statistics, and state and local health boards.15  If medicine was to fulfill its 
preventive mission, however, economic interests and incentives which structured it 
had to be thoroughly reorganized.   
Rockefeller philanthropies, as well as other large foundations, viewed the ‘full-
time’ plan as a centerpiece of their strategy to subordinate the medical profession to 
the needs of industrial society.  Traditionally individual and therapeutic, physician’s 
function in society had to be made social and preventive and the full-time plan 
promised to accomplish two things in this regard. First, it would reorient the medical 
profession from attending to the needs of the well-to-do patients to serving the 
interests of society and humanity at large, by harnessing the income of medical 
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professors and researchers to university salaries rather than patient fees.  Second, by 
moderating physicians’ incomes, the full-time plan would reduce the overall costs of 
medical care placing them within the reach of all classes.  If society relies on doctors 
to fulfill important social functions, reasoned the captains of corporate philanthropy, 
then “the interests of the social order” must be considered first in any reform 
proposal.16 
The Full-Time Question at Columbia 
In the agreement of affiliation, reached in the spring of 1911, Columbia 
University did not formally commit itself to a jointly constructed medical center, but 
the leaders of both the Presbyterian and P&S were resolved on that goal.  In May of 
1915, after a thorough canvass of the upper part of Manhattan, the Presbyterian’s 
Building Committee reported that a three-square-block plot of land in the Washington 
Heights area, bounded by 165th and 168th Streets on the south and north, Broadway 
on the east and Fort Washington Avenue on the west, was the best site available.  At 
the time, the property was valued at about one and a half million dollars.  Because 
other parties had been negotiating for the property, Edward Harkness decided to 
secure the option with $77,000 of his own money but announced that the Hospital was 
under no obligation if it decided against the purchase.  The Managers agreed with the 
Committee that it was indeed the best site and authorized its purchase provided that 
Columbia gave proper assurances that it would share in the purchase of the property 
and would eventually reconstruct its Medical School there. 
Columbia Trustees declared that the University could agree to share in the 
purchase of a site only if they could raise their portion in five years.  Forced to be 
content with these assurances, Presbyterian had nonetheless proceeded with a plan to 
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purchase, hoping that Columbia would be able to come up with at least its half of the 
down-payment – $362,500 –  required by September.  Having raised their share by 
August 20, the leaders of the Presbyterian were disappointed to learn that Columbia 
did not have nearly enough.  A tense correspondence between Edward Harkness and 
Columbia’s President, Nicholas Murray Butler, ensued.  Butler reiterated that 
Columbia made no commitments to share in the down-payment, while Harkness 
accused University leaders of not doing nearly enough to secure the necessary funds.  
Presbyterian’ Board of Managers moved to extend the option on the property and give 
Columbia two more months to secure the funds.  Two days before the option was set 
to expire, Columbia’s President confidently announced that he expected to receive a 
gift from a certain donor on that very day and that the plan to purchase the property 
could now be finalized.  Alas, the gift never came and the Washington Heights site 
appeared to be lost for good.17 
As the year wore on, it became increasingly clear that America would sooner 
or later be drawn into the war raging in Europe.  Columbia’s failure to join in the 
purchase of the Washington Heights site and the preparations for the war, which began 
at Presbyterian months before the United States officially entered the conflict, had the 
inevitable effect of deferring further planning of the joint medical center.  At the end 
of the year, however, Presbyterian and New York hospitals began to explore the 
possibility of a merger between the two hospitals and the two medical schools 
affiliated with them.  Negotiations seemed very promising and by the end of the spring 
all four institutions were apparently on board.  A month later, however, Columbia 
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declared that there were “insuperable legal obstacles” to the merger and, with that, the 
whole proposal was abandoned.18 
Soon afterward, Columbia invited Dr. Abraham Flexner to prepare a 
memorandum on medical education in New York with special emphasis on the 
question of the Columbia-Presbyterian affiliation.  Not surprisingly, Flexner’s 
memorandum closely followed the premises of his famous 1910 Report on medical 
education.  In a nutshell, Flexner recommended that the Hospital and the School be 
reconstructed in one location, all clinical instruction concentrated in the Presbyterian 
Hospital, and the clinical staff reorganized on the full-time principle.   Following this 
study, President Butler wrote to the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations to state 
Columbia’s intentions to proceed with the project of the Medical Center essentially 
along the lines recommended in Dr. Flexner’s memorandum.  On the basis of this 
letter, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the two 
Rockefeller philanthropies – the Rockefeller Foundation and the General Education 
Board – stated their interest in contributing one million dollars each to the project and 
conferences between the representatives of the Medical School, Presbyterian Hospital, 
and the two foundations ensued.  As a result of these talks, all parties, including 
Columbia, which was represented during the conferences by President Butler, agreed 
on the plan which included all the main recommendations developed in Flexner’s 
memorandum.19  
The official account of these events is consistent with an elaborate subterfuge 
which the Rockefeller foundations used to push its full-time project.  When selected 
medical schools were approached with grant offers, the foundation officials made it 
very clear that the adoption of a strict full-time appointments in all departments was a 
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non-negotiable condition.  They were careful, however, that such communication was 
made orally and confidentially and that the written proposal to adopt the full-time 
system emanated from the institution, not the foundations.  According to this fiction, 
institutions themselves proposed to institute strict full-time requirement and, 
moreover, chose to be bound by elaborate contracts which invariably included a clause 
stating that if the full-time plan shall be “abandoned, substantially modified or 
departed from”  without the consent of the grant-making foundation, the university 
will, upon demand of the foundation, return its grant.20  The foundations made sure 
that prior correspondence was orchestrated in a manner that supported this myth.  The 
events that followed made it abundantly clear that both the Columbia’s solicitation of 
Flexner’s study and the President Butler’s “proposal” to the foundations were typical 
steps of this process. 
Shortly after publicly agreeing on the terms of the Rockefeller and Carnegie 
grants, Columbia’s President wrote two confidential letters to the President of the 
Presbyterian, Mr. William Sloane, in which he vehemently objected to the main points 
of the Flexner’s report and declared that the University could not go through with the 
plan.  He declared that the terms of the grants were “so reactionary and so antagonistic 
to the best interests of the public, of medical education, and of Columbia University, 
that they will not, under any circumstances be approved by us.”21  Obviously, 
Columbia desperately needed the money promised by the Rockefeller and the 
Carnegie foundations but President Butler and the Dean of the Medical School chafed 
under the compulsion to submit to the conditions imposed by the outsiders in return 
for receiving from their largesse.   
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This turn of events raised serious concerns among Presbyterian’s leadership.  
The three key figures on its Board who represented the Hospital at the negotiations – 
Edward Harkness, William Sloane and Henry W. deForest – supported the conditions 
stipulated by the Rockefeller foundations.  As the letter accompanying his gift to the 
Hospital testified, Edward Harkness shared the basic belief of the Rockefeller and 
Carnegie foundations that medicine’s “real underlying province and mission to 
humanity lies more particularly in preventing disease than merely curing it” and his 
vision of how modern scientific medicine ought to be organized was in substantial 
agreement with that of the foundations’ leaders.  Understandably, Harkness and his 
supporters among the Presbyterian’s Managers were outraged at Columbia’s resistance 
and President Butler’s personal backing of the conservative members of medical 
faculty.  Either out of desperation or in hope to exert the last bit of pressure, the 
Managers resolved to cancel the affiliation agreement of 1911 and sent an official 
notice to that effect to Columbia’s Trustees.  
Columbia Trustees agreed with President Butler’s position but declined, at this 
time, to approve the cancellation of the affiliation agreement and asked for another 
round of negotiations with Presbyterian.  What transpired during the nine months 
between January 18 and October 22, 1918 is not known because the official reports of 
the negotiations between Presbyterian and Columbia that took place during this time 
are missing from the records.  According to Dr. Lamb’s account of the history of 
Presbyterian Hospital, the most plausible explanation of the gap in records is that these 
negotiations contained so much open and personal criticism that the Managers decided 
at some later date to withdraw or destroy them.22  When the dust settled, President 
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Butler withdrew from the negotiating committee for Columbia and a new dean was 
appointed to head the medical school. 
Dean Darrach’s Memorandum  
Shortly after succeeding Dr. Samuel L. Lambert as the Dean of the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons in summer of 1918,  Dr. William Darrach wrote a 
‘Memorandum on the School of Medicine,’ in which he supported the view that the 
clinical departments should be restructured on a full-time basis and proposed a 
concrete plan of organization.  It is apparent that the memorandum was meant to serve 
the same purpose as President Butler’s earlier “proposal” to the foundations; less clear 
is the extent to which Dean Darrach believed what he wrote.  Regardless of its 
sincerity, the memorandum outlined a specific form in which the full-time plan would 
be adopted at Columbia and serve as a telling background for the rhetorical strategy of 
retraction. 
Dean’s memorandum opened with an appropriately forceful affirmation of the 
holy trinity of the new scientific medicine – “teaching, research, and the care of the 
sick” – which was to be embodied in its new temple, the university medical center.23  
To pursue this tripartite goal, declared Darrach, Columbia Medical School required an 
intimate geographical and functional union with a teaching hospital, limitation of the 
number of students, and reorganization of the main clinical departments of a full-time 
basis.  All three, of course, represented the main demands of the foundations. 
The major portion of the document was devoted to the discussion of the full-
time plan.  Darrach wrote that “the heads of [the basic science] departments have long 
been on the full-time basis, and with no legislation … voluntarily refrained from any 
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outside employment.”  In view of the most salutary results in teaching and research 
that the ‘full-time’ organization produced in basic science departments, it was 
imperative that the main clinical departments also be reorganized on the full-time 
basis: “Medicine and Surgery immediately, and Pediatrics [and other departments] as 
soon as financial and clinical facilities permit.”  As Dean Darrach understood it, the 
essential principle behind the full-time organization was that “the dominating group of 
men … must be free to concentrate their energies on their university and hospital 
work.”  In the clinical departments, however, 
[t]here are two main factors which tend to interfere with this freedom, no 
matter how sincere the intentions of the men may be.  These factors are 
insufficient assistance and the distractions of private practice.  By providing 
the full-time men with sufficient assistance, professional, clerical, technical 
and menial, he may relieve himself of such unnecessary details as he desires.  
He must also be protected from the demands of private practice. 
Private practice presented particular difficulties for the most talented members 
of the clinical faculty because “[a]s a man’s value as a clinician increases, the 
demands made for his services by the public naturally increase.” 
If this increasing demand is satisfied he will have less and less time for his 
university duties.  It therefore becomes necessary for these men to control the 
amount of private practice they shall do and the conditions under which it is 
done.  
“There is apparently,” opined the Dean, “but little question in the minds of medical 
educators as to the wisdom and necessity of this main principle [but] there is, 
however, some doubt and much discussion concerning the details of organization [as] 
evidenced by the wide variation among the plans now in force or planned throughout 
the country.”  There were five possible ways in which the limitation of the demands of 
private could be achieved. 
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Plan 1. No private practice and no outside employment.  
Plan 2. Private practice at the discretion of the clinician but no fee is paid 
for such service.  
Plan 3. As in Plan 2 except that the fee is paid to the University.  
Plan 4. Private practice for fees allowed in such limited amounts that it 
does not interfere with the thorough, efficient and sincere fulfillment of his 
academic duties.  
Plan 5. Unlimited private practice within the hospital.  
 
According to Darrach, Plan 1 has not been tried anywhere, Plan 2 was in effect at the 
Rockefeller Hospital, Plan 3 was adopted at Johns Hopkins, Plan 4 was instituted in 
several schools and Plan 5 was the one suggested for Columbia and Presbyterian in 
1911, but not implemented.  The Dean recommended the Columbia Medical School 
adopt Plan 2. 
To explain his choice, Dean noted that Plan 1, in which the clinicians would 
limit their clinical experience to the wards of the hospital and the dispensary, was “the 
simplest method” from “an administrative standpoint.”  However, he thought it 
“unwise to deprive the public of these men’s services, for patients who are not eligible 
for the charity wards are at times of great scientific, educational, or humanitarian 
interest.”  Plans 2 and 3 removed the above objection.  However, the payment of the 
patient fees to the University, which was the practice at Johns Hopkins, was “strongly 
criticized by many men and is not entirely satisfactory to some of the men who have 
been working under that arrangement,” wrote Darrach alluding, undoubtedly, to 
Janeway’s article.  Somewhat puzzlingly, Plan 4, under which the hospital would 
provide a number of private office facilities to the clinicians who would then “spend a 
large part of, if not all, of their time in the school and hospital” was rejected because 
“it could not be combined with Plan 2 without introducing a discordant element into 
the situation.”  Finally, Plan 5 was “the one suggested by the Faculty of the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons in 1911 [but did not] meet the requirements of today, as with 
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unlimited facilities within the hospital such private practice might well claim the 
major portion of a man’s attention.”    
Thus, the Dean proposed to organize the clinical departments such that “the 
director with all of his associates … and as many of his other assistants as he desires 
and can afford, shall be on the basis of Plan 2.”  This scheme would allow physicians 
to “see private patients at their discretion for scientific, educational, humanitarian, or 
personal reasons” but since no fee would be paid, it would protect them from the 
excessive demands of private practice by “removing the financial inducement.” 
Subsequent events would make it clear that, in truth, Plan 2 was preferable 
only to Plan 1.  Whether charging no fees at all, as in Plan 2, or turning the fees over 
to the University, as per Plan 3, was more repugnant to the clinicians’ sense of 
‘justice’ is hard to say, although the latter certainly made more economic sense.  Plan 
5 was probably the most desirable, closely followed by Plan 4.  For the time being, 
however, Dean Darrach could not say that and had to paint his ideal of the medical 
center’s organization within the confines of what was acceptable to the foundations.  
So limited, Dean Darrach proceeded to elaborate all the advantages that ought to be 
secured for those who will head the full-time departments.  “The fundamental 
principle upon which these departments shall be reorganized,” insisted Darrach, “is 
that the control of each main clinical department shall be vested in a director.”  What 
he envisioned was admittedly a more hierarchical organization than that which 
traditionally obtained at medical schools.   
At the head of each shall be placed a man of such training, ability, and 
character that he may assume full responsibility for and the direction of the 
general policies of the department, the character of the teaching, the hospital 
service, and the nomination of his associates.  It shall be his duty to develop a 
modern clinic of the best type. 
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Greater power required greater resources and the memorandum dreamily 
envisioned full wards and plentiful assistants to relieve the university physicians from 
tedious administrative and technical tasks.  “The head of the department,” he 
pronounced, “shall be given every facility to develop a well-rounded, modern clinic, 
with sufficient clinical material in both wards and dispensary, with the specialized 
assistants, professional, clerical, and menial he requires, and the necessary 
laboratories.” 
The new men of science would have to be properly rewarded. “The salary of 
[full-time] men … should be sufficient to make them independent of any private work 
and that of the director should be enough to allow him to assume the position in the 
world that he deserves.”  Further indulging his fantasy, Dean Darrach declared  that 
the head of each department “should have as much time for constructive thought and 
productive leisure as the head of a large industrial concern.”  That said, physicians’ 
primary motivations had nothing to do with either money, or power. 
Of more importance than salary for either type of man is the proper 
arrangement of his work, so that he shall be freed from unessential details and 
useless waste of time.  In the end the opportunity to carry on teaching and 
research under wholesome conditions is the most effective force for bringing 
into the medical school men of ability and ideals.  
On the whole, Dean Darrach’s memorandum succeeded in striking a consistent 
note but some statements were obvious ‘red flags.’   Although he stated that unlimited 
private practice would interfere with clinicians’ university duties “no matter how 
sincere the intentions of the men may be,” the Dean preferred not to dwell on the crass 
material interests.  The question was ethical, not economic, he contended. 
The success of any plan will depend on the character of the man in question 
and the spirit of the school.  Any form of legislation will be unavailing if the 
wrong men are appointed to these positions.  There are many forms of 
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distraction besides private practice, especially in New York City, which might 
lure a man from proper fulfillment of his academic duties. 
In a strange prelude to his careful consideration of five possible ways to institute the 
full-time plan, Darrach refused to grant importance to the specific rules of 
implementation. 
The main purpose is to obtain a more truly university type of clinical teacher.  
The full-time plan is a means to this end – a method by which it may be 
obtained.  Neither the time element nor the question of fees is, in itself, the 
essential point, and these must not be confounded with the primary object.  
More mundanely, the memorandum also sounded concern with financial feasibility of 
strict full-time plan.  
Even if it were advisable to have the entire department on a full-time basis, the 
expense in certain departments would be enormous and the plan therefore 
impractical.  [T]he conduct of hospital, dispensary, and school requires 
additional assistance from men giving only part of their time to hospital, 
dispensary and school.  The extent to which they are used should vary with the 
ideas and plans of the respective directors, provided they are not made an 
essential part of the hospital organization.  
Finally, the Dean ended his memorandum by saying that “[t]his plan represents the 
best thought of the present time but will naturally be subject to such modifications and 
changes in future years as larger experience may suggest and justify.”   
There would be no need to read anything into these lines if it were not for the 
fact that these very statements would later be used to renege on the full-time plan as 
outlined in the Dean’s memorandum.  For the time being, however, Dean Darrach’s 
memorandum formed the basis for reopening the negotiations between Columbia, 
Presbyterian, and the foundations, which resulted in the signing of a new affiliation 
agreement on February 10 of 1921.  The agreement was conditional on the 
University’s raising three million dollars for construction costs.  Three months later, 
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the Carnegie Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the General Education 
Board each donated one million dollars to Columbia and the second agreement 
became effective.   
As an unexpected surprise, Edward Harkness announced that he and his 
mother were giving the Hospital and the University the twenty-two acre site at the 
Washington Heights.  It turned out that, in 1915, when the site appeared to be lost due 
to Columbia’s lack of funds, the Harkness family secretly purchased it to hold until 
such time when the differences between Columbia and Presbyterian were ironed out 
and a solid basis for affiliation established.  With that, the real work of planning the 
Medical Center could finally begin. 
Inauguration and Repeal of the Full-Time Plan at Columbia 
It appears that, for a while, Columbia and Presbyterian indeed tried a strict full-
time system as outlined by Dean Darrach and agreed to by all the sides to the 
negotiations.  The main clinical departments – Medicine and Surgery – had started on 
Plan 2 on July 1, 1921.24  As could have been expected, the announcement and 
implementation of the full-time plan prompted a new wave of resignations.  It seemed, 
too, that much of the reorganization was affected by transplanting a large group of 
clinicians from Johns Hopkins, who had already worked there the full-time system 
under, to New York.  
The Medical Service was reorganized under Dr. Walter Palmer who was at 
Johns Hopkins at the time of his appointment. With him eight other physicians and a 
chemist came to Presbyterian from Johns Hopkins.  After a number of resignations 
among the old staff, all of the higher posts in the Medical Service were placed on a 
full-time basis.  Lower-level positions, however, remained with the part-time 
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appointees.  In the Surgical Service, full-time reorganization was more drastic.  On 
July 1, Dr. Adrian Lambert resigned from the post of Director of Surgical Service.  
The new Director, Dr. Allen O. Whipple decided to reduce the surgeons with 
attending rank from thirteen to five and place all of them on strict full-time basis.  As a 
result, ten surgeons left the staff and two new appointments were made.25   
The retrenchment of the strict ‘full-time,’ however, began almost as soon as 
the system was instituted.  Less than six months after the inauguration of the full-time 
plan, dissatisfaction became so apparent that Edward Harkness gave a dinner at his 
house on January 17, 1922 to discuss the matter.  Dr. Lamb, who was among those 
invited to this informal conference, reminisced that their host had been convinced by 
Dean Darrach that Plan 2 was not only sound but perfectly acceptable and, therefore, it 
came as a considerable surprise to him that “there were features of the full-time 
program not altogether satisfactory.”  In an atmosphere of their informal exchange, 
however, the representatives of the clinical faculty made it clear that the official 
acceptance by the faculty of the 1921 agreement “had not meant that all who 
consented to participate in full-time were in full accord with all of its provisions.”26  
Apparently,  
[t]he clinicians had all been most anxious to have the affiliation consummated 
between Presbyterian and Columbia, especially after the tense and protracted 
negotiations of ten years.  Since the plan proposed by Dean Darrach’s 
“Memorandum” had been favorably received by both institutions and by the 
three foundations, the doctors had accepted the plan whole-heartedly even at 
the temporary sacrifice of personal convictions and financial security.  The 
trial of the plan, they had hoped, would lead to the elimination of many 
difficulties …  
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The dinner meeting resulted in a consensus on two issues: that the policy of not 
charging fees for services to private patients was unsound and that the current salaries 
were inadequate to attract and retain sufficient number of high-caliber clinical faculty.  
In accordance with these conclusions, the Medical Board submitted to the Medical 
School’s Committee on Administration a document outlining the changes to the full-
time plan that had been agreed upon at the dinner meeting.  Proposed changes were 
three-fold: private patients should be charged; the Hospital should collect such fees 
and turn them over to the University’s special fund for research and teaching; and the 
salaries of several full-time clinicians should be adjusted so they may cope with the 
cost of living in New York.  In addition, the Medical Board recommended that the 
clinical departments be organized on a more flexible model than the strict full-time 
and include three categories of appointments: “(1) full-time men; (2) men with offices 
and sufficient private beds in the Hospital, confining their work entirely to the 
Hospital, but receiving fees directly from patients; (3) part-time men, limited service 
to the Hospital, with offices outside.”27  
After more conferences, the Joint Administrative Board and the University 
sanctioned the following changes in the full-time arrangement.  Private patients would 
be charged fees according to the schedule fixed by the doctor in attendance and 
approved by the Superintendent. The fees would be collected by the Hospital and 
credited to a fund for paying full-time clinicians supplementary salaries based upon 
the expected fees. The Hospital would estimate the amount it expected to collect each 
year and pay this sum in equal monthly installments to the University.  Any 
discrepancy between the estimated and collected amounts should be adjusted the 
following year.  These changes were to become effective on July 1, 1922.   
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What the Medical Board won in this round of its campaign to repeal the full-
time system was essentially a change from Plan 2 to Plan 3, the Johns Hopkins plan.  
It will be recalled, however, that Dean Darrach rejected Plan 3 because “the payment 
of the [patient] fee to the University [was] strongly criticized by many men and [was] 
not entirely satisfactory to some of the men who have been working under that 
arrangement.” Although the fees collected from private patients made possible a 25 to 
50 percent increase in clinicians’ salaries, the new arrangement did not address what 
appeared to be the main issue of contention.  Clinicians were especially incensed by 
the requirement that patient charges be approved by the Superintendent and collected 
by the Hospital.  In line with the official stance of the organized profession, 
Columbia’s clinical professors considered both to be dangerous precedents of 
administrative control of professional fees.28  Less than a year after the first round of 
changes to full-time system were put in effect Dean Darrach was moved to appoint a 
committee to propose a thorough revision of the whole full-time program. 
The Report on the Organization of Clinical Departments 
The committee’s recommendations were summarized in a Report on the 
Organization of Clinical Departments which called for abolition of all restrictions on 
private practice by the members of the clinical faculty.  Committee’s argument rested 
on three main ideas.  First, the full-time requirement was unnecessary because, as a 
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members of a profession, physicians were above material interests and economic 
motives.  Second, the restrictions on private practice or, for that matter, any other 
externally imposed rules, were inimical to professional work and would not be 
tolerated.  Third, the full-time organization of the clinical departments was deeply 
unfair to the members of the non-clinical departments.  We examine each in turn. 
The authors of the Report began by stating that the argument for the necessity 
to place clinical faculty on the full-time basis rested on erroneous assumptions.  The 
initial impulse to reorganize clinical departments, argued the authors, arose out of “the 
general dissatisfaction felt at many medical schools where the clinical teaching and 
scientific productiveness were considered inferior to those in the fundamental 
departments.”29  The inferiority of the clinical departments was believed to be due to 
the fact that “the clinicians spent less time on their school work and took less interest 
in it.”  To remedy the situation, it was suggested that “if the financial attraction of 
private practice was supplanted by a high salary and the individual’s whole energies 
confined to University channels, true excellence of teaching must result.”  Two 
assumptions, then, informed the views of those who advocated full-time in clinical 
departments: (1) “that only by offering larger salaries could clinicians [truly devoted 
to teaching and research] be secured;” and (2) that placing clinicians on salaries and 
restricting practice outside of the teaching hospital “were necessary to protect them 
from the demands of what is commonly known as private practice.” 
There were a number of fallacies inherent in these assumptions, argued the 
Committee.  The first of these was that physicians were or could be motivated by 
economic interest.  To the authors of the Report, the restriction of private practice 
imposed by the full-time plan was insulting because it implied “that the clinicians 
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must be prevented from succumbing to their own weakness” and added that “[s]uch an 
implication [was] not the best basis for continued cordial understanding and loyal 
service.”  The architects of the full-time plan, warned the Report, failed to take into 
account that “the services of the most desirable clinicians cannot be secured merely by 
offering high salaries” and that neither money, nor facilities could “buy their 
continued services under conditions which are burdensome and restrictive.”  The 
attraction of private practice did not stem from its monetary rewards but from 
professional satisfaction that physicians derived from it.  Unlike medical faculty in 
basic science departments who are “wholly devoted to the application of science,” 
clinical professors “must practice an art or cease to be clinicians.”  By imposing full-
time requirements on clinical departments, “[h]uman nature was to be cut to fit an 
idea.”  
More precisely, the issue was not so much about human nature but the nature 
of the professional man. 
[I]f the University has secured the right type of man and if it has provided him 
with a fair salary and with facilities and opportunities commensurate with his 
needs and desires, he will neither want to do too much private practice nor will 
he have to.  His tastes lie in other directions.  There is no need for special 
prohibitions. 
Mindful of the incontrovertible record of Johns Hopkins, the Committee remarked that 
it was “idle to ask whether men work better under agreeable than under disagreeable 
conditions.” 
Good work has been done in both ways.  But it is generally accepted that men 
work longer and more contentedly and with less wasted effort under congenial 
working conditions.  And it may be urged that the most intelligent men work 
best in an atmosphere of confidence and are unlikely to abuse it, for dishonesty 
is unintelligent. 
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Regarding Columbia’s own experience with disagreeable working conditions, the 
authors insisted that, in assessing the work of clinical faculty under the full-time 
system, “most of the advantages must be credited to the clinicians who have done the 
work and that most of the disadvantages must be debited against the plan under which 
they did it.”  When it came to professional and scholarly work, what mattered was not 
the structure of the institution, but the character of men working within them.  ‘Men 
over rules’ was the idea that would sound frequently in the pages of the Report. 
Contradicting their own argument that the full-time plan was to be made 
attractive by offering large salaries, the authors of the Report warned that “many of the 
clinicians limited to unremunerative practice felt that they would be financially unable 
to continue working much longer under this plan.”  In general, they admitted, the 
restrictions on private practice were “uncomfortably felt by those upon whom they had 
been imposed” and the University was unable “to find enough men willing to work 
under the plan.”  This was so despite the fact that that, as the Report made clear, the 
salaries of the clinical professors, both under Plan 2 and Plan 3, were considerably 
higher than those of the non-clinical colleagues.  Lofty statements notwithstanding, 
then, here was what should have been an embarrassing and puzzling revelation that the 
clinical professors felt entitled to not only larger but much larger income than that 
received by non-clinical faculty.   
This unsettling proposition, however, was quite minor in comparison the 
audacity of the rhetorical move that followed.  Soon after the establishment of the full-
time plan in all departments, said the Committee, it began to be widely felt that the 
arrangement was “unfair to the non-clinical departments in attracting men away from 
them by the higher salaries and wider opportunities of similar positions in the clinical 
departments.”  Apparently, the fact was that either non-clinical departments were 
staffed with the ‘wrong’ men or, unlike their clinical colleagues, non-clinical faculty 
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was too weak to resist the lure of the higher pay.  The disparity in salary was 
uncomfortable for the clinical professors too, who were immediately set apart “as 
objects of interest, admiration, envy or disdain according to the spirit and inclination 
of the commentator.”  Admittedly, said the Committee, non-clinical faculty were far 
more affected and it is their plight that most concerned the authors of the Report.  
“Granted that the right men are doing the work, there is one infallible test for the 
success of any plan of organization: Has it operated to their satisfaction and to the 
satisfaction of their colleagues in the other departments, or has it not?”  Answering its 
own question, the authors of the Report unanimously concluded that the plan has not 
operated to the satisfaction of their non-clinical colleagues.30  
Rather than a source of the clinicians’ handsome incomes, private practice was 
cast in the Report as a matter of academic freedom.  The full-time system was “not a 
real University basis for it was lacking in that essential academic freedom which is a 
primary requisite in University departments.”  It imposed upon the clinical faculty of 
the medical school “restrictions which have never been laid upon the officers of any 
other departments of the University.”  The burdensome restrictions on private had to 
be lifted in order to restore the “freedom of choice which does not now exist in the 
Departments of Medicine and Surgery.” All the Committee proposed was “to 
authorize the Departments of Medicine and Surgery to assume the same rights and 
duties as the other Departments of the University” and implied nothing more than “the 
removal of the restrictions regarding private practice and the reduction of the salaries 
in [clinical] Departments to conform with those of other Departments in the Medical 
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School.”  Expressing the will of the entire medical faculty, the Report demanded “the 
removal of those distinctions between Departments which have become invidious 
distinctions during the trial of [full-time] experiment.” 
The full-time requirement in clinical departments, argued the Committee, was 
adopted on an experimental basis, the fact clearly indicated in Dean Darrach’s 
memorandum. 
The radical plan – incorporating a definition of Full-Time service for clinicians 
which had not before been tried out by any Medical School – was finally 
adopted as offering a chance for a very clear-cut demonstration of the 
desirability or undesirability of the strictest sort of full-time for clinicians.  It 
was adopted on trial.  This was definitely stated in the last paragraph of the 
Memorandum of December 13, 1919, and the clinicians of the Departments of 
Medicine and Surgery undertook with the utmost seriousness and with full 
appreciation of its difficulties the scientific trial of this important experiment. 
According to the Committee, “the experimental trial of this plan of full-time for 
clinicians has been completed, the data recorded and the conclusions drawn” and now 
it was time to announce that “the plan has been proven unsatisfactory.”  However, 
insisted the authors, “it cannot be too strongly emphasized and it must be very clearly 
understood that this proposition for a change in the plan of its application does not in 
any way imply an abandonment of the principle of full-time for clinicians.”  How 
could these two seemingly contradictory statements be reconciled?  “The principle of 
full-time,” wrote the Committee, “bears the same relation to the plan of its application 
as the spirit of a law bears to the letter of that law.”  That was precisely what Dean 
Darrach meant when he wrote that  
[t]he main purpose is to obtain a more truly university type of clinical teacher.  
The full-time plan is a means to this end – a method by which it may be 
obtained.  Neither the time element nor the question of fees is, in itself, the 
essential point, and these must not be confounded with the primary object. 
Elaborating Dean’s thought, the Committee insisted that  
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[t]he real essential is to live up to the spirit of full-time rather than to preserve 
its empty name.  This cannot be effected by the imposition of restrictions nor 
by the lure of extraordinary salaries.  It can only be accomplished … by 
securing for the clinical departments clinicians of the highest caliber who 
desire to work in this spirit, the spirit of service. 
Turning outright Hegelian, the authors of the Report argued that “the University ideal 
of teaching can be lived up to more closely [when] spiritual leadership rather than 
restrictive legislation will be the impelling force.”  In effect, what the Committee was 
proposing was not a repeal of the ‘full-time’ but its transcendence and the higher aim 
for which they reached had its own capital-letter name.  
[W]e cannot help feeling that a new tradition has arisen within those years: a 
tradition of Full-Service rather than of Full-Time; a tradition which has been 
founded by no one Department alone but which can be shared equally by all.  
We feel that the present Directors and their Associates in the Departments of 
our School are the type of men who will foster this tradition.  And we 
confidently expect that, under their inspiring leadership, the troublesome 
distinctions between full-time and part-time will eventually disappear in the 
general desire to give full service: full-service which can be rendered by any 
man – whether he works one hour or eight hours or twenty – if he gives the 
best there is in him to the University.  
If all the lofty rhetoric did not suffice to convince their audience, the 
committee laid out the more prosaic reasons to return to the old order. 
It is expected that the clinical staffs can be considerably increased in numbers 
without an increase in cost to the University. … [T]he young men who need 
financial help and the older men who object to the present restrictions can be 
brought back into the service of the Departments.  Thus the present burden of 
work in the O.P.D. clinic and in the wards and clinical laboratories, which is 
now carried by a few, can be better divided among an adequate number of 
workers; and provision may be begun for the greater burden which is to be 
expected in the new development of the proposed Medical Center.  
If the proposed changes received approval, wrote the authors in conclusion, 
one thing would be certain: “the officers of the Medical School will again be working 
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under an organization plan of their own choosing.”  This, however, was exactly what 
the leaders of the Rockefeller foundations wished to prevent. 
The Defeat of the Full-Time Requirement 
The trustees of both institutions approved the proposed changes and, effective 
January 1, 1924, restrictions concerning private practice were lifted and the salaries in 
the clinical departments were to be gradually reduced to conform with those in the 
non-clinical.  The change, however, was not reported to the three foundations upon 
whose funding Columbia was relying for financing the construction of the new 
Medical School building.  The foundations’ officers first learned about it from a brief 
paragraph in the Columbia Alumni News dated May 30, 1924 which read: 
During the past year the Faculty of the Medical School advised the 
abandonment of the “full-time” teaching system in P. and S., and a return to 
the part-time system now general throughout the University is being worked 
out.31  
The General Education Board and the Rockefeller Foundation were outraged at 
what they considered an act of bad faith and at the fact that they had not been 
consulted about the change.32 They informed Columbia that, since full-time had been 
‘abandoned,’ they were no longer under obligation to supply the grants.  Both 
Columbia and Presbyterian officials were naturally very perturbed about this turn of 
events. Several conferences were hastily called but, as the year drew to a close, a 
solution to the crisis had yet to be found.  
On January 9, 1925, Columbia issued a resolution reassuring Presbyterian that 
there was “no change in the determination of Columbia University to proceed with the 
Medical Center.” Unfortunately, it could offer little comfort since the University 
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simply did not have an alternative source of funds and its assertion could not quiet the 
fears about the fate of the whole project.  The Rockefeller institutions remained 
adamant and there was even talk of a suit against Columbia for breach of contract.33   
By Fall of 1925 there was still no settlement and the two Rockefeller 
foundations announced that they intended to cancel their agreements with the 
University.  Meanwhile, Dr. Walter Palmer, who held the joint posts of Director of the 
Medical Service and Chair of Department of Medicine, had been working on a 
proposal for settling the dispute. He was well respected by the authorities of the 
foundations, and Columbia trustees urged him to seize the dwindling chance of saving 
two million dollars of grants.   
What Dr. Palmer accomplished within the next few weeks in his talks with 
foundation officials may at first seem to be nothing short of a diplomatic feat.  In a 
memorandum which he submitted to the Rockefeller foundations, Dr. Palmer pointed 
out that a considerable number of physicians in the Medical Service – nine, to be 
precise – would prefer to work on a full-time basis.  However, four out of nine, 
including himself, “found it necessary to take advantage of the privilege of 
supplementing their salaries by limited private practice in the Hospital.”34  The 
memorandum, then, proposed salary increases for all nine doctors plus another 
$11,000 to hire a new Associate Physician and three Assistants.  Increases requested 
ranged between 13 and 67 percent of current salaries and the sum of all funds 
requested totaled $28,000 a year.   
If the salary increases were effected, wrote Dr. Palmer, all nine physicians 
would work on a form of full-time, while retaining the right to see private patients of 
interest to them. The fees collected from private patients would go into a fund to be 
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used for purposes determined at a later time. Dr. Palmer estimated that about $68,000 
were needed for the next two and a half years, until the Service was completely 
established at the new Medical Center, at which time it would be possible to cover 
salary increases from the regular budget.  Dr. Palmer’s proposal, then, was that the 
foundations provide the relatively small sum of $68,000 to permit full-time work by 
these physicians.  In conclusion to his proposal, he stated:  
In the light of the turmoils and struggles of the last four years, the above plan 
may appear to be a reversal of opinion.  This is not the case.  From the very 
beginning, the desirability of providing for suitable men relieved of the 
necessity of practicing to supplement their salaries in order that they might 
devote their time and energy to teaching and research has been recognized and 
stated.  That this can be accomplished in association with men in active 
practice has been amply demonstrated. 35 
In mid-December, Dr. Palmer represented the Medical School and Hospital at 
a decisive meeting with Abraham Flexner, who represented the General Education 
Board, and Thomas Debevoise of the Rockefeller Foundation.  Apparently, Mr. 
Debevoise had with him the papers necessary for canceling the agreements with 
Columbia. The copy of Dr. Palmer’s memorandum had been already circulated among 
all the parties to the dispute and now he made an official presentation of his case.  Dr. 
Palmer declared emphatically that there had not been the slightest intention of 
abandoning the full-time principle, but, on the contrary, a special effort to increase its 
usefulness. A number of doctors on the Medical Service were already working on full-
time, as the memorandum showed, and others wished to do so when the funds became 
available.  
In what seemed like an unlikely event, Dr. Palmer’s plan was accepted and 
Abraham Flexner announced that the General Education Board would provide the 
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$68,000.  Columbia emerged from the shadow of the long crisis not only with the 
original two million dollars of grants but with an additional sum to increase the 
salaries of the Medical Service. The full-time arrangement applied only to certain men 
who did not object to the restrictions.  The biggest victory of all, however, was to be 
found in the language of the new agreements with the two foundations.  That with the 
General Education Board stated that “ … nothing in this agreement shall be 
understood to impair the responsibility and right of the University to make in future 
years such changes and modifications in the organization and conduct of the Medical 
Clinic as educational and scientific experience may, in their judgment, justify.” The 
agreement with the Rockefeller Foundation placed still fewer obligations on 
Columbia: “It is understood that the University will give a trial to the plan for which 
these funds are contributed but will not be obligated to continue any particular type of 
organization or method of instruction.”36  
Behind this unexpected reversal of Columbia’s fortune lay deeper changes in 
the policy of the philanthropic foundations.  One year after the General Education 
Board extended to Johns Hopkins a one and a half million dollar grant on a condition 
of strict full-time organization of all departments, Dr. Welch reported that the system 
was a great success.  Encouraged by their success at Hopkins, over the next few years 
the Rockefeller foundations made grants to Washington University at St. Louis, Yale, 
and the University of Chicago on similar conditions.  Opposition to the full-time plan, 
however, did not abate either within or outside the university circles.  Dr. Janeway’s 
departure from Johns Hopkins and his public criticism of its full-time plan were 
uncomfortably felt by the foundations but the biggest blow came from Harvard.   
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The General Education Board invited Harvard to apply for a grant while the 
details of its contract with Johns Hopkins were being worked out.  At the time, 
Harvard could really use the money but the chances that its clinical faculty might be 
persuaded to accept the strict full-time plan appeared quite low.  Opposition to strict 
full-time policy at Harvard was lead by the renowned neurosurgeon Harvey Cushing 
and the former dean of the school Henry A. Christian.  Like other faculty members, 
Cushing and Christian had lucrative private practices and refused to give them up.  
Cushing was also a brilliant researcher and his commitment to scientific medicine 
could hardly be doubted.  He even offered his resignation to Harvard President 
Lowell, so as to not stand in the way of the medical school receiving the grant, but, as 
he undoubtedly knew, the President considered the famous surgeon more important to 
Harvard’s academic reputation than the $1.5 million dollars.37 
Lacking the clear support of the faculty, Harvard tried to obtain the grant by 
promising that clinical professors would “devote the major part of their time to school 
and hospital work,” but could still collect fees from their private patients who they 
would see in offices located at the university hospital.38  The chiefs of the Rockefeller 
philanthropies, however, refused to accept the diluted full-time plans which Harvard 
submitted to them over a period of several years.  If exceptions were made for some 
schools, they would be able to lure the best clinical faculty from those schools who 
adhered to the strict full-time by matching their salaries plus allowing them to keep 
fees from private practice.  In fact, the raiding was already in full swing and Johns 
Hopkins had to work very hard to keep their best clinicians.   
The stature of the Harvard faculty, as well the incomes and interests involved, 
however, were too powerful and the Rockefeller foundations failed to make Harvard 
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accept their terms in return for grant money.  Harvard also had an insider among the 
trustees of the General Education Board, the illustrious former president Charles Eliot, 
who shamed the foundation for systematic violation of its own official policy of non-
interference with running of a recipient institution.  The foundations, however, had far 
larger concerns to worry about than internal dissent and academic resistance. 
The Rockefeller foundations operated in a tense atmosphere of popular, 
legislative, and political attacks on their founder.  Of all the “robber barons” of the 
age, Rockefeller’s name was perhaps most vilified.  The Rockefeller family hoped that 
philanthropy would help clear their name but, more often than not, the foundations 
were attacked as shameless ploys to cover up the injustices of the Rockefeller 
economic empire.  When Rockefeller attempted to obtain a congressional charter for 
the new Rockefeller Foundation, the move was met with loud protest from working-
class and Progressive leaders.  Failing the passage of the charter bill in Congress, the 
Rockefeller organization found a more receptive mood in New York and was granted 
an unrestricted charter by the state legislature in 1913.  But even here, anti-monopoly 
sentiments ran high and four years later a bill to repeal the Foundation’s charter was 
introduced.  Although it did not pass, the investigation inflicted considerable damage 
to its public image.39   
The severest blow, however, followed the 1914 “Ludlow Massacre” at the 
Rockefeller-controlled Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, in which the company’s 
private militia and the state guard called to put down a strike shot to death six workers 
and set on fire the tents in which strikers’ families were forced to live, burning alive 
two women and eleven children.  In response to public outrage, the Congress created 
the Commission on Industrial Relations to investigate not only the Ludlow affair, but 
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also the broader relations between capital and labor and the role of philanthropic 
foundations.  The Commission subpoenaed the senior and junior Rockefeller, Charles 
W. Eliot and Jerome D. Greene to testify about the activities of the Rockefeller 
Foundation.  Its final report noted that the policies of the Rockefeller and Carnegie 
foundations were “colored, if not controlled, to conform to the policies” of the major 
corporations, which were in turn controlled by a “small number of wealthy and 
powerful financiers.”40  
As a result of these investigations, the foundations’ policies were coming 
under attack from the wider circles of Progressive era leaders.   In 1914, for example, 
the National Education Association criticized the foundations for introducing 
undemocratic controls into the schools.  Socialist and working class organs went 
further and regularly condemned the work of the foundations as a project of 
ideological control.41  In this climate, some of the trustees of the Rockefeller 
foundations feared that the tide of lower-class protest might force the government to 
take control over all educational institutions or, worse, limit the ability of economic 
elites to appropriate surplus wealth. Like many other prominent university figures, 
Charles Eliot also feared the future of great “injustice inflicted on those who have by 
those who have not, and corruption and extravagance in the expenditure of money 
raised by taxation.”42  In this regard, the foundations considered their investment in 
education and medicine the most effective means to prevent the ‘expropriation of the 
expropriators.’  With the waning of Progressivism after the war, such apprehension 
was probably unwarranted, but fears were not to be easily quelled. 
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Some trustees of the General Education Board, who favored the full-time 
requirement in principle, began to feel nevertheless that the policy of imposing 
specific form of organization as a condition for receipt of foundation grants was 
dangerous.  It was not a question of whether the full-time policy was right or wrong 
but whether, in view of public opinion, the foundation could afford to pursue it.  The 
protracted negotiations with Columbia added to the fear because, while Harvard’s 
president and faculty “could be counted on to keep a gentlemanly silence about their 
conflict with GEB, the more volatile president of Columbia, Nicholas Murray Butler, 
was not adverse to spilling the beans.”43  As the conflict between Columbia and the 
Rockefeller foundations escalated, the Carnegie Foundation urged the officials of the 
General Education Board to abandon their strict full-time contracts. 
Such a contract binding  a university to a fixed policy laid down by the giver of 
money seems to me a dangerous thing.  If these contracts were made public, I 
am sure it would bring down on all educational foundations no less than on the 
universities themselves severe criticism.  It seems to me a dangerous policy for 
those who administer trust funds to adopt.44 
By 1925 this view was shared by the majority of the Rockefeller trustees as 
well.  Only Gates and Flexner remained intransigent in their insistence of full-time 
contracts.  Thomas Debevoise, who prepared the case against the old leadership, 
argued that explicit contracts were not only dangerous but unnecessary.  “Most of the 
schools which receive money from the board come back at least a second time, and the 
possibility of their needing additional help should lend all the inducement necessary to 
make them follow the ideas of the board.”45  In 1925 the Board voted to modify the 
original contracts with Johns Hopkins, Vanderbilt, Washington, and Yale universities 
                                                 
 
43
 Ibid., p. 172. 
44
 Ibid., p. 173. 
45
 Ibid., p. 174. 
  117 
to allow them to deviate from strict full-time if they so desired and all subsequent 
contracts were free of binding requirements.  
Profession and Class in the Full-Time Conflict 
In 1925 the conflict over full-time clinical appointments was essentially over 
and a specific settlement over the claim to determine the institutional organization of 
academic medicine was reached, at least for a while.  The battle over the full-time plan 
lasted for over a decade or, perhaps, much longer, if we take the long view of the 
emergence of scientific medicine in America.   One of the final acts in this drama was 
played out in the boardrooms of Columbia, Presbyterian, and the Rockefeller 
foundations, although the particular institutional location is far less important than the 
records documenting the interests and strategies involved.  The importance of events 
at Columbia reached far beyond its institutional walls, as, one after another, the terms 
of subsequent, as well as prior, contracts between corporate donors and recipient 
institutions fell in line with Columbia’s model. 
The conflict over the full-time clinical appointments was not, in its essence, a 
struggle between the foundations and the universities, nor did it pertain, as clinical 
faculty alleged, to academic freedom. Although the trustees and officers of the 
universities jealously guarded their powers against external imposition, their conflict 
with the foundations was over turf control and financial solvency, not fundamental 
conditions of academic work.  This was not surprising because, not infrequently, the 
very same people who sat on the governing boards of the universities were also 
trustees of the foundations.  As it became increasingly clear toward the end of the 
‘full-time’ affair, both sides of the argument had support among the trustees of the 
universities and the foundations alike.  Institutions, however, played a crucial role in 
structuring the positions of the adversarial groups that emerged during this conflict.  
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They did so not as particular organizations but as embodiments of a distinct, and 
ascendant, form of social production. 
What was, then, the essence of the conflict that that played out so dramatically 
in the creation of Columbia-Presbyterian?  Competing accounts that can be brought to 
bear on this question fall into two broad categories: those which view the process that 
restructured American medicine during the first quarter of the 20th century as 
basically consensual and those who see it as conflictual.  Both functionalist and neo-
classical economics perspectives, associated most closely with the work of Talcott 
Parsons and Kenneth Arrow, view the structural organization of medical care as a 
result of adaptation to either the society’s functional needs or the uncertainty inherent 
in medical practice, respectively.46  Resting on the assumption that, in the long run, 
social and economic organization tends toward functional stability and equilibrium, 
these perspectives tend to view social conflict as secondary to the process of rational 
adjustment.  Consequently, the accounts of the evolution of medical institutions, 
which arise from within these perspectives, depict the interwar development of 
American medicine as a series of logical adjustments to social and technical 
requirements of modern medicine. 
A more recent example of a consensual interpretation of the emergence of the 
full-time appointments in academic medicine can be found in Kenneth Ludmerer’s 
magnificent history of American medical education.47  Unlike functionalist and neo-
classical economics perspectives, Ludmerer’s argument by no mean denies the 
potential for significant conflict of interest between research- and practice-oriented 
segments of medical faculty or among other interests within the health care economy.  
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Rather, Ludmerer stresses that the specific conditions, which prevailed during the 
interwar period, worked to balance and reconcile these potentially opposed interests.  
Consensual relationships, according to this argument, characterized both internal 
institutional relations and larger relations between academic medicine and society.  
The notion of public trust as a foundation of the profession’s authority and privilege is 
central in Ludmerer’s account and, during this period, he argued, the medical 
profession largely fulfilled its part of the social contract.   
Both consensual and technical-rational accounts of the history of American 
health care do not stand close scrutiny.  The former are belied by the historical 
evidence and the overall context of Progressivism and its aftermath, while the latter 
fail to explain why in other advanced societies modern medicine proved compatible 
with very different structure of health care provision.48  Clearly, the account of the 
‘full-time’ struggle presented above contradicts the consensual view of this period in 
the history of American medicine, whether rooted in a global view of social 
organization or in a historical analysis of contingent factors.  Consensual interpretation 
is belied by the evidence of broad awareness of and sharp division over the issue 
within the medical profession at large, presented here and well-documented in other 
studies.  Consistent ideological positions adopted by the opposed interests, combined 
with the amount of money involved, are hardly indicative of the trivial nature of the 
full-time conflict.  The eventual settlement of the ‘full-time’ question, signified by the 
foundations’ abandonment of outright requirements, should not obscure the intensity 
of the conflict that preceded it.   
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Two characteristic features of consensual approaches tend to remove social 
conflict from view.  First, by focusing on the relationship between specific features of 
health care organization and societal needs, they tend to overlook conflicts of the 
smaller scale and, perhaps more problematically, operate with a dubious and 
underspecified notions of ‘society at large’ and ‘societal needs.’  Second, consensual 
theories’ concerned with the long-term outcomes might systematically privilege 
resolutions of social conflicts over the actual processes of conflict which precede all 
such resolutions.   
Conflictual accounts of the institutional development of American medicine 
have been advanced by scholars working with both Weberian and Marxist categories.  
One of the most prominent proponents of the former, Paul Starr argued that the 
structure which American medicine assumed during the interwar period reflected a 
temporary settlement in an extended social conflict.49  During the first three decades of 
the 20th century, he contended, physicians consolidated and defended their position at 
the top of the medicine’s food-chain and accomplished a feat that few other 
occupations had: an “escape from the corporation.”  For Starr, the specific form which 
American medicine assumed during this period was far from a logical outcome of 
functional and technical requirements of medical care, nor was it uncontested.  The 
multiple advantages, which the organized medical profession secured its members, 
were attained through vigorous struggle against multiple adversaries and vigilant 
guard against encroachments.  By the early 1930s, the medical profession emerged 
more powerful and more autonomous than ever before vis-à-vis corporate 
rationalizers, Progressive reformers, public health, hospitals, the states and just about 
any other force that endeavored to interfere with physicians’ prerogative to engage in 
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solo practice and to set their own fees.  While the medical profession engaged in a 
number of public battles during this time, its ultimate achievement consisted in 
suppression of significant social opposition to its goals through extension and 
strengthening of its cultural authority. 
The hallmarks of the Weberian approach to the analysis of medicine and health 
care – emphasis on profession as a primary unit of social process and cultural 
authority as its main instrument of social struggle – are unsupported by the present 
analysis of the ‘full-time’ affair.  As to the professional unity, it is clear that the ‘full-
time’ conflict both stemmed from and reaffirmed significant divisions within the 
medical profession and, therefore, cannot be adequately theorized in a framework that 
privileges profession as a primary unit of social politics of health care.  Even before 
the ‘full-time’ struggle commenced, significant conflict of interest already divided 
professional elite from mainstream physicians, specialists from generalists and urban 
from rural practitioners.  While all of these divisions stemmed in varying degrees from 
the differential access to institutional resources, none were as clear-cut in structural 
terms as those between clinical and non-clinical medical faculty.  Not surprisingly, all 
of them declined in significance during the three decades after the World War II.  In 
contrast, dissimilarity in the positions of the clinical and non-clinical faculty were so 
unambiguous that even in the 1930s the trend toward the disappearance of medical 
graduates from the basic science departments and their replacement with Ph.D.s from 
liberal sciences was quite evident.  It would be hard to find a clearer indication of a 
radical distinction between the two segments of what is nevertheless considered a 
unitary profession. 
The crucial distinction between clinical and non-clinical segments of academic 
medicine must be theorized in terms of class.  The essential difference between the 
two groups parallels the distinction between the old middle class of small proprietors 
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and businesspeople and the new middle class of credentialed educated employees who 
sell their labor at a premium.  In this sense, non-clinical medical faculty has more in 
common with the liberal arts and sciences faculty than with private physicians.  
Arguably, the position of non-clinical faculty is more comparable with that of the 
technical professionals employed by private corporations, insofar as both of these 
groups cannot sell their services directly to the consumers.  It is not surprising, then, 
that in the ‘full-time’ conflict the laboratory faculty sided with the foundations, whose 
policy, as I argued in previous chapter, was formulated by and from the point of view 
of the salaried corporate professionals.   
Consideration of the institutional position of the medical faculty in basic 
science departments explodes the myth of the uniform antagonism between 
professionalism and bureaucracy, the characteristic trait of modern institutional 
organization.  Both the scientific faculty and the leaders of the medical profession 
irrespective of their field were well aware that scientific medicine was rooted in 
research and that the latter required, as its pre-condition, a high degree of institutional 
centralization and external investment.  It was abundantly clear that the financial 
resources of the profession itself would not suffice to underwrite either medical 
research or education on the level of the leading European countries.  During the first 
decades of the 20th century, American state was not yet a viable source of massive 
investment in private education and research.  Corporate wealth, therefore, constituted 
a principal potential source of funding of scientific medicine.  Corporate organization, 
just as much as corporate wealth, was an acknowledged necessity for systematic 
scientific progress.  By the turn of the 20th century, leading American hospitals and 
universities were already restructured on a corporate model and, thus, provided logical 
institutional anchoring for scientific medicine. 
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Non-clinical medical faculty members were as loyal to institutional structure of 
medicine as their clinical colleagues were ambivalent about it.  In the ‘full-time’ 
struggle, however, the latter had the support of the large portion of the medical 
practitioners who, by virtue of their exclusion from institutional privileges, were 
outright antagonistic to the institutionalization of medicine.  This factor, combined 
with numerical weakness of the non-clinical faculty and internal institutional problems 
of the foundations, offers a far better explanation of the full-time affair than that which 
credits the purported unified front put up by the medical profession against 
institutional rationalization of medicine.   
Starr’s emphasis on cultural authority as the primary instrument of professional 
dominance is just as problematic as his insistence on professional unity.  He defined 
cultural authority as a surrender of private judgment and assumption of deferential 
cognitive posture by patients and lay public of all classes.  Leaving aside the question 
of how much authority patients actually granted medical practitioners, it is clear that in 
the post-Flexnerian era, the foundation managers, as well as other educated reformers 
and donors, hardly conceded to doctors the authority on the issue of how best to 
organize medical care provision.  Medicine’s new scientism failed to impress the lay 
reformers who viewed American medical profession as provincial and petty.  In fact, 
many lay reformers believed that much credit for modernizing American medicine 
justly belonged to those outside of the profession. 
Rhetorical fight between the clinical faculty and the foundations was waged 
over the territory not automatically considered physicians’ cognitive prerogative.  The 
question was not how to perform surgery or diagnose disease but how to organize 
medical practice, education, and research so to optimize their contribution to social 
welfare.  In this matter, economists, sociologists, educators, or statesmen might have 
well claimed to have more expertise than physicians.  This is not to say that physicians 
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easily gave up their claim to be the best judges.  In fact, professional leaders often 
claimed special expertise in the matters of professional organization and functions.  
But creative they were not, repeating one and the same cry that no program, policy, or 
plan was acceptable unless it respected the professional sovereignty of physicians, by 
which was understood preservation of the institution of private solo practice.  Not 
surprisingly, lay reformers accused physicians of commercialism and viewed them as 
a significant part of the problem with medical care itself.   
The concept of cultural authority, advanced by Starr, closely resembles a 
dichotomy between expert physician and lay patient which has been at the center of 
interactionist sociology of medicine and comes as a surprise from a structural 
sociologist.  This dichotomy, anyway, works best to explain encounters between 
doctors, who uniformly belong to the educated middle class, and patients from lower-
class backgrounds and with low educational achievement.  As Starr himself insists, 
lower-class Americans did not have much influence on the organization of medicine.50 
It is clear, then, that most of the struggles over institutional structure of medicine were 
waged among the various middle- and upper-class groups, which is to say, among 
peers, in cultural terms at least.51  This does not mean that cultural authority, rhetorical 
strategy, and ideological obfuscation had no place in these social negotiations: after 
all, the members of the professions may well be the choice victims of their own 
ideologies. 
Conceptualization of medicine’s modernization in terms of the profession’s 
cultural authority is challenged not only by the evidence of opposing discourse of its 
lay opponents but also by the inherent dualism in the structure of modern professional 
knowledge.  Conventional sociology of the professions has for a long time maintained 
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that the special character of professional expertise, encompassing both considerable 
technical complexity and inherent uncertainty, underpinned professional autonomy 
and privilege.  In their path-breaking analysis, Jamous and Peloille argued that, far 
from being a constitutive factor of professional autonomy, systematized scientific 
knowledge provides an opening for external intervention and regulation of 
professional work.52  Inherent in the structure of modern professional knowledge, they 
argued, is a duality of ‘technicality’ and ‘indetermination.’  Technicality refers to a 
rationalized and transferable body of knowledge which serves as a basis of 
professional efficacy and continuity, insofar as it can be communicated as a set of 
rules, procedures and solutions among contemporaries and from one generation to the 
next.  While such systematization and transferability of professional knowledge 
provides a basis for legitimation and certification of professional expertise, it also 
exposes professional work to codification, fragmentation, and routinisation.  Thus, the 
trend toward greater codification of professional knowledge and creation of more 
technical means of production increase the possibilities of intervention.53  The concept 
of ‘indetermination,’ on the other hand, refers to the intangible ‘virtualities’ of the 
profession – the “bases of its mystique, the sources of its legitimation, and the 
elements of its ideology” – all of which act as barriers to external intervention and, 
therefore, underpin the profession’s monopolistic position.54  In this sense, 
indetermination is not an aspect of knowledge but, instead, an aspect of the 
occupational control of knowledge. 
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Different rhetorical strategies adopted by the adversaries in the ‘full-time’ 
conflict are consistent with the Jamous-Peloille thesis of the dualistic character of 
professional autonomy.  The foundations, as well as other lay advocates of medical 
reform, stressed the ‘technicality’ of professional knowledge.  While they did not 
claim to possess physicians’ skills, the lay reformers insisted that, as intelligent and 
educated persons, they were perfectly qualified to understand and improve the 
organization of medical work.  Instead of rendering medicine less accessible to lay 
understanding, scientific medicine actually clarified to the lay philanthropic reformers 
how the optimal gains to public health could be achieved.   
Not surprisingly, the opponents of full-time clinical requirement resorted to the 
arguments stressing the aspects of ‘indetermination’ in medical practice.  Osler, 
among others, stressed that medicine was an art, as well as a science.  The official 
statement produced by Columbia’s clinical faculty against ‘full-time’ was a superb 
exercise in elaborating the profession’s subtle virtues and relied on a predictable 
dichotomy between the futility of “restrictive rules” of institutional organization, on 
one hand, and the “true spirit of service” which could be guaranteed only by 
recruitment of the “right men,” on the other.  Professional excellence stemmed from 
intangible embodied qualities of the professionals themselves and had nothing to do 
with the crude technical prescriptions of institutional engineering.  ‘Taylorist’ science, 
insisted Columbia’s clinicians, did not apply to professional work.   
In contrast, the position of the foundations’ managers turned on a ‘technical’ 
view of scientific medicine.  The greatest promise of medical science lay in discovery 
of the foundational causes of disease and measures to prevent it.  It is true that both of 
these goals were understood mostly in bio-physical terms.   There was, nevertheless, a 
pronounced social-scientific bend to the foundations’ stance as well.  The foundations’ 
leaders understood medicine as a social, rather than private function and sought to 
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optimize its public benefits through rationalizing the social organization of production 
of medical research, education, and care.  It is interesting to note, however, that, unlike 
the more successful attempt to rationalize health care, launched by state and corporate 
interests during the early 1980s, the corporate-philanthropic efforts during the 1920s 
had virtually no foundation in the university or governmental research establishment.  
As academic fields, both public health and administrative medicine were in their 
infancy.  More significantly, both were shunned by physicians and weakly claimed by 
nurses, public health officials, and hospital administrators, shaping up to be the 
educational fields of the subordinate professions with weak graduate component.  
Consequently, the lay medical reformers were drawn from a variety of social science 
disciplines and professional careers, many of which were caught in the middle of their 
own professionalizing projects.  Loosely organized by such singular institutions as the 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, philanthropic boards and civic 
organizations like the Committee of One Hundred, their numbers were few and the 
‘technical’ component of their reform agenda was weak.  Although they passionately 
believed in the rationality of their analyses and proposals, in truth, they lacked the 
principal institutional and professional means of furthering the technocratic approach 
to the problem of medical care.  Not until the 1980s were such means to materialize in 
the form of specialized academic disciplines, governmental agencies, and corporate 
analysts.   
In contrast to the proto-social-scientific discourse of the foundations and other 
lay reformers, the basic science faculty elaborated the argument for medicine’s 
‘technicality’ from within the new discourse of scientific professionalism.  Actively 
attuned to the full-time conflict, scientific faculty saw their work in both technical and 
productivist terms.  Medical scientists, insisted one prominent physiologist, ought to 
“remodel the whole system so as to fight disease at its source. … Surely it is a time 
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when those who have laid the scientific foundations for the new advances should take 
counsel together, assume some generalship, and show how the combat is to be 
waged.”55  Academic physicians in laboratory sciences, as well as handful of those 
clinical scientists who strongly preferred research and teaching to private practice, 
believed that the credit for the modern medicine’s effectiveness belonged to those who 
labored in laboratories and on the hospital wards.  Private physicians, on the other 
hand, were in the business of selling the new cures to paying patients.  In what must 
have surely seemed like a sad irony to the medical scientists, private practitioners 
reaped much higher material rewards than they.  Much like class-conscious workers 
saw their plight, medical scientists felt exploited in the prevailing system.  They did 
not, however, advocate abolition of the corporate organization of production.  In fact, 
they proposed to extend it to include all medical faculty or even all physicians.  The 
faculty in the basic science departments clearly understood that their work was 
inextricably bound to modern organizations and their ideological position reflected the 
de facto institutionalization of their work.  Like corporate-philanthropic rationalizers, 
medical scientists saw the collectivized, institutionalized system of production, 
reflected in the structure of modern university, as an expression of technical 
rationality.  The main problem with this organization, as they saw it, lay in the 
disproportionate power of the clinical faculty who were not even fully incorporated 
into either the university or the hospital organization.  In the context of the ‘full-time’ 
conflict, the interests of the non-clinical faculty were to equalize the institutional 
position and, therefore, the material interests of all medical faculty.  For this segment 
of the new middle class, the problem of leveling the class position called for an 
institutional solution. 
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Theorized in the framework of institutional class analysis, the socio-economic 
character and distinct interests of this segment of the medical profession differ from 
those put forth in Marxist accounts of American medicine.  Scholars writing from 
within the Marxist tradition argue that the provision of medical care in capitalist 
societies is subject to fundamental, rather than contingent, social conflict and is 
overwhelmingly determined by the interests of the dominant class.  Although clearly 
an instance of class struggle, interpretations of the full-time affair and related 
developments offered by Marxist scholars fail to capture the complexity of the 
historical process.  E. Richard Brown, whose work is especially germane to the period 
and issues explored here, viewed the full-time affair as an opening act in the struggle 
to subordinate medicine and the medical profession to the interests of the ascending 
corporate capitalist class.  It is hard to agree with Brown’s overall conclusion that, 
notwithstanding the abandonment of the full-time requirement, corporate capital 
succeeded through its philanthropic foundations in subordinating medicine to its 
hegemonic class interest.  In regard to the outcome of the full-time struggle, we must 
side with Paul Starr’s conclusion that, despite their considerable resources, the 
foundations’ success in rationalizing medical care was quite limited.56 
While Brown’s analysis of the differences between clinical and non-clinical 
faculty is quite astute, his insistence on the identity of interests between corporate 
capital and medical scientists and his overall class analysis of the philanthropic 
foundations and their leaders are less than convincing.  These problems are, to a large 
extent, the two sides of the same coin: what Brown misreads in both instances is the 
identity and interests of the new salaried middle class, to which belong both the 
medical scientist and the foundation manager.  While the ideological convergence 
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between the foundations and the laboratory scientists makes a lot of sense, their 
reduction to the interests of the capitalist class is surely an oversimplification born out 
of inexorable attraction of Marxist scholars to binary or totalizing accounts of social 
organization.   
The leaders of both Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations believed in the 
enormous social value of scientific medicine and were outraged that the narrow 
commercialism of the medical profession stood in the way of extending medicine’s 
benefits to all.  Moreover, foundations’ managers maintained that the greatest promise 
of modern medicine lay in preventive rather than curative measures and aimed to 
reorganize American medicine toward that end.  Curiously, these views bore the 
greatest similarity to those of socialists, while neither labor leaders, nor capitalist 
employers shared this enlightened stance to any significant degree.  To this author, this 
suggests the possibility that the foundations’ strategy reflected most closely the 
interests of their managers, rather than founders.57  It will be recalled that the key 
figures among the foundations’ managers came from middle- and even lower-middle 
class backgrounds.  But more important than the socio-economic origin may be the 
particular function with which they were entrusted, namely, to disburse philanthropic 
funds in a way that would promote rationalization of key social spheres.  As such, the 
foundations’ managers occupied a position similar to the executive officers in the non-
profit sector. 
A theory of the middle class professions arrived at by Johnson via the work of 
Jamous and Peloille, as well as Carchedi, allows us to move from an intuitive 
apprehension of the ambiguous class position of the salaried middle class to its 
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theoretical specification.58  Carchedi argued that in the advanced stages of capitalism 
the functions of both labor and capital become subdivided into specialized operations, 
dispersed among different categories of workers.  Under the system of production 
increasingly reliant on application of science and technology, the work of educated 
credentialed employees, traditionally considered unproductive in Marxist theory, 
becomes productive, insofar as it involves mental labor of technical character and 
contributes to the production of surplus value.59  Just as productive labor comes to 
encompass a wide range of specialized work functions – both mental and manual – so 
the global functions of capital are delegated to agents who do not formally own the 
means of production.  This process involves the development of a complex 
organizational structure which collectively performs what during the competitive stage 
were the functions of the individual capitalist.  Following Carchedi, Johnson views 
middle-class professions as being, in varying degrees, agents of both the collective 
laborer and global capital.  They are, then, “part of a class which carries out the global 
functions of capital without owning the means of production … while at the same time 
and in various ratios carrying out the functions of the collective laborer – they are then 
both laborer and non-laborer, exploited and exploiters.”60 
It is not difficult then to see why the ideological motifs traditionally associated 
with socialist and working-class interests may be found in the rhetoric of the 
institutionalized middle class professionals.  Insofar as a significant portion of their 
labor becomes subordinated to organizational imperatives of the institutions, directly 
or indirectly controlled by corporate capital, these middle class employees may well 
reach for ideological arguments that most often come from the lower rungs of the 
                                                 
 
58
 Jamous and Peloille, “Professions or Self-Perpetuating Systems?”; Guglielmo Carchedi, On the 
Economic Identification of Social Classes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). 
59
 Johnson, Professions and Power, p. 103. 
60
 Ibid., p. 104. 
  132 
occupational hierarchy.  In the context of the university, where middle class academics 
are not as obviously involved in the exploitation of the working class people as some 
of their colleagues in corporate management and industrial production, an attenuated 
version of the call for control of production by direct producers may be a viable 
rhetorical strategy in certain circumstances.  This potential affinity between the 
interests of the institutionalized middle class employees and ‘productivist’ ideology of 
the working class explains some of the rhetorical positions adopted by both medical 
scientists and foundation managers in the ‘full-time’ conflict.   
However, the extent to which the salaried middle class may be willing to adopt 
progressive ideology is clearly limited as long as their privileged position in the 
division of labor is sustained.  While Carchedi is correct in asserting that, in the 
framework of corporate capitalism, the mental labor of the credentialed employees is 
productive, its productivity lies in what Jamous and Peloille identify as ‘technicality’ 
of professional function and not, as both Carchedi and Johnson seem to suggest, in the 
functions of “co-ordination and unity.”  Separation of mental and manual labor always 
already presupposes deskilling and, hence, exploitation, of the manual workers and 
any of the functions of “co-ordination and unity” that the middle-class employees 
might perform are the veiled directives of the collective capitalist.   
Defense of precisely this privileged position in the social division of labor 
served to lessen the conflict between the clinical faculty, on one hand, and the non-
clinical faculty and the philanthropic foundations, on the other.  In varying degrees, 
representatives of all three groups subscribed to the belief that their privileged 
occupational and economic position stemmed from the meritocratic system of social 
selection and the imperatives of rational social organization.  In the context of growing 
institutionalization of all spheres of production, this view implied a shared interest of 
the middle-class professionals in expansion and rationalization of the hierarchical 
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principles of corporate organization.  In the context of academic medicine, all parties 
to the ‘full-time’ conflict agreed that, to speed up medicine’s progress, physician-
scientist should be provided with all administrative and technical assistance necessary 
to free his time for scientific work of the highest order.  This goal received much 
attention in Dean Darrach’s memorandum and in writing of academic leaders at large.   
The more centralized and hierarchical organization achieved at the leading 
medical centers has by itself accomplished a large part of rationalization sought by the 
foundations.  Even though the clinical faculty retained the right to engage in private 
practice at their discretion, during the first quarter of the 20th century the cumulative 
changes in the organization of academic medicine greatly increased the proportion of 
official or de facto full-time employment in the professional and academic 
departments of the medical centers.  All residents, as well as many junior faculty 
members who were yet to develop significant private clienteles, worked on a full-time 
basis.  While retaining private patients, top clinical faculty were also devoting a much 
greater proportion of their time to their academic duties.  This latter change resulted 
not only from voluntary limitation of private practice but also, no doubt, because of 
growing ability to devolve basic tasks to their subordinates.61   
During this period, hierarchical centralization significantly strengthened the 
position of the departmental chairs and was, therefore, actively supported by the top 
faculty in both clinical and non-clinical departments.  At Columbia-Presbyterian, 
however, centralization had also reinforced the dominance of medicine and surgery 
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over other disciplines and marginalized laboratory science faculty in institutional 
governance.  In the atmosphere of massive resignations and new appointments which 
marked the process of affiliation, new clinical leadership seized an opportunity to 
create at the Presbyterian Hospital an organizational structure quite different from that 
of the P&S and, in principle, contrary to the general trend toward specialization and 
growing importance of basic science.  While the number of academic departments of 
the Medical School was increasing, the reorganization of the Presbyterian professional 
staff reduced the number of all in-patient services to three: medicine, surgery, and 
pathology.  Their directors were constituted as the Medical Board which remained a 
three-man body until its reorganization in 1922.62  The dual institutional grounding of 
the academic-professional staffs – in the university and in the teaching hospital – 
allowed the dominant departments to create and utilize two different structures of 
authority in a way that favored their interests.  Although the full-time conflict 
appeared to center around the University, it was managed through the Hospital-based 
governing structure of the Medical Board which did not fairly represent the interests of 
the non-clinical departments of the medical school.   
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The Aftermath of the Full-Time Struggle 
While the foundations failed in their project to rationalize the provision of 
medical care in society at large, they succeeded, for the most part, in modernization of 
the medical education and research.  Most medical schools, which the foundations 
deemed strategic, were restructured to provide high-quality medical education and to 
conduct impressive volume of research.  The initiation of massive federal investment 
in medical research after the Second World War reinforced the gains made by 
corporate philanthropies.  For the next two decades, advancement of medical research 
emerged as one of the top public priorities and the amount of federal funding 
channeled toward that end made it the ‘golden age’ of American medical research.  At 
the academic medical centers, research became the predominant force of institutional 
growth and the leading medical schools were transformed into veritable centers of 
medical research.  At the same time, teaching hospitals and clinical staff continued to 
develop their private and semi-private patient services which continued to be 
important sources of hospital revenue and clinicians’ income.   
The balance between the medical centers’ academic functions and commercial 
services began to unravel after the early signs of Medicare’s fiscal crisis.  To stem the 
tide of rising health care costs, in the early 1980s the federal government began 
experimenting with a series of cost-cutting mechanisms in the system of Medicare 
reimbursements.  A decade later, cost-management measures were widely adopted by 
private insurance industry.  Unlike the original Medicare, the new public and private 
systems of reimbursement did not give recognition to the necessarily higher costs of 
teaching hospitals associated with their function of training the future physicians and 
forced the medical centers to compete with non-teaching hospitals and clinics on an 
equal basis.  
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Squeezed from all sides by shrinking profit margins from clinical practice and 
diminished federal research grants, American medical centers adopted a market-based 
approach to institutional survival.  Clinical services were expanded again, although 
this time with little hope of substantial cross-subsidy of the medical center’s 
educational and research mission.  Shrinking profit margins of clinical services 
plunged medical centers into the competition to raise clinicians’ productivity, capture 
more profitable patients, and expand the volume of services.  The medical centers’ 
adjustment to the managed care system of health care financing prompted a wave of 
vertical integration with outlying community hospitals and clinics, motivated 
exclusively by the need to improve clinical revenues.  If during the late 1960s and 
1970s the explosive growth of the medical centers’ involvement in provision of 
clinical services distracted much of their attention from education and research, at 
least it was reimbursed generously enough to subsidize them.  Now, clinical services 
had to be expanded simply in order to preserve the medical centers’ clinical facilities 
in an ultra-competitive environment, with little hope of substantial cross-subsidy of 
the medical center’s educational and research mission.   
Ever since the 1920s, when academic physicians fought to preserve their stake 
in private practice, medical centers were compelled to expand their involvement in 
care of private patients, both to allow their faculty members to enjoy higher incomes 
and to use a part of the profits to support institutional purposes.  In the 1980s and 
1990s, when the medical centers’ hypertrophied clinical services were occupying more 
and more of their human and financial resources, while giving little back to education 
and research, the ultimate price of that fateful choice was becoming apparent.  With a 
slowed growth of federal support, the maintenance of the enormous research 
capacities, built up after the war, required new methods of financing.  In a radical 
break with traditional tenets of academic ethics, medical centers and individual 
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investigators began to accept corporate sponsorship in exchange for patent rights to 
their intellectual work and to form their own for-profit biomedical research 
companies.  Although, through these and other methods, the medical centers stayed 
afloat, all three elements of their original mission – charitable care, medical education, 
and scientific research – may have suffered permanent damage through their ruthless 
exposure to the strictures of the market.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BUILDING THE FIRST MEDICAL CENTER:  
CONFLICTS OVER PHYSICAL SPACE AND INSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE,  
1922-1945 
Introduction 
The enormous task of building the nation’s first university medical center was 
an occasion to examine the organizational structures and functions of the two 
institutions that were about to tie their destinies in a common physical space.  
Financially and logistically daunting, the construction of the Columbia-Presbyterian 
Medical Center revealed divergent priorities among the different groups involved in 
the project.  One of the most visible conflicts during the construction phase concerned 
the outpatient department (OPD), a vital service to the poorer urban residents that had 
been and continues to be one of the weakest links in the American system of health 
care services.  From a thirty-two-story air castle imagined in the early construction 
plan, the outpatient department was quickly reduced to the one-and-a-half-story joke 
and the very last item on the funding priority list.  The struggle for the adequate OPD 
revealed both the different interests within the Medical Center and the different logic 
of institutional responsibilities and resource allocation deployed by opposed groups.   
Far from settling organizational conflicts, the completion of the Medical 
Center brought on the new challenges of adjusting the new physical spaces to the 
evolving demands of patients, educators, and doctors.  The problem of providing 
adequate yet differentiated services to the so-called ‘semi-private’ patients was 
especially acute in the newly built Medical Center.  Despite a serious effort to study 
the problem and propose a solution, Columbia-Presbyterian failed to address the 
‘semi-private’ question either in terms of physical accommodations or by way of 
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novel financial arrangements.  The conflict over the ‘semi-private’ patients pitched the 
professional interests of the younger physicians and demands of the community 
against and the resistance of the professional and administrative staffs as a whole. 
From the outset, Columbia-Presbyterian presented a breathtaking endeavor: 
over a dozen hospitals, institutes and clinics, as well as the medical, dental, and 
nursing schools coming together to recreate themselves as a unified center.  But the 
actual reach of its activity was even farther than its physical campus would suggest.  
During the first two decades of its existence, the Center affiliated with a dozen other 
institutions, while continuing to bring others to its site.  Its relationship with public 
institutions was especially noteworthy, often involving not only clinical instruction of 
students but the nomination of professional staff as well.  The pattern of relationships 
created both within and beyond the Center reflected a complex structure of 
professional hierarchies and social connotation of disease, revealing interrelationships 
among private institutions and between private and public spheres. 
The creation of the physically unified Medical Center opened as never before 
the question of the ultimate purpose of such an institution and the best way in which it 
could be achieved.  A survey of the key statements of purpose produced during the 
first two decades of Columbia-Presbyterian’s existence highlights two broad 
perspectives: that of community service and that of balanced facilities necessary to 
carry out the task of medical education.  While the rhetoric of ‘community service’ 
was quickly tethered to the primary purpose of educating future physicians, the 
primacy of the educational mission was also something of a myth, contradicted by 
divergent interests and organizational developments. 
The issues of institutional structure and purpose, which emerged during and 
after the construction of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, point toward a 
number of common conclusions.  Institutional conflicts were structured along the lines 
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of what I call ‘institutional class positions,’ rather than more commonly recognized 
professional and organizational divisions.  Institutional class positions of health care 
providers were significantly linked with class, race and other salient social divisions 
among patients.  Public and private structures of health care provision were vitally, if 
hierarchically, linked, each constituting an institutionally organic part of another.  
Taken together, these conclusions emphasize the larger arguments of this dissertation, 
namely the call for a combined study of the public and private structures of social 
provision and the need for new theoretical perspectives on the structure of health care 
politics. 
Struggle for the Out-Patient Department 
Outpatient services have been long-standing, yet particularly troubled parts of 
America’s private hospitals.  The outpatient department of the new Columbia-
Presbyterian Medical Center was no exception.  The new department was to combine 
the budgets, staffs, and traditions of the two previously separate entities – Presbyterian 
Hospital’s Out-Patient Department and Columbia Medical School’s Vanderbilt Clinic. 
Presbyterian’s outpatient department had its roots in the Dispensary which was 
built as a part of the Hospital’s first major expansion.  The building was made possible 
by Miss Henrietta Lenox, the Hospital founder’s sister, who offered to give $50,000 if 
other friends of the Hospital would match this sum.  The Dispensary opened in 1888, 
when the Hospital was in its sixteenth year of operation, and by the end of the first 
year it served an average of 38 patients a day.1  
Columbia Medical School’s outpatient clinic was one of the gifts of the 
Vanderbilt family, the School’s chief benefactors during the late 19th century.  The 
plot of land and the money for the construction of the new buildings to house the 
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College of Physicians and Surgeons, as the medical school was officially called, were 
given by the patriarch of the family, William Henry Vanderbilt, in 1884.  The 
Vanderbilt Clinic was given by his three sons in the memory of their father after his 
death.  In 1886, Vanderbilt’s daughter and son-in-law, Emily Thorn and William D. 
Sloane, offered to erect and endow on the College grounds “a lying-in asylum to be 
known as the Sloane Maternity Hospital of the College of Physicians and Surgeons.”2  
Vanderbilts’ beneficence toward the school came about through the influence of Dr. 
James McLane, a family physician to the Vanderbilts and member of the College’s 
faculty.   
Like most urban dispensaries of the time, Presbyterian’s was a rough 
institution, challenged by the surging demand and limited resources.  The Hospital’s 
chief historian, who was personally involved with the Dispensary for a long time, 
recalled that 
[a]lthough it gave valuable attention to thousands of patients each year, as late 
as 1911 Presbyterian’s Dispensary was not well organized.  There were almost 
no records of histories or of physical examinations; records that were made 
generally contained nothing more than a note of the medication ordered.  
Cooperation with the inpatient service was weak and the follow-up system 
covered only a portion of patients.  Many of the doctors were lax in attendance, 
coming late or leaving early to see come private patients, often not appearing 
at all.3 
According to Dr. Lamb, significant changes in this state of affairs were 
affected soon thereafter.  At this time, departments of medicine and surgery conducted 
separate out-patient clinics and improvements were first achieved in the latter when 
Dr. Hugh Auchincloss was appointed Surgeon-in-Chief.  “With great effort and skill, 
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he gradually converted his clinic from one of scantily recorded minor surgery into a 
model clinic with an excellent staff of assistants, adequate records, and a follow-up 
system.”  As a result of these improvements, “members of his staff found the 
opportunity for genuine accomplishment, and many of them began to do work in their 
individual fields of interest right there.”4 
In 1913, the surgical and medical clinics of the Dispensary were combined into 
a single Out-Patient Department and a year later reorganization began at the medical 
half of the clinic.  Appointed Physician-in-Chief at the OPD, Dr. Lamb received a 
valuable advice from an outgoing head of the medical clinic.  “Don’t try to force any 
of the staff out,” he was told, even the bad ones.  Instead, “[m]ake the work so 
thorough and interesting that the good men will see the advantages and enter into the 
work wholeheartedly [and the] others will naturally drop out.”5 
Working in cooperation with Dr. Neergaard, Dr. Lamb gradually succeeded in 
reorganizing the medical clinic along the lines established by Dr. Auchincloss in 
surgery.  As early as 1915, the out-patient department of the urban hospital already 
revealed the essential dilemma at its core: to raise the quality of service, the quantity 
of patients served had to be reduced.  Under Dr. Lamb, it was decided to limit the 
number of medical admissions into the OPD to those who could be adequately treated 
with the available staff and facilities.  It was also noted that many medical cases, for 
whom admission into the hospital wards had been arranged, never checked in.  To 
remedy this situation, the follow-up measures were intensified and thereafter some 95 
percent of such patients actually entered the wards.  Upon discharge from the hospital, 
patients were given a specific appointment at the OPD and about 94 percent complied.  
As a result of these changes, definite information was obtained on over 2000 patients 
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or 91 percent of the total.  According to Dr. Lamb, “[s]uch data was and remains 
crucial in evaluating operative results and treatment methods” and Presbyterian’s 
follow-up system was adopted by twelve other hospitals.6 
The early efforts at improving the outpatient service revealed a number of 
themes.  The hospital dispensary could not succeed as a pure service institution.  Both 
the ethic of service and a suitable class of workers who could be swayed by that ethic 
were absent.  Rather, the OPD served the professional interests of the larger hospital.  
This relationship was primarily effectuated by the OPD’s function of feeding the 
wards with suitable and interesting cases.  Secondarily, the OPD could – with proper 
organization and improvements – serve as a field of medical research and training in 
its own right.  Only if tied with the professional interests of the hospital’s physicians 
could the outpatient service function adequately.  Even so, the generalized interest in 
using the OPD as a feeding pipe of interesting ward material did not dictate anything 
beyond the most basic triage and service arrangements.  It is only the more specific 
interests of the younger, less successful physicians who were assigned to serve at the 
OPD that could effect the badly needed improvements.  This explains the frequent 
theme of strengthening the OPD’s research value.  Only if OPD physicians could 
leverage their unpromising clientele into training and research pool and the OPD as a 
whole into career stepping stone, would significant changes be affected. 
Additional personnel and equipment, as well as better management of patients, 
could also make a significant difference.  In 1921, for example, Presbyterian’s OPD 
became involved in the larger project.  As part of the initiative of the Dispensary 
Development Committee of the United Hospital Fund and with the financial support 
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of the Rockefeller Foundation, Presbyterian Hospital agreed to designate its OPD as a 
demonstration unit. According to Dr. Lamb, 
The whole project, which looked to the improvement of out-patient work in 
general, was successful over a considerable period.  Miss Elsie Jameson, a 
clinic executive, was very helpful in relieving the chief of clinic of much 
administrative work.  Additions were made to the clerical force, new 
equipment was acquired, closer cooperation between the O.P.D. and the wards 
was effected, and discharge clinics were established.  These improvements and 
the fact of being selected as a demonstration unit showed how far the O.P.D. 
had progressed from the days when it had been regarded as an unimportant 
appendage to the Hospital and service there as tedious drudgery.  Those of us 
who had believed that the O.P.D. could be developed and could be of service 
to the Hospital and the community – mainly Dr. Hugh Auchincloss, Dr. Arthur 
Neergaard, and I – now felt doubly rewarded for our work with it.7 
The addition of a new female administrator and clerical workers filled the lack of 
suitable ‘service’ layers in the structure of the OPD.  These staff additions could 
relieve the higher-class, male physicians from those tasks which did not constitute 
direct investments in career advancement. 
The next pivotal moment in the history of Presbyterian’s and Columbia’s 
outpatient departments came with the building of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical 
Center.  Construction plans got underway in 1922.  An architect and a builder were 
secured and Dr. Clarence Charles Burlingame was made Executive Director of the 
Joint Administrative Board, which had the responsibility of formulating the 
construction plan.  During his varied career, Dr. Burlingame had inspected many 
hospitals in the US and accumulated an enormous amount of date valuable in the 
planning process.  Several other members of the Hospital and the University had also 
visited various hospitals and medical schools in preparation for the construction 
planning.  The most comprehensive trip had been undertaken by Dean Darrach, who 
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had gone abroad in the summer of 1921 and visited some seventy-three hospitals and 
twenty-eight medical schools.8  Another important appointment during this period was 
that of Mr. John Bush as the Hospital’s superintendent.  Until this time, almost all 
hospital superintendents – at Presbyterian and elsewhere – were either doctors or 
ministers.  Mr. Bush was a businessman and it proved the most fortuitous innovation 
as Presbyterian embarked in reincarnating itself in a new Medical Center.   
Despite all the appointments and activity, little progress on actual planning was 
achieved.  Despite his broad experience, Dr. Burlingame’s approach to the task of 
planning struck many as “mystifying.”  Plan after plan produced by the architect and 
the builder were rejected.  Dr. Lamb’s account of the state of planning in 1923 painted 
a sorry picture. 
An informal dinner meeting to discuss the project was held at the University 
Club on May 3.  There was a large group present, including doctors and other 
official from the Hospital and the University.  Many of them were getting their 
fist glimpse of the proposed size of the Medical Center.  The same layouts of 
thirty and fifty stories were displayed.  When the question of cost was raised, 
no accurate estimate was attempted.  Those qualified to give an approximate 
figure mentioned nothing less than fifty millions.  This figure, of course, was 
staggering, and most of those present sense what John Bush had already 
detected: “Much time has been wasted in building air castles, and the whole 
subject has to be brought down to earth.”9 
When the planning process was finally forced into a more practical mode, it 
was clear that the size of most services had to be derived from the proposed extent of 
the teaching activities.  “The size of Presbyterian’s and Columbia’s buildings – the 
nucleus of the Medical Center – would have to depend upon the size of the student 
body and teaching program of P. and S.  Until this decision was made, no concrete 
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plans could be formed.”10  University administration preferred a larger student body – 
about 125 to a class – for the greater financial return in tuition that would entail.  Most 
faculty members preferred a smaller class size of 60 to 75 students for the sake of 
providing better education.  The planners from the two sides settled on compromise: 
classes of 100 students each with a total student body of 400.  It was estimated that the 
number of hospital beds necessary for teaching this number of medical students was 
about 500.  This figure, in turn, helped determine the size of the outpatient department, 
“because it required a certain number of clinic patients to furnish a sufficient number 
for the wards.”  The estimate, which was carefully derived from the experience of the 
old Presbyterian O.P.D. and the Vanderbilt Clinic, called for a facility capable of 
handling from 1,000 to 1,200 patients per day.11 
While the planning of the inpatient wards was soon accomplished in a more or 
less rational manner, the planning of the outpatient clinic encountered a different fate.  
Dr. Lamb recalled a meeting at which he and Dr. Auchincloss were present.    
We met with the Planning Committee of the Joint Board one afternoon to 
discuss the structure of the new O.P.D.  Dr. Burlingame announced that a 
building of thirty two stories was proposed.  Dr. Auchincloss and I were 
astounded.  Even as we caught our breath, Dr. Burlingame went on to state that 
eight of the floors were being planned for dentistry.  I had to comment that 
such a scheme was impracticable and entirely out of balance with a proper 
clinic.  We were brusquely informed that we were not competent to decide 
such matters.  We had no recourse except to remain silent though I was sure of 
my stand and though a thirty- two-story building smacked of the air castles 
earlier envisioned.12 
As Drs. Auchincloss and Lamb had suspected, the air castle of thirty-two 
stories collapsed very soon.  After a serious financial crisis, which had been barely 
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averted, as well as predictable overruns on construction costs, only $600,000 were 
allocated for the outpatient clinic.  For that amount the building firm could produce a 
structure of only one and a half stories.  Presbyterian’s President, Mr. Dean Sage, 
announced the bad news to a group of doctors associated with the outpatient 
department, “adding that there would be later additions when the funds were 
available.”  Dr. Arthur Neergaard, who was in charge of the medical part of the clinic, 
“stated flatly that the proposal was a mistake and that it would be better to do nothing 
at all until there was sufficient money to construct an adequate building” but, in spite 
the protestations, a committee was appointed to prepare building plans.   
In May of 1925, President Sage announced to the Hospital’s trustees that the 
ground plan for the OPD was determined and that the projected building would 
accommodate the services necessary for Presbyterian and Sloane, although not for the 
whole Medical Center.  More space would eventually be added.  Dr. Lamb was harsh 
in his assessment.   
Rarely did Dean Sage stray so far from the facts.  He was familiar enough with 
O.P.D. problems to know that what he was proposing was obviously 
inadequate even for Presbyterian and Sloane, but apparently he was imbued 
with the idea of keeping the construction costs within $600,000.13 
In his view, the O.P.D. committee spent a great deal of time “in a futile and pathetic 
attempt to squeeze a clinic to handle 1,200 to 1,500 visits a day and all ward 
admissions into a truncated structure of one and a half stories.”14  Luckily for the 
beleaguered planners, excavation was considerably slowed down by the presence of 
quicksand, a symbolism of which they could likely readily appreciate.   
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In Dr. Lamb’s judgement, the Hospital’s most significant construction 
problems came from “an unrealistic attempt to stay within $7,000,000 allocated.”  The 
early estimate was quite off, with the final cost of the Hospital’s share of construction 
approaching $12 million. “The very conscientiousness with which every economy was 
pursued came near to causing grave errors.”15  But this assessment was likely only 
partly true.  While there were several other examples where financial pressures led to 
regrettable decisions, the most conspicuous case of the institutional willingness to cut 
corners concerned the outpatient service, a hardly random choice.   
Throughout early 1926, the OPD planning committee continued the futile 
effort to plan a clinic of one and a half stories.  While concern about the inadequacy of 
the proposed budget grew, planning proceeded.  Frustrated and disappointed with his 
previous experiences with the main planning committee, Dr. Lamb was nonethemess 
encouraged to review the OPD process by John Bush.  Reluctantly, he agreed to meet 
with the planning committee. 
Immediately they wanted to show me the plans on which they had labored so 
diligently. I told them that although I was sure the ‘plans were excellent 
considering the limitations of space which had been imposed, I saw no point in 
going over them. I went ahead to explain that Vanderbilt Clinic just could not 
be contained in the story and a half with which they had been working. That 
much space, I pointed out, would just about care for the admitting clinic. It 
would require an eight- or nine-story building to house the whole program. … 
This was all very well, the committee members countered, but could I write out 
the necessary check? I replied that the cost was not our concern and then 
plunged into what I considered the proper approach. To be sure, the committee 
had been told that only $600,000 was available and that they should plan a 
clinic of only one and a half stories. They had accepted these instructions 
literally and had spent much work trying to do what they knew from the outset 
to be an absurd impossibility.  I believed that the responsible Managers really 
wanted them to state that under the conditions outlined an adequate clinic was 
impossible and then to offer a plan for a satisfactory one. With that 
accomplished, the committee’s responsibility would end, and the rest would be 
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up to the Managers. The necessary money would then become available, or 
not.  If it did, the committee could proceed with detailed plans.  If not, it would 
be better to do nothing at all than to attempt an abortive plan which would 
simply stymie the whole vast undertaking.  Up until now, whenever the 
Managers had been convinced that a given course of action was right, they had 
always followed through.  There was no reason to believe that they would 
break that tradition now.16 
When Dr. Lamb left the meeting, the committee agreed with his position and the quiet 
revolt against the one-and-a-half-story “abortion” had begun.17   
On the very next day, the Hospital’s chief benefactor, Mr. Edward Harkness, 
stopped by Dr. Lamb’s office “on a minor professional matter.”  Dr. Lamb had always 
refrained form discussing Hospital problems on such occasions but Mr. Harkness 
insisted on hearing how things were going.  Dr. Lamb told Mr. Harkness of his 
meeting the day before and asked for his advice.  “Don’t budge from that position,” 
Harkness told the doctor and two days gave $250,000 toward the project and 
practically guaranteed that a sufficient facility would be constructed.18  At the same 
time, President Sage began urging Columbia’s President to raise their part of the 
needed funds.  In particular, he was urged to inquire whether the Vanderbilt family – 
the original donors of the Medical School’s outpatient clinic – would increase their 
donations.  Indeed, soon after Mr. Harkness had made his gift, Frederick W. and 
Harold S. Vanderbilt contributed $400,000 for the Clinic’s building and additional 
$100,000 for its equipment.  Adequate financing was finally assured and the 
construction plans were completed quite rapidly.19   
In December of 1926, a budget of $1,366,000 was announced to build and 
equip a Vanderbilt Clinic of five stories.  A month later, three additional floors were 
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added to the plan in order to include the Dental School in the building.  “At last,” 
wrote Dr. Lamb, “we had our eight-story Vanderbilt Clinic.”  Although it would have 
been appropriate to include an outpatient dental department, he though that the whole 
Dental School should not have been lumped together with the Medical Center’s 
outpatient clinic.  While not perfect, he thought Vanderbilt Clinic was well conceived 
and has served its purpose well for more than twenty-five years.  On the whole, it was 
“surely worth the fight we made for it.”20 
The entire episode surrounding the construction of the Medical Center’s 
outpatient department revealed several features of intra-organizational politics.  While 
the value of outpatient department as a feeding pipe of inpatients was apparent to all 
professional and administrative leaders, a more specific interest in adequate facilities 
and decent working environment was limited to those closely associated with the work 
of the outpatient clinic.  The advocacy for an adequate outpatient service then fell 
upon the shoulders of those younger or less successful physicians assigned to the 
outpatient work.  Close association with the clinic in the past also facilitated increased 
interest in adequate provision for the outpatient facility at the new Medical Center.   
The Problem of the Semi-Private Patient 
Beginning in 1922, planning for hospital ward construction proceeded swiftly.  
The layouts of different floors and services were determined in conferences between 
the architect and building firms and professional and administrative staffs of the 
departments involved.  The process worked so well that the planning of the ward 
floors was completed by the end of 1923.21   
But a different set of problems with the planning process had soon emerged.  
Guided by the idea of full-time appointments in all departments, initial plans did not 
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include accommodations for private patients.  When the strict full-time idea was 
defeated, the frustration felt by the doctors with the insufficient number of private 
rooms at the old hospital has been brought out into the open.  Moved by the hints from 
some of the professional staff as well as his own foresight, in 1924 Edward Harkness 
persuaded his mother to make a gift of a private patient building in memory of her 
husband.  Named Harkness Pavilion, the structure was entirely separate from the 
wards, providing 150 rooms for accommodating private patients, their guests, 
servants, or special nurses.22   
Although the gift was received with both gratitude and relief, the resulting 
building left much to be desired.  Harkness Pavilion was “too narrow” and “not well 
planned.”  Worse yet, “[e]ach floor was arranged to include both expensive rooms 
with bath and the less expensive ones without.  Consequently, there could be no 
differentiation of services by floors.”  The building’s elevators were markedly 
inadequate and no soundproofing was planned.  Both problems had to be confronted 
after completion and in a decidedly regrettable manner.23   
The issue of private room service remained controversial for at least another 
decade.  As late as 1932, President Sage argued that New York was “suffering from 
the oversupply of private beds” and that even upon recovery from the economic 
depression hospitals would not recover the former level of earnings from private 
patient services.  Two years later, however, he had changed his position, declaring in 
his annual report that “more and more, the Hospital must look to operating income for 
support.  This means a building up of private patient occupancy since this is the only 
service in which our income is greater than our out-go.”24  In 1936 Harkness Pavilion 
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was enlarged with adding three more floors, even if over objections of many older 
trustees.  In addition, a three story building adjoining the Pavilion was built to provide 
facilities for X-Ray, therapy, and allied services.  The project met with considerable 
resistance from many trustees who argued that anticipated occupancy would not make 
enlarged service profitable.  No sooner than the improvements were completed than it 
became obvious that demand for private service would far outstrip supply.25 
Although it was felt that the Harkness Pavilion was poorly designed, on the 
whole the new Medical Center provided excellent accommodations for both ward and 
private room patients.  The problem was – as in so many other hospitals during that 
time – accommodating the so-called semi-private patients, people of moderate means 
who could not afford private room rates but would not enter charity wards.  In the new 
facilities at the Medical Center, just as in the old Hospital, no provision was made for 
this category of patients.  The Great Depression, which struck the country soon after 
the Center opened, threw the need for moderately priced service in sharp relief as 
many rooms in Harkness Pavilion stood empty.  In an attempt to provide some kind of 
a solution, the smaller and more moderately appointed rooms were made available at 
lower rates.  Additionally, in 1928 rooms adjacent to the wards in the main hospital 
building – originally designated for “the dying, infectious, noisy and disfigured 
patients” – were converted into the semi-private rooms.  This, of course, was a 
temporary and unsatisfactory solution yet it took another ten years before the 
Committee to study the semi-private situation was appointed.26 
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The findings and recommendations of the study were summarized in the 
“Report on the Semi-Private Situation at the Presbyterian Hospital,” dated June 2, 
1937.27  The Report stated that, under current arrangements, Presbyterian was mixing 
semi-private patients with ward patients on the one hand, and with private patients on 
the other, and argued that these three different categories of patients should not be so 
mixed. 
There was no longer any doubt that there existed a great demand for semi-
private accommodations and the hospital as large as Presbyterian, argued the authors 
of the Report, owed it to the community to furnish hospital care at reasonable rates.  
Such service was urgently needed for yet another reason.  While the majority of 
doctors on the staff at Presbyterian had among their clients those who fit the definition 
of ‘semi-private’ patients, the greatest need for moderately priced accommodations 
was among the younger doctors on the staff.  Many senior physicians built up 
successful practices by serving patients of moderate means and, if Presbyterian was to 
keep its younger doctors, it had to provide adequate semi-private service.   
The number of make-shift semi-private rooms – 82 in all – did not convey the 
frustrations faced by the doctors and patients alike. 
The inability to tell a patient when a room will be available, the constant 
telephoning to the hospital and to the patient, the awkwardness of having to 
send sick out-of-town patients home to wait until there is space, the necessity 
of sending patients to other hospitals because the Medical Center has no room, 
make up a set of circumstances which are both discouraging and irritating – 
more especially to the younger men who are trying to establish a practice. The 
Hospital loses friends inevitably as a result of this situation.28 
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As a result there was a long waiting list for semi-private patients who wished to enter 
Presbyterian for non-urgent procedures.  In this regard the Report wryly noted that 
whereas the waiting list “has been considered an attractive feature in making clubs 
exclusive … it is not an asset to the doctor who is trying to take care of patients who 
need hospitalization.”  It should not be forgotten, warned the authors, that “well 
satisfied semi-private patients of today … often become the private patients of 
tomorrow.”29  The questionnaire sent to all doctors on the staff at Presbyterian 
revealed that in 1936 the doctors had to send at least 234 semi-private patients to other 
hospitals in the city.  This not only placed heavy demands on the doctors’ time, having 
to care for the patients hospitalized in different parts of the city but caused 
considerable irritation to patients and their friends. 
The Report emphasized that the make-shift semi-private accommodations in 
the main hospital building decreased the already inadequate number of ward patients 
needed by the affected serviced to fulfill their teaching duties.  Mixing private and 
semi-private patients in the Harkness Pavilion was even worse.  “There are too many 
common facilities-entrance, admitting, elevators, roof, reception rooms, solaria, 
bathrooms, etc., and the floors are so arranged that unless you use the larger rooms 
with baths at a [semi-private] rate, you have private and semi-private patients on the 
same floors.”  This situation nearly invited abuse, the Committee wrote.  “It did not 
take people long to get onto the fact that a room for which they were paying $10.00 to 
$15.00 on the 8th Floor could be duplicated for $7.00, with the laboratory discount, a 
floor or more down.”  The answer, argued the Committee member, was obvious: 
“[e]ach type of service should have a separate and largely self-contained unit.”30 
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The Committee’s recommendations were largely based on a careful study of 
the Baker Memorial Unit, a semi-private facility of the Massachusetts General 
Hospital in Boston.  The study reported that Baker was to a great extent a self-
contained eleven-story unit, with its own operating and delivery rooms and X-ray 
department.  It shared with Phillips [the Hospital’s private patient unit] the clinical 
pathological laboratory and the kitchen. The menu was limited in Baker, and the best 
food was sent to Phillips.  In Baker, for a bed in a nine-bed room the daily charge was 
$3.70, for a four-bed room, $4.50; for one in a two-bed room, $5.50; and for a single 
room the rate was $6.50.  The Committee learned that the nine-bed wards had been 
installed to care for “compensation” cases, but had turned out to be a source of 
constant trouble. The two-bed wards had little demand, but the four-bed wards were 
well occupied.  Most successful were the 157 single rooms.31   
Baker collected professional fees, with the maximum professional fee set at 
$150 for a hospital stay of three months or less.  For a longer stay, an additional fee 
might be charged, but no more than $150 in an additional three months.  A deposit 
was required from each patient at the time of admission.  As money was collected, it 
was applied to hospital charges and then, what remained, to the professional fees.  
Each patient was carefully checked to ascertain whether he belonged in the semi-
private or in the private service.  Operating on this basis, Baker succeeded in 
collecting over 98 percent of the hospital charges.32 
The Presbyterian’s observers concluded that, although not perfect, Baker 
offered valuable example.  The Committee concluded that the best plan for 
Presbyterian would be to build a unit containing only single rooms.  They found those 
in Boston too small and lacking in proper facilities. Each was furnished with an open 
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basin but no toilet, and the closet space was inadequate. The Committee concluded 
that a good semi-private room should have a toilet and wash basin at one side of the 
door and an adequate closet at the other.33  
Presbyterian’s Committee found the cap on professional fees imposed at 
Massachusetts General to be questionable and the arrangement whereby the hospital 
collected professional fees was sure to raise objections from the medical profession.  
The latter, however, might have to be replicated at Presbyterian, they concluded, 
because with the low-income patients the doctors often had particular difficulty.34  The 
problem, in Dr. Lamb’s words, was that many among the semi-private group were 
“poor but proud.”  Unwilling to go to the wards, they entered the semi-private service 
even though the charges overtaxed their budget.  When they settled their hospital bill, 
there was often little or nothing left for the doctor.  Therefore, if it could be arranged 
for the hospital to collect both fees from semi-private patients, it might prove very 
helpful.35  
The ideal organization of patient service, recommended in the Report, had to 
proceed from clear realization that the Hospital served three distinct groups of patients 
and had different interest in regard to each.  The first group consisted of ward patients 
who were either treated for free or paid what they could up at the time paid from 
nothing to $4.00 a day.  The Report stated that ward patients “represent a community 
and teaching obligation. The hospital loses money on this group, as it should.”  The 
semi-private patients were paying $6.00 per day which was more or less a proper rate.  
Whatever rate may be set at the separate semi-private facility, it should assure that the 
Hospital did not incur losses from semi-private care.  “The plan should guarantee the 
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hospital a little better than an even break.”  A reasonable range for private service at 
Harkness Pavilion would be from $8.00 to $25.00, or even more than that, per day.  
Private patients, noted the Report, were “the only patients from whose care the 
hospital is entitled to, and receives, a profit.”  With this in mind, it recommended that 
“the profits should be fair, without nuisance charges, and the service, from entrance to 
discharge, should be above criticism.”36 
Taking their cue from the Massachusetts General, the authors of the Report 
wanted to do away with such terms as “private,” “semi-private,” “group private,” and 
“white-collar” because they suggested invidious comparisons.  In Boston, these terms 
were no longer used and one spoke of “Phillips House patients” [the private unit], 
“Baker patients,” or “pavilion [that is, ward] patients.”37  
Alas, the semi-private unit for the Medical Center was not realized in the years 
before the start of the war.  Part of the reason may have been that President Sage 
continued to believe that it was very possible that the semi-private service would 
compete with Harkness Pavilion to the detriment of the Hospital’s income, even 
though the study showed otherwise.  More likely, however, the project never got off 
the ground because instead of trying to raise estimated $3 million dollars, the 
estimated cost of a 300-bed semi-private unit, President Sage was asking another $5 
million for an entirely different purpose.  Dr. Lamb, who was among the authors of the 
study, believed that had the extra $5 million were not tacked onto the price tag of the 
semi-private facility, Edward Harkness would have financed it.38  
In 1941, however, the administration did make some improvements in the 
designation of rooms in Harkness Pavilion, approximating something like a 
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differential service by floors. Previously the sixty group private rooms had been 
dispersed throughout several floors together with higher priced rooms, an arrangement 
which was strongly criticized.  Now floors 3, 4, 5, and 6 were converted into a kind of 
low-income service. Fifty-nine rooms, the less desirable ones on the four floors, were 
to be let at $7 per day and given a less elaborate service, which resulted in a 
considerable economy for the Hospital.  Seventeen other rooms on these floors were to 
be used for personnel and six for endowed beds. These were more desirable rooms, 
most of them with baths. The rates on floors 7, 8, 11, and 12 were revised to provide a 
greater number of moderately priced rooms.  No patient paying $7 a day was to be 
housed above Floor 6 for less than the established rates except when an emergency 
arose or the number of personnel exceeded the quota.  In view of the faulty planning 
of the Pavilion, this was a reasonable makeshift in the direction of segregating 
different types of service on different horizontal levels, by all odds the most sensible 
way to provide a proper number of low-cost and medium-cost rooms.39  
The failure to devise a comprehensive solution to the semi-private patient 
problem was not atypical.  During this period, it was not uncommon for hospitals to 
approach the question of semi-private patient with apprehension.  The Report of the 
Committee to study the semi-private situation captured the generalized feeling among 
doctors and hospitals about providing service to low-income patients: “[o]ne has only 
to experience the difficulty of trying to care for people with limited means to realize 
how much the doctor has to give of himself and of his time to accomplish the desired 
result.”  Some of the problems were stated in the Report but, generally, the margin of 
profit that could be earned on semi-private care was very small and, if every aspect of 
the service was not carefully thought out, it could easily incur deficits.  Another 
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complicating factor was the negative experience which many hospitals, including 
Presbyterian, had with the emerging hospital insurance plans.   
In the spring of 1935, President Sage presented to the Managers a proposal to 
join the Associated Hospital Service of New York, a hospital insurance plan sponsored 
by the United Hospital Fund.  The plan outlined the list of services that the Hospital 
would furnish to covered patients at a rate of $6 a day.  The Managers authorized the 
President to file the application to join the plan, subject to a further consultation with 
the professional staff.  Upon reviewing the proposal, the Medical Board voted against 
it, arguing that given the Hospital’s present semi-private facilities, the patients 
admitted under the plan would take up the rooms in Harkness Pavilion but would pay 
no laboratory and other fees that would be normally charged to the semi-private 
patients staying at Harkness.  Conversely, many patients who would ordinarily go into 
the wards would take semi-private rooms, receiving more than the usual semi-private 
patient and would not expect to pay a doctor’s fee.40  
President Sage, however, did not agree with the Board and decided to proceed 
with the application unless the Managers objected.  Although he noted the Board’s 
position, he felt that the Hospital should join the plan “as a matter of public policy and 
service.”  Professional staff naturally resented the President’s decision believing that 
the Hospital and the doctors should not accept a plan that would entail financial losses.  
Some of the problems with the plan were addressed at a later time but the main 
problem, in the opinion of the professional staff, remained: “furnishing many services 
to semi-private – and soon to private patients as well – without any corresponding 
remuneration to the Hospital.”  It was estimated that under the plan the Hospital lost 
about $150,000 annually.  While the growth of hospital insurance was recognized as a 
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permanent phenomenon, many felt it was wrong to subsidize hospitalization of the 
lower middle class from the funds of the charitable hospital.41  
It was widely felt at this time that insurance plans were appropriate only for the 
lower middle-income group.  The fear was that the increasing number of patients, 
presumed able to afford private rates, were enrolled in these plans.  Financial strategy 
that the voluntary hospitals developed for the past several decades, aimed to charge 
patients in accordance with their economic status was now under threat.  If the 
insurance plans continued to spread into the higher income groups, they threatened to 
equalize the revenue which hospital received from caring for patients from different 
economic groups, effectively eliminating the large part of the profits derived from the 
differentiated fee scales in the semi-private and private service. 
Hospitals were reluctant to sign onto these insurance plans and, if they did, 
attempted to provide the ‘compensation’ patients, as they were called, with the level of 
service just above that of the wards.  Usually, they were accommodated in the 
oxymoronically titled ‘private wards,’ or in ‘group private’ service.  These were, 
essentially, small wards which, presumably, accorded the lower middle-class patients 
if not privacy, than some assurance of not being mixed with the denizens of the ward.  
At Presbyterian, some patients who were admitted to semi-private rooms under the 
Associated Hospital Service insurance plan were transferred to the wards because of 
their inability to pay the doctor’s fee.  The Hospital decided that any profit arising 
from such transfers would be allocated to the educational and research funds of the 
department rendering the care.42  
In 1941, Dr. Sigmund Goldwater, New York City’s Commissioner of 
Hospitals, and the Associated Hospital Service proposed a new plan which would 
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essentially insure low-salaried patients for the cost of ward care and associated 
physicians’ charges.  A memo outlining the proposed plan, to be known as 
Community Medical Care, was distributed to the members of the Center’s Medical 
Board in May.  No immediate action was required, but in its discussion the Board 
agreed that insurance plans should involve compensation for the insured by the 
insurance company and that Hospital should be careful to make no commitments that 
would entail financial losses.  The Board felt that the original Associated Hospital 
Service plan did involve a loss to the Hospital and should stand as a warning.  Also, 
physicians’ fees for ward patients were entirely foreign to the Hospital’s traditional 
policy and should be approached carefully.  Finally, Presbyterian was a teaching 
hospital and it would be “a serious error to enter an arrangement which might curtail 
the free choice of cases needed for teaching purposes.”43  Three members of the Board 
were appointed to write a full report on the proposed plan and their document 
emphasized the following points.  
Adoption of the plan might well result in interfering with the number and 
variety of cases to be used for teaching. The American Medical Association’s 
approval of the Hospital for training interns might be jeopardized. Work for the 
nursing staff would become more complicated, and there might be confusion 
among the attending physicians, the residents, and the interns as to who should 
be paid. From the proposed contract, it was not clear how many extra services 
would be provided. On the other hand, if Presbyterian did not adopt the plan, 
patients who could pay the full rates might go to hospitals which had adopted 
the plan. The professional fees from a patient insured under this plan might be 
pooled for distribution among the various doctors who had contributed to the 
case. The problems of the costs of medical care to the layman and the threat of 
socialized medicine should be kept in mind.44  
Later that year, Presbyterian’s Medical Board met with Dr. Goldwater to 
discuss the plan. Although he argued strenuously against every objection, the members 
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of the Medical Board were not wholly convinced.  After a stir of opposition from other 
corners of the City’s medical profession, Presbyterian’s Medical Board declared itself 
against the plan, calling it “neither sound nor in the public interest” and “not in accord 
with the teaching functions of the Hospital.”  Discussions of the project dragged for 
another two years, which the Medical Board again reiterated its stand of being 
unequivocally opposed to the Hospital’s “underwriting” of this or any other 
hospitalization plan.45  Not until some time after the war, did the Center come to the 
realization that “a substantial portion of the population will have some form of 
prepayment medical care insurance, including a large fraction of the patients admitted 
into the wards of the hospital at the Medical Center.”46  
Institutional Purpose and Structure: Rhetoric and Reality 
The conflicts surrounding the construction and expansion of the Medical 
Center revealed some of the most underserved patient groups – the lower class 
ambulatory patients and the lower-middle class inpatients.  Intimately connected with 
their plight was relative powerlessness of those segments of the medical profession 
most likely to serve them, namely, the younger, less successful physicians in general 
medicine and related fields.  The completed Medical Center and directions of its early 
growth revealed a far more complex structure of division and subordination which 
eluded even the most pragmatic statements of institutional purpose. 
Presbyterian Hospital’s Annual Report of 1926 was symptomatic of the 
mismatch between stated institutional objectives and the actual organizational 
hierarchy.  Written by the Hospital’s President, Mr. Dean Sage, the report looked 
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toward the completion of the Medical Center from a broad perspective of its 
institutional mission. 
A teaching hospital is an outstanding unit in community life.  Its activities are 
not confined within its walls.  They touch the mainsprings of the social 
organization.  The layman is apt to conceive the Hospital’s function in relation 
only to its bed patients.  That is truly a most important work but, properly 
evaluated, by no means its only great contribution.  We must look to 
preventive medicine in the broadest sense of that term, for a test of the ultimate 
social value of the Hospital.47  
The opening statement was followed by a discussion of the various parts and 
services of the Medical Center which furthered its central institutional goal.  Both the 
content and the order of discussion are notable.  The pride of place in furthering the 
cause of preventing disease was given to the outpatient clinic. 
The Out-Patient Department or Clinic yields the most patent example of 
hospital activities directed toward preserving the economic status of the 
individual.  This type of preventive medicine is growing enormously in 
importance.  Its endeavor is to keep the patient out of a hospital bed except 
where the ultimate diagnosis discloses the real necessity of such treatment.  
Obviously, if the sufferer can be restored to health while still an ambulatory 
case, he is best served and so is the community, for the economic waste of a 
complete removal from social usefulness has been avoided.48 
The functional thrust of this conception, with its heavy emphasis on work ethic 
prescription for the working classes, is unmistakable.  But even a sympathetic account 
could find faults with it.  While praising President’s report as a “well-written essay 
[that] affords a picture of the whole,” the Hospital’s historian concluded that, under 
the circumstances of the time, the great emphasis laid placed on avoiding 
hospitalization was actually mistaken.  “It required so many appointments for 
consultations and laboratory examinations that the net expense and loss of time were 
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greater than for a couple of days spent in the Hospital, where a comprehensive work-
up could be quickly accomplished.”  As things were, however, the clinic patients had 
to take half or an entire day off from work or household responsibilities to hold each 
appointment.  Not until much later could appointment and diagnostic time be 
significantly shortened.49  
The second division of the Medical Center which President Sage chose to 
highlight was the Social Service Department.   
The Social Service Department is another important adjunct to preventive 
medicine as well as a necessary link in the care of patients within the walls.  
Through this department, contact is maintained between professional treatment 
at the Hospital and the environment of the patient as a member of the social 
body.  It advises the doctor in charge of background and environmental 
conditions which directly bear upon the condition of the patient and indirectly 
upon the treatment to be accorded him.  Furthermore, it is the province of 
Social Service to see that the patient is relieved as far as possible from the 
anxieties attendant upon a family whose welfare is unprovided for while its 
head is in confinement.  This is done by establishing contacts with other 
organizations which are devoted to social aid and in some cases by the actual 
application of such aid.50  
Next in the discussion came nursing.  Presbyterian had always considered its 
Nursing School to be among its greatest contributions to community service.  The 
nurses, “through their administration to the sick, and particularly in public health 
nursing and teaching, contribute directly to the prevention of disease.”  The question 
of the degree and kind of training in the sciences to be given to nurses was moot, 
claimed the President, but it was “safe to say that the proper tendency should be 
toward equipping the graduate to undertake any field of work which may interest her, 
whether it be hospital nursing, private nursing, public health nursing, or education.”51  
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The operation of the Department of Nutrition was described next, as affording 
“an opportunity of bringing to the home much medical instruction in the art of 
preserving health through a proper understanding of the meaning of diet.”52  In point 
of fact, the newly-built Medical Center instituted an important structural innovation, 
removing meal service, as well as preparation of menus and food, from the province of 
the nurses to that of the Department of Nutrition largely independent from the nursing 
service.53  From nutrition, the Report moved on to the Department of Occupation 
Therapy which “deals with the problems of inactivity resulting from hospital 
confinement” and the planned building of the convalescent home which had to be 
postponed due to the heavy financial demands of current construction.  Finally, the 
Report turned to the functions of teaching and research. 
Doubtless the greatest contribution to preventive medicine made by a teaching 
hospital is found in the furnishing of clinical and laboratory facilities to the 
professional staff.  Medical practice, research and education are hand-maidens 
in a common task, the securing of the public health-no one of them can 
succeed without the assistance of the others.  Together they seek not only the 
alleviation but also the prevention of human suffering.  To their common 
effort, resulting in the application of an aggregate of brains to a given problem, 
the world must look for the great medical discoveries of the future which may 
make the world a safer and better place in which to live.54 
In view of the actual relegation of the outpatient department to the last line on 
the budget, it is easy to see that the President’s report placed first what was in fact the 
most dispensable and the least funded enterprise.  Distinctly feminized and de-classed 
fields of nursing, nutrition, social work, and rehabilitation were largely service-
centered functions or, at best, professionally marginal areas.  In point of fact, Report’s 
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order of discussion was nearly the reverse of the actual order of institutional privilege 
and functional importance. 
Even if the enthusiasm for preventive medicine and community service was 
real among administrators and philanthropists, the actual architecture of the Center’s 
activities did not bear it out.  Many public health and community service functions 
were abandoned or limited with the move to the newly Medical Center.  During the 
years of preparation for the move to the Medical Center, several services were 
discontinued.  In 1925 Presbyterian transferred general visiting nursing for its district, 
together with the training of nurses in public health nursing, to the Henry Street 
Visiting Nurse Service.  The Hospital’s social service department had gradually 
discontinued its commitment to help patients financially, except when such aid was 
necessary to obtain things prescribed by doctors for medical treatment.  This change 
was apparently made to avoid duplication of services offered by other agencies in the 
community.  Both inpatient and outpatient departments discontinued programs for 
treatment and prevention of tuberculosis, ostensibly because this responsibility was 
assumed by New York City’s departments of Health, Hospitals, and Public Welfare.55   
There were also significant changes in social service.  In anticipation of the 
move to the Medical Center, a plan for a single department of social service was 
drawn up.  It proposed to separate social work from the public health nursing and 
more strictly subordinate it to the clinical medicine.  The Vanderbilt Clinic Auxiliary, 
a committee of interested women who was largely responsible for organizing and 
funding the social work at the old clinic, was removed from direct management but 
continued the general sponsorship of the unified department.56  The plan envisioned 
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that the Director of the new department was to be approved by the Medical Board and 
the Board of Managers.  The teams of social workers, selected by the director and 
approved by the administration, were to be attached to each major clinical division.  
Many of the social workers, who had previously combined nursing and social work, 
“obligingly adapted themselves to the new division of labor among nurses, social 
workers, dietitians, and clinic aides.”57  Increased specialization and the narrowing of 
the field’s focus were notable in the work of the reorganized social service 
department.58   
More than any other, the discontinuation of the Katie Geitz’s Kitchen seemed 
to mark the end of an era.  For many years, the Kitchen was one of the auxiliary 
services which helped create good will for the Presbyterian Hospital.  This is how Dr. 
Lamb described this institution. 
In 1904, Katie Geitz, a frail German-born woman, was admitted to the 
Hospital. She remained as a ward patient for a year. Although her life was 
saved, she was to retain a permanent limp. Meanwhile, the Visiting Nurse 
Department, generously helped by Mrs. William K. Vanderbilt, was being 
organized. An important part of the program was the establishment of a milk 
kitchen in Yorkville to fight malnutrition in tubercular and other 
undernourished children.  In charge was Katie Geitz, who was grateful to 
Presbyterian for her recovery and who had endeared herself already to the 
Hospital personnel.  She carried on for some twenty years.  At first she 
distributed only milk, but soon also fed Yorkville children the fresh eggs 
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brought in from Vanderbilt farms.  During the depression of 1907 she 
distributed bread.  In later years she prepared school lunches for the children.  
When she retired on March 26, 1925, the Hospital gave a reception for her at 
Nightingale Hall and many grateful persons came to tell her good-bye.  The 
Managers voted her a gift of $250.59  
Proceeding at an accelerated pace during the period of transition, addition of 
some and discontinuation of other services revealed two partially intertwined logics 
shaping American medicine – the hierarchical structure of medical specialties and the 
division of labor between private and public providers of care.   
Although a prominent general hospital, Presbyterian could not by itself offer 
adequate teaching facilities across the entire range of clinical specialties.  Facilities for 
instruction in obstetrics and gynecology were secured through merger of Sloane 
Hospital for Women with Presbyterian in 1925.60  Teaching and research in pediatric 
medicine was made possible by affiliation with Babies Hospital, which agreed to 
move to the Medical Center in the same year.61  Another hospital to affiliate with the 
Medical Center at the time was the Neurological Institute.62  The need to expand the 
Center’s facilities in orthopedics was felt early on and formal negotiations with the 
New York Orthopaedic Dispensary and Clinic began in 1941.  The war has postponed 
the process but the official affiliation was secured in 1945 and the Orthopaedic 
Hospital moved to the Center in 1950.63  In an effort to broaden its involvement in the 
problems of rehabilitation and physical medicine, the University affiliated with the 
Institute for the Crippled and Disabled in 1947.64  
Other notable structural changes included considerable expansion of urological 
and ophthalmological services.  In 1924, Director of Urology, Dr. J. Bentley Squire, 
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offered to finance the construction of one whole floor to be devoted to his specialty 
and to raise an endowment fund to cover its operating deficits.  Floor 10 of the new 
Presbyterian Hospital building was accordingly designated for the Squire Urological 
Clinic.65  In 1931 Edward Harkness offered $5 million to endow an Institute of 
Ophthalmology at the Center.66  In 1940, the Hermann Knapp Memorial Eye Institute, 
one of the pioneer institutions in the field, merged with Columbia-Presbyterian’s 
Institute of Ophthalmology, transferring most of its funds, patients, and staff.67   
All of these additions and affiliations concerned private institutions and 
donations and they revealed to some extent the working out of several principles in 
American hospital system.  The expansion of Presbyterian’s urology department into 
an independently funded Squire Urological Clinic and the endowment of the Institute 
of Ophthalmology exemplified the power of male-dominated surgical specialties.  
Conversely, the absorption of the Sloane Hospital for Women and the Babies Hospital 
typified the disappearance of the institutions established through women’s 
philanthropy and activism in the second half of the 19th century.68  The affiliation with 
hospitals specializing in orthopedics and rehabilitation underscored the secondary 
status of these specialties which until after WWII served mostly low class clienteles. 
If the pattern of institutional affiliations with private hospitals revealed relative 
prestige and power of medical specialties and their clients, relationships which the 
new Medical Center established with public entities bespoke an even starker division 
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of labor.  The establishment at the Center of a solid base for work in psychiatry and 
oncology, for example, was made possible through bringing into the geographical 
union of the two public institutions – the New York State Psychiatric Institute and the 
city-owned Francis Delafield Hospital for the treatment of cancer.  The Psychiatric 
Institute and Hospital was built at the Center concurrently with all of its major original 
buildings.  The decision to locate a cancer hospital at the Medical Center was reached 
many years later.  Both, however, were part of the larger relationship of the private 
Medical Center and the various parts of the public health care system.   
According to the account published by the Dean of Columbia’s Medical 
School, in 1935 the New York City Commissioner of Hospitals, Dr. Sigmund S. 
Goldwater, created the Research Council in Chronic Diseases and approached the 
University for aid in implementing the highly desirable program.  As the plans to 
establish a city-owned hospital for chronic diseases took shape, Columbia entered into 
negotiations with the city to affiliate with the future institution.  The Hospital for 
Chronic Diseases, later named the Goldwater Memorial Hospital, was built on Welfare 
Island.  The plan called for a unit for research and teaching and Columbia’s Medical 
School was placed in charge of one of the divisions of this unit.69 
In 1936, the University began talks with the City about a similar role in the 
staffing of the cancer hospital planned by the City.  Initially, the City intended to build 
this hospital on Welfare Island, too, but Columbia persuaded the city that the acute 
professional care required by cancer patients would be hard to provide on the Island 
because of transportation and other difficulties.  Edward Harkness’ purchase of the 
block of land just south of the Medical Center in 1937 enabled the University to bring 
the future Francis Delafield Hospital in close proximity with Columbia-Presbyterian.70 
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The College of Physicians and Surgeons also staffed and used for the 
instruction of students Bellevue Hospital’s Tuberculosis Service.  In 1938 the Service 
moved into a new pavilion of 270 medical and 47 surgical beds. According to Dr. 
Lamb, “[t]he thoroughly modern unit included an excellent teaching amphitheater, 
laboratories for the investigation of respiratory and cardio-circulatory function, a 
library, special units for collapse therapy, chemical and bacteriological laboratories, 
and operating rooms.”71  In his annual report, the Dean of the College predicted that 
the service would be of even greater importance to the Medical School in the future. 
In 1939, a new 50-bed service for diseases of the skin opened in the Welfare 
Island Hospital for Chronic Diseases was made available for training of Columbia’s 
medical students.  In Dr. Lamb’s words, this relationship helped “compensate for the 
inadequate facilities of the Dermatological Service at Presbyterian.”72 
Another visible project of cooperation with the public health institutions was 
the establishment of the Washington Heights Health and Teaching Center.  In 1934 the 
Dean of the Medical School began negotiating with the City of New York in regard to 
locating one of the City’s new health centers at Columbia-Presbyterian.  The Center 
would provide training opportunities for members of the Department of Health, the 
Visiting Nurse Service, Family Relief and Social Service Agencies through the 
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creation of appropriate courses adapted to the needs of variety of such personnel.  It 
would also afford experience in public health nursing to students in the School of 
Nursing and assume some of the public health activities of the Vanderbilt Clinic, the 
Center’s outpatient department.  The final agreement was reached in September of 
1936 and the center, situated at the corner of 168th Street and Broadway, opened in 
1940.73  In 1945, Columbia organized a course in hospital administration at the Center 
and the program became one of the leading educational efforts in this field in the 
country.  Five years later the Institute of Administrative Medicine was created as an 
outgrowth of the program and was renamed the School of Public Health and 
Administrative Medicine in 1955.74  
Even a cursory overview of the Center’s relations with a number of public 
health care institutions and initiatives suggests that they conformed to the traditional 
division of labor between private and public institutions established as early as the 
18th century.  It will be recalled that the first American voluntary hospitals were 
established not to share in the public burden of caring for all sorts of social and 
physical ills, but to save from the indignities of the public almshouse only those who 
were morally deserving.  In practice, however, not only the victims of their own 
licentiousness, but many other merely troublesome and disturbing categories of 
patients were turned away.  Voluntary hospitals routinely rejected not only the 
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syphilitic and the alcoholic, but also those suffering from tuberculosis, any and all 
contagious diseases, mental disturbances, cancer and other incurable maladies, as well 
as the chronically ill and the aged.  Moral or not, with few exceptions, voluntary 
hospitals transferred such patients to the city institutions. 
Even after most of the old almshouses evolved into public hospitals, their 
patients – as well as their staffs and services – differed markedly from those at the 
private institutions.  Thus, the voluntary and public hospitals existed in a 
complementary relationship and the rapid growth of the private institutions did not 
reduce the need for the public ones, quite the contrary.  Well into the twentieth century 
there was a clear division of labor among the two: the private hospitals creamed the 
population of social and medical ailments, taking in the more profitable and 
professionally rewarding cases, while the public institutions were left to take care of 
the rest.75   
It is not surprising, then, that the psychiatric or cancer hospitals at CPMC were 
publicly owned or that Columbia was happy to staff and instruct its students at public 
hospitals for chronic diseases or for veterans but not to provide care for these 
categories of patients in the facilities at the Medical Center.  The devolution of many 
public health and social service functions to city and state agencies was in evidence as 
well, although Columbia was always eager to extend its academic programs at and 
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with public institutions.  Staffing and teaching on the hospital wards, however, 
entailed rather little responsibility for the institution as a whole even in private 
hospitals and even less so in public,  for, until the last third of the 20th century, the 
physician’s relationship to the proverbial ‘doctor’s workshop’ was clearly such that he 
was in, but not of the hospital. 
For the most part, public authorities at all levels of government looked 
favorably on private provision of health care as an unquestioned and unmitigated 
public benefit, as evidenced by tax exemptions, direct subsidies and payments to the 
voluntary hospitals for the care of indigent patients.  It seems, however, that this long-
standing ‘complementary’ relationship has created two levels of health care, as well as 
a clear hierarchy of health care investment, in which both the poor and the public 
interest are underserved. 
Early Views on Institutional Development 
In April of 1937, at the request of Presbyterian’s Executive Vice-President, the 
Medical Board held a meeting to discuss the current structure and future needs of 
CPMC.  The former dean of the Medical School, Dr. William Darrach, was asked to 
outline the original plan of the Center, focusing on the relationship between the School 
and the Hospital.  In addition, the Board circulated a questionnaire to all heads of 
departments, whose responses were to be incorporated into a comprehensive report, to 
be written by the current dean, Dr. Willard C. Rappleye.  The heads of departments 
were asked to comment on whether Hospital facilities were in balance with the present 
educational requirements and, if not, what additional facilities were needed.  More 
specifically, they were asked if their requirements would be met by returning to ward 
status those beds which were currently reserved for semi-private patients.76 
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In keeping with their decision to look back at the original institutional goals, 
the Report reiterated that the Medical Center “was created to provide an integrated 
program for the highest quality of medical care for the sick and injured, to advance 
knowledge regarding the causes, prevention, and treatment of disease and disability, 
and to train young men and women for the professions of medicine, dentistry, nursing, 
public health and allied fields.”77  Overall, the Review concluded that  
 [a] study of the early memoranda and plans for the Medical Center in the light 
of present needs and conditions clearly indicates the wisdom, flexibility and 
soundness of those plans.  The extent to which the program has been realized 
can only bring deep satisfaction to those who made the Center possible 
because the original plan has been largely realized.  There are no indications or 
suggestions for changes in the policies adopted in the beginning.78 
The report noted that the early vision of the Medical Center emphasized 
division of labor between the Hospital and the Medical School in which responsibility 
for all hospital activities should rest eventually with a single hospital organization for 
the entire Center, while the responsibility for all research and teaching rest with the 
University.  With few exceptions, such arrangement had been achieved.  
In regard to the overall size and the range of specialties represented at the 
Medical Center, the Report noted that  
[i]n the original program there was agreement between the Presbyterian 
Hospital and the University that the former would endeavor to provide 
facilities for the instruction in general medicine and surgery for a student body 
of one hundred medical students per class.  In was agreed that to satisfy these 
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conditions there should be 200 beds for medicine, 200 for surgery, and 250 for 
other specialties.79 
These expectations were linked with the hope that certain specialized hospitals would 
move to the Medical Center and, in the words of the Review, “[t]hat hope has been 
realized.”80   
Table 4.1 summarizes the number of beds designated for various medical 
specialties across the geographically affiliated institutions of the Medical Center in 
1937.81   
 
 
Table 4.1. Number of Hospital Beds by Specialty at the Columbia-Presbyterian 
Medical Center, 1937 
 
Specialty Beds 
Medicine 118 
Surgery 114 
Obstetrics (Sloane Hospital) 131 
Urology 45 
Pediatrics (Babies Hospital) 147 
Neurology 200 
Psychiatry 200 
Ophthalmology (Eye Institute) 53 
Otolaryngology 29 
Fracture 26 
 
Source: Compiled from the “Review of the Program of the Medical Center” (1937), reprinted in Albert 
R. Lamb, The Presbyterian Hospital and the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, 1868-1943 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 450-458. 
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On the surface, it appears that the number of beds available to the various specialties 
was simply out of balance with the original conception.  General medicine and surgery 
had many fewer beds than originally planned, whereas the number of beds in the other 
specialties was far greater than initially projected.  The deeper reality was that the 
original conception of clinical training itself was altogether abandoned.  Initially it was 
contemplated that all clinical instruction of medical students would be conducted at 
the Medical Center but, as the report put it, “although facilities for instruction in the 
medical sciences remain adequate for 100 students, it was realized early that this 
would not be practical or desirable for all phases of clinical teaching.”  Several reasons 
were cited for this change of heart.   
To provide all the facilities needed for a complete program would require a 
number of additional hospital units which would make the Medical Center too 
large for most effective management and would require more money for 
construction and endowment than has been available.  A certain number of 
special services, such as those for tuberculosis and contagious diseases, would 
duplicate in large measure those maintained by the City … . …  The location 
of the Medical Center makes it difficult of impossible to provide for the many 
emergency problems of medical practice care for by institutions located in the 
congested and industrial areas of the City and especially the type of medical 
work in those institutions maintaining an active ambulance service.  There was 
also a feeling that concentration of all activities at the Medical Center would 
tend to isolate the staff and the hospitals from their larger community 
responsibilities and would not satisfy the fullest public and professional 
purposes of the program.  For these and other reasons it was decided that the 
major part of the undergraduate teaching should be given at the Medical 
Center, but that other hospitals would be utilized to supplement those basic 
facilities.82  
Clearly, the actual facilities of the Medical Center were very different from the 
200-200-250 model contemplated at the beginning.  It must be remembered that the 
period of the Center’s construction was one of rapid growth of medical specialties and 
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fundamental change in American medical education.  Perhaps, then, the original 
model itself was found to be inadequate, although this was not mentioned in the 
Review.  Table 4.2 summarizes the data on clinical instruction conducted outside of 
the Medical Center in the Review.83  The document confirmed the general logic of the 
relationship of the (private) Medical Center with the public institutions of the City.  
Certain categories of disease – including tuberculosis and communicable diseases – 
were excluded from the Center’s purview in virtue of the lower-class stigma and 
greater perceived danger attached to them.  The sole reason why the Medical Center 
would even contemplate provisions for these diseases was the “need at the Center for 
facilities for the care of those of the hospital staff and their families who may be ill 
with one of the communicable diseases” and a realization that there were “no 
satisfactory provisions in New York City for private patients with contagious 
diseases.”84  This narrow construction of need was articulated despite the fact that 
Babies Hospital, as well as Departments of Medicine, Bacteriology, and Public Health, 
urged creation of facilities for communicable diseases.85 
Supplementation of clinical teaching at a broad array of other hospitals 
revealed yet another structural conflict at the Medical Center.  At the time of the 
Report, the number of teaching beds available in Obstetrics and Neurology was far in 
excess of anything that might have been contemplated at the outset.  The Sloane 
Hospital for Women had 131 beds, while the Neurological Institute had a whopping 
200 beds.  Thus, the beds available in these two specialties alone far exceeded the 250 
beds originally contemplated for all specialties other than general medicine and 
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Table 4.2. Clinical Instruction of Columbia’s Medical Students Conducted Outside of 
the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, 1937 
 
Institution Public or private Type of clinical instruction 
Bellevue Hospital Public Physical diagnosis, 2nd year 
Bellevue Hospital Public Rotation in medicine, surgery, and 
chest diseases, 4th year 
City Hospital Public Elective courses 
Hospital for the Ruptured and Crippled Private Orthopedic surgery 
Memorial Hospital Private Cancer 
Montefiore Hospital Private Neurological diseases and physical 
diagnosis 
Morrisania Hospital Public Obstetrics 
New York Orthopaedic Hospital Private Orthopedic surgery 
Roosevelt Hospital Private Elective courses in medicine and 
surgery 
Sea View Hospital Public Physical diagnosis 
St. Luke’s Hospital Private Elective courses 
St. Vincent’s Hospital Private Elective courses 
Welfare Hospital for Chronic Diseases Public Chronic diseases 
Willard Parker Hospital Public Contagious diseases 
 
Source: Compiled from the “Review of the Program of the Medical Center” (1937), reprinted in Albert 
R. Lamb, The Presbyterian Hospital and the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, 1868-1943 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 450-458. 
 
surgery.  Why, then, did Columbia medical students had to go to Morrisania and 
Montefiore hospitals for additional instruction in obstetrics and neurology?  The 
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problems with the integration of the Neurological Institute into the Medical Center 
went rather deep, although their exact nature seemed underspecified in the Report.  At 
least a part of the problem was financial.  The funds for full-time faculty were lacking 
and there was a critical need “for a moderate increase in free bed service in the wards 
over present provisions in order to permit a larger measure of selection of patients on 
the basis of their value in research and teaching rather than on their ability to pay.”86  
In regard to obstetrics, the Department’s feedback indicated that “more ward 
deliveries than can at present be provided in Sloane Hospital are necessary for the 
adequate training of the medical students.”  While sending Columbia’s students to 
Morrisania Hospital for additional obstetrical experience was found advantageous, the 
Department nonetheless felt that the 17 obstetrical and 7 gynecological semi-private 
beds should be returned to the ward service.  Only then the combined clinical facilities 
of Sloane and Morrisania “would provide approximately enough material for the 
instruction of a student body of the present size.”87  
Situation in obstetrics and neurology bespoke the conflict between the goals of 
teaching and private hospital service.  In both cases, effective instruction required 
massive numbers of poor ward patients which could be used for teaching.  While the 
availability of great numbers of suitable ward material was a priority of the Medical 
School, the private hospitals – in this case, the Sloane and the Neurological Institute – 
clearly had somewhat different priorities which included paying patients unavailable 
for teaching and possibly also the modes of selection and treatment of ward patients 
which did not primarily maximize their value as teaching material. 
The report from the Department of Dermatology revealed yet another line of 
structural conflict within the Medical Center.  Unlike urology or ophthalmology which 
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received their own floor and building respectively and reported being satisfied with 
their facilities dermatology felt grossly neglected.  Only six hospital beds, previously 
assigned to general medicine, were allotted for dermatology and the Department of 
Medicine actually wanted the beds returned for its own needs.  Department of 
Dermatology, meanwhile, argued that no less than “a unit of 40 beds should made 
available for undergraduate and graduate instruction in that subject.”  Moreover,  
It is felt highly desirable that hospitalization should be provided for the 
purpose of treatment of certain cases, particularly those with syphilis, for 
diagnostic problems and for clinical research.  A certain number of special 
facilities would be needed such as an allergen-free chamber, special beds for 
certain types of diseases, several treatment rooms for electrical and minor 
surgical procedures, a unit for actinotherapy, one for X-ray theray, and another 
for fever therapy, together with necessary offices and conference rooms for the 
staff.88  
While the Report recognized that no less than a large part of an entire hospital 
floor was needed to realize these plans, in the immediate future the demands were 
given a rather short shrift.  It concluded by saying that “[m]ost of the instruction of 
undergraduate students in this specialty can be given satisfactorily in the out-patient 
department” and that “[t]here [was] no great need of hospitalizing patients for the 
purposes of such teaching.”  The real need for hospitalization, it admitted, stemmed 
from research.89  
The report on dermatology revealed another facet of divergence between 
teaching and research.  The original conception of the Medical Center boldly asserted 
the structural dependence of teaching, research, and care of patients upon each other 
for the achievement of highest quality in each.  Conflict between teaching and care of 
patients were already apparent but even research and teaching needs did not 
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necessarily coincide.  When the social stigma entered into the picture, as was the case 
with syphilis and other ‘skin’ diseases, the very definition of needs – being it for 
research, teaching, or treatment – were deeply impacted.   
Even as all these contradictions were implicit in the Report, the great myth of 
the Center’s structural purpose – that of the derivation of the size and structure of the 
Medical Center from the task of providing high quality medical education for 400 
students – persisted.  Two factors tended to explode the myth.  The first was the rapid 
evolution of ideas about medical education that was fueled, in turn, by the rapid 
changes in the nature of medicine itself.  The second and less benign was the 
realization that scientific progress and practice were dependent on funding.  Just as the 
development of medical centers as such required enormous funding, greater 
development of some areas of specialization – such as ophthalmology and urology at 
Presbyterian – were predicated on complex interrelations among professional prestige 
of the specialty, personal status of the practitioners, social status of the patients, and 
individual interests of the donors. 
The deficits created by the semi-private accommodations and the critical need 
to expand Dermatology were the clear implications of the Review, yet nothing was 
really done about either problem for another two decades.90  Even less attention was 
given to the fact that the Center did not in fact fulfill its purpose of providing 
comprehensive, one-location facility for clinical instruction of medical students.  
Clearly, students’ convenience was not the leading rationale of institutional structure 
and neither was there a real need of bringing in geographical proximity all of the 
various medical specialties for either research or treatment purposes.  Thus, only the 
more prestigious specialties were located at the Center, in which the current medical 
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staffs were professionally interested.  In the absence of professional interest, neither 
community responsibility, nor students’ convenience would bring to the Center those 
specialties – like tuberculosis, syphilis, or contagious diseases – which were assumed 
to be natural preserves of the City’s institutions.91 
Yet this failure was instructive, both for the Medical Center and for American 
medicine more generally.  The idea of the university medical center did not break the 
lines of interest which pulled the various parts of ‘the teaching-research-and-care 
triad’ in different directions.  The prestige of being associated with a private hospital 
powerfully motivated the professional staffs at the elite medical centers.  At its root, 
this was still an old-fashioned phenomenon of the practitioner’s prestige being 
dependent on the social status of his clients.  Association with elite private hospital 
allowed physicians to avoid serving the worst kinds of patient populations, those 
relegated to public institutions.  Equally important was the fact that the Medical 
Center’s professional staff had also retained a right to continue with lucrative private 
practice among the social elites.92  Yet a private hospital or even a broad collection of 
private hospital assembled in one geographic location was in many ways not ideal 
teaching environment.  Despite the enormous number of ostensibly ‘teaching’ beds 
gathered at the Medical Center, Columbia’s medical students had to be sent to a large 
number of other hospitals, both public and private, to supplement their clinical 
instruction.  This surprising deficit of ‘teaching material’ highlighted the selective care 
practices of private hospitals, as well as a divergence of interests between private 
hospital care and medical research, on one hand, and medical education, on the other.  
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As the status of certain medical specialties at CPMC made clear, research interests 
were often in conflict with teaching needs and hospital policies, while all three were 
powerfully determined by socio-economic and status associations of diseases and 
patients.   
Not only did the myth of structural unity derived from an educational 
commitment persisted through the 1937 Report, it was found useful in the future 
reviews and critiques of the Center’s development.  In 1945, Dr. Albert Lamb wrote a 
report entitled “The Program to Place the Various Activities of the Medical Center in 
Balance” at the request of the Medical Board.  Standing at the close of this career, Dr. 
Lamb’s report opened on a more pensive note. 
All of out original and subsequent plans have not been accomplished.  Perhaps 
it is just as well that some of them have not been.  Some have been dropped or 
altered materially.  Too often expediency has dictated out policy without 
sufficient consideration of how the expedient thing, however satisfactorily it 
seem to meet the requirements of the moment, would alter or block future 
essential and correct moves. … Even if we [plan] to the best of our ability 
some things will be overlooked and emphasis will be misplaced.  This 
possibility serves to bring out a point of utmost importance, i.e. planning for 
the Medical Center should not be sporadic.93    
Dr. Lamb hoped that the institution’s present program was indeed “one of 
bringing the activities of the Medical Center into reasonable balance rather than as a 
program of expansion.”  Quality, not size, was the ultimate goal and an institution 
could become too large and unwieldy. 
Size is the thing with which the Planning Committee had had to contend ever 
since it began work.  Wherever we turned there was request fro more space and 
still more space for possible future expansion.  The reason which was given 
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was generally that there was such an increasing demand from so many patients 
that two to four times as much space was needed as it now available.94   
In Dr. Lamb’s opinion, “this point of view totally disregard[ed] the principle that 
services should not be larger than necessary to carry out the fundamental concepts 
upon which the Medical Center was put together.  Patient demands in themselves must 
not dictate out fundamental policy, and no one activity should be dominant.”  Any 
service – be it plastic surgery or arthritis – can grow to any size.  Low-cost private 
patients could fill a facility two to three times larger than the one contemplated.  Yet, 
argued the report, “[w]e feel certain that we do not want such an unbalanced 
program.”95  
Though clearly concerned with the pressure stemming from ‘patient demands,’ 
the Report reserved special ire for another factor threatening institutional balance – 
community service. 
There is a great surge, at present, toward various types of expanded community 
service. We believe this trend is as it should be, if kept within reasonable and 
practical limits, that it will continue, and that the Medical Center should play 
its full part in this field.  The pertinent problem is “How much of this 
community service should one hospital carry?” The whole Medical Center 
could be devoted to this one end. Then what becomes of the concepts upon 
which the amalgamation between Columbia University and the Presbyterian 
Hospital was based? We shall play a much more useful and important part in 
the medical education of the present and the future if we adhere to our original 
concepts and fit the various phases of this community service into our picture 
than if we allow these things to dominate our policy.96  
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In response to these threats to institutional balance, the document made the 
following suggestion.  On the immediate and practical side, it recommended 
“providing more facilities for medicine” and “using the rest of the evacuated housing 
space for comparatively small research units for specified periods of time and with 
proper grants for such work.”97  
On the longer-term policy side, Dr. Lamb’s review recommended trying to 
stick to “the fundamental concepts upon which the Medical Center was put together 
and not be influenced by any demand for expansion beyond such concepts.”  These 
concepts were as follows, in the order of listing: 
 
(1) Services of the size essential to teach classes of 100 students at P&S – 
never more, preferably less. 
(2) An Out-Patient Department – Vanderbilt Clinic – with services of the 
proper size to supply suitable and adequate material for the wards, for teaching 
in the O.P.D., and for research there.  In addition there should be facilities for 
proper ambulatory diagnostic service, follow-up clinics, care of students, 
personnel and compensation cases, and some special clinics carefully selected 
and supervised.  An O.P.D. organized in this way will carry out its other 
important functions – service to the community and to the doctors in the 
community. 
(3) Research facilities for the different services adequate to carry on this 
most important part of our program. 
(4) Adequate laboratory and teaching facilities in the Medical School to 
care of all of the routine work and research activities. 
(5) Facilities for the care of private patients above ward rates and 
ambulatory and bed cases, to allow those doctors devoting an essential part of 
their time to the various necessities of the Hospital to do so at a minimum of 
stress and strain. 
(6) A Training School for nurses of not over 100 to a class to provide 
adequate nursing training and to care for the hospital program as out-lined 
above.98   
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
specialists.  Its greatest contribution, however, is to educate men and women to meet these 
responsibilities, rather than assume direct management of community services, except those necessary 
to discharge its function.” [Rappleye, p. 78.]   
97
 Lamb, pp. 409-410. 
98
 Ibid., pp. 410-411. 
  187 
The recommendations created an impression that a proper size and structure of 
the Medical Center had to be derived from an imperative to teach 100 medical 
students per class.  Yet even the list that followed undermined this structural clarity.  
The connection between teaching and research in terms of institutional size was not 
even attempted.  The extent of the research facilities was described only as “adequate” 
for “the different services.”  While declared “[the] most important part of our 
program,” research was listed third, not first, in this hierarchically and logically 
arranged program.  Non-ward patient services were derived from the desire to 
minimize commuting for doctors, while their subsidy of physician’s and the Center’s 
incomes went unrecognized as a root of possibly discordant interests.  Emphasis on 
training medical and nursing students – to the exclusion of students in public health, 
administrative medicine, and other allied fields – hid unacknowledged emphasis on 
functional cross-subsidies, such as the use of nursing and medical students in actual 
patient care, which also influenced institutional policies.99  Recognition of separate 
obligation to serve the community and community’s doctors did nothing to ask what 
influence the Medical Center had on the medical services available to surrounding 
community, what dynamics structured the surrounding community, and what the 
community’s changing needs and expectations were.   
Conclusion 
As the nation’s first Medical Center, Columbia-Presbyterian embodied an idea 
long championed by the most visionary medical minds.  The concrete realization of 
this idea had repeatedly tested its coherence.  The fundamental expectation of creating 
a class of full-time researchers and professors, freed from the burdens and temptations 
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of private practice, had been decisively defeated at Columbia.  The actual building and 
early expansion of the Center revealed further challenges to the institutional vision. 
By far the most visible conflict during the construction period involved the 
Out-Patient Department.  To the astonishment of many, one of the early plans for the 
outpatient clinic envisioned a thirty-two-story building.  While elated, the interested 
member of the professional staff sensed dangerous delusion at work.  They were right 
and the air castle had quickly collapsed to whatever could be built with the remainder 
of construction funds – a structure of one and a half floors.  Horrified at this reversal 
and convinced that no outpatient clinic would be better than this ‘abortion,’ a few 
determined physicians made a terrific fight for an adequate building.  This early 
incident pointed toward a more systematic contradiction.  It was broadly recognized 
that the outpatient department was a very important part of a teaching hospital.  Its 
size had to be carefully determined because it crucially determined the ability of the 
teaching hospital to secure an adequate number and kind of ward patients to be used as 
teaching material.  At the same time, the actual work at the outpatient clinic carried a 
low professional prestige and was relegated to younger and less successful physicians.  
Given this contradiction, the outpatient clinic was bound to settle for a minimal 
acceptable functioning, without regard to patient comfort or service standards.  The 
low quality of outpatient care bred dissatisfaction among those who worked there.  
Sooner or later, substandard outpatient services were also bound to provoke an outcry 
from the patients and the community.100  At the heart of the outpatient problem were 
many structuring divisions: patient social class, professional medical hierarchy, 
general versus specialized care, academic versus community physicians, and so on.  
Their varied confluence carved out some predictable and some unusual interests in 
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regard to outpatient services.  Besides those who actually worked at the outpatient 
clinic, member of particular departments, including medicine, pediatrics, and 
orthopedic surgery, were more interested in adequate outpatient services.  OPD 
‘alumni’ who moved on to higher professional posts were also more concerned.  
A similar problem arose after the completion of the Medical Center.  One of 
the most acutely felt deficiencies of the new Center was a lack of arrangements for the 
so-called “semi-private,” whose accommodations and hospital rates lay somewhere 
between ward and private-room patients.  Despite a serious effort to study the problem 
and propose a solution, the Medical Center had failed to fix the problem either in 
terms of physical accommodations or by way of novel financial arrangements.  Again, 
conflicted interests and a weak constituency in support of change was involved.  
‘Semi-private’ patients were not useful for either teaching or generation of revenue for 
the hospital and physicians.  As paying patients they were excluded from examination 
by or in front of students and interns, while their fees and collection problems ensured 
that the hospital just about broke even.  The exception were the younger doctors who 
often depended on ‘semi-private’ patients to build up their own private practices.  As 
the number of such patients grew, ‘semi-private’ accommodations became of larger 
public interest.  With the rise of private hospital insurance, the problem of the ‘semi-
private’ patients was soon intertwined with one of insurance and compensation plans.  
Increasingly, the ‘semi-private’ patients were the derisively called ‘compensation 
cases.’  Columbia-Presbyterian’s records suggest that the widespread opposition to 
any negotiated hospitalization plans contributed to the failure to deal with the ‘semi-
private patient’ problem.  Not until much later were measures taken to provide 
adequate accommodations for this growing group. 
These ‘patient-determined’ institutional divisions were only the tip of the 
iceberg.  As the Medical Center took shape, the patterns of geographical and non-
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geographical affiliation presented a rich picture of diverse and disparate structure of 
medical care.  An early decision to integrate with Presbyterian two previously 
independent hospitals specializing in obstetrics and pediatrics, as well as internal 
reorganization of Presbyterian’s social work and public health departments, were part 
of a larger ‘end of an era’ of the 19th century institutions founded and funded by 
women.  Decisions to bring some hospitals into geographical proximity, while 
affiliating with others at a distance for the purpose of clinical instruction, revealed a 
complex logic of professional prestige, social stigma, and philanthropic whim.   
The hierarchies reflected their time and place.  The Center’s psychiatric 
hospital was a public institution and so was its cancer unit.  Reflecting the dread and 
stigma attached to cancer at the time, the hospital in question would have been located 
on Welfare Island – along with the hospitals for contagious, chronic and mental 
diseases – had the CPMC not timely shown sufficient foresight into the future of 
oncology.  Other affiliations – involving tuberculosis, chronic, contagious and 
sexually-transmitted diseases – were never pursued.  These and other affiliations 
revealed not only a hierarchical arrangement of specialties and patient pools within 
medicine but an intimate relationship between the private and the public institutions.  
Not only were the public institutions expected to provide the care for the patients and 
diseases of the worst kind, but the private institutions tremendously benefited from the 
ready ability to ‘affiliate’ with them for the purposes of clinical instruction.  Whether 
the public patients and American medicine as a whole had reaped benefits from this 
arrangement remains questionable. 
While various ‘deficiencies’ and ‘imbalances’ were recognized in early 
reviews of the Medical Center’s development, Columbia-Presbyterian’s leaders clung 
to the vision of coherent institutional purpose.  One such vision was rooted in 
‘preventive medicine’ and ‘community service.’  While the former was clearly not a 
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priority of either this institution or American medicine as a whole, the latter was soon 
repudiated, unless by it was meant the Center’s primary educational purpose.  But 
even this more focused and pragmatic mission was belied by divergent interests and 
incentives.  Early reports spoke of harmful pressures of ‘patient demands,’ which in 
reality may have been just as much those of providers.  Despite efforts at rhetorical 
coherence, research appeared to be largely independent from either teaching or patient 
care.  Early on, it was largely driven by philanthropic funding, institutional imperative, 
and professional prestige.  Like patient care, research showed tendency to develop 
independently from the needs of teaching.   
The premonition of structural discord had deeper roots.  Early in the Center’s 
history, it became clear that, besides the ‘full-time’ principle, another fundamental 
idea went unrealized.  Originally, it was envisioned that all clinical instruction should 
be concentrated at the Medical Center but very soon Columbia’s students were 
completing part of their training at a dozen other hospitals in the City.  The reasons 
were complex and understandable, yet this adjustment revealed that the institutional 
structure had a logic other than that which was contemplated at the beginning.  That 
the educational mission was not the unifying element of the institutional structure may 
not come as a surprise but the other theories of organizational logic proposed to 
explain the genesis and functioning of academic medical centers are not supported by 
evidence either.  Above all, the process of building and expanding the nation’s first 
medical center demonstrated substantial complexity of professional and institutional 
organization.  Although frequently hierarchical, this organization is not reducible to 
either the dominance of the medical profession, nor the capitalism-promoting mission 
of the corporate philanthropies.  The medical profession was too significantly 
fragmented and caught up in a web of complex relations with other institutions and 
actors.  To analyze the politics of the first medical center, we need a level of analysis 
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which is both bigger and smaller than the profession and is sensitive to institutional 
embedding of health care professions.  The concept of institutional class positions 
proposed in this dissertation aims to provide such a tool.  It refuses to see professions 
as monolithic, undifferentiated formations, pointing out significant differentiation 
among their different segments.  It applies larger categories of class, gender, race to 
break the monolith of the profession and situates these professional fractions within 
their institutional and career settings.   
It is through this analytical lens that we can see that the struggle for out-patient 
and ‘semi-private’ services was structured by different kinds and degrees of interests, 
rather than by the politics of the medical profession as such or the institutional policy 
of the medical center as a whole.  This theoretical perspective also helps us 
deconstruct the purported trinity of education, research and patient care placed at the 
conceptual foundation of the academic medical center.  Not only did the education, 
research, and patient care entail different investments, interests and incentives, but 
they themselves broke down along the lines of specialty, disease, institutional 
embedding, and donor interest.   
The planners at Columbia-Presbyterian sensed the strong possibility of 
unchecked and incoherent growth of the various parts of the Center and their efforts to 
impose a purposive coherence to institutional development are instructive.  Seen as a 
field of institutional class positions, the process of building and planning the Medical 
Center is a good illustration of the private health care environment.  In it, micro-
inequalities of the professions and institutions are deeply rooted in the macro-
inequalities of social class.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
IN A CLASS OF THEIR OWN:  
WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSIONS AND 
EDUCATION, 1891-1980 
Introduction 
In the past several decades, scholars working in diverse disciplines have done 
much to reconstruct the history of women and minorities in the various institutional 
and occupational fields.  Much excellent research has been done on women, African-
Americans, and other minority groups in medicine and the related fields of biomedical 
sciences, public health, nursing and health care administration.  This work – and the 
larger goals of diversity which propel it – holds vital importance for the American 
health care system, impacting everything from health outcomes for different socio-
economic groups to the structure and course of health care politics.   
Studies of women and minorities in medicine and related fields have 
contributed tremendously to placing race, gender, and ethno-religious identity 
alongside class, occupation and institutional structure (bureaucracy) as fundamental 
elements in the making of the social fabric.  While one result of these efforts has been 
a picture of social space characterized by higher complexity (and, hopefully, by higher 
fidelity), there has also been a notable lack of theoretical synthesis of the new findings 
into more coherent narratives of social structure.   
Most work being done is still concerned with one or two dimensions of social 
division (gender/occupation; race/institutional structure) with no more than a nod of 
acknowledgement given to others.  Exquisite sensitivity to the multiple lines of 
division often coexists with an unwillingness to question the analytical validity and 
integrity of such received concepts as the profession or professional power.  Even the 
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work devoted to the intersectionality of class, race, and gender has mostly failed to 
acknowledge the deconstructive implications of its own paradigm.  Overall, most of us 
still see several classes, a couple of genders, a number of racial and ethno-religious 
groups (depending on the historical context), a list of occupations, and a chart of 
institutional fields as workable images of the social space.   
This chapter uses an investigation into the practices of admission to medical 
school and professional employment at one of country’s oldest academic medical 
centers to question this simple conception of the social structure.1  The main topic of 
this chapter is the subject of gender, race, and ethno-religious discrimination in the 
medical school admission, understood in a broader context of selection, training, and 
employment in health care field.  I focus particularly on the period of over half a 
century between the late 1910s and the early 1970s, when both women and minorities 
were admitted to Columbia, as well as most other medical schools, but on highly 
unequal terms.  My principal contention is that, if entering medicine is synonymous 
with entering a range of positions within the middle and upper-middle class, women 
and minorities have not entered medicine until the 1970s or even not yet.  I show that 
what they did enter were different and differently constrained structures of 
occupational, institutional, and social positions which existed alongside, not within, 
the structures open to the profession’s white male majority.  In other words, as I show 
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 Unless otherwise indicated, all primary materials pertaining to the admissions practices at the 
Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons have been found at the Health Sciences 
Division Archives of Columbia University housed at Archives and Special Collections, Augustus C. 
Long Health Sciences Library, Columbia University, 701 W 168th Street, New York, NY.  On women, 
primary sources were Folder 54, “Women in P&S, 1921-1961,” and Folder 54, “Women in P&S, 
Current.”  On the subject of the charges of ethno-religious discrimination, primary sources were Box 
623, “Discrimination 1946-1950s,” including  Folder 623, “Discrimination in Medical Schools, 1945-
1946;” Folder 623, “Discrimination in Medical Schools, 1947-1949;” Folder 623, “Discrimination in 
Medical Schools, Current;” Folder 623, “( ) Newspaper Clippings;” and Folder 623, “( ) Proceedings 
(Hart – Goldstein – City Council).”  Information on African-Americans was drawn from Folder 551, 
“Negroes” and Folder 551.1, “Negro Students.”  Many documents have been copied and are in the 
author’s possession; the rest were transcribed in Research Notebook 2. 
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on the example of Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, there are existed separate 
structures of social class positions, constituted within the field of health care 
occupations, into which majority women, minority men and minority women were 
routed. 
It is tempting to conclude that racial minorities and women were confined, as it 
were, to the back of the medical bus but that, too, would be an oversimplification.  
Whenever the formal practices of exclusion were defeated, some, usually the 
exceptionally gifted, women and minorities were permitted in the front section, even if 
extra and less comfortable chairs had to be added to accommodate them.  Thus, we 
have an analytical conundrum, where gendered and racialized practices systematically 
confined women and minorities to a distinct structure of occupational and social 
positions, yet this structure did not nevertheless amount to a separate – women’s or 
black – sphere in medicine.   
This puzzle calls for a novel analytical framework of ‘class-institutional 
positions’ proposed in this dissertation.  It is not simply that there are what a historian 
Ellen More termed “composite roles” at the intersection of woman/physician or 
African-American/physician but that the structure of the medical profession as a whole 
falls apart into multiple social positions comprehensible in terms of differential 
relationships to power and privilege.  Despite the elegant analyses of its professional 
power and organization, academic medicine has been and continues to be an ensemble 
of hierarchical structures headed by multiple elites.  The histories of those who have 
been most blatantly excluded illustrate the processes of division and exclusion most 
vividly; but even the stages through which the provisionally included members are put 
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through indicate the definitive hierarchicalism and particularism of the professional 
structure.2   
Throughout the chapter, I pay special attention to the very pronounced 
differences in the construction of unequal and discriminatory terms, on which female, 
ethno-religious minority and racial minority applicants were admitted to Columbia’s 
medical school.  Women were officially barred from Columbia’s College of 
Physicians and Surgeons until 1917 and for the following five decades comprised less 
than ten percent of students.  Formally, there was no discrimination in the admission 
process, as female applicants were admitted at about the same rate as male.  The 
delimitation of the women students at Columbia, as in most other institutions, was 
accomplished by means other than those pertaining directly to the admission 
decisions.  In the decades before and after World War II, members of some ethno-
religious groups, particularly Jews and Catholics, encountered well-documented 
discriminatory practices in medical schools, as well as other educational and 
professional institutions.  The situation was especially appalling with respect to the 
Jewish applicants in New York City, where the community was very large and had a 
disproportionate number of well-qualified students.  Unlike the fair sex, the Jewish 
community did not limit the number of their applicants to the proportion with which 
the medical schools were comfortable.  Against this group of applicants, the medical 
colleges practiced direct forms of discrimination, admitting them at the rates much 
lower than those for the similarly qualified gentile applicants.  But the worst situation 
– at Columbia and everywhere else – was reserved for the African-Americans.  
Although not formally barred from admission, until the 1970s black students were 
both extremely rare and largely invisible.  Despite some statements to the contrary, 
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 Both hierarchicalism and particularism are assumed here, as in much democratic theory, to be 
incompatible with equal membership. 
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Columbia did not make particular efforts to recruit, educate, or recognize African-
American students and physicians. 
The differences in discriminatory practices adopted in regard to different social 
groups are often attributed to the different situation of these groups.  There is some 
truth to that but they also reveal the variety of both discriminatory and affirmative 
mechanisms which medical institutions have at their disposal.  This part of my 
analysis leads to the chapter’s second, and partially normative, point that institutions 
bear responsibility for their membership.  I conclude that careful and innovative 
investigation of discriminatory and inequitable practices of institutional exclusion in 
the past can help us formulate more socially responsible approaches to institutional 
membership of the future. 
Gender 
In colonial America, most medical care was routinely provided by women in 
the home.  Women were also prominent as lay practitioners.  By the Jacksonian 
period, however, women’s prominence as both lay healers and as midwives began to 
wane.  Traditionally, women practiced where male doctors were absent and, as the 
number of male doctors began to rise, the women practitioners became displaced.  The 
rise of modern medical professionalism provided both obstacles and opportunities for 
women.3  The emergent emphasis on formal medical training and certification 
established a powerful mechanism for categorical exclusion of women from the 
profession.  At the same time, the growing standardization of training and certification 
provided a more focused field of battle for those determined to win women a place in 
medicine.   
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 This development must be seen as a part of the larger process which commenced after the Renaissance 
and saw the wholesale expulsion of upper and middle class women from public and professional 
pursuits. 
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In 1849, Elizabeth Blackwell became the first American woman to earn a 
degree from an established medical school, but women’s right to medical education 
has been far from firmly established.  In fact, “[t]he graduation of Miss Blackwell 
from Geneva Medical College in 1849 aroused such general condemnation among the 
medical fraternity throughout America that the experiment was not repeated, Elizabeth 
Blackwell thus being the first, and for many years the last, to graduate as Doctor of 
medicine from a regular New York medical school.”4  The few women who followed 
graduated predominantly from homeopathic, eclectic and other sectarian schools 
which were less subject to ostracism from the side of the chauvinistic fraternity of 
medical men.  Nevertheless, through the efforts of these pioneering women, several 
women’s colleges of medicine were established after the Civil War. 
The first such school, the New England Medical College, was founded in 
Boston in 1848 and was the first medical school exclusively for women in the world.  
In all, seventeen medical colleges for women were founded in the United States the 
second half of the 19th century and their founding had a considerable effect on 
women’s participation in the medical profession.  Between 1880 and 1890, the 
percentage of doctors who were women increased nationally from 2.8 to 5.6.  In some 
cities, the proportion of women was considerably higher: 18.2 in Boston, 19.3 in 
Minneapolis, 13.8 in San Francisco.  With more than 7,000 women physicians at the 
turn of the 20th century, the United States was far ahead of England, which had just 
258, and France, which had only 95.   
Despite this progress, most regular schools of medicine – and especially the 
elite institutions – remained uniformly closed to women and the country’s second 
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Online Edition by Holice, Deb & Pam), Book 12, Chapter 13, Part 6, on the web at 
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oldest institution – Columbia’s College of Physicians and Surgeons – was no 
exception.  No woman has been ever been admitted to its courses since its opening in 
1767 as part of the King’s College and a century a quarter later, the school officially 
affirmed its desire to continue this policy of exclusion.  The decision was occasioned 
by the movement toward a closer affiliation between the University and the medical 
school.5  The agreement, eventually reached signed by the two institutions, was 
notable for containing two provisions that allowed the medical school to nominate its 
staff and also to refuse admission to women.6  That the issue of women’s admission 
was included within the agreement was not so much an indication of the medical 
faculty’s particular conservatism or the University’s progressivism, as the fact that the 
battle for women’s access to higher education has begun in earnest.  In New York 
City, the battle was particularly fierce, for a number of reasons. 
New York City, as well as the East more broadly, was hardly a pioneer in 
women’s education.  The first coeducational college was Oberlin of Ohio which 
admitted four women to special courses in 1837.  A few female seminaries were 
opened after that, including Mount Holyoke which opened in the same year.  
Philanthropic brewer Matthew Vassar made it possible in 1861 for the college named 
for him to pioneer.  After that, a handful of men’s colleges let down the bars in the 
1870s: Cornell, Michigan, and Boston allowed girls to take courses.  Two more 
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 This development was typical among the top-rate institutions at this time, taking place at the same 
time at Harvard, Princeton, Cornell and others, and both sides of this development – the medical 
schools and the universities – had compelling interests in the matter.  The universities, undergoing a 
period of becoming equal to their designation, were trying to bring closer into its orbit – or to establish 
from scratch – the requisite assortment of professional schools and graduate disciplines.  The medical 
schools, no longer considered excellent without the effective university and hospital affiliations, sought 
the aegis of the university, including the infrastructure and resources to bolster their basic science 
departments.  (Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 
1982), pp. 112-116.) 
6
 Albert R. Lamb, The Presbyterian Hospital and the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, 1868-
1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 73. 
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women’s colleges – Wellesley and Smith – were established in 1875, while Mount 
Holyoke Seminary had become a college in 1893.  Harvard Annex, which later 
became Radcliffe, opened in 1879.  New York City, however, did not have a single 
institution that would grant college degree to a woman.  A Normal College, connected 
with the free City College, offered some training for teachers, but granted no degree.  
Some private girls’ schools in the city have high social standing, but did not amount to 
much academically.  Other cities – including Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia and 
Chicago, St. Louis, and even New Orleans – had better provision for educating women 
than New York and a number of citizens and citizen groups began advocating for the 
cause.7 
Under the influence of these advocates, as well as in virtue of his own 
upbringing in a family of strong women, Columbia’s President Barnard became an 
outspoken champion of college education for women.  In this, however, he had few 
supporters and many opponents, including most of Columbia’s trustees and members 
of the faculty.  According to the memoir of Columbia’s later President, Barnard’s 
annual report for the year of 1879 “created a panic by advocating the admission of 
women to Columbia College.”8  Undaunted, President Barnard continued to make this 
recommendation with renewed vigor in the reports for 1880 and 1881. Butler 76  His 
advocacy was seen as so dangerous, that “the trustees went so far as to decline to 
permit President Barnard to print, without their previous censorship, one of his Annual 
Reports because of the vigorous arguments it contained in support of his 
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 Horace Coon, Columbia: Colossus on the Hudson (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1947), pp. 
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 Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections I (New York: Charles 
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recommendation that women be admitted to Columbia College on equal terms with 
men.”9 
Predictable arguments were sounded against higher education for women.  
Reverend Morgan Dix of Trinity was horrified by the gathering movement and 
declared that “the education would destroy the modesty of women.”10  Very soon a 
racial card was thrown into the fray.  While President Barnard continued to agitate for 
co-education at Columbia, powerful forces led by Professor John W. Burgess declared 
that if Columbia became co-ed the young ladies admitted would likely be Jewish, and 
that would make Columbia’s student body predominantly Jewish.  This unscrupulous 
raising of the racial issue had the effect of arousing the alumni in loyal support of 
Burgess.11 
The pressure from some citizen groups continued and in 1883 the College 
reluctantly established what came to be known as the Collegiate Course for Women.  
The Course would grant a degree to those who would pass the examinations, except 
that the women were barred from attending lectures, on which the examinations were 
to be based.  Although a good number of women signed up for the Course, only a few 
succeeded in earning a degree, since they had to pass examinations without having had 
the opportunity to sit in on any of the lectures. 
With true co-education being a battle that could hardly be won, the strategy 
adopted by the advocates of women’s higher education was one of persuading 
Columbia to establish a separate college for women.  One of the alumnae of the 
Collegiate Course, Annie Nathan Meyer, spearheaded a vigorous campaign of 
publicity, persuasion, and fund-raising and in 1888 Columbia’s trustees were prevailed 
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upon to agree to the establishment of a separate annex for women on the model of 
Oxford’s Girton, Cambridge’s Lady Margaret Halls, and Harvard’s Radcliffe.   
The momentous event coincided with President Barnard’s death and the new 
college was named after him.  To some, this was the most appropriate recognition of 
his early and courageous advocacy of women’s education.  Others judged it as an 
ironic and callous insult to his memory, for he had strictly insisted on co-education 
and opposed separate institutions for women.  Columbia’s trustees laid down 
appropriately unjust conditions concerning the new women’s college: it was to be built 
and operated without any financial assistance from Columbia, but Columbia would 
have a controlling share of power in its governance.12   
While of historic significance, the establishment of the Barnard College was 
not recognized by Columbia’s faculty as either the fact of, or even a step toward, co-
education.  A telling evidence of this was the chief reason given in the report of the 
University Council on the proposition for consolidation of the New York College of 
the Training of Teachers (now the Teachers College) with the University.  The 
proposal came at a time when the Columbia College was implementing closer 
affiliation with the Law School and the College of Physicians and Surgeons in a quest 
to become a true University and the committee agreed that the school was “doing most 
excellent work of a character that is in part, if not as a whole, germane to the work of a 
university.”  However, the consolidation on the pattern of the law school or the 
medical school, was soundly rejected by the committee. 
 
Two reasons influence your Committee to report against this plan.  The 
first reason is that a necessary part of the organization of the College for the 
Training of Teachers is a school of observation and practice, in which every 
grade from the kindergarten to the high school must be represented.  The 
maintenance and administration of such a school as part of Columbia College 
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would involve many difficulties, and would very distinctly divert our 
administrative energy from its proper channel. 
The second reason is that such a consolidation as is proposed would 
introduce co-education into Columbia in a most pronounced form.  A large 
majority of the students in the College for the Training of Teachers are women, 
and this will always be the case.  In this county more than sixty per cent of the 
entire teaching force are women, and the proportion is increasing.  We believe 
that at this point in our development, when Columbia is becoming a university, 
and is laying the foundations of its reputation as such, it would be a mistake to 
commit the university to a policy of co-education, as such a consolidation 
would commit it.  Either of the reasons given should be sufficient in our view 
to prevent consolidation, and both together seem to form an insuperable 
obstacle. 
At the same time it is not to be denied that an alliance between Columbia 
and the College for the Training of Teachers might be formed that would be of 
advantage to both. … For such an alliance we believe that Columbia’s 
arrangement with Barnard College, with certain necessary modifications of 
detail, furnishes the correct type.13 
 
Thus, the medical faculty’s decision in 1891 to exclude women was not as 
much out of step with their parent University as may appear.  Their reasons, beyond 
sheer prejudice, were probably similar to the reasoning which balked at the proposed 
affiliation of the Teachers College.  At the time when the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons was making rapid progress toward elite national reputation, admission of 
women would exert very likely imperil its standing.  Thus, the inclusion of the specific 
provision granting the medical faculty the right to deny admission to women was not 
so much out of step with Columbia at large, as an indication of a fear that some or 
even all of the parts of the Columbia University might be compelled to admit women 
sooner rather than later and a precaution against being dragged into co-education 
along with it. 
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teaching as an academic and professional field and of the equal access to higher education for women.  
Butler himself was apparently an early convert to both of these causes and one of the principal 
contributors to the progress on women’s education at Columbia and in New York City after President 
Barnard’s death.  (See especially Chapter VIII, “Founding Teachers College,” pp. 176-187.) 
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If the question of women’s access to medical education was importantly 
constrained by their limited access to higher education in general, another determining 
factor was women’s participation in the professional field of medicine more generally.  
Of particular importance was women’s role in the work of the hospitals, which were 
rapidly emerging as central institutions of both professional training and practice.   
Despite the outstanding contribution of women to the modernization of the 
19th century hospital, their subsequent role in hospital administration and nursing fell 
short of providing the necessary foundation to support women’s progress in medicine.  
During and after the Civil War, the American counterparts of Florence Nightingale 
have done much to improve the organization of hospitals, first military and than 
civilian.  Part of a larger movement of women’s social activism and philanthropy, the 
work of these pioneers was equally concerned with administration of hospitals and 
social service, as it was with bedside nursing.  This broader agenda was reflected, for a 
while, in the increasing numbers of women superintendents during the second half of 
the 19th century and the absence of the strict separation between administration, social 
work, and nursing in the hospital work.  The three fields, however, soon began to 
diverge, in unmistakably gendered terms.  Administration increasingly separated from 
nursing and was turning into a male-headed hierarchy.  Nursing, in contrast, was 
swiftly undergoing a total feminization and assuming a clearly subordinate position to 
both administration and medicine.  Social work was also shaping up to be a largely 
female preserve, with a rather uncertain place both in medicine and the hospitals. 
As far as Columbia’s College of Physicians and Surgeons was concerned, the 
marginalization of women in the broader field of hospital-based medicine was not a 
merely abstract reality of American medicine but was also concretely embodied in the 
constraints placed on women’s participation in the work of its primary hospital 
affiliates. 
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The Presbyterian Hospital, which opened in 1872 and served as Columbia’s 
principal teaching affiliate after 1911, had a gender-and-class conflict almost at its 
very foundation.  According to Dr. Albert Lamb, Presbyterian’s second historian and 
long-time associate: 
 
On September 18, 1872, the Managers appointed Miss Jane Stuart Woolsey 
as Resident Directress of the Hospital.  She was to have the general 
supervision of the Hospital plant and its routine, including nursing.  There was 
also to be a Superintendent whose duties were concurrent, but it is clear that 
Miss Woolsey was his superior and acted in the same capacity as the Executive 
Vice-President does today.  It also seems likely that the Managers created the 
position of Directress in order to secure her services, rather than that they 
created the position and then chose her from among several candidates.  … 
At the time of her appointment she possessed an extraordinary record of 
experience.  She was born in New York City in 1830 to a wealthy family and 
had received her education there.  At the outbreak of the Civil War, she and her 
three sisters – Abby, Georgiana, and Eliza – devoted themselves to the Union 
cause.  In 1861 they worked with the Woman’s Central Association of Relief, 
the precursor of the United States Sanitary Commission and the American Red 
Cross.  The four sisters were among the one hundred women selected for 
elementary training in nursing and for service at the City Hospital and the Park 
Barracks.  In 1862 Miss Jane Woolsey served for five months at the 
Portsmouth Grove Government Hospital near Newport, Rhode Island, and then 
spent the remainder of the war at the Barrack Hospital in Fairfax, Virginia.  
The hostilities over, she helped organize and conduct the Freedman’s Institute 
at Hampton, Virginia, under General Samuel Armstrong.  She also opened the 
Lincoln Industrial School for Colored Women, another project of General 
Armstrong’s.14  
 
At that time Miss Woolsey’s services were actively sought by several other 
institutions, including New York’s Bellevue Hospital, which wanted to establish a 
training school for nurses.  The newly opened Presbyterian, located on the hard-to-
reach outskirts of the city, was very lucky to have won her over.  Independently 
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wealthy, Miss Woolsey served Presbyterian without pay and her sister, Abby Howland 
Woolsey, joined her and assisted as clerk and occasionally as Acting Directress.15  
According to Dr. Lamb, the early years of the Hospital saw some friction 
between its professional staff and administration and the root cause of the problem 
appeared to be that the Board of Managers had reserved to itself all administrative 
power.  From time to time the disagreements between the professional staff and the 
Managers concerned appointments to the Medical Board, but the major conflict came 
to be centered around Miss Woolsey.16 
Some of the younger doctors on the Medical Board opposed the appointment 
of a “lady superintendent” from the beginning.  Miss Woolsey’s strenuous 
work during the Civil War had impaired her health, and organizing the 
Hospital’s routine made further demands upon it. Also, she was a woman of 
aristocratic background and temperament and was giving her services 
gratuitously.  Accustomed to deference and respect, she found the hostility of 
some of the staff very disquieting.  The matter came to a head when one of the 
doctors insisted on breaking a stringent rule by sending infectious cases to the 
wards.  Miss Woolsey objected.  The doctor and some of his colleagues then so 
opposed her that they were dropped by the Managers from the Medical Board.  
In turn, some of the other members of the Medical Board resigned, and so did 
some of the Managers.  Miss Woolsey presented her resignation, but at the 
insistence of the Board of Managers withdrew it for the time being.17  
Miss Woolsey stayed on for another year but then asked that her resignation be 
accepted.  In Dr. Lamb’s words, “the upheaval had exhausted her, and she regarded 
her main task as done.” With sincere reluctance, the Managers accepted her 
resignation on March 1, 1876.18  Following her departure, a male superintendent of 
more modest social origins was appointed to assume her duties.  The unfortunate 
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consequences of this change were especially palpable, since he did not prove to be 
nearly her equal in the task of administering the Hospital.   
Presbyterian’s first historian – Dr. David Bryson Delavan – had witnessed the 
conflict personally as a young resident at the Hospital and concluded that the dispute 
of those first years “imperiled the existence of the institution and actually set back 
progress many years.”19  Dr. Lamb thought this judgment a bit too gloomy, but if the 
consequences of the larger process by which women were marginalized within the 
field of hospital and medical work were to be fully appreciated, Dr. Delavan’s 
judgment would have to be found sounder and more insightful than he likely even 
realized.  Insofar as Miss Woolsey’s career exemplified a broader awakening of 
American women’s ambition to participate in social and public affairs, her terminal 
replacement with a man was a sacrifice of those ambitions, as well as a sacrifice of 
aristocratic class solidarity for the sake of masculine unity among the social and 
professional elites.  Miss Woolsey’s expulsion was not an isolated event but a part of a 
broader rebuff to women’s professional and social aspirations that would intensify and 
hold sway for close to a century.  Following her departure, women’s participation in 
the work of the Hospital was never again reach comparable position of power and 
authority.   
Following Miss Woolsey’s departure, the Hospital’s organization and 
functioning assumed the typical gendered form, in which women were limited to 
separate, subordinate and marginal positions.  The most crucial step in the 
institutionalization of the Hospital’s gendered division of labor came with the 
establishment of its School for Nurses in 1892.20  This decision by the Hospital 
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coincided with a larger movement on the part of the American hospitals to establish 
nursing schools.  As the role of trained nurses in the provision of good hospital care 
rose in importance, hospitals struggled to attract and retain them in sufficient numbers.  
Graduate nurses were also more costly than the hospitals’ traditional employees.  
Nursing schools provided hospitals with an abundant source of cheap labor.  Pupil 
nurses could be immediately put to the many of the “custodial” nursing functions, 
while their supervision and the more advanced work could be carried out by a fewer 
number of paid graduate nurses. 
During the first two decades of its existence, Presbyterian’s nursing school 
established a pattern of training and employment characteristic of the “better” sort of 
nursing practice across the country.  In its selection and training of nursing students, 
the School oriented itself toward an ideal that was simultaneously gendered and class- 
and race-specific.  One of the primary goals of the Presbyterian nursing school was to 
attract the wholesome daughters of the [white] middle class to the profession.21  With 
its resources and prestige, Presbyterian largely succeeded in creating one of the 
country’s best schools of nursing.  It produced a large number of skillful practitioners 
and willful leaders who fought admirably for advancement and social recognition of 
nursing and women.  Yet the overall effect of nursing and its professional struggles on 
the larger cause of women’s equality in the professional and public spheres remains 
ambivalent. 
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By the last decade of the 19th century, when Presbyterian’s School of Nursing 
was established, feminization of nursing was virtually complete.  The profession’s 
gendered identity was inscribed in the many practices surrounding nurses’ training and 
practice, from uniforms to housing arrangements, curfew rules to relationship to 
physicians.  Despite the clearly subordinate role of nurses in relation to physicians and 
hospital administrators, there was a specific sense of honor attached to nursing and 
especially to the leaders of the profession.  Before closer affiliation with medical 
schools and widespread training of medical interns and residents, nurses were medical 
“professionals” and “apprentices” most closely and clearly associated with their 
respective hospitals.  Trained nursing was considered one of the pillars of modern 
hospital care and the uniformed nurse corps was one of its proudest symbols.  A 
photograph taken between 1910 and 1916 depicted a collegiate meeting of the 
Presbyterian’s President, Superintendent and Director of the School of Nursing and 
was inscribed as “three great administrators of the old hospital.”22  The honor, as well 
as the burdens, attached to nursing leaders partook of both monastic and military 
themes.  Professional leadership presumed, both in theory and in practice, renunciation 
of marriage and family, while the strict discipline expected at all levels of nursing 
organization harked back to the founding institutions of Western modernity, including 
the monastery, the military, the penitentiary and the schools.   
While women physicians were failing to win the right to be commissioned into 
the military service, the leaders of the nursing profession succeeded, albeit in a very 
difficult battle.  The founder and director of Presbyterian’s School of Nursing, Miss 
Anna C. Maxwell, was personally involved in winning the nurses military ranks and 
the nurses’ service in the Spanish-American War and especially in World War I 
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brought an immeasurable degree of pride and confidence to the profession and women 
more broadly.   
Yet, those who were fighting to elevate nursing and the nurses, had to sense 
that they were fighting the fight which was hard to win.  The structural subordination 
of nursing to the medical profession had already been a foregone conclusion and the 
struggle only concerned the terms of this subordination, including the division of 
labor, conditions of employment, and material and symbolic rewards.  As 
distinguished as the Presbyterian’s School of Nursing was compared to the majority of 
American hospitals, the predominantly custodial nature of the nurses’ training and the 
abiding paternalism in every aspect of nursing organization made it a questionable 
instrument in the cause women’s equal participation in the medical field.  Apart from 
symbolic gestures, even Miss Maxwell – Presbyterian nursing’s founding and 
respected leader – was systematically excluded from the corridors of power and 
influence within the hospital.  For the longest time, she did not even receive courtesy 
copies of the minutes of the medical board or the board of trustees and her 
administrative functions had been long as reduced to administration of the nursing 
service solely. 
Like the nursing schools across the country, the Presbyterian’s was from the 
very beginning subject to the seemingly never-ending debate on nurse over-training.  
By over-training, of course, the critics did not mean the inhumane hours and custodial 
content of the first-year nurses’ hospital training, but the fear that the measly hours of 
actual classroom or bedside instructions in basic medical concepts and nursing 
techniques were so much of unnecessary and inassimilable science for the nurses’ 
minds.  After the affiliation with Columbia, this unfortunate debate morphed into the 
institutional tug of war between the Hospital and the medical school over the 
institutional place of the nursing school.  The founding agreement between the two 
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institutions prescribed the transfer of all educational functions to the Schools and all 
the clinical services to the Hospital.  The nursing school was the sole exception.  The 
Hospital desired to retain full control over the disposition of it valuable resource of 
cheap hospital labor, while the University did not rush to embrace the feminized 
profession. 
It is hard not to think that the occupational subordination of nursing and the 
constant belittlement of its professional and educational foundations, affected not only 
nursing but the cause of women in allied health care fields as well.  More often than 
not, the discourses – both in favor and in opposition of thorough education of the 
nurses – were more than thinly colored by the gender of the nursing student.  The issue 
of whether nurses should be instructed in this or that type of knowledge and technique 
often morphed into one of whether the feminine mind was fit to receive and apply 
them.23 
Ironically, during the early decades of the century, the nurses were far more 
visible than the female physicians fighting for professional success.  Their sheer 
numbers, the spectacle of the uniforms, the honor of the war service all made the nurse 
the paragon of feminine patriotic duty.  Enjoying high application rates, nursing was 
transformed – at the better schools at least – into a respectable collegiate major track 
for inspired young women.  This, of course, created an odd sort of disjuncture in the 
purported class-determining effect of the educational opportunity, whereby the 
college-educated woman was routed into the profession that paid much less than that 
into which the college-educated man was.  More ominously, the association of nursing 
with all-American femininity, and of femininity with nursing, was likely at odds with 
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the cause of women in medicine, a cause which threatened to upset the established 
gendered division of labor between the male physician and the female nurse.24 
The gendered precedents set at Columbia’s other teaching affiliates – the 
Vanderbilt Clinic and the Sloane Hospital for Women – were of similar import.  Both 
institutions, as well as the new home of the medical school, were gifts from the 
members of the wealthy Vanderbilt family and came about through the influence of 
Dr. James McLane, a family physician to the Vanderbilts and member of the College’s 
faculty.  The plot of land and the money for the construction of the new buildings to 
house the College were given by the patriarch of the family, William Henry 
Vanderbilt, in 1884.  The Vanderbilt Clinic was given by his three sons in the memory 
of their father after his death.  In 1886, Vanderbilt’s daughter and son-in-law, Emily 
Thorn and William D. Sloane, offered to erect and endow on the College grounds “a 
lying-in asylum to be known as the Sloane Maternity Hospital of the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons.”25 
The central role played by Emily Vanderbilt in this beneficence, as well as her 
lifelong financial support of this institution, served to cast into starker relief the 
gendered implications and practices of the Sloane Hospital under the control of 
College of Physicians and Surgeons.  As most other institutions of this sort, Sloane 
Hospital was part of the larger institutional assault on the earlier practice of midwifery 
and its predominantly female ranks.  The displacement of midwifery with obstetrics 
was both a class- and gender-specific project, replacing women of lower classes with 
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men of middle- to upper-middle class status as principal attendants to the parturient.  
By virtue of the official exclusion of female students and physicians, the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons, under whose control the Sloane Hospital was placed, was 
doing its part.  Until 1923, when the first female intern was appointed to Sloane, 
women’s participation there was limited to financial beneficence, without 
corresponding control over institutional direction, and to nursing.26  The situation was 
scarcely different in any other division of the School.  The first woman physician 
appointed to the staff was Rosalie Slaughter Morton, who was made an attending 
surgeon in general surgery at the Vanderbilt Clinic in 1916.27 
During the first decades of its existence, the Sloane Hospital’s nursing service 
and training school did not seem to have the fortune of the kind of success achieved at 
Presbyterian.  The first several women appointed to head the nursing service left the 
institution within short periods of time, apparently without explanation.  The 
Hospital’s relationships with various nursing schools, which sent their students to take 
the obstetric rotation at Sloane, were often short-lived and strained.  Finally, there 
were reports of overwork of nursing students which, in those times, indicated nearly 
unbearable conditions.28 
Besides nursing, which became nearly a sole domain of women’s participation 
in the professional work of the hospital, the women’s roles were in philanthropy, for 
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the very few who were in position to engage in it, and in the voluntary work of the 
hospitals’ auxiliaries, which usually included the wives of the professional and 
administrative staff and other interested women, typically of upper-middle class 
standing. 
On the national scene, however, the picture appeared to be brightening: just 
two years after Columbia ruled out the admission of women, another elite school, 
Johns Hopkins, agreed to admit women.  Finally, it appeared that a long struggle for 
admission to the elite medical schools was finally brought to victory.  The momentous 
decision, however, had less to do with enlightened views than financial exigencies.  
With the legacy left by Johns Hopkins, the Johns Hopkins University and Johns 
Hopkins Hospital had been founded, but decreases in the endowment and the cost of 
recruiting prominent faculty left insufficient funds to open the medical school. 
Elizabeth Garrett and several friends had offered financial support if women were 
admitted.  The funding secured was still insufficient and the Trustees had decided that 
nothing less than a first-class medical school was acceptable and they would wait until 
sufficient funds were available. Finally, Elizabeth Garrett offered to donate $500,000, 
the entire amount needed to open the medical school, if women were admitted and 
four years of undergraduate preparation were required for admission.  Despite concern 
that students would not attend because of the strenuous admission requirements and 
the presence of women, the Trustees had no other choice and accepted.  Three women 
were admitted to the first year class out of the total of twelve students  A few years 
later, the famous William Osler apparently declared that the experiment of admitting 
women was a failure but the “die was cast.”29  In effect, as Paul Starr commented, 
“American women were forced to buy their way into elite medical education.”30  
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After the medical schools of Johns Hopkins and Cornell began admitting 
women in 1893 and 1898, respectively, the New York Infirmary and other women’s 
medical colleges closed; the reasoning was that there was no need for separate 
education for women doctors.  Little did they know that it would take two more 
decades before Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons would start 
admitting women. The last citadel, Harvard Medical School, did not accept female 
students until 1946. 
By the beginning of the 20th century, a number of medical schools were 
admitting women, although most of these were homeopathic or proprietary schools of 
a second or even a third rank.  The general opposition – both on the part of the medical 
profession at large and of the most established medical schools in particular – 
persisted and even intensified in the climate of growing competition for institutional 
survival.  As one of the results of the process of upgrading and standardization of 
medical education, which culminated in a famous Flexner’s report of 1910, a large 
number of those schools which admitted women disappeared during the first decade of 
the 20th century.  By 1909 only three women’s medical colleges still existed.  The 
number of female medical students has plummeted as well.  Between 1904 and 1909, 
the number of women medical students nationwide had decreased from 1,129 to 921.  
The decline was not due to the disappearance of women’s schools only, as at the 
coeducational institutions the number of women students dropped from 752 in 1910 to 
464 six years later.31  For the next half century after 1910, except the wartime, the 
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schools maintained quotas limiting women to less than 10 percent of medical student 
admissions.32 
The overall situation of (white) women’s medical education during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century is usually characterized as one of gender 
separatism and marginalization, but it should also and importantly be comprehended 
in terms of class.  The unenthusiastic admission of women by less prestigious, cash-
strapped institutions forced even the best-bred young women fooldhardy enough to 
insist on medical vocation to receive their degrees from second- or third-rate 
institutions.  The lack of financial resources and widespread ostracism relegated all-
women’s colleges of medicine to similar rank within the hierarchy of medical schools.  
Perhaps even more damning than the imputed worth of women’s medical degrees 
were their limited professional opportunities after graduation.  In the majority of cases, 
the combined ostracism of professional societies, local practitioners, hospitals, and the 
public limited women’s practices to far less lucrative and prestigious types of practice 
among the poorer clientele, especially women and children; with charitable clinics for 
the poor, the tubercular, and the confined; and in the less competitive geographic areas 
of smaller cities and towns.  With few exceptions, women’s practices were far less 
conducive to advancement of medical technique and, for a long time, they were 
categorically barred from the participation in the professional societies and their 
scientific meetings.  Thus, even the beginning of women’s admission at the few top-
ranked schools did not dramatically change the de-classing processes forced upon the 
pioneering generation of American women physicians.  Even a hard-won degree from 
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a prestigious institution could not by itself compensate for the enormously constrained 
professional opportunities imposed by the multiple refusals of hospitals, male 
colleagues, and paying patients to help the women to appointments, training, 
partnerships, referrals, and earnings. 
It is true that those women, who could rely on family or marital wealth, were in 
many cases able to build financially successful private practices in the metropolitan 
centers, but theirs were exceptional, rather than typical outcomes.  Overall, even as the 
arduous task of overcoming multiple obstacles to medical profession ensured that only 
the most hard-willed daughters of middle- and upper-classes would ever venture into 
the field, the regime of their marginalization had the effect of de-classing their 
professional and personal situation in relation to their male peers.  The combined 
effects of less prestigious degrees, limited career opportunities, lower-class clientele, 
and professional exclusion, made career in medicine an exercise in hardships, 
iniquities and sacrifices which these pioneering women bore with amazing dignity and 
resolve. 
A quarter of a century after Columbia’s first official position on the admission 
of women, the question was being raised once again and, this time, it was decided 
differently.  This is how the College’s Alumni Newsletter described the momentous 
event in the issue honoring the 75th anniversary of women’s admission. 
Back in 1917, when Gulli Lindh ‘21 (later married name Muller) sought entry 
to the then all-male College of Physicians and Surgeons, Dean Samuel 
Lambert stipulated that if $50,000 could be found for the necessary 
improvements of the physical plant, i.e. separate washroom facilities, he might 
consider her application.  It was a stalling tactic akin to those impossible 
chores with which the hero or heroine is charged in fairy tales.  True to the 
world of once upon a time, a fairy godmother (or rather father) interceded on 
her behalf: an anonymous Texas gentleman (whose two sisters were doctors) 
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came through with a gift of $50,000.  And so 9 young women, including Gulli 
Lindh, were subsequently admitted to the Class of 1921.”33 
Instead of comparing this curious event to the fairy tale, it may be fairer to say 
that Columbia had followed in the footsteps of Johns Hopkins and several other elite 
schools in allowing women and their supporters to “buy” their right to admission.  The 
price of admission to Columbia was certainly not as high as it was at Hopkins and 
bespoke lesser resistance to this step.  Why and how this change of heart had taken 
place is unclear, nor is the full spectrum of opinion on the matter which undoubtedly 
existed.  The power of the precedent, however, was probably one of the factors.  By 
1916, when Gulli Lindt and her future classmates sent their applications, several of the 
top medical schools have already allowed the admission of women:  Johns Hopkins 
did so in 1893, Cornell in 1898, and in 1915 Yale joined in as well.  The approach 
chosen also had a virtue of being open to several interpretations – as either a stalling 
tactic or a pragmatic financial decision – suitable to the divided opinion of the faculty.   
Four years later, the results of this experiment, as the decision to admit women 
was to be referred for a long time, were in and the rumors spreading through the 
University were that they were quite impressive.  In a brief note to the Dean of the 
medical school, Columbia’s President, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, wrote: 
It occurs to me that in view of the excellent record made by some of the 
women students in the first class to be graduated at the P. and S. that contains 
women, it would be well to make public from the University some facts 
relative to the matter.  We should not want to mention names of the 
individuals.34   
The President asked the Dean to furnish him with some facts to use as the basis 
for “a little public statement.”  For instance, the President wanted to know the number 
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of women admitted to the graduating class, colleges from which they came, their 
general record at the P. and S. as a group, and the hospitals to which these women are 
securing appointments.  He was particularly impressed to hear that “women stood 
first, third and fifth in a class” and wanted to have this fact confirmed, as well as 
Dean’s comments on the “significance of this for the development of women’s part in 
medicine” or “anything else that you think would be useful to the P. and S. and the 
general movement in this connection.”35 
With less enthusiasm, perhaps, the Dean provided the following report.  A total 
of twelve women were admitted to the Class of 1921 but only 6 of them graduated.  
Those who did graduate held the following ranks among the 117 graduates: 1st, 3rd, 
5th, 46th, 49th, and 60th.36     
The following information was available about the six women who did not 
graduate: 
 
1 dropped after 2 months as her preliminary education was insufficient 
(misrepresentation) 
2 dropped in February of 1st year, no reason stated 
1 at the end of 1st year because of 2 failures and 3 C’s 
1 was dropped at the end of 2nd year after receiving one condition in her 
1st year 
1 withdrew at the end of 3rd year to be married; had 13 A’s and 3 B’s in 
first 2 years]37 
 
It is of interest, wrote the Dean, that “[a]ll the women have medical hospital 
appointments, rather than surgical.”  His only other comment was that “[o]ne striking 
thing [about the first women medical students] has been their attitude towards special 
privileges; they have not only not asked for it but refused to accept it when it was 
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offered.”38  Thanking the Dean for his report, Columbia’s President noted that the 
women’s record “show[ed] that a very interesting experiment has produced good 
results in its beginning at any rate.”39   
Although the experience of the first co-educational class may have been 
expected to exert some influence on the future policy on the admission of women, it 
has instead set in stone the institutional attitude which would scarcely change in the 
next five decades.  The main elements of this static regime of gender policy were: (1) 
the consistently better academic results of female students compared to that of male; 
(2) intermittent institutional pride about these results often worked into the public 
relations opportunities; (3) refusal to increase the rate of women’s admission in light 
of their better academic performance; (4) mainstreaming of women into medical, 
rather surgical internships; (5) contentment with not having to adjust any institutional 
practices on the account of women students.  
Undoubtedly, there were a number of individuals among Columbia’s faculty 
and administration who strongly supported the broadening of women’s opportunities 
to study medicine.  Yet, an amazing finding was that during the next twenty years the 
average proportion of women in the graduating class remained exactly the same as it 
was in the first class that included women.  One of the individuals who worked toward 
breaking this quota was Prof. Florence Lowther of the Department of Zoology at 
Barnard College.  In 1943, she collected and analyzed the records of the first twenty 
years’ of women at the College of Physicians and Surgeons and forwarded her 
findings to the Dean of the Medical School.40   
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According to Prof. Lowther’s study, the basic numbers on women graduates 
were as shown in Table 5.1.  According to the study, 31 percent of women graduated 
with honors while only 13 percent of men did.  Although women accounted for only 9 
percent of all graduates, they held 18 percent of honor ranks.41  85 percent of women 
graduates of the College of Physicians and Surgeons were practicing while 15 percent 
were listed as “not in practice” at the present moment in the 1942 Edition of the 
American Medical Association Directory.42  In her cover letter, Prof. Lowther noted 
that “[a]ccording to your [P&S] records in the Registrar’s office, many of these [15 
percent currently ‘not in practice’] have practiced for from five to eighteen years.”  
Hence, she intended to “make further inquiry into the reasons for their present 
inactivity.”  The proportion of women graduates in active practice was calculated on a 
sample of 162 persons.  13 of 175 graduates were either deceased or could not be 
found.  52 women graduates, or 32 percent, were either full or partial specialists and 
21 percent of women graduates were full specialists.  The leading specialty practice 
among women graduates was pediatrics (26 percent of full specialists and 33 percent 
of full and partial specialists); dermatology (14 and 10 percent); pathology and 
psychiatry (11 and 8 percent each); gynecology and surgery (6 and 8 percent).43   
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Table 5.1. Women Graduates of the Columbia University’s College of Physicians and 
Surgeons, 1921-1941 
 
Class Year of 
admission 
Total number of 
graduates 
Number of 
women 
graduates 
Percent of 
women 
graduates 
1921 1917 70 6 9% 
1922 1918 70 7 10% 
1923 1919 94 12 13% 
1924 1920 88 10 11% 
1925 1921 94 11 12% 
1926 1922 105 11 10% 
1927 1923 96 11 11% 
1928 1924 97 11 11% 
1929 1925 103 14 14% 
1930 1926 103 5 5% 
1931 1927 102 9 9% 
1932 1928 102 7 7% 
1933 1929 91 6 7% 
1934 1930 98 5 5% 
1935 1931 97 6 6% 
1936 1932 88 11 13% 
1937 1933 93 7 8% 
1938 1934 91 6 7% 
1939 1935 88 7 8% 
1940 1936 103 10 10% 
1941 1937 104 3 3% 
TOTAL  1,977 175 9% 
 
Source: Prof. Florence deL. Lowther, Department of Zoology, Barnard College, Columbia University 
(with Dr. Helen Downes ?), “Statistical Report on the Women Doctors Who Have Graduated from the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons,” enclosed with a cover letter to Aura E. Severinghouse, Assistant 
Dean, February 19, 1943, Table II, Proportion of Women in Each Class.  Notes: Columns I, II, and IV 
are from Lowther’s Table.  Columns II and V, giving year of admission and percentage of women 
graduates respectively, have been added by me (O.P.).  My calculation of the total number of P&S 
graduates between 1921 and 1941 gives the result of 1,977, while Lowther had 1,967 which I believe is 
a typographical error.  Also, on the basis of her numbers, Lowther reported the average proportion of 
women graduates to be 8 percent, whereas 175 divided by 1,967 is actually 8.89 percent, i.e. almost 9 
percent. 
 
“It seems to me,” wrote Lowther, “that their records as students are nothing 
short of superb.”  More importantly, “their subsequent career as medical practitioners 
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should put to rout (sic) those who claim women doctors doe (sic) little with their 
knowledge after graduation.”44  “I am myself somewhat surprised by your findings,” 
wrote Assistant Dean Severinghaus, thanking Dr. Lowther for the study and “the 
extremely interesting data that it contained.”45  
Did this study prompt any changes in admissions policy on the part of the 
P&S?  The answer appears to be no.  The only divergence during this period occurred 
immediately after World War II.  It could have been expected that the wartime 
shortage of qualified young men would result in the increase of the proportion of 
women admitted but that did not really happen at Columbia.  The policy behind the 
unchanged numbers was confirmed by the Dean of the Medical School.  Replying to 
an inquiry regarding any changes in the number of female students “in response to war 
pressure” and whether P&S was “offering them any inducements or discouraging 
them,” Dean Rappleye said only that, at P&S, “[they were] continuing to take the 
same number of women … as previously and [were] very glad to do whatever we can 
to help them with their training.”46  It was not the war shortage of men, but the glut of 
returning veterans and the federal provisions for them, which were responsible for the 
one and only spike in the proportion of women graduates during this time.  In 1945, 25 
women were admitted to the Class of 1949 and four years later 23 women graduated in 
a total class of 108.  Accounting for 21 percent of all graduates in 1949, this was a 
departure from the average proportion of 9 percent.  The departure was widely noticed 
and this is how the unusual graduation ceremony of that year was described in the 
news. 
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Women in medicine took a giant step forward this week.  For the first time in 
history of Columbia’s august College of P and S, 23 of 108 graduates were 
women.  The ladies usually number only six or eight.  A young mother, Mrs. 
Anthony Ianone, walked off with one of the two highly coveted surgical 
internships at Columbia’s PH.  Six out 18, exactly one third of the students 
tapped here for Alpha Omega Alpha, national honor society were women.  To 
make the feminine victory really complete, by graduation time five of the girls 
already were married to fellow students.  And from rumors circulating about 
the campus, more will be following their example soon.  Wartime absence of 
qualified young men four years ago was partly responsible for the large 
feminine percentage.  But the chief reason for their astounding number, 
according to Dr. Aura Severinghaus, a dean of the medical school, was the 
plain fact that “so many excellent young women applied at that time.”  They 
had the makings of good doctors, he said.  And like men in the profession 
planned to continue their careers after marriage.  Of the lady graduates from P. 
and S.  Interviewed, not one had noticed the slightest prejudice against then in 
their entire four years.  “In fact, the older doctors, the men least likely to accept 
the idea of women in medicine, bent over backward to be kind,” observed 
lovely, dark-haired Roxana Read, who is taking a rotating internship in Texas.  
“I wasn’t aware that there was such a thing as prejudice at all until I filed an 
application by mistake at a hospital which did not accept women.  Fortunately, 
there aren’t many like that.”  The married girls are just as convinced they’ll 
stick to their careers as the single.  Commented Mrs. Yvonne Wyker, who is 
planning to intern at Rochester with her husband, “Better to try both marriage 
and medicine than give up one for another, although we all know we are up 
against serious hazards.”  “Just looking around at the successful women at 
Columbia was always encouraging to us,” Roxana Read added.  “Dr. Virginia 
Apgar, anaesthesia, Dr. Barbara Stimson, fractures, Dr. Edith Quimby, 
radiology.  I was Howard Schnur, veteran of the ETO and fellow graduate, 
who delivered the greatest accolade.  “The girls were always hard working lab 
partners and knew most of the answers.  They could have been intolerable if 
they wanted to but they weren’t.  Why, I dated one girl for the years and she 
never mentioned medicine once outside school.”47  
The feminine victory, however, was rather short-lived and its true reasons were 
other than those stated for the record.  Recalling the wartime experience, P&S 
alumnus and current administrator was more candid: 
                                                 
 
47
 Columbia’s Girl Meds Score Slam,” New York World Telegram, June 3, 1949, all paragraphing 
removed. 
  225  
It was an unusual class after the war.  We had about 15% women and after that 
it dropped back to the usual 8%.  We were told that the reason was that P&S 
would rather take women than be assigned these people from the army and 
navy.”48   
The surprising absence of gender discrimination, described in the newspaper 
article, was also probably an exaggeration.  As another alumna of the College 
reminisced in an article devoted to women in medicine, some professors still bristled 
with hatred toward the female students and the institutional practices hardly proscribed 
their open expression of this sentiment. 
In 1947, I was accepted by Harvard Medical School but elected to go to P&S. 
In September of that year, at a welcome reception for the entering class of ‘51, 
a senior faculty member pointed to me: “Had I been on the admissions 
committee you would have never been accepted.” In the midst of general 
hilarity I treated it as a joke and chuckled, “And why not?” He said, “Because 
women get married, have children and waste their education. Don’t you laugh, 
young lady, I am serious.” This was my introduction to P&S. I could have told 
him that I was already married, but I didn’t want to spoil his fun. I am very 
lucky that he was not on the admissions committee.49   
Reflecting on the consequent return of the women’s percentage to its average 
levels, Dean Rappley wrote that “[e]ach year since 1917 approximately ten per cent of 
the medical students have been women.  During the war period the percentage rose to 
above thirty but only for a short time because immediately following the war the 
number of women applicants dropped markedly.”50  
To the credit of some of Columbia’s leaders, the institution did not hesitate to 
share its data on the excellent academic accomplishment of the women graduates.  
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When, five years after Harvard decided to admit women, the school’s leaders were 
still quite unsure of the correctness of their decision, Columbia’s data was likely 
sought as ammunition.  The Chairman of the Harvard Medical School’s Committee on 
Admission wrote to the Dean of Columbia’s medical school, Dr. Severinghaus, for 
advice in this matter: 
The question of advisability of admitting female medical students in the 
present rush of candidates is rearing its ugly head among the faculty once more 
at Harvard.  Our experience with this sex as graduates is too brief to be of 
statistical value.  I wonder if you have any statistics as to the number of 
women medical graduates who are still actively engaged in medical work five 
or more years after their graduation.  Such statistics would be most helpful to 
us in the discussion of this problem which is bound to come up.51   
In his reply, Dean Severinghaus replied that the “experience at the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons has been very satisfactory indeed and we would have no 
reason at all to question the desirability of continuing their admission.”  To support his 
view, he cited the main findings of Dr. Lowther’s study of P&S women graduates 
between 1921 and 1941. 
Over a twenty-year period, from 1921 to 1941, we have graduated 175 women, 
13 of these died.  Of the remaining 162, 85% were still practicing actively and 
15% were not practicing at the present moment.  We understand that a 
considerable number of this 15% again took up active practice during the 
emergency years of World War II.  It also interested me to know that 32% or 
this number had gone on for specialty boards and that 60% were in general 
practice.  Their achievement in medical school was outstanding.  8% of the 
tota1 number of graduates were women, although 18% of the total honor ranks 
were captured by them.  31% or the 175 women graduated with honors, that is, 
within the upper fifteen places in the class, whereas only 13% of the men 
graduated with honors. Thus our record both within school and after school 
compare very favorably with those of the men and I believe we have no 
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hesitation at all in continuing the admission of women to the study of 
medicine.52   
Still, the institution as a whole did not deviate from its established percentage 
of female admission until compelled by the wave of civil rights and feminist struggles 
of the 1970s. 
The most interesting aspect of these decades’ regime of gender discrimination 
was that, on the surface, no discrimination was taking place at all, in the practice of 
admissions at least.  Women were consistently admitted to medical schools at the 
same rate as men were.  When they applied in greater numbers, as it happened right 
after the war, their proportion among the admitted students rose correspondingly.  In 
view of their better academic performance, which was well documented at Columbia, 
it is possible to make a charge that Columbia should have increased the rate of 
admission, given the clearly superior pool of applicants which women represented.  
This charge, to be sure, could have been easily countered by the likewise documented 
short-fall which the women graduates were showing in the post-graduate professional 
performance.  The bulk of the critical assessment, I believe, has to be laid elsewhere: 
on the fact that most institutions are capable of influencing their application pools and 
numbers.  To be sure, they are not the only factor in this, but they are able to 
communicate their intentions quickly and clearly to the colleges from which their 
applicants are predominantly drawn. 
Unfortunately, there must have been absent a sufficient support within the 
Columbia’s establishment to raise the percentage of women beyond the average of 
under ten.  Given that this number slightly exceeded the national average, the actions 
of Columbia’s medical school were innocent of open discrimination, yet eerily 
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calculated to keep the proportion of women in medicine an inconsequential minority.  
As the sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter has shown in her pioneering study of 
minorities in the workforce, there exist certain significant thresholds which determine 
minority’s power potential.  Minorities, whose numbers fall below 15 percent, are 
rarely able to influence the decision-making and policies of their institutions, 
functioning more as tokens than full-fledged participants in their fields.  Minorities 
constituting between 15 and 30 percent, however, are usually able to make alliances 
with their majority supporters and advance their positions in this way.53 
The broader significance of women’s quotas – at Columbia and nationwide – 
was that women in medicine could not build effective campaigns to increase their 
numbers.  Quite unlike the happy normality depicted in the newspaper account of the 
post-war crop of women M.D.’s, exceptionalism, isolation and quietism were the 
primary effects of this regime on women in medicine. 
During this period, both professional and organizational weakness of women in 
medicine worked to inhibit the growth in applicants to medical schools and the 
struggle against the unjust conditions of their participation in the profession.  The 
experiences of Columbia’s women graduates differed significantly from the earlier 
generations of women.  They entered the profession at the moment when women 
physicians had mostly lost the earlier gender-specific niche which helped increase and 
support the earlier generation of women physicians.  As historian Ellen More 
concluded: 
The devaluation of a gendered conception of women’s practice and the 
elimination of the professional outposts from which earlier generations of 
women physicians had made their mark disrupted patterns of recruitment and 
advancement from women physicians.  Previously women physicians, and not 
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merely those who taught at women’s medical colleges, had attracted 
professional successors through networks of personal and professional 
reputation.  By the 1920s they could claim few heirs, not only because 
women’s admissions to medical school were low but also because, in a world 
where internships, residencies, and hospital privileges replaced gender-specific 
medical institutions as avenues to professional prestige, senior women 
physicians were rarely able to help young women colleagues up the career 
ladder.54 
Even successful women practitioners were deflected from full participation in 
hospitals, which increasingly constituted a critical factor in the advancement of 
medical careers.  Women’s under-representation on most hospital inpatient staffs, as 
well as in internships and residency programs, significantly slowed their move into the 
core institutions of twentieth-century medicine – hospitals, medical specialties, and 
medical school faculties.55   
Women’s organizational politics were also in disarray. The national women’s 
medical organization attracted limited membership and its greatest accomplishment – 
both domestically and overseas through the American women’s hospitals – 
represented a clearly gender-specific and marginalized achievement, focused on the 
service to the needy, especially women and children, and on public health and 
preventive medicine abroad.  An organization that began as an exercise in 
demonstrating women’s equal professional competence ended up operating within 
women physicians’ traditional, culturally sanctioned role that, alas, remained 
professionally marginal.56   
Passage of the 1921 Act for the Promotion of the Welfare and Hygiene of 
Maternity and Infancy, better known as the Sheppard-Towner Act, one year after the 
ratification of the woman suffrage amendment, seemed to presage a breakthrough for 
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maternalist medicine and for women physicians.  But the moment was short-lived.  In 
1929, under the pressure of conservative backlash and anti-communist hysteria, the act 
and the agencies created under its authorization, including the Children’s Bureau, were 
allowed by the Congress to expire.57 
With repeated defeats, adaptive professionalism, not feminism, was ascendant 
among women physicians.58  The MWHA’s was careful to oppose compulsory health 
insurance and socialization of medicine in general.  It refused to admit African 
American women physicians to its organization until 1942.  The Association also 
opposed birth control and abortion as a matter of policy and reduced the problems of 
women in medicine to the difficulties in securing household help.  
If women remained a small minority in medicine as whole, they were even 
more exceptional in the academic medicine.  In spite of steady erosion of the women’s 
institutional niches, the few successful women in academic medicine were located 
predominantly in pediatrics and a few fields closely associated with it.  Women who 
gained prominence in academic medicine were generally exceptional – in their 
backgrounds, talents, lifestyle, and luck – which did not bode well for increases in 
their numbers.  In her analysis of seven outstanding women academicians before 1950, 
Ellen More concluded that they had several characteristics in common. 
Generally speaking, they all received substantial boosts early enough in the 
career to propel then beyond the lower academic ranks.  But in addition, they 
consistently performed at high or even “super achiever” levels. (f73)  All were 
educated at excellent coeducational medical schools.  They were admitted to 
high-quality internships and residencies and continued in academic medicine 
directly after finishing their training.  Much of their forward momentum was a 
result of their own gifts and preparation, of course, but it also resulted from 
astute and committed mentoring by male faculty who recognized their skills 
and went out of their way to alert them to career opportunities.  Frequently 
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they created and became identified with innovative clinical approaches, 
sometimes working at the border of clinical specialties. … Several attained the 
rank of full professor, although none became a dean, department chair, or 
hospital administrator.59 
Besides outstanding abilities and mentors, these women’s careers were marked 
by exceptional personal choices or sacrifices which set them apart from the vast 
majority of women.  It is hard to escape the conclusion that the career success for 
these women was strongly associated with foregoing of the traditional family life.  
Five out of seven in More’s group never married or had children of their own, 
although two of them shared a household with each other. 
The career of Virginia Apgar, a graduate and a faculty member of Columbia’s 
College of Physicians and Surgeons in many ways typified the few women who 
managed to enter academic medicine during the middle-third of the twentieth 
century.60  Apgar was born in 1909 in Westfield, New Jersey, to a middle class family.  
Her father’s active interest in science and experiments, combined with a death of an 
older brother and a chronic illness of a younger one, were the likely sources of 
Virginia’s interest in a medical career.  Apgar attended Mt. Holyoke College, drawing 
financial support from scholarships and a variety of jobs, including catching stray cats 
for dissection in the zoology laboratory.  In September 1929, she entered the College 
of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University.  The onset of the Great 
Depression has considerably complicated Apgar’s financial situation and, despite the 
availability of small scholarships, she had to borrow money from family friends.  She 
graduated in 1933, fourth in her class and nearly $4,000 in debt. 
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During her last year, Apgar won a prestigious and – for a woman – a rare 
opportunity to become a surgical intern at Columbia-Presbyterian.  Although she 
performed brilliantly at this task, Columbia’s chairman of surgery, Dr. Alan Whipple, 
discouraged her from continuing in the field of surgery.  Instead, he suggested that 
Apgar choose anesthesia as her field of specialization.  Whipple had at least two 
reasons for deterring her.  He had trained four other women surgeons and they had not 
been financially successful. Surgery was a crowded specialty in New York City and it 
was the Depression: even men had trouble getting established.  Apgar, of course, had 
to support herself, since her family was not wealthy and she was not married.   
Another reason Whipple urged her not to continue in surgery was his 
recognition of the need for better anesthesia.  At that time, few physicians specialized 
in the field, and most anesthesias were given by nurse anesthetists. As many others, 
Whipple realized that surgery could not advance unless anesthesia did.  It is likely that 
he saw in Apgar the energy and ability to make significant contributions to this area.   
Although this is not documented, Whipple may also have urged Apgar to enter 
anesthesia because it was then thought to be a suitable field for a woman and one in 
which there would be considerably less competition from men.  When Apgar 
graduated from medical school, anesthesia has not yet been widely recognized as a 
separate medical specialty.  Even if some leading academic surgeons recognized the 
need to develop anesthesia as a separate specialty with research agenda, because of 
low prestige and low pay, it was difficult to interest male physicians in this area.  
Thus, women doctors and nurses comprised a disproportionately large number of 
personnel who specialized in performing anesthesia.  From 1920 to 1948, women 
comprised 11-13 percent of professional anesthesia organizations but only 3-4 percent 
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of physicians at large.   There were even three female presidents of national anesthesia 
societies between 1922 and 1930.61   
Less than a year after starting her surgical internship, Apgar began looking for 
training in the new field.  At first, she stayed at Columbia-Presbyterian, probably for 
financial reasons, and spent almost a year training with nurse anesthetists.  After that 
she trained for six months each with Ralph M. Waters, M.D. at the University of 
Wisconsin and then with his protégé, Dr. Emery A. Rovenstine, at Bellevue Hospital 
in New York.  Both in Wisconsin and at Bellevue, Apgar faced the all-too-common 
problem confronted by the women of her generation, that of the lack of housing 
facilities.  In Madison, she moved three times in six months, while at Bellevue, she 
ended up living in the maids’ quarters.  It is then that, for the first time, she recorded in 
her diary her feelings of frustration at her exclusion on the account of her gender. 
“Fairly good meeting,” she wrote, “but stag dinner-MAD!”62 
Five years after her graduation, Apgar was invited to return to Columbia as 
“Director of the Division of Anesthesia and Attending Anesthetist.”  Beneath the 
impressive title, however, lay a rather compromised and constrained position.  Almost 
immediately, Apgar encountered tremendous difficulties on four fronts: limited 
recruitment, an overwhelming clinical load, reluctance by the surgeons to accept 
anesthesiologists as their equals in the operating room, and difficulty getting adequate 
compensation.  
Recruitment was difficult because administering anesthesia was still thought of 
as a nurse’s job. Apgar was the only staff member until August 1940, when Dr. Ellen 
Foot, one of the residents, joined her. The situation did not improve much until after 
the war when many of the physicians returning from World War II showed increased 
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interest in anesthesia.  1945 was the first year in which more anesthetics were given by 
doctors than nurses.  The number of nurse anesthetists decreased sharply during this 
period and, gradually, they were replaced by the growing number of medical interns.  
The success of anesthesiology as a medical specialty, thus, came at the expense of the 
professional advancement of nursing and nurses.  Ironically, the process which 
allowed some of the women physicians to carve out their careers was also depriving 
the nursing, still by far the largest female profession in health care, of an established 
area of professional specialization.   
Another problem which Apgar’s lofty title disguised was the surgeons’ refusal 
to accept anesthesiologists as their equals in the operating room.  Having administered 
anesthesia themselves or with the help of surgical nurses for years, surgeons often 
thought they knew what was best for the patient, even though the methods and 
techniques were changing rapidly.  They were also accustomed to giving orders to and 
receiving compliance from the nurse anesthetists. 
Finally, there was the problem of adequate financial compensation.  Physicians 
giving anesthesia were not allowed to charge professional fees.  In October 1940, 
Apgar threatened to resign because of inadequate compensation and inability to charge 
fees, and followed through in December.  Although not documented, this conflict was 
apparently resolved, because she did return. The anesthesia division was funded by 
charges for operating room use until 1941 when a budget was allowed.  Private and 
semiprivate patients were to be billed for anesthesia at the discretion of the surgeon, 
placing the anesthesiologist into direct dependence upon the surgeon.  Being able to 
charge a fee is the ultimate symbol of a professional and this situation clearly 
indicated that the anesthesiology was still a subordinate field.  Both its erstwhile status 
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as a nurses’ function and its considerable feminization were likely responsible for this 
situation.63 
Different problems faced Apgar after the war.  As anesthesia was gaining 
increased recognition as a medical specialty and the interest among students 
increasing, Apgar thought it was time to form a physician-only department, to separate 
from surgery, and to develop a strong research program.  Apparently reasonable 
proposals, they have nevertheless met with considerable opposition and for the next 
three years Apgar was forced to engage in a difficult struggle over the department’s 
structure and the role of research.  Evidence indicates that Apgar expected to be made 
chair. But in 1949, Emmanuel Papper, a Bellevue anesthesiologist with a research 
background, was made head of the division. It became a department six months later. 
Apgar and Papper were both appointed professor, making her the first woman full 
professor at Columbia.  
Sidelined from chairmanship of the department she helped create, Apgar 
moved into a new field of obstetric anesthesia where she was able to make her greatest 
contribution.  Her most important innovation was the Apgar Score, a standard 
evaluation procedure of the newborn child.  First published in 1953, it became and 
remains the best clinical tool in the evaluation of neonates.64  With the arrival of 
important personnel and the development of new technologies, Apgar was able to 
build on her technique and make several other important advances in the field of 
obstetric anesthesiology.  Later in life, she changed course once again, earning a 
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masters in public health and becoming a director of the National Foundation’s 
(previously the March of Dimes) new division of congenital defects. 
Pondering her remarkable career, Selma Calmes summed the mixture of 
constraints and opportunities as follows: 
 As a woman, Apgar could not be a surgeon so she entered anesthesiology, 
which needed physicians.  When she could not be a department chair, she 
entered obstetric anesthesia where, once again, there were great needs.  This 
move freed her from administration, and allowed her to make her greatest 
contributions.  A chance remark led to her formulation of the Apgar Score in 
1949.  The arrival of important personnel and the development of new 
technology for measuring blood gases, pH, and anesthetic blood levels made 
further development of the Apgar Score possible.  There was a reciprocal 
relationship between Apgar and the developing field of anesthesiology during 
the Columbia years.  She needed the opportunities available in this specialty 
and anesthesia needed her contributions.65 
A woman of exceptional character and talent, Apgar had also foregone family 
life.  Of her decision to remain single, she said, “It’s just that I haven’t found a man 
who could cook.”66  Perhaps in virtue of her personal exceptionalism, or the 
imperative to survive in the very difficult circumstances, Apgar did not see structural 
barriers which kept women out of full participation in medicine and other professional 
fields.  According to Calmes, Apgar rarely recognized gender issues, and never in 
public. 
She often declared that “women were liberated from the time they were born.”  
She appears to have had little regard for women residents, and she never 
participated in female medical organizations.  She felt she did not need them.67  
Only in rare diary notes and in private conversations did Apgar sometimes 
express outrage at such things as salary differentials between her and her male 
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colleagues and the “stag” dinners that followed professional meetings.  Like most 
women doctors of the time, she did not speak out about them, silently working with 
those opportunities which came her way.    
Apgar’s career and views were in many ways typical of the few women who 
managed to break through into the academic medicine in the decades immediately 
before and after the Second World War.  Their exceptionalism and isolation, 
combined with the dearth of feminist consciousness and fragile foothold in the 
institutional ladders, typically prevented them from appreciating the full scale of 
gendered discrimination and injustice in the medical field.  With few exceptions, 
women have not achieved a position from which to increase their numbers and had 
often were even lacking a disposition to do so. 
Despite the steady marginalization of women in medicine, the point of 
breakthrough came in the 1970s.  It was not limited to the health care field, but 
encompassed in its effect the entire economy of higher education and the white-collar 
occupational fields.  Its source was the rebirth of political feminism which was 
inspired in turn by the Civil Rights struggle of the 1960s.68   
Titles VI and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act banned discrimination on the 
basis of race and sex but exempted colleges and universities from compliance.  
President Johnson’s executive orders 11246 (1964-1965) and 11375 (1966-1970) 
barred sex discrimination in federal employment and among contractors to the federal 
government, but their effect on women faculty and students of medical schools was 
slight.  Despite their dubious reach, the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) filed 
two class action suits in the course of 1970, first against 250 colleges and universities 
and then against all of the medical schools in the country.  Partly as a result of this 
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offensive, in October of 1971 Congress passed the Public Health Service Act which 
included a provision barring employment discrimination in medical and other health 
professions schools.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 overturned 
Title VII’s exemption of institutions of higher education.  Finally, in June of 1972, 
Congress passed Title IX of the Higher Education Act, banning discriminatory 
admissions and employment policies in any institution receiving federal funding.69 
The general climate of outrage at the decades of stalled progress of women and 
minorities, rather than the legal merits of the particular suits, were likely responsible 
for this remarkable breakthrough.  In fact, if a few medical schools clearly remained 
quite closed to women, at the collective level discrimination in medical education was 
impossible to prove.  The testimony used by WEAL in regard to medical school 
admissions and furnished by the representative of the AMWA appears to have been 
indeed incorrect.  Specifically, the testimony noted that since the 1930s the number of 
women applications to medical schools had risen by more than 300 percent, while the 
number of men who applied had increased only by 29 percent.  Despite this disparity, 
the rate of admission for women had remained at a steady 50 percent, a result, as it 
was charged, of “an arbitrary grouping of applicants by gender.”70   
It appears, however, that the story was much more complicated.  The numbers 
show that between 1935 and 1960, the rate of increase in the number of female and 
male applicants was virtually identical.  Their acceptance rates were also were close, 
differing in at most two percentage points, which is how the proportion of women 
among medical students could have been kept steady throughout this period.  In fact 
men’s and women’s rates of admission to medical schools would continue to be the 
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same for the rest of the century.  The only difference would be that, after 1975 the 
number of female applicant would sky rocket, while the number of male applicants 
would decline not only proportionately, but even in absolute numbers.   
It seems, then, that both before and after the breakthrough, the gender 
composition of the medical schools was shaped at the level of the total number of 
applicants.  The entire picture of the system of career signaling which accounted for 
the size and composition of applicant pools cannot be reconstructed from the available 
data, but it appears to have included strong elements of positive or negative advising 
and major-tracking at the college levels, as well as published and unpublished remarks 
of the medical schools, which infrequently included unabashed statements about 
preference of male students.71  Both the reluctant tone of admissions literature and the 
cautionary stories of the advisors and women who have entered medical schools 
collectively created the impression of the medical training as a particularly arduous 
ordeal for women.  Combined with not so certain career prospects, this negative 
advertising must have accounted for the steadiness of the women’s proportion among 
all applicants.   
What happened after 1975 was equally amazing.  In a very short time, there 
was an entirely new system of career signaling in place.  It persuaded women to 
quadruple the number of their applications to medical schools in ten years, while 
compelling men to reduce theirs by over 10,000 applications per year, or over 30 
percent, during the same period.  
More importantly, perhaps, there was a change in the terms of women’s 
participation and in their views of their situation.  There was far less amusement at the 
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misogynist remarks of the faculty or administrators and much less tolerance for the 
institutionalized practices of women’s marginalization. The questions of paternalism 
and harassment, women’s mentoring and skewed specialization were now being 
openly raised.  These new attitudes have been well captured in the report issued by 
two women students at P&S in October 1977.  Entitled “Double Image,” the report 
explored the status of women and minority students at the College and found it ridden 
with problems of neglect, disingenuousness, and harassment.72   
So was their a discrimination on the part of Columbia?  Both on paper and in 
interviews, women were likely systematically better than men.  In this case, then, their 
rate of admission, which was almost as high as that of men, was likely discriminatory.  
Of course, in virtue of their sex, women were likely substantially discounted in regard 
to their future potential.  Admissions officers likely thought that both women’s family 
roles and the likely discrimination they may encounter in their future careers would 
render them less professionally successful than men.  Such a ‘future discounting’ 
presented a considerable moral problem, because Columbia, like all other institutions, 
was itself contributing to women’s lower professional success.  Recognizing this 
dilemma, a socially responsible institution would feel an obligation to do more than its 
share in both admitting women to the study of medicine and in ensuring the fair 
treatment of women in post-graduate and other professional posts within its 
institutional walls.  It would also find it necessary to try to influence other related 
institutions to do the same.  This, I believe, is a yardstick by which the record of the 
institutions should be judged and, in this view, Columbia could have done 
considerably more.  The steady adherence to the under 10 percent quota of female 
students is incomprehensible in itself.   
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Ethno-Religious Identity 
In an intensely nativist climate of the 1920s that saw the enactment of many 
immigration restriction laws, widespread biases existed in the admission of Catholics, 
Italians, Irish, Slavs, Jews, and other ethnic or religious minorities to most branches of 
higher education and professional practice.  By virtue of their success in climbing the 
educational and social ladders, the most systematic quotas were faced by the Jewish 
applicants.  Discrimination was most intense in New York, where the number of 
applicants was the highest.   
Between 1880 and 1925, the Jewish population in the United States increased 
from 200,000 to over 4,000,000, and Jewish youths sought admission to colleges and 
professional schools in high numbers.  In places like New York, with a high 
concentration of immigrants, the numbers of qualified Jewish students who applied to 
colleges and professional schools have risen sharply by the 1920s.  Some New York 
colleges, particularly the City College, had a majority of Jewish students and even the 
best medical schools in the City – Cornell and Columbia – found over forty percent of 
their classes Jewish.  The WASP elites, entrenched in the institutions such as 
Columbia, were threatened, reckoning that if they instituted blind admission processes, 
some schools – notably, those of medicine, pharmacy, and the law – would soon be 
overrun, as they put it, by the Jews.   
With the still high percentage of foreign-born or first-generation Americans 
within the City’s Jewish community, all sorts of horrors, including un-American 
culture, foreign influence, even socialistic ideas, were implicated in such an outcome.  
The fact that the new wave of Jewish immigrants came from Eastern Europe rather 
than Germany as the earlier one had been was only adding to the prejudice against 
them.  The plain fact was that they were newcomers who dared to challenge the 
established elites through the channels of education.  Eastern European Jews were 
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violating the unspoken rules of massive immigration from the lesser developed 
countries: that the newcomers should for a long time pay their dues, by occupying the 
lowest social positions in their new society, and that they remain a minority in the 
more rewarding pursuits.  While there was a lot of poverty and hardship undergone by 
the East European Jewish immigrants, they were succeeding like few other groups 
before them in securing education for their children and quickly improving their social 
standing. 
Very soon, a backlash began.  The first manifestation was the creation of 
quotas at many elite private colleges. Soon quotas appeared in medical schools and 
other areas of professional and graduate training.  By the late 1930s and early 1940s, 
rigid quotas were found throughout medical education.  When the rejected Jewish 
applicants resorted to the foreign medical school route, the American Medical 
Association had withdrawn its approval of a large number of the European institutions 
which were more liberal in their acceptance of American students, making it 
impossible for their graduates to obtain licenses to practice in the United States.  
Repelled from the medical schools by the stiffening quotas, the Jewish youths have 
turned to related professional paths, including dentistry and pharmacy.  Whenever that 
was within the power of the medical profession, it tried to establish Jewish quotas 
there as well.73 
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After the end of the war, the continued existence of the quotas aroused a 
struggle, as some Jewish groups organized to fight against them.  Throughout this 
period of public allegations, investigations, and efforts to reform New York’s system 
of higher education, the medical schools, Columbia included, vehemently denied the 
existence of either quotas or discrimination.  Discriminatory limitation was fairly easy 
to achieve but difficult to prove.  Into the late forties, medical school application forms 
routinely asked for photo, nationality, birthplace and even father’s birthplace of the 
applicant.  Applications from the graduates of certain colleges known to have a very 
high proportion of Jewish students, such as the City College of New York, could be 
viewed with disfavor.  Since the city and the state of New York had an especially high 
number of Jewish applicants, schools could use the goal of a geographically diverse 
student body as a disguise for anti-Semitism.  Similarly, an insistence on accepting 
students of only the proper “character” for medicine could also be used as an effective 
cover for ethno-religious discrimination.   
While Columbia has flatly denied discriminatory practices, its records tell a 
different story and also shed light on the larger picture of how the academic and 
professional medical institutions have shaped their memberships. 
Columbia’s files on the charges of discrimination began with an interesting 
copy of the correspondence.  The letter was from Morris Fishbein, the editor of the 
Journal of the American Medical Association and a powerful spokesman for the 
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organization, to Arthur Garfield Hays, a prominent attorney and the subject was the 
problem of the Jewish boys in medicine and, more specifically, a possibility of 
pressing for matriculation of the number of Jewish-American medical students 
enrolled in the Scottish medical schools to the domestic institutions. 
 
Since I have returned home from my trip to the Northwest I have looked 
into the matter about which you talked to me when I was in Yakima. 
All the evidence which we can secure indicates that the extramural schools 
in Scotland which most of these boys have been attending are of a rank 
distinctly inferior to the American medical schools.  Inasmuch as there are 
thousands of boys on the waiting list for medical schools in this country, many 
of them far better qualified than these boys who are left the United States to 
study in Scotland because they could not get into medical schools in the first 
place, I do not see how or why any one ought to exert a terrific effort to force 
American medical schools to take them in.  After all, our first duty in to the 
people of the country who are entitled to have the highest quality of medical 
service that they can get. 
I feel bad indeed about these boys, yet everyone suffers in time of war, and 
there is no way to overcome an emergency.  The case of the Jewish boys in 
medicine is particularly serious because they have overwhelmed the schools, 
and many schools turn them down simply because they are Jewish.  There is no 
way to prove this, but it is obvious. 
At the same time, I wish to point out that somewhere between 15 and 20 
per cent of the doctors in this country in the practice of medicine are Jewish, 
and there is about 3 ½ per cent of the population in the same category.  If the 
Jewish boys would all go out into the rural communities where doctors 
happened to be needed, they might be encouraged to go into medicine.  
Unfortunately they elect to settle in the large communities.  When they settle in 
the large cities, they find it difficult to secure practice.  This makes for a 
lowering of ethical standards.  The problem has so many ramifications, as you 
can see, that it is exceedingly difficult to know just what to do. 
However, even if all of this were not the case, the fact still remains that the 
Council on Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical 
Association has no authority in the matter.  We are not in a position to tell 
schools whom to take in.  All that we do is to inspect the schools and to 
determine that they are selecting a high quality of men and maintaining 
minimum standards.  We exert no pressure on them to accept or reject any one.  
Indeed, there is no way in which we could do this.74   
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Fishbein’s conclusion about the Scottish schools was probably particularly 
pleasing to Columbia’s Dean of Medical School, Willard Rappley, who happened to 
have been personally involved in the withdrawal of their approval and received several 
angry letters from the superintendents of the Scottish Extra-Mural Medical Schools 
whose recognition by the AMA was withdrawn following Dean’s alleged visits of 
inspection.  A letter from one superintendent stated that he had no record of Rappleye 
ever visiting his school.  Another superintendent angrily recognized the “Jewish 
problem” behind the whole unpleasant incident: 
Looking into the whole circumstances and with the special knowledge one has 
with regard to the situation, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that this so 
called inspection was a mere pretext.  It is, in my view, an attempt to deal with 
what is really a U.S. question on his side of the Atlantic and an action of this 
sort taken against a sister Corporation in a very sinister one and is resented.  
This points to the U.S. question to which I refer are twofold; - firstly, that a 
larger number of you people in American are seeking admission to American 
Medical Schools than the Schools can handle, and secondly, that racial 
discrimination enters largely into the question.75   
It was quite clear that there were many more qualified Jewish applicants than 
the American schools cared to admit.  The problem was known to everyone in the 
medical education establishment, yet when the public charges of discrimination were 
brought up, Columbia, along with most other institutions, sought to deny them in 
absolute terms.   
The earliest records of public charges in Columbia’s files date to the spring of 
1946.  On March 15th, The New York Sun reported that Dr. Stephen S. Wise, 
President of the American Jewish Congress, filed an application with the New York 
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City Tax Commission to cancel the tax exemption granted to Columbia, charging the 
school with racial discrimination.  
Ten days later the New York Times reported that  
Tax Commission will not act on petition by Wise to cancel CU’s tax 
exemption, announced Harry B. Chambers, president of New York City Tax 
Commission because of pending litigation – a suit by Julius L. Goldstein 
resulted last June 14 in a decision by Supreme Court Justice James B.M. 
McNally that discrimination … is not grounds for canceling tax exemption.  
[of non-sectarian educational corporation.]  His decision held that “… legal 
remedy provided must be exercised by the persons aggrieved.”76  
The attack would not, however, be brushed aside so easily.  In May of 1946, 
Rabbi Wise urged the City Council to open an investigation into racial discrimination 
in colleges and university schools, singling out Columbia again.  He noted that he 
studied at Columbia for ten year and “he made the charge with great reluctance.”  
Nevertheless, he accused the University of practicing racial discrimination “in a 
manner slyly and subtly concealed” and called with revoking its two millions worth in 
tax exemptions if discrimination does not cease.77  Another petition, by Julius L 
Goldstein, to remove Columbia’s tax exemption was filed on May 27th, to keep the 
process going. 
In July, the Mayor’s Committee on Unity issued a Report on Inequality of 
Opportunity in Higher Education, which concluded that the available evidence 
suggests the existence of discrimination and called for “a thorough-going investigation 
of the policies and practices of institutions of higher learning in New York State.”78  
The interim report of the Hart Committee concluded that “the evidence is 
inescapable that the Cornell Medical School, Columbia College of Physicians and 
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Surgeons, Long Island College of Medicine, New York University School of Medicine 
and New York Homeopathic Medical College discriminate against the graduates of 
city colleges.”79  By examining the registraras of the several schools, the committee 
endeavored to show that the institutions arbitrarily limited the number of students 
from New York City, saying that “[t]he application of any quota, geographical or 
otherwise, would directly result in discrimination against students of the various racial 
origins predominant in the city of New York.”  The report also noted that there 
appeared to be a trend to increase the number of questions, included in application 
forms, which aimed at eliciting information pertaining to applicant’s religion and 
nationality.  Columbia’s application form for 1947, for instance, required a 
photograph, place of birth, citizenship, father’s occupation and father’s birthplace.80  
The committee also dug out some musings over the question of alien students and un-
Americanism, which some schools have put in print in the 1930s.  The report quoted 
some passages from “History of New York University, 1832-1932,” to the effect that 
“in 1919 the faculty agreed that the university’s quality of ‘Americanism’ was in 
danger.”  In 1932, continued the passage, “we are perhaps less sure of what 
‘Americanism’ is but we can probably admit that the university college was being 
swamped in 1919 by an invasion of students of what, to older American students and 
teacher, seemed wholly alien habit and manners.”81   
While a number of petitions, investigations, reports, and resolutions were flung 
around the power center of the City and State, Columbia’s strategy of defense 
included several elements.  First, its legal counsel successfully argued in the courts 
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that tax-exemption of non-sectarian educational institutions was not predicated on the 
requirement of non-discrimination, but only on “exclusive ownership, exclusive use, 
and non-profit making.”82  Second, although their legal strategy was to deny that non-
discrimination was their obligation in return for non-profit tax status, both the 
University and its medical schools flatly denied any discrimination on the basis of race 
or ethno-religious identity.  These stone-faced denials have angered some of the 
Jewish alumni and former associates.  Dr. Harold Thomas Hyman, an alumnus and a 
former faculty member of the College of Physicians and Surgeons have made public 
the following letter to Columbia’s Acting President. 
 
The New York Times of May 18th (pg. 19, Col. 1), in its report of the 
public hearing before the Rules Committee of the City Council, quotes you as 
stating that “Columbia University has always been, and now is, strongly 
opposed to any discrimination whatever against any person by reason of race, 
color or creed.”  Later in the same report, Dr. Rappleye declared that 
applicants for admission to the College of Physicians and Surgeons were 
judged on the basis of “highest promise of becoming sound, ethical, well-
trained and competent practitioners of medicine and leaders in the medical 
profession.”  
When the resolution to take steps to end the tax exemption privileges of 
Columbia University, as sponsored by Councilman Eugene P. Connolly, first 
came to my attention, I permitted loyalty to my Alma Mater and selfish 
personal discretion to influence me to stay aloof from these public hearings 
despite my intimate knowledge, from my twenty-five years of experience as 
student and teacher at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, of the truth of 
the charges of discrimination against applicants because of race color or creed. 
The crass and brazen falsity of your statement and the characteristically 
suave and misleading evasiveness of Dr. Rappleye leaves me no honorable 
alternative other than to place myself at the disposal of the Committee before 
whom I shall, if requested, give first-hand testimony of the truth of the 
situation as I have seen it, as well as supplementary data that may be of even 
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greater interest to the taxpayers of our City who, like me, have steadfastly 
supported Columbia University and who wish now to protect that institute of 
learning from those who would use it for undemocratic purposes.83  
 
Finally, the University and the Medical School engaged in public relations 
campaign, the cornerstone of which appeared to be the close acquaintance of Dr. 
Fackenthal’s one of the prominent members of the Jewish community and the 
publisher of the New York Times, Mr. Arthur Hays Sulzberger.  Secretive 
correspondence from Columbia’s Acting President, thanking Sulzberger for 
“transmitting the reports of the two ‘guinea pigs’” and discussing what can be done 
“informally” about the American Jewish Committee, suggests a careful campaign to 
set the record “straight” with at least a portion of New York’s Jewish community.84  
Another letter from Dean Rappleye furnished Sulzberger with Columbia’s internal 
estimates of the number of Jewish students, disputing American Jewish Congress’ data 
of precipitous decline of Jewish admissions at Columbia, as shown in Table 5.2.85  The 
information was likely intended for transmission to certain members of the Jewish 
circles who appeared to show “their own satisfaction with our situation” and could be 
helpful in diffusing the wave of attacks.86 
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Table 5.2. Proportion of Jewish Students Enrolled at Columbia University’s College 
of Physicians and Surgeons, 1920-1946: Internal Institutional Claims 
 
Percentage of Jewish 
students Year of 
admission 
Enrollment 
reported by 
A.J.C.* 
Correct 
figure 
Number of 
Jewish students 
(A.J.C. figures) 
Our opinion 
A.J.C. Our opinion 
1920 98 94 46 46.92 % 47 % 
1924 108 108 20 19.2 19 
1928 112 108 23 20.24 20 
1932 88 112 22 
Not 
checked 
(probably 
close to 
figures of 
A.J.C.) 33.60 20 
1936 103 116 6 23 5.82 21 
1940 124 110 8 24 6.40 22 
1944 not given 116 not given 32 - 28 
1946 not given 111 not given 29 - 27 
 
* American Jewish Congress 
 
Source: Table attached to Rappleye to Mr. Arthur H. Sulzberger, New York Times, Times Building, 
New York, N.Y., September 25, 1946. 
 
Through Mr. Sulzberger, Columbia’s officials also had an opportunity to 
influence the preparation of the manuscript for a proposed article on discrimination to 
be published in the New Republic.  University’s legal counsel received the portion of 
the manuscript dealing with Columbia for comment.  The portion noted that the 
attitude of Columbia was of particular interest, one of them being that “General 
Eisenhower will become head of that institution early next year.”  If the General has 
presidential ambitious, as the author believed he had, “the question of discrimination 
at Columbia might come to have political significance.”  After successfully 
negotiating a deal that the part on Columbia would include “the answer of ‘a 
spokesman for Columbia’ which clarified the situation,” the University won an even 
more favorable disposition.  The editor of the New Republic informed the University’s 
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representative that “in view of President Truman’s Committee report he has decided to 
eliminate the part on Columbia entirely.”87  
For all its unreality, Columbia’s strategy must have worked reasonably well 
because soon the bulk of the attention had shifted to Cornell’s medical school which 
was not nearly as careful.  In the fall of 1946, a copy of the letter written by the former 
dean of Cornell’s medical school and which addressed the issue of Jewish admissions 
was found and submitted to a special City Council committee chaired by Walter R. 
Hart.  Written in 1940 in regard to the rejection of admission to a particular Jewish 
applicant, the letter said in part: 
Cornell Medical College admits a class of eighty each fall.  It picks these 
eighty men from about twelve hundred applicants of whom seven hundred are 
Jews.  We limit the number of Jews admitted to each class to roughly the 
proportion of Jews in the population in this State, which is a higher proportion 
than in any other part of the country.  That means we take in from 10-15 per 
cent Jews.88  
In the circus of accusations and investigations, honesty was dangerous and 
sounded pathetic, as the report of the questioning of Dr. Charles O. Warren, a former 
member of Cornell’s admissions committee had shown. 
Dr. Charles O. Warren, a member of the admission committee in 1945-46 until 
he left the college last August, had difficulty in explaining testimony he had 
given in private.  With Mr. Hart constantly reading his private testimony, Dr. 
Warren testified that when he said the religious of applicants had been 
“discusses” by committee member, he meant it had been “mentioned.”  He said 
he could not answer “yes or no” to a question whether he was prejudiced 
against Jews, but admitted to a prejudice, though a mild one, against the Irish.  
He insisted emphatically that he had never consciously allowed whatever 
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prejudices he had to affect his decision on any applicant.  He said he believed 
everyone has prejudices.89  
The rest of the testimonials from Cornell’s officials denied any and all discrimination 
and quotas but their strategy was clearly not as consolidated and smooth as that of 
Columbia. 
Following this mess, Columbia’s public relations campaign incorporated 
spying on the open meetings concerned with educational discrimination.  A spy report 
of one such gathering, the Meeting of the Physicians Forum on the subject of 
Discrimination in Medical Schools held at the New York Academic of Medicine, 
contained the information on the speakers, statistical figures presented, as well as a 
personal assessment of Councilman Hart characterized as “a pretty smooth operator” 
who “has his teeth into something which looks like a red plush carpet Valhalla.”90  
The reporter came away “even more convinced of the importance of our doing a 
constructive, aggressive and understandable public relations job.”  The uncareful 
strategy of the other accused schools, Cornell in particular, made the situation 
considerably worse.    
For out of the testimony of many of the Deans and members of the Admission 
Committee last Fall, Councilman Hart has some pretty powerful, “on the 
record” ammunition.  It will be a long time before we hear the end of the 
curious statements attributed to Drs. Hinsie, Edwards, Flood, Morton, Warren, 
etc.  His particular targets, in an extremely skillfully organized address, were 
Hinsie, Warren and Theodore Francis Jones.  I must say that the content of 
their testimony as read by Mr. Hart is a pushover for ridicule in the name of 
Democracy.91 
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Columbia and Columbia’s officials, on the other had, fared much better at the 
meeting.  Throughout the meeting Mr. Hart “made repeated points to emphasize the 
fact that ‘since the beginning of our investigation the medical schools have complied 
with every request we have made’” and, in this connection, referred particularly to 
Dean Rappleye.  The only other mention of Columbia was in connection with what 
“he call[ed] the ‘destruction of our records’ – the application blanks of those who were 
rejected by the Committee on Admissions.”  Incidentally, the spying mission included 
reporting on one of Columbia’s own, Dr. Viola Bernard, who was the last speaker on 
the program.  According to the anonymous reporter, it was quarter to eleven by the 
time she was to speak and s/he did not wait for the speech “beyond her introduction 
that indicated that her emphasis was to be laid upon the problem of women doctors 
after graduation in obtaining internships, residencies, and hospital appointments.”92  
By 1947, the battle shaped up to include an Austin-Mahoney anti-
discrimination bill in the state legislature and also a proposal to create a State 
University, in part as another measure to assure residents of the state equal educational 
opportunity.  Columbia’s officials have gone to work against both measures as part of 
the acknowledged leaders of the New York State Association of Colleges and 
Universities.  The paper delivered by Provost Jacobs for Dr. Fackenthal at the meeting 
of the association is interesting in several respects.93  The speech served as an 
overview of the recent developments leading to the formulation of the Austin-
Mahoney Bill and a summary of the position which the Association developed in its 
regard.  The first part of the speech was rather distasteful.  Firstly, as the following 
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excerpt shows, it has painted the entire episode of allegations and legislative proposals 
as a work of one interested group, the American Jewish Congress.   
 
In 1946, late in the legislative session, the American Jewish Congress 
announced in the press that on the previous day it had caused to be introduced 
in Albany a bill known as the Austin-Mahoney Bill.  No serious attention was 
paid to this measure at the time.  Bute after the 1946 Legislature had 
adjourned, the American Jewish Congress started an active campaign in 
support of such legislation.  From April, 1946, until the early autumn it 
conducted the campaign in its own name, and during this period, caused to be 
drafted several widely different versions of the original Austin-Mahoney Bill. 
In the early fall of 1946, with the gubernatorial election approaching, the 
AVC decided that it would be more effective to organize a so-called “non-
sectarian” group to further its legislative proposals.  It caused to be organized 
the New York State Committee Against Discrimination in Education, which is, 
in effect, but an arm of the American Jewish Congress.  Its office was a room 
in the suite of the American Jewish Congress and one of its chief and most 
active representatives was and is Mr. Shad Polier, the son-in-law of Rabbi 
Wise, the President of the American Jewish Congress.  From September, 1946, 
the American Jewish Congress, under Rabbi Wise, and the newly-formed 
Committee Against Discrimination, through Mr. Polier, waged an active 
campaign for an Austin-Mahoney Bill, and at the opening of the 1947 
legislative session, such a bill was again introduced.  In some respects this bill 
was different from the earlier versions, but in most respects, and 
fundamentally, it was just as bad; as indeed any legislation of this nature must 
necessarily be.94   
 
The speech had also endeavored to paint the American Jewish Congress as a 
shrewd and aggressive political pressure group, while the Association, its members, 
and its supporters, such as the Catholic Church, as politically naïve but, when pressed, 
courageous institutions. 
 
From September, 1946, up and through February, 1947, every effort was 
made by the proponents of this bill to arouse public support for it.  Prior to 
mid-February, 1947, little was done by anyone to oppose it.  I think it is fair to 
say that most educators, although they were vitally concerned, had not 
seriously considered the bill; and indeed many of us had not even read it. 
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While the colleges and the great mass of the public slept, the American 
Jewish Congress and its satellite, the Committee Against Discrimination in 
Education, left no stone unturned.  They conducted petition campaigns, held 
mass meetings and sponsored marched on Albany. 
It was known that the great majority of the legislators opposed any such 
measure.  But they were being subjected to such a bombardment by the 
pressure groups sponsoring the bill, without any help from those who should 
have been opposed to it, that in mid-February passage appeared inevitable.  
Then two things happened.  The first was the courageous and outspoken stand 
of the Catholic Church.  The second was the opposition voiced by this 
Association.  The Church’s opposition was expressed in the form of a public 
statement by the Catholic Welfare Council, issued on February 26th.  The 
opposition of the Association was conveyed to the Governor and legislative 
leadership, and announced to the press on February 28th.  A number of leading 
citizens of the State and other groups who had awakened to the danger of the 
proposed legislation, also joined in the opposition.  The bill died a few days 
later.95 
  
The opposition of the Catholic Church, to which the speech referred with such 
enthusiasm, was cleverly calculated punch below the waistline.  Delivered 
unannounced at the clerical meeting, the position of the Church of course had nothing 
to do with the goal of eradication discrimination as such.  After all, mentioned 
Archbishop McIntyre, Catholics have been victims of discrimination as well.  The 
Church opposed to the Austin-Mahoney bill as one “formed after a Communistic 
pattern.”   
The bill states that education is the function of the State.  Education is not the 
function of the State.  Education is the function of the parent.  If the statement 
that education is a State function is written into law, it will permit future 
encroachments on the parental functions of education.  That is what we mean 
by the infiltration of Communist ideas.  The bill is formed after a communistic 
pattern which would be detrimental to future generations.96 
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Chad Polier issues a reply to Archbishop McIntyre, noting that the proposed 
bill would not apply to sectarian schools:   
To label public responsibility for education ‘communistic’ is to undo more 
than a century of American tradition and practice.  Such labels as Communistic 
and un-American will not persuade this country to set the clock back to the day 
when education was considered a purely private concern.  Nor will these labels 
obscure the single purpose and the complete soundness of the Austin-Mahoney 
bill.  That purpose is simply to assure that no parent will be deprived of the 
opportunity to send his child to a non-sectarian school because of his race, 
color, creed or ancestry.97   
In his speech, Columbia’s Provost denied the existence of discrimination at the 
state’s institutions of higher learning, although he did choose his words carefully. 
When the colleges and universities are charged – as they have been – with 
admission practices that are discriminatory rather than discriminating, it is of 
the first importance that the facts be ascertained and studied in perspective.  I 
believe the facts will show that they are exercising their trust, in good faith and 
with honesty of purpose, and that the spectre of discrimination is small indeed.  
The few instances of discrimination that may have occurred, and it is 
remarkable in these days of tension and overcrowding that there have not been 
more, are infinitesimal in comparison with the thousands of persons belonging 
to minority groups who have enjoyed the benefits of our independent 
educational facilities.  I endorse the Statement that there is no such thing as a 
policy of discrimination on the ground of race, color, creed or national origin.98   
He also endeavored to give a positive definition of what the process of student 
selection should be, and had presumably always been, at the institutions united into the 
Association. 
The objective of our institutions has been and continues to be a student body of 
high quality composed of a cross section of the population and representative 
of all races, religions and social classes.  Our objective has also been to 
minimize prejudice and to teach young people of different faiths how to 
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understand each other and to live together in an integrated community.  No 
institution today can admit all applicants and any interference with its own 
sound judgment in selecting students would impair its usefulness in providing 
educational opportunities for all classes and races.99 
The speech particularly objected to the part of the proposed bill which would 
make it illegal for educational institutions to solicit information concerning race, 
religion, color or national origin of an applicant.  The speech quoted another 
educator’s argument to the effect that it is precisely by having this information that 
colleges and universities can make their largest contribution to fighting prejudice. 
 [A] college which is trying to overcome prejudice by building an unprejudiced 
community of undergraduates needs to know what representation is had of 
different groups and may need to select its members with a view to distributing 
them for educational purposes.  This bill, if passed, would prohibit our 
selection of students whom we actively want because they represent minority 
groups with which we want our majority to become acquainted.100 
All this talk of crafting a representative student body and of bringing in the 
members of minority groups “with which we want our majority to become 
acquainted” was patently misleading in the case of charges of discrimination against 
Jews.  In New York City, where the scandal has been centered, Jews if taken on their 
merits alone could have easily close to or even over half of the student bodies in many 
colleges and professional schools, as was clear from the their numbers before the rise 
of the quotas.  The whole discourse of “we need to know race, color and creed,” so 
that we can increase minority representation sounded plausible only because there was 
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another minority – namely, African-Americans – for whom this kind of ‘affirmative’ 
admissions process would have worked.  Just as the institutions of higher education 
had systematically exploited the different and particular weaknesses of the undesirable 
groups, so it was now confusing their position on discrimination by means of 
substituting discourse applicable to underrepresented minorities to the issue of the 
group which was well-represented, yet, on its merits, deserved a higher rate of 
admission. 
The speech concluded by denouncing any legislation that would make 
scholarship a decisive criterion of student selection.   
No institution of learning can prosper if it is obliged by law to abdicate 
responsibility for its membership.  Certainly it requires no special insight to 
detect in the legislative proposals the kind of coercion which would make it 
impossible for an admission officer to reject a minority applicant on the same 
group that he might find it necessary to reject others – namely, that for the 
purpose of a given institution, a particular applicant’s total performance and 
promise fail to measure up to the overall competitive standards set by 
successful applicants.  He would be fearful of doing so because in effect the 
proposed legislation denies the validity of all competitive criteria save 
scholarship alone.  To make scholarship by law the sole criterion for admission 
is arbitrary and unjust and would tend to increase rather than diminish 
prejudice based on racial and religious tension.  Instead of equality of 
opportunity for all regardless of race, color, creed or national origin, the 
legislative proposals would favor minority groups and serve to intimidate the 
institutions with consequent unfair treatment of the majority.101 
This again was a cleverly calculated step.  In insisting that making scholarship 
a decisive factor would tend to increase, rather than decrease discrimination, the 
speech was again substituting the problems of the other minorities – namely, blacks 
and those others which had an overall lower socio-economic status – for the distinct 
dilemma facing the Jews. 
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The Jews were caught in the room of mirrors where the specific methods of 
discrimination which they were subjected to where continuously presented as the very 
means by which equitable representation of (the other) minority groups was to be 
achieved.  Where scholarship was their strongest suit, it was proclaimed to be a factor 
that, if made decisive, would increase discrimination against (the other) minority 
groups.  Where the race-blind admission process would have surely increased the 
Jewish rates of admission, it was argued that the knowledge of applicants’ race was 
the only way to ensure the admission of student bodies that included equitable 
representation of (other) minorities.   
By deliberately confusing the statuses of and discourses about the different 
minority groups, the colleges and universities were able to convince themselves and 
the public that they were not doing anything wrong in regard to the Jewish applicant, 
while also pretending that they might be doing something constructive for the other 
salient minority, the African-Americans.  Alas, they were not.  In the case of the 
overwhelming numbers of well-qualified Jewish applicants, arguing that scholarship 
alone should never be a deciding factor was convenient indeed.  When it came to the 
battle over the numbers of black students, scholarship was all of a sudden the factor 
which explained why there were few to none enrolled in New York’s medical 
schools.102 
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Race 
Like women, African Americans have also participated in the healing arts 
since colonial times.  Most were informally trained slave practitioners, herbalists, and 
midwives but a few also practiced as apprenticeship-trained physicians.  By the 
nineteenth century, according to historian Herbert Morais, “Negro women engaged in 
the general practice of medicine were frequently listed in plantation inventories as 
‘Doctor.’”  Several free African-Americans practiced in the northern states before the 
Civil War, being either self-taught or apprenticed in medicine.  A few, like Dr. David 
J. Peck, who graduated from Rush Medical College of Chicago in 1847, were 
graduates of a college of medicine.103  By 1860 nine northern medical colleges had 
begun to admit African American men.  The first African American woman, Dr. 
Rebecca Lee Crumpler, received a degree from a college of medicine in 1864.  The 
first black medical college, Howard University Medical College, was organized in 
                                                                                                                                            
 
deliberation and study by the Commission on the Need for a State University which in fact “found that 
such discrimination existed in certain instances.”  American Jewish Congress declared the act to 
represent a successful outcome of a two-year fight.  Under the act, the State Commissioner of Education 
was empowered to investigate alleged unfair educational practices either upon a petition filed by an 
aggrieved individual or on his own initiative.  The latter provision, enabling the Commissioner to order 
an investigation without waiting for a complaint, was lauded as the law’s chief advantage.  In cases 
where the Commissioner was unable to eliminate a discriminatory practice by voluntary agreement, the 
law called for referring the matter to the Board of the Regents, whose final orders were said to be 
“reviewable and enforceable in court.” 
 Jewish organizations, including the Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’Rith and the 
American Jewish Committee, continued to produce studies documenting both improvements made in 
the wake of the scandals, such as the removal of potentially discriminatory questions from the 
application forms, and the continuation of discrimination against Jewish and Italian American 
applicants.  (Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’Rith, 212 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY to Director to 
Admissions, School of Medicine, Columbia University, November 2, 1950 with “A Measure of 
Freedom,” Annual Report, reprint in a pamphlet form of a chapter “Cracking the Quota.”)  The study 
published in 1957 charged that “instead of arithmetical quotas, ‘personality’ had become the device 
medical schools now used to continue discriminatory admission practices.”  If applicants with top 
grades faced little difference in acceptance rates, among applicants with average grades, the ratio of 
rejection of Jewish students and Roman Catholics of Italian descent was more than double that of 
others. (“Hospitals Found Lacking Doctors: Almost a Third of Posts Are Vacant, Jewish Study Says – 
School Bias Charged,” The New York Times, June 2, 1957.) 
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1869, and together with the second such institution, Meharry, became the training 
ground for the majority of African-American physicians.  Still, the opportunities were 
enormously constrained.  According to historian Darlene Clark Hine, in 1890 there 
only 909 black physicians in practice, of which 115 were women.104  
Until the 1950s, African-Americans attended medical school in very small 
numbers.  Many schools, including several in the north, had never admitted a black 
medical student and it was not until 1966 were all medical schools desegregated.105  
During the interwar period, Howard and Meharry enrolled 87 percent of the country’s 
black medical students, even as both schools were in severe financial circumstances.106  
Even the schools which admitted blacks took in appalingly low numbers.  As late as 
the early 1960s, African-Americans comprised between 2 and 3 percent of all entering 
medical students, while the total proportion of black population was 10 percent.107  
Racial discrimination in medicine was hardly confined to medical schools.  Most 
hospitals excluded blacks from internship and residency positions, even those that 
allowed African-Americans to work there as medical students.  Internship 
opportunities for African-Americans were mainly provided by “colored hospitals.”  
Very few residency positions for blacks existed, and these were found at only a 
handful of institutions.108  Like women, African-Americans experienced frequent 
institutional discrimination, even when formally admitted into the training programs.  
They had a difficult time finding university housing and often had to eat in separate 
dining rooms.  A particularly demoralizing obstacle for African-Americans was 
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insufficient clinical experience as hospitals often prohibited them from examining 
nonblack patients.109 
Little to no information is available on the black students or graduates of the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons prior to the 1940s.  Before the Civil War, 
apparently, a young black slave, David K. McDonough, ended up studying at the 
College.  As the story is told, this was occasioned by “a wager between two slave 
owners on a Black Man’s intellect, specifically whether a Black man could 
successfully complete medical training.”  McDonough was sent to Lafayette College 
in Pennsylvania and graduated third in his class.  He was admitted to Columbia 
College of Physicians and Surgeons, graduated and practiced in New York, “having 
won his freedom with the bet.”110   
Almost a century later, the situation was scarcely better.  In the decade 
between 1934 and 1944, only six Africa-Americans have been graduated from P&S 
and even this number may have been forced by the investigation into the plight of 
blacks opened by the medical society.  Although publicly moot on the question, 
behind the closed doors many faculty members expressed the view that African-
Americans were mentally inferior to Caucasians, and resolved that the school would 
admit only the most unusually superior applicants of the race.111   
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A little bit more is known about Columbia’s stance in regard to post-graduate 
training of black physicians, as some foundations and groups have contacted the 
medical school in regard to this issue.  In the mid-1930s, there was a series of contacts 
between the College of Physicians and Surgeons and the Rosenwald Fund.  Among 
these was a 1935 inquiry whether Columbia might be able to arrange a one-year 
course of post-graduate clinical training for a colored physician whom the Fund was 
providing with a scholarship.  The polite rejection which came from Columbia did not 
seem entirely predetermined and, in fact, some internal searching for a division into 
which a black physician could be placed for a year appeared to have been undertaken 
in earnest.  The newly rebuilt Presbyterian Hospital, the School’s principal teaching 
affiliate appeared to be ruled out from the start.  The Associate Dean for Graduate 
Studies, Dr. Raymond B. Allen, then made a hopeful inquiry to the head of the Post-
Graduate School and Hospital.  The letter enthusiastically described Dr. Henderson’s 
goal, the scholarship provided by the Fund, and ended with a statement from the 
author that he, personally, was “very much in sympathy with the efforts of the 
Rosenwald Fund and the problem of medical education of colored physicians 
generally.”112   
Alas, the inquiry received a two-part negative reply, typed right on the lower 
margin of the original letter.  The first, and rather baffling part, was that “at Post-
Graduate our ward service is too small to offer anything worth while to any physician 
for post-graduate study,” while the second noted that “[a]s regards the feasibility of 
having a negro physician in the dispensary we went into that only recently and 
determined it was not possible to take on a negro physician.”  The routine seminar, 
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without the clinical training, is all that could be offered.113  Apparently disappointed, 
Dr. Allen conveyed to Dean Rappleye that Dr. Mosenthal “[did] not feel that we have 
facilities as the Post-Graduate for a year’s training of this character for a colored 
physician.”  He expressed his hope that “the time [would] come when facilities at 
Harlem Hospital [would] be available for educational purposes of this sort; it will 
certainly solve a great many of these problems.”  On the margins, Dean Rappleye 
scribbled: “So do I.”114  
In the end, then, the deans of the country’s best-endowed medical school, 
which had just relocated to a new joint campus with one of the finest private hospitals 
as its principal teaching affiliate, wrote to the representative of the Rosenwald Fund 
that “[w]e are very anxious to do everything we possibly can to help Negro physicians 
obtain additional training, but we find ourselves greatly handicapped at the moment 
because out present facilities at the Post-Graduate and at the Columbia-Presbyterian 
Medical Center are so limited.”  Didactic course is all that Columbia could offer, 
although Dr. Allen also recommended that the Fund inquire about courses offered at 
the Mount Sinai Hospital.115  “I assure you that I understand your problems and have a 
corresponding appreciation for your willingness to help,” was the equally polite 
response from the Rosenwald Fund’s Dr. Bousfield.116 
The placing of hope that Harlem Hospital might be able to take care of the 
glaring need for clinical and post-graduate education of black physicians in New York 
City was both fanciful and irresponsible and Columbia’s leaders undoubtedly knew it.  
Harlem’s troubled history of integration and its precarious financial situation were 
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indicative of inadequacy of such a solution.117  A municipal institution founded in 
1887, Harlem Hospital was surrounded by the rapidly growing black community 
twenty years later.  Like the rest of New York hospitals, whether private or municipal, 
it did not have a single African-American doctor on their staffs.  By 1910, the 
hospital’s patient census was fifty percent black.  The overcrowding and the shortage 
of staff were constant problems and the reports of the mistreatment of Harlem’s 
patients were rising.  Nevertheless, when in 1917, Harlem Hospital hired several 
African-American nurses, many of the white nurses resigned.  Even amidst one of the 
densest black communities, the struggle to introduce any African-American medical 
staff was going to be a hard one.   
By 1920, over three quarters of the hospitals patients were black and the 
superintendent had finally agreed to take a colored doctor on to the Hospital’s staff.  
Thus, Dr. Louis T. Wright was appointed clinical assistant in the Out-Patient 
Department, the lowest job possible at Harlem Hospital and his service there began on 
January 1, 1920.  Four doctors resigned from the Hospital in protest and Dr. Casmo D. 
O’Neil, the superintendent and person directly responsible for Dr. Wright’s 
appointment, was promptly demoted to the information booth at the Bellevue Hospital.  
Outraged at the racism shown by the hospital staff, the Harlem news media and 
community leaders mounted a campaign to remedy the situation and to gain staff 
access for other black medical personnel.   
The first victory came in nursing. The establishment of the Harlem Hospital 
School of Nursing in 1923 represented a triumph by and for Harlem’s black 
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community. Until 1923, the only school in New York accepting black women for 
nurse training was the Lincoln Hospital School for Nurses in the Bronx, and as private 
school, it proved too costly for most. An alternative school was vitally needed. The 
first class of twenty students graduated in 1925, and all passed the New York State 
Board examination, qualifying as registered, licensed nurses.  After the school was 
established, the hospital’s white nursing staff was gradually phased out. As soon as the 
black students proved capable, they assumed patient care responsibilities as part of a 
work/study routine, and after graduation many returned to Harlem Hospital because 
they could find employment in only four municipal hospitals, Lincoln, Harlem and 
two special hospitals for tuberculosis patients.118 
Over the next five years, unrelenting pressure by Dr. Wright, the North Harlem 
Medical Association, and the N.A.A.C.P brought results and, on November 23, 1925, 
the secretary of the Harlem Hospital medical board received official instructions that 
“as far as possible, all of the appointments to the house staff at the next examination 
should be colored men.”  In January 1926 three other African-American physicians 
were added to the visiting staff and Dr. Wright was elevated to the rank of assistant 
visiting physician.  In 1929, out of the total number of sixty four physicians on the 
hospital staff, seven were African Americans.  In the same year, Dr. Maynard was the 
first African-American intern officially appointed to the house-staff at the Hospital.  
Another appointment which marked a milestone was that of Dr. Peter Marshall 
Murray, who was appointed as a provisional assistant adjunct visiting gynecologist in 
1929. 
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What to some appeared as a triumph of genuine racial integration, could have 
been also interpreted as a decision to make Harlem into a ‘colored’ institution of the 
City, removing the pressure to appoint black physicians at other city institutions.  And 
that, apparently, was the implication with which Columbia was most comfortable.  
During this time, there were talks and correspondence between Columbia, the 
Rosenwald Fund, and members of New York’s black medical community regarding 
the possibility of affiliation between the College of Physicians and Surgeons and 
Harlem Hospital.119  The goal was ostensibly that of providing a quality post-graduate 
instruction to black medical graduates at Harlem but a part of the black professional 
community worried about “the difficulties and undesirable features of designating 
Harlem Hospital as a Negro institution, as this might imply official sanction to the 
principle of excluding colored patients and physicians forever from other city 
institutions.”120  At the same time, an extended correspondence between the Dean of 
Columbia’s Medical School and the Julius Rosenwald Fund suggested that Columbia 
did not think much of the efforts within the black community to raise funds and 
establish separate private teaching hospitals where black physicians might receive 
clinical training.121  So what Columbia’s position really amounted to was a program of 
isolation of the City’s black physicians into one or a few municipal institutions 
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combined with the strengthening of the white professional control over the ‘colored’ 
institution.122  
After the war, the emerging allegations of discrimination against Jewish 
applicants have also propelled a look at the statistics on black students at New York’s 
medical schools.  “Negro students are hardest hit by the discrimination against 
minorities in New York’s colleges” and “[t]he medical schools are the worse 
offenders,” declared the article in the Daily Worker.123   
Where the other minority groups, mainly Jewish and Italian students, who 
suffer discrimination are admitted on a quota system into the graduate and 
professional schools, the Negro finds the doors virtually barred.   
The article reported that in the ten years between 1934 and 1944 “only 26 
Negro students were enrolled in the four medical schools in New York County, 
according to data compiled by a County Medical Society investigating committee.”  
The paper interviewed the Deans of the Cornell and Columbia medical schools, 
marveling at their flat denials of discrimination.  The outrageous fact was that 
“Cornell has not graduated a single Negro student” and its Dean “did not place any 
Negro students in the school until one year after the Medical Society began putting 
pressure on him to do so.”  Thus, there was only one Negro student in the entire 
medical school, and one admitted for next year.  The situation at Columbia was only 
marginally better.  During the decade covered by the study, the College of Physicians 
and Surgeons enrolled only six Negro students and “of the six, four had been enrolled 
in 1941, the year of the probe.”124   
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The article said that, out of the 178 Negro physicians practicing in Manhattan, 
the majority were graduates of the two Negro schools – Howard University and 
Meharry Medical College, while 20 were graduates of foreign schools, concluding that 
it was “almost as easy for a Negro student to get on a boat and stay abroad for four 
years as it is for him to get into a medical school in this city.”125 
The paper reported that both Deans “admitted that the Negro students (or 
student) are faced with Jimcrow practices” which are “justified the same way southern 
lynchers alibi murder – the protection of white womanhood.”  Apparently, the 
administrators of both schools admitted that “Negro students do not as a rule handle 
childbirth cases,” claiming it was “because the patients objected to being handled by 
Negroes.”  The same also held for women’s diseases.  Dr. Peter M. Murray, noted 
Negro surgeon and a visiting gynecologist and member of the Medical Board at 
Harlem Hospital, offered a rebuttal to this.  He said that he saw hundreds women 
patients, both black and white, at the Hospital and in his private practice, adding that 
“[w]hite charity patients don’t offer any objections to any doctor.” 
Charity patients’ objections are never needed in big hospitals.  If they don’t 
like the treatment they are told that they can leave the hospital.126 
Thus, this kind of Jimcrow could only originate with the school, he said.  This 
situation, noted the article, is all the more criminal when one remembers that the infant 
mortality rate and death from childbirth are by far the largest among the Negro 
population.  Discrimination in medical school admission was, of course, part of the 
larger system of closed doors.   
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The few Negroes who do manage to break through the wall of discrimination 
in medical schools find it extremely difficult to get placed as internees (sic) in 
private hospitals in the city.  There has been some improvement in city 
hospitals in recent years, but nothing approaching the solution to the problem.  
The same is true with regard to placing Negro doctors on hospital staffs.127 
But the problem is apparent in undergraduate education as well.   
One can walk the campus of Columbia University for days without seeing a 
Negro student.  There are some – but Columbia has 23,000 students enrolled.  
Many Negro students don’t even bother to apply, knowing that they do not 
stand a chance.  They are forced, those who can afford it, to do far from their 
homes to Negro colleges to receive a higher education.  These numbers were 
certainly sobering, given that there were at the end of the war, over 400,000 
Negroes living in Manhattan alone.128   
The New York Times reported similar findings, although in a more understated 
form.  The article appearing in March of 1947 quoted Dr. Viola W. Bernard speaking 
at the meeting of the NY Chapter of Physicians’ Forum in the NYAM as saying that 
“[d]uring the 25 years between 1920 and 1945 fewer than 50 Negro physicians have 
been graduated from the 5 NYC medical schools.”129  The national figures were even 
more sobering.   
The views of Columbia’s administration on the issue of discrimination against 
African-Americans were predictably different, as evidenced by the letter addressed to 
the Chairman of the “Committee of 100,” protesting the circulation of the article by 
Henry F. and Katharine Pringle entitled “The Color Line in Medicine” published in 
the Saturday Evening Post.130 
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In it, Columbia’s Associate Dean, Dr. Aura E. Severinghaus proclaimed that  
[i]f anyone is really interested in the facts regarding medical education for the 
negro or racial discrimination in general in the medical schools, and there is 
abundant evidence to show that neither the City Council Committee nor the 
Pringles were, these facts are readily available.131 
The facts were summarized as follows. 
There are many qualified applicants for medical school today who cannot gain 
admission because of the tremendous numbers who are now competing for 
admission.  We have just completed the selection of our 1948 class of one 
hundred and fifteen from more than twenty-eight hundred applicants.  
Obviously many well-qualified applicants are among those whom we could not 
admit.  In spite of this situation, I would venture nevertheless that any well-
qualified negro applicant would gain admission just because he is a negro.  I 
base this opinion on my own experience as the responsible officer of admission 
at the College of Physicians and Surgeons during the last six years.  Well-
qualified negro applicants are accepted by almost every school to which they 
apply.  Of the last four negro students whom we accepted, three declined their 
places to go elsewhere, and two of these told me they had been accepted in 
every school to which they applied.132 
Dr. Severinghaus explained his letter as arising from a concern “about the false 
impressions which are being created regarding the negro in medicine.”  Where there 
was a real problem and a desperate need for action was “a program in secondary and 
college education which will produce competent applicants at the professional school 
level.”133 
While loudly defending their right to collect information regarding applicants’ 
and students’ ethno-religious identity, in the context of the struggle over 
discrimination against Jewish and Italian students, Columbia feigned ignorance in 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Saturday Evening Post was enclosed.  As one who is constantly working toward the ends to which your 
Committee is dedicated, I feel that the circulation of this report, which amounts to its endorsement, does 
the cause of medical education and particularly negro medical education a great disservice.”   
131
 Ibid. 
132
 Ibid. 
133
 Ibid. 
  272  
regard to the numbers of Negro students and staff.  Actually, the degree of 
forthcoming differed with the inquirer.  A 1949 letter from a physician at the Hospital 
Division of the Department of Public Welfare of the city of St. Louis received the 
following reply. 
We have no hesitation in appointing Negroes but since we make no inquiries 
about race, we are not sure who are negroes and who are not.  I have seen 
several around in different departments but I am sorry to say that we cannot 
give you any accurate information about either staff or students, as far as their 
nationality or color is concerned.134  
Two years later, an inquiry from the Dean of Meharry Medical College in 
regard to the number of Negro students enrolled at P&S was satisfied with full 
statistics: 4 in the first year class, 1 in the second, 2 in the third, and 1 in the fourth.  In 
1953, an inquiry by Charles F. Steward, Chairman of the Continuing Committee on 
Discrimination of the Medical Society of the County of New York, was replied to as 
follows: 
In regard to Question 3, we have no way of knowing how many negro 
instructors we have on our teaching staff because we never asked the question.  
There are a few.  We have quite a number of students who are apparently 
negro although we do not ask for his information when the student applies for 
admission.  A report from one of the negro associations indicates that for the 
year 1950-1951 Columbia had as many negro medical students as any of the 
medical schools, excluding Meharry and Howard … We are very happy to be 
high among the institutions helping in negro education.135  
Another thirteen years would pass before the College was able to reveal even 
an approximate numbers of African-Americans among its professional staff.  An 
inquiry from Jasper F. Williams, M.D., Chairman, National Medical Association, Inc., 
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Council on Medical Education and Hospitals, Howard University College of 
Medicine, was given the following reply: 
We believe that there are approximately 25 Negro physicians on out academic 
staff.  They rank from Assistants to Clinical Professors; some are full-time, 
other on our part-time teaching staffs.  The departments involved include those 
of anesthesiology, dermatology, medicine, microbiology, neurology, 
ophthalmology, pediatrics, psychiatry, radiology, surgery and urology – and it 
is know that several have been on our faculty for decades and that other have 
passed their specialty board examinations.136 
The fuzziness of the numbers, the letter explained, was due to the fact that “it 
has been always our policy and tradition not to ask for or maintain records concerning 
all details of the backgrounds of our staff.”  These approximate numbers became 
available “as a result of a recent survey requested by federal agencies.”  These 
statements are hard to square with evidence of swift marshalling of similar 
information for internal purposes.137  Only in the 1970s and later did the firm numbers 
became available as a result of the affirmative action reporting requirements. 
The invisibility of the black students and staff also lead to both the 
incomprehensible callousness toward their professional and personal needs and the 
collective effacement of their remarkable achievements and contributions.  Margaret 
Lawrence, who was among the first black women to enroll at P&S, recalled that when 
she applied for an internship at Babies Hospital in 1940, she was turned down by Dr. 
Rustin McIntosh, chief of pediatrics.  “He said he was pleased that I had applied … 
that I was well qualified and they had hoped to accept me for internship.  But since 
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there were no quarters for women interns at the doctors’ residences, women interns 
had to stay at the [graduate] nurses’ residence … and the superintendent of nursing 
[Young] had said that they could not possibly accept Negroes in the nurses’ 
residence.”138  A Class of 1940 nursing school graduate, Elizabeth Colmers Standen, 
remembered a more general sense of shock and disbelief at the extent of 
discrimination.   
When I was at Presbyterian, I had a black friend, a doctor at Vanderbilt Clinic, 
who couldn’t get his pregnant wife a private room.  I went out of my mind.  
Here was this beautiful plaque in front of the Hospital, which read ‘Without 
Regard to Race, Creed, or Color,’ and it didn’t admit blacks in the private 
pavilion, there were no black attending physicians, no black nurses, and no 
black nursing students.  It was the times, I guess.139 
Even the best of the best among the African-American students and staff at 
Columbia were made invisible.  It is hard to know the details of the reception and 
treatment which the few black students and associates received at the Medical Center 
but, if the official history of the institution is any indication, their presence and their 
work were made largely invisible.  Between 1938 and 1941, Columbia had the honor 
of having Dr. Charles Drew enrolled in a program of graduate study at the Center on a 
Rockefeller grant.  More importantly, Dr. Drew was centrally involved in the 
strategically very significant project of developing methods for creating stable blood 
supply in the face of the coming world war.  Even though Dr. Lamb’s book devotes 
the entire and separate section to the blood bank, considering it one of the most 
important projects in which the Medical Center was involved, its description of Dr. 
Drew’s contribution is rather cryptic and gives him nowhere near the credit which 
most contemporary accounts suggest.  Although it is Dr. Drew’s name which now 
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graces the American Red Cross headquarters in Washington, D.C., Lamb gives far 
more credit to Dr. Scudder.  Nor does Lamb mention the real reason for his eventual 
departure from the project – his outrage at the fact that, even in the emergency of war, 
the army and the Red Cross had a policy of the outright rejection of Black blood 
donors, later changed to the careful segregation of white and colored blood supplies.  
Dr. Drew’s race, along with his outstanding career, was effaced as well.  While 
Lamb’s account of the blood bank project had much to say about the other early 
contributors to the development of the technique, including their nationality, nothing is 
said about why and how Dr. Drew came to be appointed to this strategically important 
undertaking, nor of his remarkable background.140 
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Thus, the most shadowy existence in the practices of medical school admission 
and education was undoubtedly reserved for the African Americans.141  At Columbia, 
as in many northern schools, there has not been an official policy of exclusion.  The 
miniscule number of black students who ever attended from, and even smaller number 
of those who graduated, compounded with utter lack of recognition of or recording of 
these facts, have rendered their invisibility very nearly equivalent to formal exclusion.  
The erasure of the very existence of the black students at P&S was probably 
deliberate.  Until the 1960s, there was little positive that would come to the school 
from advertising the presence of a “colored” student and there may indeed have been 
many negative consequences wrought by the racially prejudiced.  There was also no 
felt obligation on the part of the College to recruit and educate any more black 
students than were occasionally able to break through the combined obstacles of 
historical disadvantages, entrance requirements, hefty tuition and likely ostracism. 
The Turning Point of the 1970s 
The situation with the admissions of African-American and other racial 
minorities did not improve until the late 1960s.  According to the recollections of the 
administrators and faculty at the time, the reasons for a change of policy had to do 
with mounting political pressure and institutional guilt, while the initial mechanisms 
of the change were an appointment of new admissions committee with a new 
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mandate.142  The political pressure of the civil rights movement and widespread urban 
rioting had a fundamental effect.  As one member of the admissions committee 
recalled: 
You couldn’t pick up a paper any morning without being aware that places 
were having riots all over.  I think everyone, more or less with one feeling, 
woke up to the fact that we have to make a bigger effort.  There were many 
newspaper articles about it.143 
A faculty member recalled: 
There was a sort of convulsion which was long overdue in the 68-69-70 period 
… where the American public had to realize this was not a country club that 
could be run by one segment of the population while everybody else paid 
taxes.144 
The change in the structure and leadership of the admissions process provided 
an effective mechanism of immediate change.  As the authors’ of the student report 
explored the reasons for the change, they have found that “[f]rom most accounts, the 
admissions process … pre-1970 … was a ‘one-man’ show.”  A former administrator 
described the man who was in charge of the old admissions regime as follows: 
He was conservative in his selection of students.  He thought white males were 
what the medical school was about.145 
In contrast,  
The first class admitted by the former dean’s successor, Dr. Frederick 
Hofmann, was dramatically different.  It was 20.4% female: almost 7% higher 
than the national average and nearly double that of the previous year.  Dr. 
Hofmann’s Admissions Committee is a more heterogeneous body which in 
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fact operated as a committee.  It is currently composed of 28 faculty members, 
4 of whom are women and 4 of whom are black.  In addition, 3 students sit on 
the committee and serve as observers.  The changes in the population of P&S 
… seem to indicate that a heterogeneous admissions committee is more likely 
to admit a heterogeneous student body.146 
Increase in student activism and protest played a part as well.  Black students 
instigated the alumni recruitment effort for minority students during an alumni dinner 
in the late 1960s.  A report on minority and women students, prepared in 1977, 
concluded that  
[p]erhaps the single most important person involved in the change of 
admissions policies and procedures at P&S was Dr. George Lythcott, 
Associate Dean for Urban and Community Health Affairs from 1969 to 1974.  
Although his job description did not include responsibility for minority 
students, Dr. Lythcott became and remained involved in minority admissions 
and retention problems.  When he was informed by the former admissions dean 
in 1969 that only 3 or 4 minority students had been accepted for the incoming 
class, Dr. Lythcott wrote a memorandum which has been held, by at least one 
administrator to have been of prime importance in the subsequent increase in 
the numbers of black students.  In his memorandum, Dr. Lythcott decried the 
small number of black students at P&S and expressed extreme dissatisfaction 
with the schools feeble attempts to increase black representation.  He stated 
that the situation was such that it was becoming increasingly difficulty for him, 
in good conscience, to represent the institution.147 
Dr. Lythcott’s concerns extended beyond the fact of admission but included 
the problem of retention as well.  “After a minority students was admitted, Dr. 
Lythcott’s office attempted to offer support, both academic and non-academic, to 
buffer the impact of an environemtn which was clearly alien to many of the 
students.”148  In the opinion of the Report’s authors, the administration as a whole has 
been doing considerably less to make sure that recruited minority students successfully 
completed their studies and “the only measure implemented systematically by the P&S 
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administration and faculty to insure the retention of minority students was the passage 
of the automatic repeat regulations.”149 
By the late 1970s, however, there were signs of danger again, as the growth in 
the rate of minority enrollments have stalled or even rolled back.  (See Table 5.3.).   
 
 
Table 5.3. Minority First-Year Medical School Enrollment at Columbia University 
and Nationwide, 1968-1976 
 
Columbia Nationwide 
Year 
Number Percent of total Number Percent of total 
1968-1969 - - 292 2.9 
1969-1970 - - 501 4.8 
1970-1971 15 10.9 808 7.0 
1971-1972 24 17.5 1063 8.6 
1972-1973 25 17.0 1172 8.6 
1973-1974 20 13.6 1301 9.2 
1974-1975 14 9.5 1473 10.0 
1975-1976 9 6.1 1391 9.2 
1976-1977 8 5.4 1400 9.1 
 
Source: “The Double Image: Women and Minority Students at P&S,” report prepared by Nancy A. 
Anderson, ’80 and Mary J. Roman, ’80, presented to Dr. Bernard D. Challenor, Associate Dean and Dr. 
Bernard Schoenberg, Associate Dean, October 1977, p. 9, Table 2, Minority Group Enrollment in the 
First-Year Class: Nationwide and P&S. 
 
Probing into the factors which may have stopped the progress, the Report said that 
perhaps the most important was a decline in recruitment … directly attributed 
to the loss of Dr. Lythcott and the drop in Alumni Association funding.  This 
decline also reflected changes in the national interest.  The federal government 
has shifted its focus away from improving race relations through affirmative 
action in employment and education.  Likewise, major foundations, 
responsible for much financial aid for recruitment, have developed other 
funding interests and priorities.150 
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As one faculty member understood these signs to mean that there was not as much 
enthusiasm at the close of the decade, “primarily because the minority student had 
required proportionately more support, and financial support has become increasingly 
difficult.”151 
Even as they entered in greater numbers, women and minority students 
occupied a different symbolic space, as well as a different structure of opportunity.  
Not everyone perceived these differences, but some did feel them with exquisite 
clarity, extending far beyond the experiences of personal slights.152 
Medicine is a male profession still (by and in large) so the sexism quotient is 
pretty high simply because there are a lot of men and few women.  But that’s a 
kind of general attitude; bias specific to the field of medicine comes out in the 
clinical area most, I think.  The small brushes we had with clinical encounters 
showed that.  My feeling is that I was generally able to bear the offences 
coward women practised (sic) by faculty and male students.  I don't think I’ll 
be so able once the clinical year starts.  Also the main feeling after one year 
isn’t just that medicine is sexist or racist or any other -ist, but rather that it just 
plain doesn’t care about the human beings as human beings and that is what is 
most enraging.153  
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Attitude – beginning with the sensitivity to the denigrating and dehumanizing 
practices – was also clearly playing a role in the kind of ‘social world’ into which 
these students were entering.  Perhaps, as the story recounted by one of the students 
who participated in the survey for the 1977 Report on women and minorities testifies, 
both men and women, minority and majority students were apt to find themselves in 
the house of mirrors, unable to comprehend just what kind of profession they have 
chosen to enter. 
When I was on Neurology, we had a patient, an old black woman, who had 
organic brain syndrome.  She was very confused, her memory was gone, she 
wobbled on her feet, couldn’t stand up straight, and was very weak.  We were 
trying to find a diagnosis for her.  She also happened to have a large liver.  We 
took this patient to Dr. ----, noted neurologist, well-known throughout the 
medical world, to get his advice, his tempered, seasoned advice, his experience 
in treating neurological disease.  His major interest in the patient, after having 
heard her entire medical history, was not in helping us with the diagnosis, was 
not in helping us with what to do with this woman, how to help her and her 
family make the best of the situation, how to prepare her for what seemed 
probably death after a period of deterioration.  None of these things.  What he 
wanted to know and what he asked us in an offhand manner was, ‘What race 
has the worst drinking problems?’, referring to the woman’s large liver.  
Everyone was confused; people stumbled around a bit.  We were all a bit 
aghast, but here was a noted, venerable figure.  Here was what he wanted to 
talk to us about.  The woman on my left stumbled forward and said, ‘The 
Irish,’ with nervous laughter.  The resident behind her grabbed her arm and 
shook her playfully, saying, ‘You can’t say that about my race.’  She said, ‘but 
I’m Irish too.’  The resident than suggested, ‘Perhaps it’s the human race.’  
Everyone was very relieved.  But Dr.---- was not going to accept this.  He 
repeated his question two or three times, looking at each of us, searching.  
Finally he said, ‘The colored race.’  We sort of reeled, looked at him, looked at 
each other, at the patient who was still there as he said all this.  I sat there 
thinking: how could he have said all this, what should I do, should I make a big 
thing of it, should I get angry?  If I don’t say anything, isn’t that being 
cowardly, not standing on my own convictions?  Should I trust that everyone 
knows this man’s a looney?  But I decided to say something.  So I walked up 
to him and said, ‘Could you please give me your references for that?’, he being 
a man who has a reference in his hands at all times.  He throws them out like 
seeds.  He said, ‘References? I don’t need references. Everyone knows that.’  I 
now believe whenever anyone says ‘everyone knows that,’ there’s something 
wrong with the statement.  I walked away and sat down next to a friend.  He 
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came over and said, ‘Anyone who’s ever hired a colored person knows that.’  
There was a black resident and he went over and asked him what he thought.  
The black resident was trying to hold onto his feelings and decided he was 
going to be cool and not talk about it.  He finally said, ‘who introduced alcohol 
to the Indians? Who introduced alcohol to the Chinese? What race, in fact, has 
pushed alcohol allover the world?’  Dr. ---- had no answer to that, of course.  
The upshot of the story is that here’s a man who’s one of the leading figures at 
Columbia-Presbyterian, one of their sons, their laurels, and what is he doing 
but spreading racism, useless lies, and perhaps convincing someone.  
Hopefully they knew he was an old fool.  But you can’t ever assume that the 
people who have prestige and power in the society, that their lies will not 
influence people.  That’s the most blatant example I’ve seen recently, but it’s 
pervasive.154 
In the politically charged atmosphere of the 1970s, discomfort, 
disappointment, and shame at racist, sexist, and dehumanizing institutional practices 
were experienced by many different types of students, both from traditional and more 
recent pools of the medical students.  Greater sensitivity was likely a characteristic of 
their generation, as well as specific backgrounds.  If the cultural norm of the previous 
generation was denial or suppression of such experiences, the post-1970 students 
probably experienced more recognition, more anger, and more disappointment.  As 
psychological studies of discrimination suggest, such experiences are apt to have 
significant consequences for subjects experiencing discrimination.  Barring 
constructive outlets of anger and pain, they are likely to cause isolation, self-doubt and 
depression, often expressed in a “marked drop in energy and competence and increase 
in self-destructive behavior.”155   
It is not too difficult to venture that the psychological burdens imposed by 
insensitive institutional practices upon the ‘sensitive’ individuals created yet another 
structure of opportunity shaping their professional careers.  This structure very likely 
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retarded, as it were, those who could not overcome – by suppression or otherwise – the 
negative fallout of the experiences of injustice.  Still mostly anecdotal, there is 
evidence that many socially sensitive individuals remain – by choice or by aversion – 
at the bottom of professional pyramids.  There is also more firm evidence from 
psychological studies suggesting that the most distinguishing personal characteristic of 
those who have successfully climbed to the pinnacles of academic pyramids, is high 
levels of … hostility.  An indirect proof, perhaps, that the meek – in professional and 
academic fields – have a career structure of their own, one tending toward the bottom 
layers. 
Still, many of the students fought back as evidenced by the formation of 
student organizations, the publication of the 1977 report, and other actions taken by 
the students.  In a notable episode, six first-year women students objected to such 
comments in a letter to the Dean: 
While humor is an invaluable asset, laughter at the expense of any group of 
people (Women, ethnic groups, patients, etc.) should not be justified or 
condoned.  In particular, we feel that the same standards by which anti-semitic 
‘jokes’ are judged to be in poor taste should be applied to ‘jokes’ made about 
women and female patients.  Such humor creates an atmosphere scarcely 
conducive to the development of the respect and dignity which should 
comprise a physician-patient relationship.156   
The Dean was obliged to send the following communization to all department 
chairmen. 
A number of students have come to the Office of the Dean during the past year 
to express their displeasure at Faculty humor and remarks which show a lack 
of respect for women students and women patients.  This is a matter of great 
concern to me, as I am sure it will be to you.  Therefore, I ask you to draw to 
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the attention of your faculty that such ill chosen remarks have an adverse effect 
on the whole student body.  Thank you for your cooperation in this important 
matter.157 
The Report, which was issued nine months later, reported that the 
communication had an effect and asked the dean to “compliment the faculty on having 
decreased its volume of discriminatory remarks in response to his letter … and stress 
that they continue to be vigilant in their efforts.”158  The report did no shy away from 
incisive critiques of the school’s institutional practices and made a number of more 
structural recommendations, including the formation of the Committee on the Status 
of Women, increased institutional support for the school’s Black and Latino Student 
Organization (BALSO) and the institution of effective recruitment and remedial 
programs. 
Still, for years afterward and most likely well into the present, women and 
minority students have been instructed by even the well-meaning mentors to play the 
games.  At the 1986 conference on women in medicine the following advice was given 
by senior faculty women to their younger colleagues. 
To advance in schools, everyone agreed, there is only one path: research.  
“You may be teaching,” Dr. Lewis said, “but there is no tenure, no promotion, 
no pay increase in the teaching component of your position; it is all in the 
research.” … Other factors can help, however.  “Get the best training possible, 
no matter what sacrifices you must make, and be board certified,” said Dr. Lois 
Anne Katz, associate chief of staff … Along with training comes political 
game-playing.  “It is important to know the right people and find them at your 
school,” Dr. Katz said.  “Every medical school and every hospital has its own 
intricate political system.”159 
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At the 1991 AAMC Professional Development Seminar for Junior Faculty 
Women, Associate Dean of the Harvard Medical School offered the following five 
“laws” of successful academic medical careers in academic medicine, intended for 
men and women alike: 
first, “If you don’t know where you’re going, any road will do”; second, “If 
you don’t play, you can’t win”; third, “A faculty appointment is only a hunting 
license – whatever you bag, you can keep”; fourth, “It’s not what you know 
but who you know”; fifth, “The playing field isn’t level – it’s tilted in favor of 
those who follow these rules.160   
His take on the challenges and strategies specific to women was, if anything, 
even more disquieting.  He counseled that “women need to pay careful attention to 
gaining appropriate credit for the work they do; second, women need mentors more 
than men do (but are less likely to find them); third, women have to either be twice as 
good as their male colleagues or work twice as hard to make sure their real worth 
finally registers.”161  
Surely, nobody wants for underrepresented students to fail to succeed, yet there 
seems to be a profound lack of indignation that career structures are still shaped by 
‘whom you know, not what you know’ and similar practices.  There is a continuing 
assumption that students and junior faculty should just bow down and play to win – 
for their own sake, of course.  When they make it, then they can be movers and 
shakers.  Right now, we just need bigger numbers of successful women and 
minorities.  If our goal is equal representation of every group, except those who might 
rock the boat too violently, than this policy is certainly right on target.  
It might be instructive to revisit a different kind of advice on how to fight 
discrimination that was given to women a few decades ago: 
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Constructive support can develop out of that anger in the presence of a sturdy 
sense of self esteem and the opportunity for frequent (if only brief) contacts 
with men and especially women who are committed to helping each other 
combat discrimination …. While the members of one’s first small 
homogeneous group of mutual supporters often remain one’s close friends, 
such ‘consciousness-raising’ groups often run their course and come to an end.  
Groups that coalesce with an action orientation – often concerned with social 
change not necessarily related directly to feminism – may provide some of the 
supportive contact.  It is in fact difficult for a small homogeneous women’s 
group to provide a sufficiently broad base of support to allow defusing of or 
constructive outlets for the anger.  It is probably necessary, although perhaps 
not sufficient, to have the support of a network of women – and perhaps men – 
including some persons who are significantly different from one’s self in class, 
occupation, and experience.  This is, I believe, the meaning of ‘sisterhood is 
powerful’: that we work together to change discrimination against all women, 
not just our own small group.  No individual woman can be liberated until all 
women, and all men, are liberated.162  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONFRONTING LABOR: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR UNIONIZATION OF HEALTH CARE WORKERS,  
1958-1976 
Introduction 
In the late 1950s, New York City became the center of an intense struggle over 
the right of employees in voluntary hospitals and health care institutions to organize 
and bargain collectively.  Legally, the issue had long been decided in the negative: 
voluntary hospitals, as well as other non-profit organizations, were exempted from the 
landmark New Deal legislation establishing workers’ rights to collective bargaining, 
minimum wages, and maximum hours of work.1  While the legal ruling closely 
corresponded to the actual state of affairs in America’s non-profit sector, in a handful 
of states, cities, and institutions, hospital employees were organized and worked under 
union contracts.  These exceptions begged the question of whether the exemption of 
voluntary hospitals from the labor laws was an absolute necessity, as a matter of 
public policy, and whether allowing unionization in voluntary hospitals would be as 
disastrous as their spokesmen insisted.2   
But the issue, of course, was not merely one of law, for hiding behind the legal 
exemption was a unified stand of hospital boards and associations against any 
concessions on workers’ rights and any intrusions by the government in the hospitals’ 
internal management.  Individuals who sat on the boards of America’s voluntary 
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hospitals were not only members of  the economic and political elite but also had a 
strong moral claim to social responsibility, public service, and concern for the welfare 
of the less fortunate.  The ideal of the voluntary social provision, which supported 
their argument for exemption, was not a novel concept but a long-standing practice of 
unquestioning public support of private philanthropy.  Hospital workers, on the other 
hand, were among some of the least powerful members of American society.  
Historically, hospitals drew heavily on immigrant, migrant, and surplus labor and were 
quite frequently the employers of last resort for unskilled, dislocated, and marginalized 
workers unable to secure any other jobs.  With a high proportion of women, racial 
minorities, and recent immigrants, the hospital labor force was effectively isolated 
from the more powerful segments of American labor.  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that, even during the high points of labor unrest, hospital workers have rarely risen in a 
clear demand for unionization, or that those who did were swiftly put down.3   
As the 1950s were coming to a close, however, this state of affairs was about 
to change, first in New York City and then in other parts of the country.  With the 
worst of McCarthyism mostly over, the more radical union organizers, who had been 
at the forefront of hospital organizing efforts prior to the ‘red purge’ and managed to 
survive those difficult years on the fringes of the labor movement, could breathe a 
collective sigh of relief and slowly start rebuilding their work.  Of momentous 
significance to the future of New York’s hospital organizing was the tenacity of Elliott 
Godoff and the only hospital union contract he managed to win and maintain through 
these years.  Godoff’s original, Communist-led union base had been destroyed in the 
fratricide of the McCarthy era.  For a while, his efforts to find refuge for his tiny 
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hospital chapter in a larger union were also repeatedly thwarted by the unions’ 
indifference to hospital organizing and a systematic ousting and expulsion of 
organizers with past communist ties.  Fortunately, in 1957 the pioneer of hospital 
organizing was welcomed into a small, but resourceful union of pharmacists and 
drugstore workers, Local 1199.  The twenty-five year old union was led by a seasoned 
labor organizer Leon Davis who, like Godoff, had his roots in the radical wing of the 
American labor movement.  The two unionists had in common so many details of their 
lives, it was surprising that their work had not brought them together decades earlier.  
When their paths finally did cross, however, the distinctive leadership and 
membership of 1199 was the perfect weapon to take on New York’s arrogant hospital 
establishment.4 
A broader foundation for change in hospital labor relations was emerging 
inside the hospitals themselves.  The hospitals’ and medical centers’ robust growth 
during the post-war period, coupled with their growing cultural prestige as engines of 
scientific progress and social betterment, uncomfortably coexisted with persisting 
poverty among their lower-level workers.  For most hospitals, the post-war period was 
also one of protracted transition from traditional-paternalist to modern-bureaucratic 
modes of management.  This process was especially painful for the lower-echelon 
workers who were subjected to work restructuring, production speed-ups, stricter 
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discipline, and an erosion of formal and informal rights.  The lower rungs of the 
hospital labor force were also increasingly marked by racial and gender segregation of 
women and minorities into the least-desirable, lowest-paid jobs.5   
At the heart of the struggle to unionize hospital and health care workers was 
the plight of two segments of the American workforce.  The first comprised the low-
skilled, manual workers who ran food, laundry, housekeeping, and maintenance 
services.  The second consisted of those semi-professional, technical, and clerical 
workers employed in the laboratories, X-ray departments, and record rooms of 
hospitals and medical schools.  While there were some differences between 
geographic areas and individual institutions, the basic problem consisted of a common 
set of economic, social, and legal issues which placed these groups of workers at a 
considerable disadvantage relative to their employers, other hospital employees, and 
workers in other industries.  In other words, even in a deliberately narrow view, the 
issues involved were broadly social and not particular to individual institutions.    
As pressing as this simple conclusion might be to us or even to the impartial 
contemporary observers, this was not how the issue of hospital unionization was 
treated in the actual historical process.  Although the struggle has prompted repeated 
political intervention and legal change, the conflict between the workers and the 
employers was systematically thrown back on individual institutions and 
organizations.  Although the hospitals claimed that the “militant” labor movement had 
subjected them to compulsory unionism, this was an overstatement.  While the law 
permitted unionization in the City’s voluntary hospitals, it did not make collective 
bargaining an automatic right of the workers.  The legal presumption was, apparently, 
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that the workers might have a reason not to want collective bargaining in their 
workplaces and that the decision should be left to several groups of employees within 
the individual institutions.  But even the question itself – whether the workers wished 
to organize into a collective bargaining unit – was not, as a matter of law, to be raised 
on a systematic and comprehensive basis but only when a union organization claimed 
support of at least a third of employees in a particular institution or voting unit.  Given 
the realities of highly disparate levels of financial, organizational and manpower 
resources available to hospital workers and their employers, it was clear that, what the 
law has actually given the workers was a right to vote for a union, when and if a union 
happened to choose their workplace for an organizing drive and managed to succeed 
in the face of predictable employer opposition.   
Although undoubtedly a broad conflict over social and class structure, the bulk 
of the struggle for hospital unionization was destined to take the form of street 
warfare, fought institution by institution, voting unit by voting unit.  It should, 
therefore, be entirely unsurprising that the main antagonists in this struggle appeared 
to be the hospitals and their lawyers, on one side, and the unions and their lawyers on 
the other side.  Since the ‘enabling’ legislation established no self-actuating rights for 
the weaker social class, the struggle on behalf of the workers was going to be fought 
by organizations and through organizations.  The strategy and tactics of particular 
institutions, as well as their union opponents, became important factors in the timing, 
sequence, and outcome of the struggle.  The legally-codified institutional terrain of the 
struggle was itself a major determinant of its overall dynamic across the voluntary 
hospital sector.6   
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Nevertheless, even in the highly organizational and legalized context of the 
unionization struggle, the larger supra-organizational forces regularly intruded into the 
careful calculations of the warring sides.  General structural-economic factors, familiar 
repertoires of cultural-ideological understandings, or particular situations of 
individuals and groups all marked the hospital unionization struggle as part of a larger 
social process.  The relationship, in which these larger social (and class) factors stood 
toward the individual institutional contexts was not, however, that of the general to the 
particular.  Although immanent in a broad economic domain, the larger social forces 
infused as much difference as commonality into the positions, identities and interests 
of the social actors involved.  
The implication is that, like many other developments structuring health care 
politics, the story of hospital unionization cannot be understood without a dual 
analysis of institutional and class processes.  Moreover, the finer details of the 
unionization struggle at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center explored in this 
chapter strongly suggest that the dynamics and outcomes of this political conflict 
cannot be understood with either the traditional class concepts or the non-class 
approaches that have vied to replace them.  What is needed, I argue, is both a broader 
and more incisive view of social identity, structure, and action. 
Learning from the Sidelines 
Compared to other voluntary hospitals, Columbia-Presbyterian was in a fairly 
strong position to resist the union drive.  As one of the largest and most prestigious 
hospitals in New York City, Presbyterian Hospital could well afford to pay its workers 
higher wages than smaller, less successful institutions.  Although a dynamic and 
growing institution, Columbia-Presbyterian underwent its most dramatic institutional 
restructuring during the late 1930s, when the Medical Center was opened, and its 
lower-level employees experienced fewer disruptions in established work routines 
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during the postwar period than workers in other, later-developing institutions.  No less 
importantly, it had a deep reserve of organizational will to resist the encroachment of 
the unionization.  The kind of persons who served as trustees and officers of the oldest 
and most successful Protestant hospitals made Presbyterian into one of the least 
sympathetic institutions to the union cause.7 
Early in 1958, when Local 1199’s first victory at Montefiore Hospital in the 
Bronx signaled the beginning of a broad organizing drive in the voluntary hospitals, 
several unions vied for organizing Columbia-Presbyterian, the New York’s largest 
institution with close to 1,900 workers.  Shortly after the official kick-off of its 
campaign, 1199 assigned Phil Kamenkowitz, the union’s regional director for the 
Bronx and Washington Heights, to conduct early morning leafleting at Columbia-
Presbyterian.  Without any contacts or connections on the inside, such a task was often 
a difficult one, especially at financially stronger institutions like Presbyterian where 
the workers were better paid and feared losing their jobs.  Soon Local 1199 found that 
it had competitors on the Columbia-Presbyterian campus as Teamsters Local 237, 
State, County and Municipal Workers Union (now AFSCME) Local 302, and 
Building Service Employees International Union (now SUIU) Local 144 all jumped 
into the fray.  Early in 1958, the Teamsters had reportedly reached an agreement with 
AFSCME, to keep 1199 out of Columbia-Presbyterian, one of the biggest plums in the 
newly open organizing field.  Apparently, the strategy worked and 1199 withdrew 
organizers from Presbyterian to concentrate its efforts on those institutions were it had 
greater chances of success.  At some point, AFSCME claimed majorities in five 
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hospitals, including Presbyterian but, unlike Local 1199, the public employees union 
did not push for a showdown of strength when it ran into a stonewall of resistance 
from Presbyterian’s administration.8   
Dealing with unions less determined to take the struggle to its logical 
conclusion, the Hospital’s administration was content to wave the unions away, citing 
the voluntaries’ exemption from the labor laws.  When in April of 1958 District 
Council 37 of American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
demanded to be recognized as a collective bargaining agent of the maintenance 
department workers, Presbyterian responded to the union’s lawyer with a brief letter 
which invoked the exemption of voluntary hospitals from the provisions of New York 
State and National Labor Relations Acts and stated the Hospital’s unwillingness to 
recognize the union.9  Presbyterian’s own maintenance employees, the majority of 
whom had allegedly signed union cards, worried the administration even less.  Nearly 
six months after the event, Alvin J. Binkert, the Hospital’s Executive Vice President of 
Presbyterian, issued a brief statement to the Hospital’s maintenance employees.  The 
document, which basically reproduced the Hospital’s response to the union, cited no 
reason why these employees should not be able to bargain collectively other than the 
Hospital’s legal right to deny it.10  
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Ultimately, only Local 1199 had the chutzpah to call a strike vote and set the 
walk-out date in the six hospitals, where it focused its efforts, and Presbyterian was 
now fairly certain that its position in the coming struggle would be on the sidelines, 
rather than on center-court.11  As one of the strongest among New York’s hospitals, 
Presbyterian’s primary role in the emerging conflict was to lend its organizational 
resources and social clout to the concerted efforts of member institutions to prevent or 
prevail in the strike.  In the ensuing weeks, Presbyterian’s trustees and officers, along 
with many of their colleagues from other unaffected hospitals, dutifully appeared at 
the numerous conferences and negotiation sessions arranged by the Mayor’s office.  
Ostensibly, they were there to show solidarity with their sister-institutions and out of 
common concern over the issue of unionization.  At the same time, their presence had 
a likely effect of “stiffening the backbone” of the six struck hospitals and the entire 
hospital association throughout the six-week long stand-off with 1199.   
Representatives of the Catholic hospitals, who felt threatened by the much 
stronger financial position of both Protestant and Jewish hospitals, were among the 
most vehement opponents of any concessions, despite papal encyclicals on behalf of 
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the workers rights to collective bargaining.  Other hospitals, however, took positions 
which were not much more liberal.  One labor leader, who took part in the 
negotiations, blamed the unaffected Protestant institutions like Columbia-Presbyterian 
and St. Luke’s for hardening the position of the Greater New York Hospital 
Association and its president, who served as an official spokesman for the hospitals.  
A member of 1199, who was present at the talks, also saw these unaffected, 
prestigious, and mostly Protestant institutions as holding an effective suasion over the 
six beleaguered Jewish hospitals.  Mt. Sinai’s director Martin Steinberg recalled the 
vehemence, with which the Presbyterian trustee Sammy Schwarz (of the F.A.O. 
Schwarz toy empire) declared that he “would take apart Presbyterian brick by brick,” 
if the union ever got there.  Mayor Wagner himself stressed the influence of these 
wealthy spectators on the strike: “All through the negotiations there were observers 
from the other voluntary hospitals – New York Hospital, Columbia-Presbyterian, 
Roosevelt [and], boy, these fellows were really conservative!  The struck hospitals 
were not acting on their own.”  Other observers, however, felt that the trustees of the 
struck Jewish hospitals needed no ideological encouragement from their gentile 
colleagues.  According to one key negotiator for the strikers, the three most vicious 
hospital representatives were Jewish hospital trustees.  Despite their liberal and even 
pro-labor reputations, these men had no sympathy for the working people when it 
came to their institutional fiefdoms.12 
Just how important this group pressure was is hard to evaluate but, in the 
minds of many participants, the 1959 strike negotiations clearly indicated the 
ferocious resolve of the hospital elites to squash their enemies.  Whether their 
intransigence arose from pressure by the other hospitals or from the instinctual 
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prejudice of their own boards and benefactors, the six hospitals refused to compromise 
at any point during the strike.  Six-weeks after the walk-out began, the first multi-
hospital union strike in New York City formally ended in a victory for the hospitals.  
The hospitals had not yielded an inch on the issue of union recognition and their only 
concession was a (surprise!) voluntary program of improvements, essentially identical 
to that offered before the strike ensued.13 
Presbyterian Hospital, along with other unaffected institutions, came away 
from the City Hall with valuable lessons, both optimistic and cautionary.  Throwing 
money and promises in the wake of strike threats appeared at least somewhat 
effective.  First, hospitals with higher than average wage rates appeared more difficult 
to organize.  Second, promises to increase wages and benefits seemed fairly effective 
in appeasing critics in the press.  Such promises were ostensibly what the voluntary 
hospitals offered in lieu of being subjected to an independent fact-finding commission, 
a conciliatory deal they had unanimously rejected during pre-strike negotiations.  
Despite the fact that the promised improvements were, as Leon Davis put it, “a case of 
too little and too late” and “forthcoming only as a result of the union’s drive and the 
pressure of city officials and the press,” the mainstream press praised the hospitals’ 
program and concluded that, in view of such benevolence and good will, “Local 1199 
will shoulder the responsibility far greater than the hospitals themselves,” if it 
proceeds with the strike.14   
The hospitals were also forewarned of the union’s most explosive rhetorical 
weapon and the fact that 1199 would not hesitate to use it.  The issue, of course, was 
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that of racial, as well as class, exploitation in New York’s voluntary hospitals.  As the 
New York Times reported, the race issue was raised at the City Hall meeting by Harry 
Van Arsdale Jr., president of the New York City Central Labor Council.   
Mr. Van Arsdale said that the continued refusal of the six voluntary nonprofit 
hospitals to recognize the union would be a slap at “an abused minority.” ... 
Benjamin J. Buttenwieser, chairman of the board of Lenox Hill Hospital, 
denounced the exploitation charge as “wild and irresponsible.”  As spokesman 
for the six struck hospitals, Mr. Buttenwieser said: “How ridiculous can you 
get?  Our hospitals all operate at deficits.  These deficits are accounted for 
mainly by the costs of rendering out-patient department services and 
maintaining in-patient wards which provide the only charitable hospital 
services to many thousands from the very groups we are accused of 
exploiting.”  But a union spokesman, Moe Foner, pressed the charge.  “If these 
self-righteous philanthropists would stop exploiting thousands of Negro and 
Puerto Rican workers at $23 and $30 for a forty-hour week, their employes 
wouldn’t need their charity. ... The truth is that the workers are the biggest 
philanthropists in the hospitals.  They are striking to put an end to a system in 
which they are, in effect, subsidizing the hospitals through sweatshop wages 
that breed slums and disease.”15 
For decades, many thoughtful observers of hospital affairs had noted a 
disturbing “paradox that a charitable institution should tend to treat its employees in 
such a manner as to make them potential objects of charity.”  Local 1199, however, 
was the only union capable of effectuating a powerful and credible link between class 
and race exploitation.16  If the union’s campaign would soon connect with the larger 
Civil Rights movement, its immediate answer to racial discrimination was class-based 
organization.  “It is self-evident,” wrote Davis in his statement days before the strike, 
“that the horrible conditions of work, the low wages, the lack of security and self-
respect that these hospital workers endure today is due to the absence of a workers’ 
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organization among them.  There is no other explanation or rationale for the 
substandard wages which are being paid to workers performing an essential service for 
the community.”17 
Another cautionary lesson for the hospitals was the extent of support which the 
strikers and the union leading received from the labor movement, both in New York 
City and nationally.  A crucial element in constructing labor solidarity was the early 
personal support of Harry Van Arsdale, president of New York City’s AFL-CIO 
Central Labor Council.    From the beginning, the venerable labor chief had adopted 
the hospital’s fight as “our strike,” leading the Council to vote “food, money and 
moral support” to the hospital workers and working hard to secure co-operation of 
even the most conservative city unions.18  A total of 175 union locals officially voted 
aid to the hospital workers, sending a total of $110,000 to the strikers in addition to 
truckloads of food and supplies.  Several unions had “loaned” their organizers and 
held support rallies in front of the struck hospitals, while the members of a 
construction union, engaged in work for three of the six hospitals, walked out in 
solidarity with the hospital workers.  In the words of the AFL-CIO regional director, 
Michael Mann, the hospital workers’ strike of 1959 provided “the finest display of 
labor unity in the City’s history.”19  
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On the upside, however, the hospitals could be fairly sure that, even if the 
strikers wanted to do so, they had rather limited capacity to disrupt the institutions’ 
operation.  To begin with, the Local 1199 walked a very fine line on this issue.  On the 
one hand, the union insisted that the strike had the power to seriously disrupt the 
hospitals’ operations and that the patients had to be transferred to other institutions.  
On the other hand, the strikers took pains not to cause any real medical crises, in part 
to preserve public sympathy for their cause.  Before the walk-out, hospital workers 
made sure to leave their stations in working order and some even set up a telephone 
hotline to render assistance in case of emergency.20  Before the strike began, the City’s 
administration ascertained that, in the worst case scenario, public hospitals would be 
able to absorb most of the struck hospitals’ charity patients and, if necessary, the 
Mayor could declare the state of emergency, with all its implications for the method of 
dealing with the strikers.21  Nothing so extreme, however, became necessary during 
the six weeks of the strike.  Each hospital was able to count on the overtime effort of 
nursing and administrative staff as well as assistance of women’s auxiliaries, spouses 
of the house staff, patients’ relatives, both their regular volunteers and those who were 
moved to help for the first time during the strike.  Although significantly understating 
their number of employees on strike, a week into the stand-off, the six affected 
institutions could justifiably claim that all service was “normal” and that they were 
“encountering no difficulties.”  Speaking for the voluntary hospital association, 
president of one of the struck hospitals had indeed declared that all its member 
institutions were “now prepared and confident they can cope without difficulty with 
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any attempt on the part of the union to spread the strike to other hospitals.”22  More 
important than the army of volunteers in the long term was the ability of hospitals to 
hire new workers to replace the strikers.  Offering hourly rates somewhat higher than 
those which obtained before the strike, the hospitals were able to start replacing a 
significant number of striking employees.  Despite the overwhelming financial and 
human support from the other New York City unions, the strike was ultimately 
vulnerable to the structural effects of the army of surplus labor, the un- and under-
employed New Yorkers who were willing to take the jobs despite the taunts and 
insults of the picketing strikers.   
Managing the Legislative Process 
Having avoided direct involvement in the 1959 strike crisis, Presbyterian 
Hospital emerged relatively unscathed and unchanged.  The battle, of course, was far 
from over and the Hospital’s complex political strategy during the next several years 
revealed an intricate game played by an institution confident of its strength. 
After a painfully inconclusive, if not altogether disheartening outcome of 
1199’s long strike, the legal battle for the revocation of voluntary hospitals’ exemption 
from the labor laws emerged as a crucial goal for the leadership of the Union.  
Following several unsuccessful attempts to introduce the enabling legislation, the 
City’s labor leaders concluded that the only way to move forward was through the 
direct support of the Governor.  During the spring of 1962, the union and its 
supporters finally succeeded in securing Governor Rockefeller’s support for the 
legislative amendment in exchange for an implicit promise of re-election support from 
labor and civil rights groups.  After a series of behind-the-scenes communications, in 
June of 1962 a requisite atmosphere of crisis and public pressure ‘necessary’ for the 
                                                 
 
22
 “Hospitals to Seek Contempt Action on Striking Union,” New York Times, May 11, 1959; “Judge 
Proposes Hospitals Truce to Await Ruling,” The New York Times, May 14, 1959. 
  302 
Governor’s intervention had been created and the settlement of the two-hospital strike 
was sealed with the Governor’s official promise to introduce and push the enabling 
legislation.23   
During the period surrounding the negotiation, formulation and passage of the 
1963 law Presbyterian played an intricate, three-sided game.  Not wanting to be left 
out of the legislative process, Presbyterian, in association with New York Hospital, 
submitted a draft of legislative bill to the Governor, which accepted in principle the 
hospital workers’ rights to collective bargaining.  This initiative, apparently, has been 
undertaken with the approval of the Hospital’s Board of Trustees but not with the 
knowledge of Columbia University, the Hospital’s primary affiliate at the Medical 
Center.  Learning of this proposal from other sources, Columbia’s President, Grayson 
Kirk, was incensed that the University was not appraised of the bill and its “far 
reaching consequences for the University.”  Columbia’s president was also puzzled by 
the Hospital’s conduct, given that the Hospital Association of New York State, of 
which Presbyterian’s Executive Vice President, Alvin J. Binkert, was President, 
released a statement strongly opposing such legislation.24   
The apparently contradictory stance of the Presbyterian’s leadership was a 
result of divisions which had developed among the voluntary hospitals’ administrative 
‘fraternity’ since the start of the unionization drive.  During the opening stages of the 
organizing campaign, first at Montefiore and then in six other hospitals, the issues 
were effectively confined to New York City and the Greater New York Hospital 
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Association (GNYHA) was the hospitals’ main vehicle of collective action.  After the 
six-week strike in 1959, some of the more powerful unaffected hospitals, including 
Columbia-Presbyterian, refused to sign the “Statement of Policy” pledging their 
participation in the permanent administrative committee on personnel policy, which 
was the sole and rather minimal concession to the workers’ demands.  Thus, while the 
city’s voluntary hospitals had stood united in pressuring the struck hospitals to make 
no concessions, when it came time to share in the largely symbolic burdens of the 
strike settlement, the stronger unaffected institutions decided to free-ride.25   
When the Governor pledged to push for enabling legislation, the entire issue 
moved up to the state level, even though the organizing drives were effectively 
confined to the City.  At this juncture, a new line of division among the voluntary 
hospitals in New York State had emerged.  The state hospital association, while 
professing solidarity with its sister institutions in New York City, strongly opposed the 
legislation, effectively sacrificing the city hospitals in order to spare their own 
institutions.  As President of the state hospital association, Binkert’s name was the 
first under the group’s statement opposing any legislation.  As an Executive Vice 
President of Presbyterian Hospital, however, Binkert and some of his colleagues 
concluded that bare-knuckled opposition was not going to save the City’s voluntary 
hospitals and was, therefore, quite eager to work with the Governor’s office to write as 
favorable a bill as possible.26   
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There was, however, a third aspect to Presbyterian’s game.  The bill extending 
collective bargaining rights to the workers of the City’s voluntary hospitals was signed 
by Governor Rockefeller on April 24 and was to take effect on July 1, 1963.  Two 
weeks after the passage of the law, Presbyterian’s administration issued an official 
communication to the Hospital’s supervisors.  Although occasioned by path-breaking 
legislation directly affecting the Hospital and its workers, the administration’s 
statement was very similar to the “Bulletin” issued four year ago.  In fact, most of the 
new document’s text was actually simply reproduced from the old one, will few 
changes.   
“As you have probably already read in the newspapers,” began the open letter, 
“the New York State Legislature, in its 1963 Session, passed a bill which changes the 
legal position of collective organization and collective bargaining by hospital 
employees and the legal status of labor unions claiming to represent hospital 
employees.”  Neglecting to say what kind of changes they were, the statement 
proceeded to say that, “[i]n spite of these changes in the law, the basic policy of the 
Hospital with respect to attempts to organize hospital employees will not change.” 
Emphatically, the Presbyterian’s President declared that “[w]e have declined [union] 
recognition and continue to do so ... .”  Just as four years ago, the administration 
insisted that this position did not stem from “antagonism to unions as such.”  But 
whereas in a 1959 statement, the next sentence stated that the position was “based on 
the realistic view taken by Federal and New York State lawmakers who exempted 
voluntary non-profit hospitals from provisions of the labor laws,” in 1963 the 
administration chose not to praise the wisdom of the legislators but only to say that 
their unchanging refusal to recognize unions reflected “a realistic judgment that the 
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policies and practices of trade unionism are unsuitable for a charitable hospital and are 
not beneficial to the Hospital, its patients or its employees.”27  
While wishing to have an input into the formulation of the bill, Presbyterian 
had no intention of honoring the new law.  Although the legislation removed the 
exemption of the City’s voluntary hospitals from collective bargaining rights, the 
actual process by which the unions could be established at the hospitals was not 
obvious and allowed the hospitals to use a variety of legal and organizational tactics to 
fight unionization.  With the legislation passed, the stronger institutions like 
Presbyterian could now concentrate on developing their anti-union strategy, without 
the burden of heightened public scrutiny, criticism, and pressure focused on the 
voluntary hospitals during the four years of the ‘illegal’ organizing drive.  As might 
have been expected, the hospitals which had been involved in a six-week strike in 
1959 were the first to be officially unionized.  Although officially defeated, the 
workers at these hospitals were mobilized and unified by their unprecedented action 
and, with the Union’s support, continued to fight for unionization until 1963.  With 
their bases secured in the original six hospitals, 1199 proceeded to organize the 
weaker or otherwise more promising institutions.  In this process of ‘culling the weak 
from the herd,’ institutions like the Presbyterian or the New York Hospital once again 
found themselves in the least vulnerable positions. 
The Battle Reaches Washington Heights 
The experience of the non-profit sector during the fifties and sixties 
demonstrated that having at least one group of workers unionized dramatically 
increased the probability of organizing other groups within the same institution.  The 
crucial step was ‘getting the foot in the door.’  In the case of Columbia-Presbyterian, 
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there were actually three institutional doors through which the unionization could be 
brought in: the Hospital, the Medical School, and Columbia University proper, located 
fifty blocks to the south of the Medical Center.  And Columbia University proved to 
be the weakest link.  Despite the determinate struggle to keep the unions out of the 
University dining halls, in 1968 Local 1199 won the right to represent cafeteria 
workers.  This was 1199’s first contract at Columbia and waves of fear quickly 
reached the Medical School whose officers justifiably feared that they might be next 
on the Union’s agenda. 
On August 1, 1968, School officials met with their attorneys to discuss the 
situation at the Morningside campus and develop a common strategy.  According to 
the confidential memorandum, the attorneys “expressed unhappiness [of the 
Columbia’s administration] that 1199 won the election over the Transport Workers 
Union with respect to the cafeteria employees.”  In their opinion, “1199 [was] an 
utterly ruthless outfit” and would “go to great lengths - student involvement, etc.,” and 
was now “on the crest of the wave as a result of their recent contract victory with the 
hospitals.”  The lawyers unanimously felt that “1199 will go to any necessary lengths 
to get into P. & S. and this will be a stepping stone to a juicier plum – Presbyterian 
Hospital.”  The lawyers were authorized to inform the Medical School that, in view of 
the recent events, “the University’s policy downtown is to attempt to keep 1199 out of 
other areas by encouraging 153 (office workers) to get in ahead of them.”  The office 
workers union had “a good reputation and [Columbia] would be in a much better 
position if they were successful rather than 1199.”  With the approval of the central 
administration, the lawyers recommended that the Medical School to encourage Local 
153 to beat out 1199 in organizing the non-professional workers.  Encouraging a rival 
union was, of course, “no guarantee” of the desired outcome.  It was clear that 1199 
would inevitably “make things hot up here – pickets, demonstrations, student 
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participation (SDS, they say, is actively involved)” and that the School’s “support for 
153 will certainly not be taken lying down by 1199 who will charge that we are 
bringing in a company union, negotiating a ‘sweetheart contract’, etc.”28   
While acknowledging the reasoning behind the strategy adopted at the 
downtown campus, P&S officials hoped that the situation at the Medical Center was 
not “yet at the point where we should move actively to bring in 153, with all the 
implications of that step.”  If P&S adopted the strategy recommended by the 
University administration, the Presbyterian Hospital “would certainly be most 
unhappy as might be a good many of our people who want no part of unionization.”  
Not long before, the College and the University’s labor lawyers had initiated a “study 
on comparative wage and benefit scales” and a “survey of opinion by the 
administrative assistants” and the Medical School decided to refrain from any action 
until the results of the wage survey and “a valid reading of [the administrative 
employees] present sentiments” were completed, which would be in a few days.29  
As the University’s lawyers warned, an organizing drive for Local 1199 was 
soon underway at the Medical School.  Following its strategy in other organizing 
campaigns, the union relied on the institutions’ current employees to initiate and 
develop the organizing drive.  Whether the union initiated the contact with the 
institution or a group of interested employees contacted the union first was immaterial 
because without genuine interest and active participation on the part of at least a small 
group of employees, the Union’s organizing staff could not hope to mount a successful 
organizing campaign.  At Columbia’s College of Physicians and Surgeons, the 
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unionizing drive began in the Fall of 1968, led by a ten-person group of employees 
forming a “P&S Organizing Committee of Union Local 1199.”30 
While the Union’s campaign in New York’s hospitals seemed almost 
unstoppable, medical schools did constitute a new organizing terrain with its own 
peculiar set of challenges.  Reaching medical school employees with the union 
message was not an easy task.  Union organizers were almost overwhelmed by the 
number of different services and floors they had to cover in order to make contact with 
hospital service workers and top medical schools like Columbia were even more 
complex than the hospitals.  Whereas Presbyterian had only one teaching affiliate, the 
Columbia University’s Faculty of Medicine consisted of the schools of medicine, 
nursing and public health.  The Medical School also had many other hospital 
affiliations besides its primary base at the Presbyterian Hospital.  In addition to several 
public hospitals located near the Medical Center, such as the state-owned Neurological 
Institute and the Delafield Hospital specializing in cancer, P&S also had professional 
appointments and some semi- and non-professional staff in a dozen other public and 
private hospitals in the metropolitan area.  The School also ran several specialized 
operations such as laboratories, animal care department, dormitories, library, and the 
like.  Finally, the Medical School still served as an umbrella organization for both the 
School of Public Health and the School of Nursing and, from the outset, the 
organizing drive included the former under the general ‘medical school’ operation.   
The considerable autonomy and isolation of the separate departments of the 
Medical Center meant that medical school employees, whom the 1199 organizing 
campaign was trying to reach, had little contact with workers outside of their 
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departments.  In fact, the employees had considerably far more contact with their 
supervisors, medical school faculty, and administrators within their respective 
departments than they did with workers in other parts of the school.  The potential 
difficulty of organizing this segmented labor force was well illustrated by the 
departmental affiliations of the thirteen or so members of the original Organizing 
Committee for Local 1199 at P&S.  Two of the committee members were employees 
in the School of Public Health, another two came from the Department of Neurology, 
while the remaining nine were from Physiology, Neurophysiology, Microbiology, 
Pediatrics, Pathology, Animal Care, Obstetrics & Gynecology, plus Microbiology and 
Clinical Pathology at the Delafield Hospital.  Some of them indicated the floor number 
in the hospital building where they worked to be more precise about their location in 
the School’s complicated organization.31 
In strategic and ideological terms, medical school employees were a 
substantially different social group from the hospital workers.  In contrast to 1199’s 
successful hospital campaign which mainly involved mostly unskilled workers, 
medical school organizing involved predominantly semi-professional, technical, and 
clerical employees.  At P&S over eighty-five percent of the employees were classified 
as technical or clerical, with fewer than 15 percent falling into the ‘service worker’ 
category.  Even compared to the University’s undergraduate division, the medical 
school had less need for dormitory, dining, and maintenance services and, therefore, a 
much smaller proportion of unskilled and low-skilled employees.  
Despite its origins as a white-collar pharmacists’ union, 1199 had previously 
focused almost exclusively on the non-professional workers and thus the Union had 
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little experience with white-collar workers outside of its original pharmacy wing.32  
Although there were many indications of interest in unionization and in 1199 in 
particular among the City’s and other semi-professional medical school and hospital 
workers, the Union’s leadership did not rate the chances of success among these 
employees as very high and channeled few resources into it.  The white-collar 
employees, they felt, were on the whole unprepared for the militant struggle which the 
Union was conducting in the late fifties and early sixties. 
Legalization of collective bargaining rights in the City’s hospitals improved 
somewhat the prospects for white-collar unionization and 1199 was hoping to expand 
its efforts in this area.  As early as 1962, however, there was a feeling that in hospitals 
and medical centers it would not be possible to “just put workers together regardless 
of their background and station in life, in their job and how they make a living.” 
Receiving reports from a few of their semi-professional members that their co-workers 
wanted “an organization of professional employees for professional employees,” the 
union leadership moved to create separate divisions for non-professional and white-
collar workers.  The restructuring was also prompted by growing discontent within the 
union’s oldest constituent group – pharmacy workers – who felt overshadowed and 
neglected by the union’s consistent focus on hospital organizing.  Conceding that there 
probably was not and might never be complete identity of interests between 
pharmacists and non-professional hospital workers, the union was reorganized as three 
separate divisions: one for drugstore employees, another for non-professional hospital 
workers, and the third for semi-professional and technical hospital employees.   
This last division was officially named the “Guild of Professional, Technical, 
Office, and Clerical Hospital Employees.”  Jesse Olson, a former registered 
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pharmacist and Local 1199’s organizer since 1959, was elected to head the Guild and, 
like the other two union divisions, it was to keep its own records, collect its own dues, 
and create its own delegate assembly.33  The Guild began with about 500 members, 
mostly comprised of technical and semi-professional workers at Montefiore and 
Maimonides hospitals, as well as a few at Mount Sinai and Beth Israel.  Guild 
organizing proceeded considerably slower than that among the non-professional 
hospital workers, with the highest rate of success in institutions where 1199 already 
represented the latter.  A major breakthrough occurred in 1967, when, for the first time 
in the union’s history, it won representation of employees in a medical school, the 
Albert Einstein College of Medicine.  
Despite the Union’s success at Einstein, many questions of strategy and tactics 
in this new terrain remained unresolved.  At Einstein, for instance, 1199 did not have 
to organize the union from ground up but took over the independent employees 
organization which had been formed one year previously but made little headway in 
terms of effective bargaining with administration.  Thus, the victory at Einstein had to 
be attributed in part to the administration’s strategic error of stonewalling the original, 
‘in-house’ employee organization.  Thus, this victory did not necessarily portend 
success in convincing other semi-professional employees to affiliate with a large, 
mostly non-professional, and militant union like 1199. 
Reflecting the union’s strategic and programmatic ambivalence about its new 
divisional structure, the early organizing drive at P&S did not clearly communicate the 
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identity of the employees which the Committee for Local 1199 tried to organize and, 
by extension, their ‘place’ within the organizational and governing structure of the 
large and rapidly growing union.  Most written communications issued by the 
Organizing Committee to P&S employees omitted any reference to the ‘Guild,’ the 
union’s separate division for the semi-professional, clerical, and technical workers.  
Sometimes, but not always, 1199 was identified as the Drug and Hospital Union.  
Some of the union cards, which the organizers tried to have employees sign, suggested 
a very precise and narrow definition of the union group which the workers were 
invited to join.  Across the top of the cards, in large capital letters, was written “Guild 
of Professional & Technical Hospital Employees” and underneath it was an even finer 
focused designation: “Medical and Scientific Research Department.”  This designation 
omitted, for some reason, the ‘office’ and ‘clerical’ workers, although the discussion 
drafts of the proposed union program, circulated by the Organizing Committee, 
included secretaries and other office workers as one of the targeted employee 
categories.34  Amidst the wide variety of terms and categories, it was unclear how the 
various groups of employees fit into the union’s overall benefit and governing 
structure and how the union would serve the potentially very different interests of 
these disparate groups.  As with so many other instances of economic and class 
struggle, the organizers’ fundamental problem was the articulation of the ‘community 
of interest.’  
Unfortunately for 1199 and its supporters, the Union’s rival in the P&S 
organizing struggle had no such burden.  Although the University’s labor lawyers 
urged P&S to encourage a more mainstream organization, like the office workers 
union’s Local 153, to get in ahead of 1199, an even better alternative became available 
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in due time.  A month or two after the 1199’s Organizing Committee announced itself 
to the school’s administration with a request to use University meeting facilities, a 
professionally composed communication from the “Supporting Staff Association of 
the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University” was circulated 
among employees, inviting them to attend the organization’s meeting.  While the 
details of Association’s founding were unclear, the organization was soon able to hold 
meetings on Medical Center’s premises and Otto Gonzalez, a research worker at the 
School, emerged as the Association’s Temporary Chairman.35 
Unlike 1199, which exhibited difficulty defining their structure and targeting 
worker groups, the SSA had a very straightforward definition of its membership: “[a]ll 
employees of the College of Physicians and Surgeons who are paid semi-monthly.”  
The name of the College and its parent University were actually included in the 
Association’s official name, arousing no protestations from the administration.  This 
deceptively simple ‘community of interest’ promised an uncomplicated structure for  
“discussion of improvements salaries, pension, medical benefits, etc.,” as Association 
defined its purpose: one discrete institution, one discrete group of employees, one 
administration to deal with.36   
The Union’s Strategy 
In some respects, 1199’s organizing strategy at P&S was very similar to that it 
used at the hospitals: develop a group of inside supporters and turn day-to-day activity 
over to them; look for workers’ issues, large and small, and address them in a 
dramatic, powerful form; organize meetings, write petitions, and involve the rank-and-
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file as much as possible; and thus create through constant activity and worker 
involvement, a tangible and positive presence for the union.37  From another angle, 
however, the Union was treading on a terrain much different from its hospital 
organizing drives and had to develop a different approach.  The groups of employees 
targeted in this campaign were not only different in their socio-economic, racial, and 
gender composition but were also engaged in a different set of structural relations with 
their employers, superiors, and other workers. 
The key difference between non-professional hospital workers and the semi-
professional medical school employees was their relationship to the professionals 
within their respective organizations and, more generally, to the system of credential-
based division of labor.  With few exceptions, the non-professional hospital workers 
had little contact with the highly credentialed, professional people working in the same 
hospitals.  Kitchen, laundry, and maintenance employees were truly ‘invisible 
workers,’ whose contacts with others in the organization were mostly limited to their 
immediate supervisors.  In contrast, the semi-professional medical school employees 
worked much more closely with both professional employees and the administration.  
Assigned to particular academic departments, or even to individual doctors and 
researchers, these various assistants and technicians were more similar, in both 
personal and structural-economic terms, to their superiors.  Their hiring, assignment, 
and promotion, as well as much of their work routine, depended on the personal 
dispositions of their superiors.  The security of their employment and prospects of 
advancement also depended on the continuation of outside, competitive grants made to 
a particular investigator, project, or department.  In addition, the semi-professional 
workers were more likely to have had contact with the institution’s administrative 
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officers and one particular group among them, secretaries and office clerks, stood in 
an especially close, sometimes highly personal relationship to the administrators.  Not 
only did these employees work within more clearly defined ladders of job 
advancement, but their educational credentials – whether a high school diploma or a 
bachelor’s degree – held open a prospect, however modest, that they might join the 
ranks of professionals themselves, via graduate education.   
Although the union relied on a simple dichotomy between the workers and the 
administration when organizing and representing non-professional employees, such a 
reductive analysis was impossible with semi-professional medical school employees.  
The rhetorical strategy of the P&S Organizing Committee slowly emerged during the 
early months of communications with the administration and fellow employees.  One 
of the earliest ‘clarifications’ of the 1199’s position came through in a confrontation 
over the use of the university meeting facilities.  On November 15, 1968, Karen 
Kartlie, a technician from the 11th Floor of the Neurological Institute, wrote to Dean 
Merritt with a request to use the University’s Alumni Auditorium for an employees’ 
meeting.  Informing the Dean that, over the past few months, the activities of the 
Organizing Committee have grown, Ms. Kartlie wrote that the “committee of 
employees [felt] that future meetings should be held in a central University building 
convenient to all employees of the College.”  Replying for Dean Merritt in his 
absence, Assistant Dean Douglas Damrosch wrote that it was a “University-wide 
policy and, for that matter, accepted practice elsewhere, that University premises are 
not to be used in this manner.”  As a further reason for the denial of the Organizing 
Committee’s request, Assistant Dean noted that the State Labor Relations Board 
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prohibited employer institutions from allowing the use of their facilities to the 
contending organizations in advance of a union election.38     
In ensuing correspondence and tense meetings with the administration, the 
Organizing Committee developed a coherent posture with respect to the rights and 
interests of the employees it endeavored to organize.  After contacting both the 
National and the State Labor Relations Boards, the Committee rejected the 
administration’s ‘legal’ reason for denying the use of University meeting facilities.  “It 
seems to us,” stated the Committee, “that the question is one not of law or regulation 
but the nature of the university.”  Citing the report of the Cox Commission, which had 
studied the campus disturbances at Columbia University in the spring of 1963, the 
Committee underscored that “[a]ny tendency to treat a university as a business 
enterprise faculty as employees and students as customers diminish vitality and 
communal cohesion.”  The medical school employees, argued the petitioners, were as 
integral and vital part of the University as any other group and should be accorded the 
same rights.  As one of these rights, argued the Organizing Committee,  
the use of university facilities by any constituent unit of the university should, 
within the bounds of respect for the rights of other constituent groups, be 
recognized as a right to be employed responsibly and discretely in the interests 
of members concerned.  The administration's prerogative to grant permission 
for the use of such facilities should, we believe, be regarded as a function of 
traffic control rather than of the dispensation of privileges.    
Noting that, in recent months, the auditorium had been used with University 
consent by diverse groups (including the Medical Committee for Human Rights and 
the Health Professions for McCarthy), the Committee concluded that the denial of its 
request must stem for the administration’s deliberate attempt to “thwart employees in 
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establishing a legitimate organization to represent them in employment negotiations.”  
The petitioners concluded with a hope that the administration would reconsider its 
position in order that “what is in fact a rather routine administrative matter can be 
resolved amicably.”  This would be fully consistent with the spirit of the organizing 
efforts which aimed, after all, not at the antagonism with the administration but at 
creating “a viable and dynamic instrument of employee representation.”39  
This time the letter was signed, in addition to Ms. Kartlie, by ten other 
members of the Organizing Committee, and Dean Merritt quickly contacted 
University’s labor attorney for advice on how to handle it.  The labor counsel 
furnished Dean’s office with a response whose basic point was that it “was not the 
policy of the University to assist any union seeking to organized a group of employees 
by providing it with University facilities to speak to our employees.”  The letter 
suggested that Local 1199 should do what it has done in the past, namely, secure non-
University facilities to deliver “whatever message [it] would to the employees.”40 
Having gotten nowhere through correspondence, the Organizing Committee 
requested a meeting with the Dean.  After some evasive tactics on the part of the 
Dean’s office, on December 27, 1968 about sixty employees came to the meeting with 
Dean Merritt and Assistant Dean Damrosch to discuss the use of the University’s 
meeting facilities.  The employees’ main message was that, in rejecting their prior 
requests, the administration denied the rights of their employees, rather than of the 
Union Local 1199.  “We are organizing ourselves,” “we asked 1199 for help,” and “we 
are not being organized from ‘outside’” were the petitioners’ arguments.  Though the 
meeting was peaceful, the Dean pulled a familiar bureaucratic tactic of sending the 
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petitioner one level up and suggested that the employees take their request to the 
central university administration at the Morningside campus.  He even offered to 
review the draft and make comments and criticisms.  After two more months of delays 
and denials, Dean Merritt finally informed the Committee that, effective April 1, 1969, 
“Section 704 of the State Labor Relations Law will apply to all educational 
institutions” and will make it “illegal for an employer to interfere with the formation, 
existence or administration of any employee organization, union or association by any 
means,” including “donating free services, equipment, materials, office or meeting 
space or anything else of value.”  He then invited the Committee to go ahead and 
make any meeting space requests in the remaining two weeks before the law came into 
effect.41 
It was clear that the school’s administration was doing all it can to paint the 
activities of the Organizing Committee as impositions of the ‘outside’ union upon 
‘their,’ i.e. College’s, employees.  The Committee had to go to great lengths to assert 
that the initiative came from ‘inside’ the College, that the organizing was initiated by 
the employees themselves.  Indeed, in one of the letters to Dean Merritt, the 
Committee pointed out that one of the main reasons why P&S employees “requested” 
the help of 1199 was “the autonomy in policy and direction it accords its constituent 
groups.”42  Nevertheless, the ultimate struggle for unionization, as 1199’s veterans 
organizers undoubtedly knew, was going to be waged in the hearts and minds of the 
employees, rather than in the Dean’s office.  And here, convincing the semi-
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professional employees that Local 1199 was indeed the best way to represent their 
interests was not going to be easy.   
While the ‘meeting facilities’ affair did not do much to help the organizing 
effort, it brought together a group of employees most committed to unionization and 
allowed them to articulate their message to their colleagues.  In its correspondence 
with administration and direct appeals to the employees, the Organizing Committee 
grounded its message in a distinct ideological position.  The organizers argued that the 
medical school and university as a whole had a tri-partite structure, consisting of 
“Faculty,” “Administration” and “Staff.”  The former group was characterized as 
“associates,” “with whom [the employees] usually have a close working relationship” 
but whose efforts to improve the employees living standards are all too often 
“frustrated by administrative policy.” The Administration was defined as the real 
power holders in matters of “salary scales, pensions, health coverage, severance, sick 
leave, holidays, vacations and other conditions of employment.” Finally, the Staff was, 
according to the Organizing Committee’s leaflet, “the only group which has no voice 
in the decision-making process” and which it can acquire only by joining “an effective 
union and joining forces with other health and research personnel in 1199.”43   
Unlike the rhetoric used to organize non-professional employees where the 
issues of racial discrimination, economic exploitation and overall social 
marginalization were prominent, the organizing campaign among Columbia’s medical 
school employees articulated a vision of the semi-professional employees as a 
“constituent unit,” a kind of an estate, of the idealized “academic community,” with its 
corresponding rights and responsibilities.  In a fine example of this corporatist 
rhetoric, the Organizing Committee wrote: 
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Our purpose in attempting to establish a union group is to promote a more 
harmonious working relationship between ourselves and the other constituent 
elements of the University.  One of the ingredients of such a relationship, we 
feel, is out participation in decisions which vitally affect the quality of our 
working lives. 
At present however, charged the organizers, the Staff occupied a lowly estate, due to 
the Administration’s abuse of its power and infringement upon the employees’ 
legitimate rights.  Reminiscent of the liberal imagery of the bourgeois revolutions, the 
employees demanded, both in general terms and specifically in regard to the use of 
university facilities, that the administration, much like the liberal State, act as an 
impartial and minimal ‘traffic controller,’ rather than an arbitrary and overbearing 
dispensor of privileges.44   
In broader terms, the semi-professional employees have been here re-imagined 
as the lower, yet legitimate part of the ‘professional’ estate of the modern society.  In 
response to status anxieties, ‘professional’ aspirations, and ‘job security’ concerns, 
characteristic of these strata in the white-collar labor force, the organizers outlined a 
larger program of strengthening the position of this ‘social estate’ not only in a 
particular institution, but in the labor market at large.  Indeed, in the early organizing 
literature, the questions of salaries and benefits were de-emphasized in favor of 
“enhancing skills,” “upgrading and strengthening professional standards,” 
“safeguarding job security,” raising “levels and standards throughout the field” to 
create “continuity of salary scales, pensions and other fringe benefits” for semi-
professional workers as they move across the employing institutions.  As members of 
the ‘lower professional estate,’ the semi-professional employees were promised that 
the union would fight for their industrial interests as well, “mounting a public 
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campaign to gain more funds for continuation and expansion of much-needed health 
and medical research.”45  
While the Organizing Committee’s rhetoric took pains not to alienate the semi-
professional workers from their professional superiors, there were also some rather 
practical issues that needed to be addressed in this area.  Like the voluntary hospitals, 
which argued that most of their operating budgets came from reimbursement by the 
third-parties, the medical schools insisted that most of their work was paid for by NIH 
grants and that it was difficult or even impossible to get them to cover salary 
increases.  Unionization, warned the administrators, would inevitably produce lay-
offs.46   
The experience of unionization at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 
where 1199 has represented the employees for a year and half, was the Organizing 
Committee’s strongest card both in this specific question of grants and in more general 
issues of employee-faculty relations.  To that end, the Committee circulated a 
statement signed by twenty-six members of the Einstein’s faculty regarding their 
relationship with the union.  The statement testified that the employer-employee 
relationships had been enhanced since Local 1199 had come to Einstein.  Increased 
salaries and benefits, negotiated by the Union, brought the College’s pay scale close to 
those paid at the City’s industrial firms, enabling the School to “compete for the most 
talented personnel available.”  The Union’s presence facilitated a better working 
atmosphere for the employees and a more stable relationship between staff and 
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investigators.  As a result, the typically high rates of turnover among the employees at 
medical institutions had been reduced at Einstein.  The Union brought an end to the 
“constant struggle of the investigators to obtain raises, overtime pay, etc.,” which are 
now negotiated directly between employees and administration.  Thus, each faculty 
member now “devotes his energies to the work at hand.”  Finally, the Union joined 
with the faculty in the struggle for additional funding for the College’s teaching 
hospital and to expand funds for health care and medical research.  The Organizing 
Committee has also obtained and circulated a letter of understanding between 
Einstein’s Director of Personnel and the Union representative regarding the ‘lay-off’ 
and ‘transfer’ procedures in case of retrenchment of grant funds.  Einstein’s 
administration promised to provide the union complete information on the nature and 
extent of grant cut-backs and to transfer laid-off employees to other positions as soon 
as they became open.  The Committee has also issued a comparative pay chart in order 
to show that the unionized employees at Einstein received considerably higher 
salaries.47 
In essence, the organizing strategy of the P&S Organizing Committee reflected 
both the ‘separatist’ strategy which underlay 1199’s new organizational structure and 
recognition of a different relationship of the semi-professional workers to their 
professional superiors and their employer institutions.  The ‘third estate’-type rhetoric, 
articulated during the early phase of organizing drive, echoed precisely those 
sentiments, which the designation of the semi-professional division as the ‘Guild’ also 
tapped.  Nevertheless, the Organizing Committee’s direct identification with Union 
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1199 and even something so seemingly small as their failure to use the term ‘Guild’ or 
‘technical and professional’ employees in most of their communications, may have 
been significant in this close contest. 
The Administration’s Strategy 
With almost a decade of experience, albeit from the sidelines,  Columbia-
Presbyterian was well prepared to conduct an anti-union campaign.  When 1199 won 
its first victory on the Morningside campus of the University, medical school’s 
administration took its first steps.  Certain that its higher wages, relative to other 
medical centers, already helped keep unionization at bay, the School threw more 
money at the problem.  Modest salary raises were given in July of 1968 and more 
substantial ones were announced in December, to take effect starting January 1, 1969, 
when 1199 was already organizing on campus.  Another wage raise was to come six 
months later, along with improved benefits.  The raise in January was substantial, on 
the order of thirty percent or more.  Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage, for which 
employees previously had to pay, was now offered free.  “Why such generosity now?” 
asked the 1199’s flier.  “Clearly,” it answered, “the administration is afraid of the 
power of a union at P&S.  It is afraid that, if employees get together to bargain for 
their rights rather than waiting to receive them at College’s whim, the wage and fringe 
benefits might just be more than the administration wants.”48  
In August of 1968, the School also completed a “survey of opinion by the 
administrative assistants,” aimed at giving the administration “a valid reading of [the 
employees’] present sentiments,” which Assistant Dean Damrosch discussed at his 
meeting with the University’s labor counsel.49  This survey appears to have been the 
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very same document which, just days before the representation election, fell into 
possession of 1199, causing significant embarrassment to the School’s administration.  
The document, which received growing publicity during the summer and early fall of 
1969, contained 25 pages of typed reports, dated June through August, 1968, 
documenting a series of evaluations signed by John J. McNamara, assistant director of 
personnel for the University and James J. Dean, whom 1199 identified as the 
University’s lawyer.  The cover letter, signed by Thomas M. Kerrigan and dated June 
27, 1968, noted that it was necessary to “organize the staff at P&S for the purpose of 
communicating with employees who might be called upon to vote in an election” and 
create “a system of key personnel in each and every department who would be the 
cornerstones of any organizational campaign against the union.”50 
The “dossier,” as 1199 christened it, contained a comprehensive list of P&S 
employees by department with notes pertaining to their political attitudes and views on 
unionization, as well as other factors, such as race and country of origin, thought to be 
relevant to this issue.  In a report on workers in the Pediatrics department, for instance, 
one employees was identified as “a rabid civil rights advocate and very pro union.” 
“Fortunately,” it was noted, “her group is very small.”  In another evaluation, “[Miss 
X] reported that a girl from the Anesthesia Dept. has been talking very strongly in 
favor of the union.  It was [Miss X’s] understanding that this girl went through a 
marriage ceremony during the Columbia sit-in.” The Ophthalmology Department, on 
the other hand, was described as “very loyal to the university.” Apparently, there were 
“a number of Philipinos working in this department,” and Miss X [the informant] felt 
                                                 
 
50
 Robin Elliott, Interim Chairman, P&S Organizing Committee of 1199, “Columbia is enlightened, 
intelligent, impartial and absolutely honest, right? ... ,” undated flier.   “1199 Charges P&S With 
Stifling Union,” Columbia Spectator, September 18, 1969; “Medical Students Sit In With the Workers,” 
New York Post, September 24, 1969. 
  325 
that “since many of them are waiting for citizenship papers, they might not want to get 
involved with any problems of the university.”51 
This unfortunate stumble in the administration’s otherwise smooth campaign 
prompted the Dean of the College, Dr. H. Houston Merritt, to address the issue in an 
open letter, issued one day before the election, to dispel “all the rumors concerning 
this document.”  First of all, Dean Merritt assured the employees that he had “never 
personally seen this document, nor has anyone else on the P&S Administration Staff.”  
He was told by the University’s attorneys that “in June 1968 one of them spoke to the 
Administration Assistants in order for the attorneys to gain factual information 
concerning the physical set-up of P&S and to ascertain department heads and 
supervisors in various departments.”  All that this document contained, the Dean was 
told, are the locations of the school’s departments, names of key personnel, and, in the 
last column, “any comments that may have been volunteered by persons spoken to.” 
“At no time,” declared the Dean, “has any employee ... been threatened with this 
document or any action taken against any person since none of us at P&S has ever 
seen it.”  Although clearly on the defensive, the Dean’s letter did not miss a chance to 
attack 1199, claiming that all evidence pointed to the fact that the document was 
“taken from our attorneys’ files by someone at a conference at the State Labor 
Relations Board.” We do not know who took it, noted the Dean, but we do know that 
it is being circulated by 1199.52   
The administration’s files suggest that confidential informants have been 
employed to spy on the Organizing Committee of Local 1199, as well as other activity 
the Medical Center found threatening.  In a page-long report, received by the Dean’s 
Office on March 18, 1969, an unnamed informant supplied the following details of the 
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meeting of Executive and Issues Committees of the Organizing Committee of Local 
1199.  
 
They started to discuss the pension question.  Some wanted a contributory 
plan whereby if an employee left after a number of years the employee could, 
take out what was deposited to his account.  Others wanted only the employer 
to contribute to the pension plan.  The man from Einstein said they had the 
former plan which in essence is a forced savings plan and they are planning to 
change to the latter.  No final decision was made.  
The next question was the meeting room.  A Copy of Dr. Merritt’s letter 
was passed around and they questioned the “interpretation” of “interfering”.  
They want to take advantage of the next two weeks for meeting places and are 
planning to ask immediately for several meeting rooms such as the Faculty 
Room. lecture halls. etc.  They think they will have about 100 people at the 
meeting.  They plan to post notices which will contain in large letters the fact 
that the union won recognition to meet and to incorporate the Dean’s letter in 
the notice.  
Robin Elliott brought up the question of filing for intention to vote.  Some 
want to delay it until the fall but the leaders seem to think they should file by 
April 1st.  The others brought up the question of having representatives from 
Harlem [Hospital, P&S municipal hospital affiliate] Columbia Libraries, 
Computer Center and the other units which have already joined the union to 
Come and talk to the people here to tell them of the benefits to be derived in 
joining the union.  Some of the employees here feel they need pointers in 
“educating” those other employees who do not seem to favor the union.  Also 
they want to discuss with the Union’s legal department the right interpretation 
of the term “interfering” in the new law.  
It was the consensus that intensive floor meetings should be held 
immediately, and a representative on each floor is to go into each lab and talk 
to each person in the lab to try to get them to sign up.  
Another executive meeting is being called for Friday of this week at 5:00 
PM and to have a party afterwards.  
The meeting broke up at 8: 00 PM.53  
 
The administration also attempted to monitor the activity of various groups 
agitating for change in health care services available in the Washington Heights 
community and the city as a whole.  For instance, the Center had an informant report 
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on the “gripe and action” meeting on May 26, 1969 organized by Freedom and Peace 
Party aimed at airing complaints and problems with health care services offered by 
CPMC to local residents and its racist policies in treatment and medical school 
admission.  An informant estimated the number of people attending (“about 100 
persons”), their racial composition (“mixed, being predominantly Porto Rican and the 
rest both negro and white”) and the person presiding over the meeting (“one ‘Jack 
Mandel,’” “beatnik type, bearded, and wearing a lumberjack shirt” who was 
“recognized as having been on Hospital premises during the past week”).  The 
informant reported that the main theme of the meeting concerned the Vanderbilt 
Clinic.  “The demands are for free clinic service, with as much professional staff 
coverage 24 hours of the day as during the daytime hours,” “free ambulance service by 
the Hospital ... with admission to Presbyterian and no transfers to city institutions for 
all.”  During the question and answer period, “one woman spoke of having to wait 
more than 7 hours during the night,” another “spoke of injuring her foot and when 
finally seen, being referred to a city hospital.”  “One person defended the medical care 
and was booed and shouted down.”54   
The informant gave the Medical Center the heads-up on future action.  “A 
Board composed of six members was set up by Mandel.  Two were white females said 
to be P&S students; one white male was also said to be a P&S student.  Names were 
not obtained, nor were the other three members known.” S/he was also able to report 
that a rally was called for the night of May 30, 1969, on the street in front of the 
building where the meeting took place, and another meeting was called for June 11th.  
A petition was drawn up to present to the Hospital authorities.  “If this petition was not 
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successfully met, a demonstration in front of the Hospital was suggested,” reported the 
informant. One piece of information drew the administration’s particular attention.  
“Support will be asked from Local 1199,” wrote the informant, “which support was 
described as being so strong that any demand will be met.  Also discussed was a drive 
to obtain the assistance of Presbyterian Hospital employees, perhaps through the 
Union.”55 
Having been ‘informed’ by their spy on the Organizing Committee that the 
leaders were likely to file for election in early April, the administration contacted the 
University’s lawyers to say that “this may be the proper time for the University to 
inform our employees of our position concerning Local 1199 and to state our views on 
some of the issues that the union group have raised.”56  Over the next three months, 
the administration issued a number of information sheets purporting to answer the 
questions some employees asked about the organizing activity at the school.  
Invariably addressing the employees as “Our Supporting Staff,” the circulars 
emphasized that the employees were “not bound by union cards,” that they received 
three wage increases over the past 18 months, all of which were “granted without the 
payment of dues, without initiation fees and without a strike.”  If 1199 won, warned 
Dean’s communications, employees would pay “$5.50, $6.50 or $7.50 per month in 
union dues” and “[t]his also would be true of any dues charged by the SSA.”  Above 
all, Dean told the employees, “[y]ou must vote to protect your rights” and “[w]e would 
like a 100% turn-out at the election poll.”57  
If the Organizing Committee for 1199 articulated a corporatist vision of the 
employees’ rights within the academic-professional community, the Administration 
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sought to encourage individualism among their employees, an attitude opposed to 
collectivism and bureaucratic leveling.  In one of the ‘Question and Answer’ circulars 
distributed close to the election, the Administration warned the employees that, should 
a union win, all employees would be compelled to join the union, whether they want 
to or not, or else they will be discharged.  Such coercion, implied the Administration’s 
message, is utterly intolerable and grossly violates individual freedoms. 
As a matter of principle, the Medical School believes that each of its 
employees should be free to decide for himself or herself where he or she 
wished to belong to a Union and that the Medical School itself should be free 
to hire employees ... regardless of their Union affiliations.  Unfortunately, if 
the union wins the election, neither the Medical School nor the employees may 
have any choice concerning the question of compulsive unionism.  The only 
way an employee can be certain that he won’t be compelled to join a union as a 
condition of employment is for him and his fellow employees to vote “No” on 
election day. 
If compulsory unionism was not scary enough, the Administration’s circular warned 
the employees that, on top of hefty union dues, union members will also be subject to 
the imposition of special assessments to meet any special needs.  “These special 
assessments,” it was explained, “are often for political purposes, that is, for 
contributions to campaign funds of a particular political party.”  As a result, “union 
members are sometimes required to make contributions to political parties which they 
oppose.”58 
Administration’s ‘information’ sheet took pains to depict the union as a rigid, 
leveling organization.   Once a union is established, warned the administration, it is 
impossible to remove it, since “the New York State Labor Relations Board has no 
procedure for getting rid of [the unions], not even if an overwhelming majority of the 
employees want them out.”  The union will eliminate “merit [salary] increases as a 
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practical matter, if not by the express terms of the contract.”  In short, “the Medical 
School would take on several of the undesirable aspects of the Civil Service System.”  
Finally, the union may negatively effect the working atmosphere at the medical 
school.  The “union shop stewards in each department would cause as much 
disturbance as motivated by their own personalities.  In some departments there will 
probably be no difficulty.  In other departments constant strife.”59 
Remarkably, a series of similar communications – in the form of memoranda 
or even the familiar question and answer sheets – were sent to the Chairmen of 
Departments and other members of the professional staff.  “May we give you some 
additional information concerning the election on Friday, June 27th,” began one of 
these letters.  Only two days remaining before the election, the Dean pronounced three 
points, which he apparently deemed necessary for the chairmen to know.  The first 
concerned the union shop provision, which the Dean wrote existed in “each contract 
Local 1199 has with the University on campus and at Harlem Hospital,” as well as at 
Einstein and other institutions under contract with the Union.  After explaining that the 
union shop provides that existing and new employees must join the union or be 
discharged, the Dean raised the more important point about this provision. 
This provision becomes most important for Local 1199 at P&S since it would 
guarantee them approximately $100,000 per year in dues and initiation fees. 
The arithmetic is easy - there are approximately 1,230 employees eligible to 
vote in the three units; Local 1199's dues structure is $5.50, $6.50 or $7.50 per 
month depending on an employee's salary. By multiplying 1,230 x $6.50 we 
arrive at $7,995 per month in dues, or nearly $96,000 per year. If we hire only 
175 employees during the year this would bring the union another $25 per 
person in initiation fees or over $4,000 per year, for a grand total of $100,000. 
Do you think the union would permit us to have a contract without a union 
shop?  
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This must have been calculated to arouse the chairmen’s outrage at the over-paid 
unionists.60   
Dean’s next point was research projects.  “Most of our research,” stated the 
Dean, “is paid by NIH” and, “[a]s you all know, it is difficult if not impossible to get 
any of these grants increased to cover any increase in salaries or fringe benefits.”  In 
the event that one of the unions wins the election and demands salary and fringe 
benefit increases, “most grants will not have sufficient monies available to cover the 
added cost.”  The only solution would be for the University to absorb the added costs 
or to layoff employees.  “It can be stated emphatically,” wrote the Dean, “that the 
University is not financially able to pick up any such cost.”  But the most disturbing 
message was that the administration had “heard” that at Einstein, where such demands 
have been already made, “Local 1199 has threatened to strike if Einstein fails to layoff 
faculty members at the same time they layoff technical employees.”61 
The final point of the letter was a “100% turnout.”  “It is our goal,” wrote the 
Dean, “that every eligible employee have an opportunity to cast his ballot in SECRET 
on Friday, June 27, 1969.” In case the senior faculty missed the point of this directive, 
the Dean stressed that it was “incumbent on each department head or supervisor to see 
to it that each eligible employee is given sufficient time off to go down to vote.”62  
These and other communications were obviously directed toward diminishing the 
extent of sympathy or, at least, non-interference which professional staff might have 
granted their semi-professional colleagues in the throws of unionization struggle.  The 
strategy was to arouse fear for the future of the professionals’ own careers, closely 
bound, as was implied, with the fortunes of the institution in which they worked.   
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The crux of the Administration’s strategy was to individualize their employees 
and to reach each one in the most effective way.  Whether or not the kind of 
information gathered in the infamous personnel dossier was actionable under the 
watchful eye of the union is rather unclear but it is obvious that the administration did 
try its best to exploit every difference it could.  Whether it was pending immigration 
cases of Philippine employees or the peculiar subordination of the female secretarial 
corps to the personal authority of their bosses, administration strove to know and to 
use particular and individual vulnerabilities.  As an institution, P&S had come a long 
way from the days when the top administrators would never bother communicating 
directly to their lower-level employees and when all matters pertaining to them were 
left in the hands of their immediate bosses.  Now, communication was frequent and, 
sometimes, even personal.  Many communications were in Spanish as well.   
In its anti-union strategy, the medical school was not merely trying to discover 
particular differences among its employees that it could use to its advantage.  To a 
large extent, the organization had created and fostered those differences as well.  
Medical school’s highly fragmented structure, in which the employees were scattered 
among multiple physical locations, hospitals, and departments, was an invaluable asset 
in the administration’s fight.  Independent department operations and fragmented 
funding structure also helped the administration make the case against joining the 
larger union.  Finally, the medical school’s professional and educational work daily 
symbolized a larger vision of individual achievement projected throughout the entire 
cultural space.  Individualist worldview, opposed to all collectivism, was something 
that the administration was happy to cultivate in the minds of their employees.   
The Employee Association’s Strategy 
Whether or not the school’s administration had a hand in launching the SSA 
itself is unclear but some facts certainly point to that conclusion.  First, of course, was 
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the urging of the University’s lawyers that the School should choose ‘the lesser evil,’ 
rather than resisting unionization outright which might only increase 1199’s appeal.  
Events at Einstein also suggested that medical school employees might be interested in 
establishing their own, rather than an outside, employee organization.  Second, the 
Supporting Staff Association was apparently retaining a lawyer, an unusual fact for a 
fledgling employee organization which was yet to collect any membership fees, and its 
earliest communications featured highly precise and legalistic language.63  The flier 
inviting employees to an ‘interest’ meeting, for example, consisted of two paragraphs 
headed “Purpose” and “Prospectus,” and included such precisely warded clauses as 
“when our organization is accepted by the employees with a majority vote” or “the 
present proposed structure is to obtain two (2) representatives from each 
department.”64   
Last but not least, the SSA’s early appeals defined the organization in 
distinctly co-operative and amicable terms.  “Many of us,” read the prospectus, “who 
have been employed by Columbia University for a number of years, have had a good 
relations with the Management and Supervisors and wish to continue this relationship; 
however, we of the Supporting Staff desire to have the potential to shape our future on 
a fair basis to us and the Management.”  The Association’s accommodating posture 
was apparently reciprocated by the administration.  Unlike the Organizing Committee 
for 1199 whose requests to use University meeting facilities had been repeatedly 
denied, all of the SSA meetings took place in the School’s buildings.  During the 
months leading to the union elections, the School’s administration had also adopted 
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the phrase “Supporting Staff” as a standard address in all official communications 
with its employees.65   
First gently and then more aggressively, the SSA’s communications suggested 
that it was a genuine, home-grown organization established by and for the P&S 
employees, whereas Local 1199 was an impersonal, distant organization interested 
exclusively in extracting the school’s employees union dues and inclined to employ 
any methods to achieve their goals.  After the administration’s personnel dossier has 
been uncovered by 1199, the SSA issued a statement confirming that the Association 
“has seen the personnel dossier on P&S employees as reported by 1199.”  While 
emphatically denouncing the administration’s “spy action,” the SSA also condemned 
“the action of 1199 in acquiring such information by whatever devious method.”  The 
Association, said the statement, “has never and will never engage or endorse such 
scurrilous tactics” proceeding, in the remainder of the document, to attack 1199 as a 
distant, unresponsive extractor of union dues.66 
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As election time neared, SSA stepped up its efforts to distinguish itself from its 
rival.  “You will be asked,” read one pre-election letter, “to decide whether you wish 
to be represented by an organization founded and managed by you co-workers, whom 
you know, or whether you wish absentee representation supplied by a group of 
strangers.”  
The leadership of the SSA knows your problems better than any stranger ever 
will. ... Every time a problem arises it will require a call to an office in 
downtown New York where it will be processed in an impersonal way.  You 
might inquire of your friends at other hospitals about the kind of brush-off they 
have received from that office.  Don’t be misled by the fact that the other union 
has an organizing committee composed of P&S employees.  The chairman of 
that committee is leaving P&S on June 30.  You may be certain that after the 
election this committee won’t mean a thing and that full control will pass into 
the hands of the union professionals if they should win. ... We know that Local 
1199 plans to suppress you with enormous dues. ... We assure you that you 
will get more effective representation by the SSA for far less financial 
endorsement.”67 
All in all, this was a message, with which the School’s administration would have 
hardly disagreed. 
The First Union Election at P&S 
The New York State Labor Relations Board determined that a little over 1200 
employees of the College of Physicians and Surgeons were eligible to vote in a 
representation election.  The employees were divided into three voting units: technical 
workers, with 603 employees; clerical workers, with 437 employees, and service 
workers, with 170 employees.68  Table 6.1 summarizes the election results in the three 
units.69  The differences among the units were quite telling.  Both in its leadership and 
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Table 6.1.  Results of the First Union Elections at Columbia University’s College of 
Physicians and Surgeons, June 27, 1969 
 
Total Votes Cast  
in Each Unit 
Voting for 
1199 
Voting for 
SSA 
Voting for 
No Union Voting Unit 
# % # % # % # % 
Technical 497 100% 204 41% 173 35% 120 24% 
Clerical 375 100% 120 32% 70 19% 185 49% 
Service 142 100% 57 40% 45 32% 40 28% 
 
Source: Calculated from C.D. Auty, Assistant Vice President for Personnel, Presbyterian Hospital, to 
Dean Merritt and the Administration, “Record Memorandum,” July 3, 1969. 
 
message, the 1199 organizing drive at P&S had focused on semi-professional and, 
especially, technical, workers.  The message of professionalism, workplace 
democracy, idealized academic community and entitlement to decent wages and 
benefits were obviously most appealing to this group of workers.  The clerical unit, 
which turned out to be most convinced by the administration’s message, reflected both 
its gender composition and its distinctive relationship to administrative hierarchy and 
function.  Since, none of the three election choices presented at the representation 
election received the majority of votes required to win and the Labor Relations Board 
ordered run-off elections between 1199 and the SSA in all three units.  Due to summer 
vacations, the University requested that the run-off elections be postponed until the 
fall and the date was set for October 3, 1969.   
Although not an outright rejection of unionism, the results of the June election 
must have been reassuring to the officials at the medical school and the university.  
They still had a clear chance to carry through their Plan B, any union but 1199.  “[A]m 
I correct in thinking that we should now make every effort to get those who voted for 
No Union to vote for the S.S.A ... ?” read a hasty note from the Chairman of the 
Department of Urology to Dean Merritt.  “No answer to this is needed,” he added, 
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“unless I am wrong.”70  Indeed, no response seems to have been sent, although at the 
end of September, in one of its by now quite regular communications administration 
assured employees that “[t]he University’s position in this election is one of 
neutrality” and that it “will negotiate in good faith with the winner.”71 
The results of the run-off representation elections between Local 1199 and the 
SSA were as shown in Table 6.2.  Run-off vote results were very close in Technical 
and Service units and the University and the two unions were allowed to file briefs 
with the Labor Relations Board.  The preliminary results of the election stood and 
SSA was certified as a collective bargaining agent for all three units.72   
 
 
Table 6.2.  Results of the Run-Off Union Elections at Columbia University’s College 
of Physicians and Surgeons, September 3, 1969 
 
Total Votes Cast For SSA For 1199 
Voting Unit 
# % # % # % 
Technical 451 100% 233 52% 218 48% 
Clerical 373 100% 240 64% 133 36% 
Service 130 100% 66 51% 64 49% 
 
Source: Calculated from Dean Merritt to All Supporting Staff Employees, memorandum on October 3, 
1969 election results, dated October 6, 1969. 
 
The First Union Election at Presbyterian 
Nominally, the first ever union election at the Medical Center spelled a limited 
victory of the administration, insofar as the Union Local 1199 was defeated by what 
may well have been a ‘company union.’  A host of unsettling questions regarding the 
SSA’s constitution and legitimacy arose immediately after the election and indicated 
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that the battle was not yet over.  This probing was a work of a small but active core of 
the school’s employees who were determined to continue working for more 
aggressive, independent union representation.  Another confirmation that 1199 was 
not to be written off at the Medical Center came early in 1970, when the first ever 
group of Presbyterian employees voted to join the Local and petitioned the NYS Labor 
Board for a representation election.  The group in question was one of the smallest 
units of the Hospital, the Department of Social Work, with a 24-person, all female 
professional staff.  The Department’s slight size, however, did not indicate that the 
university would not aggressively fight the proposal. 
Upon learning of the social workers’ intention to organize, Presbyterian’s 
administration immediately launched a legal campaign to thwart their effort.  A series 
of objections filed by the Hospital succeeded in considerably delaying the election, 
although not in preventing it altogether. Five months after the filing, the Labor 
Relations Board had finally reviewed the Hospital’s objections and ordered the 
election to be held.  Predictably, the administration tried to persuade the social 
workers to vote against the union.  Their attempt failed, however, and on June 3, 1970 
the social workers voted 18 to 6 to be represented by Local 1199.73 
Despite the results of the election, the Hospital refused to negotiate a union 
contract with the social workers.  Instead, it again proceeded to file a number of 
objections to the election with the New York State Labor Relations Board.  On 
February 9, 1971, or nearly eight months after the social workers voted for the union, 
the Labor Relations Board finally managed to go through the barrage of motions filed 
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by the Hospital and strongly dismissing them as “frivolous” and stating that “the 
hospital had tried to ‘make a merry-go-round of our election procedures.’”74   
After the Board reaffirmed its certification of Local 1199 as a collective 
bargaining agent of the social workers, both the employees and the union officials 
repeatedly tried to contact the hospital administration to begin collective bargaining, 
as directed by the court decision.  These efforts were met by a concerted refusal of the 
administration to meet or negotiate with their social workers.  As the social workers 
recounted in their letter to the Chairman of the Hospital’s Board of Trustees, 
“Presbyterian has chosen not only to flaunt the courts and the law by refusing to talk 
with its Social Workers, but has also filed new objections to the elections.”75  
After more than a year of futile attempts to get the Hospital to recognize the 
union, the social workers sought to publicize their case to a wider audience and help 
put pressure on Presbyterian’s administration.  A copy of their appeal to the Hospital’s 
Board of Trustees to amicably resolve the situation was sent to the Association of New 
York Schools of Social Work, National Association of Social Workers, New York 
City and New York State Commissioners of Social Services, Community Council of 
Greater New York, and the United Fund.  Apparently immune to threats of “public 
embarrassment,” the Presbyterian continued a legal strategy of delay and evasion.   
During more than two years of legal battle, the State Labor Relations Board 
had consistently ruled in favor of the Social Workers and the Union, the arbitration 
hearings resulted in support of the Union, and the State Supreme Court also upheld the 
decision of the State Labor Relations Board.  Despite consistent findings in favor of 
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the social workers’ right to union representation, Presbyterian refused to accept these 
decisions, appealing them where possible and initiating new legal processes to justify 
its continuing disregard of the courts’ injunctions to recognize and negotiate with the 
union.  In May of 1972, for instance, the Medical Center administration requested that 
the Appellate Court delay hearings on the Union’s petition, noting that the Medical 
Center has asked that Court to rule first on its own petition which involved questions 
about which Social Workers were eligible to vote for a bargaining unit and what is to 
be considered a Social Work Unit in the Medical Center, providing yet another fine 
example of the Hospital’s hairsplitting legal tactics.76   
Stonewalled by the Hospital’s refusal to recognize their rights, the social 
workers turned to their professional organization.  On June 28, 1972, the workers filed 
a complaint with the New York City Chapter of the National Association of Social 
Workers (NASW), alleging violation of personnel standards by the Presbyterian 
Hospital. and asking for a special inquiry into the case.  Accepting the case, NASW 
appointed a committee to conduct an inquiry.  At a hearing, held on October 17, 1972, 
where a representative of the Hospital was present, along with the Hospital’s lawyer as 
a witness, the Special Inquiry Committee determined that the Hospital indeed “failed 
to acknowledge and comply with the bargaining rights of its Social Workers,” the 
rights which had been clearly defined in a policy statement on labor-management 
relations in social work issued by the NASW.  The Committee concluded that the 
Hospital was guilty of repeated disregard for the decisions of the courts and that its 
own personnel policies in regard to the social workers were grossly deficient.  In 
particular, the Committee established that “while the Medical Center has a set of 
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personnel practices, published in an Employees Handbook, only at the hiring point are 
Social Workers informed of the conditions of their employment.”  Social workers did 
not have access to the Handbook which, in any case, “ does not include all of the 
personnel practices which apply to them,” as the Medical Center representative 
admitted at the hearing.  Although the social workers had drawn up a set of personnel 
practices and submitted them to the Director of the Social Service Department, 18 
months later “there [still] has been no response to the document nor any indication that 
the Social Workers could participate in any process which would deal with changes or 
additions to the Medical Center personnel practice.”  The Committee concluded that, 
at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, “the basic responsibility which the Social 
Workers have in labor-management relations, namely to participate in the formulation 
of personnel policies and procedures which affect them on the job, is being denied 
them.”77 
The NASW Committee recommended that the Medical Center administration 
“recognize the rights of the Social Workers to select their own bargaining unit (union).  
This principle, they emphasized, as enunciated by the National Association of Social 
Workers, “operates for the Social Work Profession throughout the United States and 
applies to health and welfare agencies, publicly and privately supported, and of all 
sizes and organizational structures.”  The Committee also enjoined the administration 
to work together with representatives of the social workers “to review and revise, as 
necessary, the personnel practices, of the Medical Center and to make the copies of 
such personnel practices be easily available to all of the Social Workers.”  In doing so, 
the Committee urged that “the National Association of Social Workers’ Personnel 
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Standards, which defines the rights, responsibilities and commitments of Professional 
Social Workers, be utilized as a guide.”78   
As might have been expected, the recommendations of the NASW, the largest 
professional organizational of the social workers were ignored.  Almost eight months 
after their inquiry, the Association used its final and ultimate weapon, issuing a 
statement in which it urged 
that members of NASW refuse offers of employment in the Hospital; that 
graduate schools of social work not use the Hospital as a field placement for 
their students; that related professional organizations and governmental and 
private funding and accrediting agencies review their relationship with the 
Presbyterian Hospital in the light of this institution’s persistent efforts to 
deprive its employees of a commonly accepted right of all workers in our 
society – the right to organize in a union of their own choice and to bargain 
collectively with their employer on matters of working conditions, personnel 
practices and salaries.79  
Internal Opposition to the SSA 
While the struggle of the twenty-four social workers against the Presbyterian 
Hospital unfolded in the courts, the 1199 supporters at P&S continued their struggle, 
albeit now from the inside of SSA.  Soon after the certification of the SSA as an 
exclusive collective bargaining agent for P&S employees, an internal opposition group 
formed the Committee on Election Procedures (originally the SSA Subcommittee on 
Elections).  Frustrated by the secrecy surrounding the SSA governance, constitution, 
and negotiations with the administration, the Committee secured a court order served 
on Otto Gonzalez to show cause why he should represent the SSA and to enjoin him 
and the Executive Committee from any further collective bargaining negotiations on 
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behalf of the SSA.80  The order forced Mr. Gonzalez to submit the SSA Constitution.  
Previously, Mr. Gonzalez had failed to file it with the Labor Department (a violation 
of the law) and refused to make the constitution available to those SSA members 
which demanded to see it.  Although the court ordered Mr. Gonzalez to make the 
Constitution public, the self-appointed President of the SSA refused to print, leading 
the Committee on Election Procedures to print it at their own cost and to issue an open 
letter to all P&S employees describing this document as grossly undemocratic.  
Quoting from several articles, the opposition group revealed that the SSA Constitution 
reserved most powers – including amendments to Constitution – to the Executive 
Board.  It further stipulated that the first election to the Board would not be conducted 
until March 1972 and that only those who have been members of SSA prior to 
September 1969, i.e. before the final run-off elections, would be eligible for office.  In 
effect, no decisions would be ratified by the vote of the SSA membership.81   
The Committee on Election Procedures wrote that it was clear why Mr. 
Gonzalez had repeatedly refused to provide the text of the Association’s Constitution.  
It was “a totally undemocratic and authoritarian document” that “leaves each of us, 
whether a member of the S.S.A. or not, at the mercy and absolute control of a self-
perpetuating Executive Board.”  The Committee called on the P&S employees to fight 
for a democratic union. 
By conducting secret negotiation and disregarding the mandate of the 400 
workers at the Dec. 17 meeting, Mr. Gonzalez and the Executive Board of the 
S.S.A. have show their lack of respect for the employees and their fear of 
employee participation.  When the leadership of a union disregards the 
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interests and ideas of those it represents and seeks to protect and perpetuate its 
own leadership position with an undemocratic constitution, it is therefore 
incapable or negotiating a contract which will solve out problems or satisfy our 
needs. 
The opposition Committee declared itself open to participation by any employee and 
urged P&S workers to join them “in the creation of the widest, most unified base of 
struggle to win from the Columbia Administration the best possible wages, job 
conditions and job security.”82 
The opposition to the SSA leadership proved tenacious and the Committee on 
Election Procedures came to function as an alternative union structure with its own 
newsletter, coordinating location, floor representatives, and subcommittees on issues 
ranging from health care to contract negotiations.  The opposition criticized the terms 
of the contract which the SSA leadership managed to negotiate in secret, demanded 
disclosure of the President’s salary and budget, and called for a vote to adjust an 
exorbitant fee “23,500 for 470 hours” presented to the SSA by its lawyer, Peter 
Curley.  Making little head-way in changing the undemocratic structure of the SSA, 
the Committee called on the employees to stop paying dues to the SSA dues and to 
deposit them instead into a special checking account until such time as the SSA 
leadership conceded demands for democratic governance of the Association.83 Unable 
to eliminate the internal opposition, the SSA leadership attempted to take charge of the 
open meetings of the opposition’s committees and steer its activity onto a narrower 
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path.  As its newsletter said, the Committee on Election Procedures was working to 
broaden the SSA members’ benefits “[i]n spite of the Executive.”84   
The opposition had to fight the battle on two fronts: one against the SSA 
leadership and the other against the school’s and Columbia’s administration which 
was only too happy to assist the SSA in fighting what they both understood to be a 
1199 inspired faction.  The administration issued appeals to employees to pay the dues 
and to ratify the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the SSA.  It also 
allegedly asked administrative assistants to speak to employees and urge them to 
refrain from answering the protest calls of the internal opposition group.  The 
Committee on Election Procedures protested what it saw as illegal interference of the 
employer into the internal affairs of the employees’ organization.85   
Notably, just as before the election, some of the work of Local 1199’s 
supporters at P&S was actually benefiting the SSA.  It is doubtful, for instance, if the 
SSA could have convinced P&S to unionize on its own.  On the contrary, its very 
emergence which, unlike at Einstein did not precede entry of 1199, seemed parasitic 
on the Union’s effort.  In a struggle which opened a dangerous lacuna between the 
administration and 1199, the SSA had the advantage of offering a comfortable middle 
ground.  After the victory of the SSA, the 1199’s supporters had little choice but to 
move their struggle inside, that is, from within the organizational framework of their 
rival.  For reasons other than the ‘union shop’ rule, the loyal opposition approach was 
probably the best post-defeat strategy for 1199’s supporters, since the majority of their 
fellow workers had indeed voted for the SSA.  If the 1199 faction, however, succeeded 
in making the SSA a better, more democratic organization, as they declared, or if they 
                                                 
 
84
 “The Voice of P&S Employees,” Newsletter of the Committee on Election Procedures, September 3, 
1970. 
85
 Merritt to All Supporting Staff Employees, March 18, 1970 and June 15, 70.  Committee on Election 
Procedures to Dean Merritt, June 16, 1970.  
  346 
won some benefits the SSA leadership did not bother to fight for, they were giving 
their fellow employees the advantages of a stronger, more aggressive union without 
the need to actually affiliate with one.  Whether their strategy would eventually 
produce a broad desire for a different kind of union was uncertain at this point.   
In the spring of 1972, however, 1199 and its supporters at P&S decided to try 
their luck once more and filed for a representation election.86  In preparation for the 
vote, the administration did its best to convince the employees to either vote for 
‘neither union’ or for the SSA.  Open letters in both English and Spanish were issued, 
promising continuation of salary and benefit increases with or without the union and 
warning that choosing 1199 would result in higher union dues and likely loss of 
income during an impending city-wide strike.87  In a not-so-subtle manner, the 
administration wrote to the faculty members to explain that the National Labor 
Relations Board, under whose jurisdiction the coming union election would be 
conducted, in the case of a run-off election, the national board stipulates “a run-off 
between the 2 highest vote getters while the State Board has the run-off election 
between two unions.”88  Out of 956 valid ballots cast on May 24, 1972, 464 were for 
SSA, 421 for 1199 and 71 for neither union.  The run-off between SSA and 1199 
again ended in close victory of the SSA, 465 to 435.89   
                                                 
 
86
 Ivan C. McLeod, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board, to Columbia University for 
Physicians and Surgeons (sic), April 4, 1972.  Frederick B. Putney, Assistant Vice President in Charge 
of Medical Affairs, Columbia University, to All Columbia University Personnel, April 7, 1972 and 
April 24, 1972. 
87
 Putney to Columbia University Supporting Staff Personnel, May 17, 1972, open letter in English and 
Spanish.   
88
 Putney to Members of the Faculty, May 3, 1972.  The implication here was that, if the results of the 
upcoming election were similar to the initial ones in 1969, run-off elections is clerical unit, for instance, 
would be between “No Union” and “1199,” which might create a chance to be rid of the union contract 
for the clerical workers altogether. 
89
 Putney to All Supporting Staff Employees, June 14, 1972.  C.D. Auty to Supervisors with elections 
results certified by the National Labor Relations Board, June 23, 1972. 
  347 
Although preserving the status quo, the election results showed some changes.  
If in the original run-off contest between the SSA and 1199, the former won by 8 
percentage points, a year and a half later, the margin of victory was less than 3.5 
percent.  More importantly, if a whopping 34 percent of all P&S employees voted for 
“neither union” in June of 1969, now only seven percent made this choice.  Clearly, 
the presence of the employee’s organization dispelled many myths and fears about its 
adverse effects, propounded by the administration in the months before the first 
election, and even as flawed a union as the SSA was felt to be better than no 
representation at all.   
In spite of this defeat, support for 1199 among P&S employees persisted.  
Following the experience of unionization at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 1199 
supporters began to campaign for affiliation, rather than another election.  Although 
the move succeeded in mustering a 3 to 1 membership vote to hold a referendum on 
affiliation, the effort failed due to what seems like an intentional procedural 
mismanagement of the referendum by the SSA leadership.90   
Breakthrough Election at Presbyterian 
An appeal to the social work profession, undertaken by the beleaguered social 
workers in 1973 with the goal to shame Presbyterian into recognition of their 
collective bargaining rights, would most likely have been futile  if a new factor had 
not entered into the equation.  In 1973 Local 1199 finally committed all its resources 
to organizing the Hospital’s non-professional workers.  A few months previously, the 
Union had been contacted by a rank-and-file group at Presbyterian, who called 
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themselves Sisters and Brothers United and had tried without success to gain union 
recognition for over a year.  Believing that the time was finally right, Elliott Godoff 
assigned Eddie Kay, the Union’s vice president and director for the Queens-Long 
Island organizing team, to lead the day-to-day organizing drive.  At the start of this 
effort, Kay concluded that the union had gotten nowhere at Columbia-Presbyterian 
because it had “tried to change the boss instead of organizing the workers first,” Kay 
created a rank-and-file organizing committee that quickly grew to include 150 
workers. Previous organizers, he felt, had been “too defensive,” too accepting of the 
hospital’s definition of itself as “impregnable. They thought they were hot shit and 
they could do no wrong. . . . And we always approached them from that angle.”  One 
of the first indications that 1199’s drive was succeeding was a massive demonstration 
in November 1972.  Workers crowded into the hallway outside the office of the 
hospital’s personnel director and demanded an early certification election.91 
Presbyterian’s administration countered 1199’s efforts with a campaign that 
appealed to the workers’ economic self-interest.  One of the Hospital’s first moves in 
the months before the election was to announce an increase in wages which were 
already comparable to 1199 standards.  This gesture was followed by communications 
stressing that Presbyterian’s workers were already better off than those represented by 
1199 in other hospitals.  “Do you want less insurance coverage?” asked one of the 
Hospital’s pre-election fliers showing that employees under 1199 contract at other 
hospitals received less coverage than workers at Presbyterian had without the union.  
Another flier invited the workers to “compare [their] present rate of pay with the pay 
of union members in hospital organized by 1199,” citing average pay rates that placed 
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Presbyterian above the Union and reminding employees that “at Presbyterian Hospital 
[they] are scheduled for a salary increase every six (6) months.”92   
In another kind of economic appeal, administration’s Q & A Bulletin No. 1 
printed answers to the following question allegedly “asked by our people ... about the 
Union election.” 
 
Q.  Why does the union want me to sign a card? 
A.  For the same reason that they tried to get the Hospital to recognize 
them as your exclusive representative without an election – so they can get into 
Presbyterian Hospital and require dues payments of $90 per year from each of 
1,500 employees for a total of $135,000 plus fines, fees and assessments.93   
 
Still, as one rank-and-file leader observed, “not once did the hospital ever respond to 
our organizing efforts by trying to meet the workers’ biggest beef – the lack of respect 
for people as human beings.  All they could think of to do was to try to pay workers 
off with money, or use fear and phony buddy-buddy stuff.”94   
Pre-election consultations between the Hospital, the Union, and the State 
Labor Relations Board resulted in designation of two voting units, one comprising a 
little over one hundred workers in the maintenance and engineering department and 
another consisting of fifteen hundred service workers.  In the first unit, employees 
decided against 1199 representation in a 3 to 2 vote.  Among the service workers, 
however, 1199 won by an impressive margin of 878 to 507 votes. 95  The results were 
consistent with 1199 experience elsewhere.  Engineering and maintenance 
departments generally had better paid positions and fewer minority and women 
workers.  Their response to 1199’s militant, minority-rights inflected campaigns was 
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mixed.  Presbyterian’s service departments, on the other hand, had much higher 
proportions of both minorities and women and were more receptive to 1199’s dual 
union rights and civil rights message.  Nevertheless, in a large voting unit, many 
factors were bound to work against agreement and unity and an employer as strong 
and determined as Presbyterian Hospital was sure to exploit them.  Apparently, 
however, 1199’s message of empowering the workers to deal with their employers 
from a position of collective strength resonated strongly even among the better paid 
service workers.   
Soon after 1199’s tremendous victory among the Hospital’s non-professional 
workers came the final resolution of the social workers’ three-year long struggle.  In 
October of 1973, the social workers finally won a union contract from the Hospital, 
which included a salary raise with back pay to 1971, effective grievance procedures, 
and improvements in working conditions.  The story of their struggle was instructive.  
Over a period of three and half years the Hospital chose to spend over $100,000 in 
legal fees, as well as countless hours of labor by their administrators and employees to 
prevent thirty or so social workers from obtaining and exercising collective bargaining 
rights.96  In the end, it was neither the courts, nor the professional association, nor 
public embarrassment that forced the Hospital to accede to the social workers’ 
demands but the overwhelming victory of their fellow non-professional workers.  
Clearly, Presbyterian fought so hard because it was sure that the recognition of the 
social workers’ right to be represented by Local 1199 would open the door for this 
most feared union to organize the rest of the Hospital’s workers.  But the fact that it 
was twenty-four women in a semi-professional field highly dependent on institutional 
employment who defied both their mammoth employer and the ‘professionalism’ of 
                                                 
 
96
 “Open Letter from Presbyterian social workers to our co-workers who are voting December 12th,” 
undated. 
  351 
their work, seems relevant as well.  All these considerations and the length to which 
the Hospital’s leadership went to deny the union rights of thirty female social workers, 
should have served as an important omen to both women and men at the bottom of the 
professional middle-class in regard to their social status and their relationship to the 
non-professional working class.  
With the stunning victory among the non-professional workers, 1199 was 
finally poised for success among other employee groups at Presbyterian and P&S.  In 
the fall of 1974, the Technical and Professional Organizing Committee secured 
sufficient support to petition the Labor Relations Board for elections and on December 
12 the technical workers unit voted 257 to 75 for 1199 representation.  Around the 
same time, the Office and Clerical Employees Organizing Committee was formed and 
set to work.  Its election was set for March 4, 1975.97 
Path-breaking vote of the Hospital’s service workers seemed to have finally 
shattered the atmosphere of fear among Presbyterian’s staff.  Organizing Committees 
for other employee groups included large numbers of people from the outset and 
employees in as yet unorganized units gave free and open endorsements to the Union 
and unionism.  A large and diverse group of Organizing Committee members was 
portrayed on the cover, in a three-page professional-looking appeal backing 1199 in 
the upcoming March election.  Six of the individuals – four women and 2 men – 
permitted the Committee to publish brief statements of their support for 1199 
underneath large photos.  Speaking of promotion procedures and opportunities, Jean 
McCallion, a middle-aged secretary in X-Ray department, stated that, at present, the 
Hospital does not publicize openings and vacancies to its employees.  When the union 
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is established, “promotional opportunities have to be posted and union members have 
first crack at the instead of hiring from outside.”  As it stood now, she said, 
“Presbyterian just picks whoever they want, and they can ignore experience and 
ability.”  Larry Siegal, grandfatherly-looking cashier, said that “[a]fter half a century 
of working to live from one day to the next, it would be nice to have some economic 
security in these days of horrible inflation.”  Michael Cruz, a cashier, said that 1199 
will give clerical employees “better chance of advancement and do away with 
preferential treatment in promotions.”98   
Ronnie Roisman, a receptionist at the Hospital, told her co-workers why a 
union was a good and necessary thing. 
Proof of why we need unions is all around us.  Hospitals have their leagues and 
associations.  Doctors have AMA.  Nurses and other professional have their 
professional groups.  Some of them disguise the fact bu calling their unions 
‘associations.’  Even countries are unions of people living in common areas for 
their protection and benefit.  George Washington and other formed a union 
1776 to fight for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.  Lincoln and the 
north were willing to fight and die to present their Union.  They knew what a 
good thing the union was.  We need a union to fight for and protect our 
interests as employees.  We can join with 2,000 members already in 1199 in 
Presbyterian.  We need 1199 now!99 
Whether the profiled members of the Organizing Committee actually said those things 
or simply agreed to have their name placed under pre-crafted ‘testimonials’ from the 
Union’s publishing office is hard to tell.  But the very fact that they so readily 
permitted their pictures, names, and words to appear for all, including their employer 
and bosses, to see, was a sign of new times at the Hospital.   
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Unionism Prevails at P&S 
With 1199’s triumphant march through the heretofore impenetrable halls of the 
Presbyterian Hospital, the Medical School’s efforts to keep 1199 out of its portion of 
the Medical Center became quite explicit, although hardly creative.  The central pillar 
of this policy was laid down in a confidential memorandum from the Special Assistant 
to the Vice President for Personnel Management to the P&S negotiating team on the 
SSA re-opener in June, 1974.  Mr. Rosenberg  stressed that, in spite of the 
“unreasonable and excessive” demands made by the SSA, the negotiations should be 
guided by the larger goals of the University’s labor relations policy.  In regard to the 
situation at the medical school, “our goal remains to arrive at a settlement that will 
place the SSA in an equal or better position relative to the Local 1199 settlement on 
the Morningside Campus.”  In this regard, Mr. Rosenberg stated, the current minimum 
rates for P&S employees, which have been in effect since January 1973, “are 
completely unrealistic in terms of future recruiting needs and in terms of actual paid 
rates for new hires ... .”  Worse yet, “the 1199 faction in the SSA is using these figures 
to embarrass the University and to weaken the SSA.”100   
Even if the salary rates rose enough to match those on the Morningside 
campus, cautioned Rosenberg, they would still be lower than those paid to the hospital 
workers under 1199 contracts.  Unfortunately, Columbia made a management decision 
that it could not keep pace with the 1199 settlements in the hospitals because, unlike 
the hospitals, “the University does not have a third party to pass on the costs.”  
Nevertheless, Mr. Rosenberg was optimistic that, if the proposed increases for the 
P&S employees were implemented, “the SSA [would be able to] withstand the 
pressure from 1199’s inside organizers” as the increasingly outdated contract enters its 
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last year and the pressure to reopen negotiations mounts.  “This strategy,” he added, 
“of course, assumes that the SSA will compare their settlement to that of 1199 at 
Columbia, while we can expect the 1199 organizers to compare the settlement with the 
League settlement at Presbyterian.” Therefore, it was “essential that the SSA conduct 
some public relations to convey their settlement to the rank and file.”101   
Rosenberg’s recommendations formed the basis of the University’s position in 
the collective bargaining agreement re-opener negotiations with the SSA and in 
August a new collective bargaining agreement, providing for the minimum salary rates 
suggested in Rosenberg’s memorandum, had been reached.102  The new contract was 
ratified by the SSA membership in a 507 to 80 vote, with just over sixty percent of 
employees voting, leaving the administration quite pleased with both the turnout and 
the majority.103  The threat of 1199, however, was not exorcised for long and less than 
a year later the Union had again petitioned for a representation election at P&S.   
In an increasingly desperate effort to keep 1199 out of the College, the Dean 
issued appeals to all department chairmen, saying that he “would appreciate your 
doing everything possible to ensure that each eligible voter is informed of out position 
in this union representation election.”  The administration’s position was that 
“selection of District 1199 is not in the best interests of our employees or our School.”  
The Dean wrote that “[he was] dismayed by the extraordinary number of strikes in 
disruptive activities engaged in by District 1199 in the metropolitan area” and that “[it 
was his] great concern that if our employees choose to deal with a union that had a 
record, we fare the very real possibility of loss of income to employees and 
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interruption of the essential work of this institution.”  To assist the chairmen in 
delivering this message, administration prepared “a number of fact sheets covering 
issues in the election,” as well as a closely worded letter, to be distributed to each 
employee, personally.104 
With the rapid embrace of 1199 by the semi-professional and technical 
workers at Presbyterian, the Union’s chances of success at P&S looked much better 
than at any time in the past.  When the School’s supporting staff could easily compare 
their salaries and benefits to the union contract of the Hospital’s employees across the 
street or even across the hall, the public relations campaign to sell the SSA’s contract 
rates had poor chances of succeeding.  In a representation election on October 2, 1975, 
P&S cast 399 votes for 1199 representation, 394 votes for SSA representation and 12 
votes for neither union.  It looked as though 1199’s persistence and internal support 
had finally began to pay off.  In a run-off election on November 12, 1975 Local 1199 
prevailed over the SSA by a margin of ten votes.105   
Analysis of Unionization Dynamic 
The unionization struggle at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center and its 
larger political context must be understood in the framework of a dual analysis of 
institutional and class processes.  A basic duality lay at the heart of the unionization 
struggle.  On the one hand, it was an instance of class conflict central to modern 
capitalist societies, concerning the determination of the market price of labor.  On the 
other hand, the conflict was waged within and through a number of modern 
institutions, including the legal and political systems, as well as individual and 
collective institutions in the non-profit health care sector.  As class conflict, the 
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struggle for unionization was conducted through class-based organizations, notably 
labor unions and industry associations.  Its institutional sites, however, were 
themselves an active system of relations which created and reproduced specific class 
situations. 
The dual institutions-and-class analysis of the unionization struggle focuses 
our attention on three distinct aspects of this political conflict.  First, it alerts us to the 
complex struggle as it moved between different institutional levels, from individual 
hospitals to municipal administration to state and national legislatures.  The nature of 
political settlements reached at each level reflected the changing balance of power 
between the elite institutions of civil society and governmental structures.  Further, the 
dual framework allows us to acknowledge both the broadly social, class aspects of this 
struggle and its narrowly organizational facets and to see how political decision-
making at different institutional levels enlarges or constricts the scope of social 
conflict and thereby affects its meaning.  Finally, the institutional-and-class 
framework highlights the interlocking of class and social ideologies with institutional 
and counter-institutional discourses in the struggle over the hearts and minds of health 
care workers.   
The struggle for unionization developed across several different institutional 
levels.  Starting as a formally ‘illegal’ organizing effort at individual institutions, the 
struggle grew to involve several hospitals directly and threatened to spread to dozens 
of others.  The unexpected forcefulness of the 1959 organizing drive aroused 
widespread concern and prompted New York City’s voluntary hospitals to craft a 
unified front.  The imminence and eventual consummation of the six-week six-
hospital strike thrust the ‘hospital question’ into the limelight and prompted 
intervention by the Mayor.  The conflict was formally dealt with in New York’s 
municipal politics.  In the official negotiations, conducted on the level of the city’s 
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administration, the six hospitals were represented by the City’s hospital association, 
while the cause of the striking workers and the union leading them was taken up by 
the leaders of the Central Labor Council, an umbrella organization of New York City 
workers’ unions.  Although there was a 1959 precedent, in which municipal 
government served as a financial broker of the hospital unionization conflict, the 
stronger side chose to stake the outcome on the balance of the hospitals’ and the union 
power alone. 
The hospitals’ victory marked the high point of the voluntaries’ unity or, at 
least, the effective application of group pressure by the stronger members upon their 
beleaguered sister institutions.  Although the settlement of the 1959 strike spelled a 
clear victory for the hospitals, the union and its new pledges kept their struggle alive 
and even expanded to other institutions.  Both the unexpected vitality of the ‘illegal’ 
unionization movement and pre-election political calculations created an opportunity 
for legislative review of the unionization issue.  When, in 1962, the labor leaders 
obtained the Governor’s promise to introduce and push the legislative amendment to 
the non-profit institutions’ exemption from labor laws, a number of divisions emerged 
in the heretofore united stance of the voluntary hospitals and medical centers.  The 
stronger hospitals, like Columbia-Presbyterian, decided that active co-operation with 
the Governor, rather than concerted opposition to unionization, was in their interest.  
For the elite institutions, as long as the law granted no automatic implementation of 
collective bargaining, legalization promised a relative advantage over other hospitals 
and a rationalized framework for anti-union struggle.  For the most part, medical 
schools, upstate hospitals, weaker urban institutions, as well as those hospitals, where 
worker mobilization was already quite advanced, did not share this view.   
Not surprisingly, the resulting legislation was tailored as narrowly as possible, 
applying only to voluntary hospitals in New York City, leaving both the upstate 
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hospitals and other non-profit institutions exempt.  Although formally legalizing 
unionization of the country’s largest urban hospital sector, the law effectively 
devolved the implementation of collective bargaining rights to the level of individual 
institutions and union organizations.  Since the bill established no self-actuating 
mechanism of collective bargaining or even an automatic presumption of workers’ 
interest in unionization, the exercise of the newly-granted rights depended in practice 
on when and if, in each particular institution, a union organization could prevail over 
the employer in an ideological struggle for employee allegiance.  Given the highly 
disparate levels of political resources available to hospital workers and their 
employers, as well as social fragmentation and ideological extremism in the postwar 
period, it was clear that the struggle to unionize hospital workers would not be an easy 
one and that its dynamics and outcome would differ across separate institutions and 
localities. 
After passage of the amendment, individual institutions became the main fields 
of battle, while the general structure of health care employment and careers served as 
the broader field of contestation.  The timing, sequence, and outcome of the 
unionization struggle at Columbia-Presbyterian reflected both institutional and class 
processes at work.  The late beginning of unionization was rooted in the financial and 
organizational strength of Columbia-Presbyterian in relation to other hospitals and 
medical schools in New York City, the highly conservative perspective of its 
privileged board, and the adroit management of legal issues and personnel relations.  
As organizational theory would predict, the institution’s elites were the segment of its 
‘membership’ most interested in the organization’s competitive advantage.  An active 
interest in resisting unionization on the part of organizational elites at Columbia-
Presbyterian and other similar institutions was likely rooted in a more generalized 
interest of their class in untrammeled operation of ‘labor markets.’  Nonetheless, a 
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healthy level of pragmatism characterized their overall response, buttressed, no doubt, 
by the practical exigencies felt by the hospital administrators in charge of day-to-day 
opposition to unionism.   
The Center’s leadership assumed a variety of positions in this struggle.  The 
top administrators, whose careers and reputations were closely tied to the institutions 
they served, were generally pro-active in union-busting campaigns.  Supervisors were 
a critical link in the organizational chain, for whom the factors of institutional 
allegiance and exercise of delegated authority were tempered by the need to ‘connect’ 
with the workers, if only in order to control them.  Professional staffs, especially 
prominent in the health care sector, proved to be another important constituency with 
potentially divided interests regarding worker unionization.  While generally, if not 
uniformly, interested in holding labor costs down in the name of their institutions’ 
competitiveness, members of professional and academic staffs were also interested in 
offering wage and salary rates capable of attracting well-qualified personnel.  This 
latter interest was especially pronounced in regard to employees in various technical 
and laboratory assistant positions, directly involved in research and clinical work.  
Nevertheless, the interpenetration of professional and administrative hierarchies meant 
that, at the higher levels at least, professionals and academics would stand opposed to 
employee unions, despite the efforts of the union supporters to construct an image of 
generally coincident interests and a mutually supportive relationship between the 
professional and semi-professional employees.   
When the union finally made in-roads into Columbia-Presbyterian, here, as 
elsewhere, the struggle shifted from non-professional to semi-professional and 
technical workers and now included medical schools in addition to hospitals.  This 
new category of workers, as well as the new type of institutions where they worked 
place, presented new challenges which, together with Columbia-Presbyterian’s general 
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organizational strength, were reflected in Union Local 1199’s strategy.  That strategy 
was primarily pragmatic in that fewer resources were devoted to struggles at the 
stronger institutions where the chances of victory were not good.  Despite the 
establishment of a separate division for the semi-professional employees, 1199 was 
much less successful in organizing this category of workers. 
Starting out among the semi-professional and technical employees, 1199 
supporters had two major handicaps.  With its militant reputation and predominantly 
non-professional membership, 1199 could be cast by opponents as the most extreme of 
several options.  On the whole, the semi-professional and technical workers were less 
overtly exploited and, therefore, more ambivalent about open confrontation with 
organizational hierarchy.  For them, a less notorious union or even an independent 
employee association could serve as a comfortable middle ground between 1199’s 
radicalism and no union representation at all.  Unionization among semi-professional 
employees could also be prevented through ideological or legal methods.  At 
Columbia-Presbyterian, the route of legal contestation was taken in regard to the 
Hospital’s twenty-four social workers, whose professional status figured, among other 
issues, during three-and-a-half years of courtroom battles.  Ideological appeal to 
professionalism was likely a strong factor in the virtual absence of union interest 
among the Hospital’s nursing staff.  In both cases, the threat to the employer’s power 
was undoubtedly augmented by professional arrogance and male chauvinism toward 
all-female semi-professions.   
For nearly five years, 1199 had no success in breaking through the defenses of 
New York’s largest voluntary hospital and medical center.  Columbia’s medical 
school was able to keep the union out for over six years by encouraging an 
independent employees association.  For more than three years, Presbyterian Hospital 
was able to deny 1199 representation to its twenty-four social workers by dragging the 
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issue through the courts.  Not until 1199’s victory among the  Hospital’s 1500 service 
workers – to which the union had finally made a serious organizational commitment –  
was the door for representation of the Medical Center’s employees finally thrown 
open.  Although by the early 1970s, the rate of unionization among the semi-
professional and technical health care employees was beginning to exceed that of the 
non-professional workers, events at Columbia-Presbyterian might be interpreted as 
suggesting that the surge of semi-professional unionization rested on the power of the 
earlier and path-breaking organization of the hospitals’ lower rungs.   
While 1199’s breakthrough at Presbyterian confirmed the significance of the 
non-professional, majority minority workers’ mobilization, the Union’s difficult 
struggle at the medical school testified to a fact which the hospital boards and 
managements tried very hard to conceal.  It showed that, despite 1199’s organizational 
muscle, the struggle for unionization was broadly social and class-centered character 
and depended on the participation of large number of workers in the institutions 
concerned.  While familiar divisions between the leaders and the led, the activists and 
the uninvolved were certainly present in this struggle, the story of health care 
unionization cannot be read in cynical organizational terms but must acknowledge its 
ample social sources.    
The varied involvement of different employee groups at CPMC in the 
unionization struggle cannot be understood with either the traditional class concepts or 
the non-class approaches which have been proposed in their stead.  While it was 
clearly demonstrated that the system of class positions and relations deeply 
conditioned the hospital unionization struggle, it is the neo-Durkheimian micro-classes 
which stand out as crucial elements when viewed from a close, institution-focused 
perspective.  Institutional class positions, which anchored the varying responses of 
different employee groups, were determined not only by their relationship to the 
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means of production, but also to material and symbolic benefits stemming from 
occupational monopolies and organizational power.  These positions, furthermore, 
were also affected by the specific industry, sector, and institution of employment, as 
well as more individual circumstances and calculations of employees.  Last but not 
least, class positions appropriate for this analysis were clearly structured – and not 
merely ‘staffed’ – by the forces immanent in the systems of racial, ethnic, and 
gendered inequality.  
Gender, for instance, was a significant but not a unidirectional factor in the 
unionization struggle at CPMC.  At Presbyterian Hospital, an all-female social work 
department was at the forefront of a protracted struggle for unionization, but a 
predominantly female clerical unit at P&S had the highest percentage voting against 
representation by any collective bargaining organization.  In both institutions, women 
in technical and service positions were as likely to be actively involved in organizing 
and union activities as men.  By no means does this variation imply the irrelevance of 
gender to the determination of social processes encapsulated in the unionization drive 
at Columbia-Presbyterian and other health care institutions.  The changing system of 
gender relations and inequality was crucial to the emergence of varied, yet clearly 
gendered occupational and organizational roles.  Some of these roles, such as 
secretarial and clerical positions integrated female workers into organizational 
structures, albeit on highly subordinated and personalized terms reminiscent of gender 
relations in the patriarchal family.  Other careers, such as social work, segregated 
women from men in the lower-paid, less prestigious occupational categories with an 
unsure claim to professionalism and its attendant perks.  Still other jobs at both 
hospitals and medical schools preyed on the low social status of minority and 
immigrant women, exploiting the dual basis of that status.  These different, yet 
distinctly feminized class locations placed their occupants in different relationships to 
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their superiors and employers, affecting unsurprising differences in their ability and 
inclination to defy organizational power in their workplace.  Thus, if race and gender 
were frequently aligned with distinct occupational and organizational positions in the 
unionization struggle, their significance was exerted not in a manner of independent 
social determinants, external and additive to class, but as factors involved in the very 
construction of the manifold class locations in health care employment.   
At the same time, the dynamics of the conflict studied here are suggestive of 
the high degree of individualization in the generation of identities, interests, and 
actions of the people involved.  The emergence within the fairly homogeneous 
occupational groups of significant divisions between the leaders of the organizing 
drive and the uninvolved, conscious supporters of unionization and its opponents, 
challenges the strictly structural analysis, however nuanced.  The high proportion of 
minorities and foreigners coupled with high rates of turnover made even the more 
distinct segments of the metropolitan medical center’s workforce unlikely places of 
class-cultural homogeneity.  The social dispositions of individuals who made up 
Columbia-Presbyterian’s staff during those turbulent years, were anchored in different 
cultures, experiences, and worldviews, both passively inherited and actively chosen.  It 
is certainly a testimony to the singular force of the unionization drive, as well as the 
larger issues of the era it tapped into, that such a high level of unity was actually 
achieved among as diverse groups of workers as those at Columbia-Presbyterian.   
The highly personal conceptions of class interests and identity, coupled with 
varying empowerment to act, revealed a substantially individualized matrix of class, 
through which the hospital unionization struggle unfolded.  Class was individualized 
not only in virtue of the relative weakness of common conditioning, but also due to 
active encouragement of individualism by institutional and social forces, with 
Columbia-Presbyterian’s anti-union strategy as a clear example.  Prodded by the threat 
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of unionization, the Medical Center’s administration implemented an effective modern 
approach to personnel management.  Employee affairs now had devoted to them a 
specific department responsible for employee procedures, complaints, and 
communication.  The tremendous increase in contacts, between the administration and 
its employees fostered an impression of much more individualized, even respectful 
treatment.  Employees were supplied with more information about their positions, 
their rights, and procedures and this information was increasingly systematic and 
precise.  As far as possible, the Medical Center attempted to develop and retain its 
employees, through elaborated seniority and merit rules and symbolic incorporation 
into the system of credentialed, professional careers. 
The pronounced ‘individualism’ of this ideological campaign strangely 
dovetailed with the organizational character of the unionization struggle.  The Medical 
Center’s rhetorical strategy was essentially two-fold.  First, it aimed to paint 1199, as 
well as any rank-and-file organizing committees formed in its name, as dues-hungry, 
and income-maximizing.  Secondly, Medical Center strove, at the same time, to 
suppress any discussion of its own status as an organization endowed with an 
enormous budget and supporting an extensive range of productive processes.  
Removing itself from the category of organizations, the employer was thus able to set 
up a stark dichotomy between an individual, on the one hand, and an organization, on 
the other.  For those predisposed to buy this ‘analysis,’ a difficult choice was set up: 
either remain a free individual or be engulfed by an authoritarian and bureaucratic 
organization.  The real occlusion here was that ‘organization versus individual’ may 
not have been the main conflict relevant to the unionization struggle and that other 
social conflicts, such as those of class, may have been closer to the heart of the matter. 
In the highly organizational context of the hospital unionization struggle, 
however, the large issues of class were rarely explicitly invoked even on the other side 
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of the battlefield.  The typically ‘trade unionist’ vocabulary of workers versus 
management or employees versus administration was consistently used and individual 
workplaces defined the relevant boundaries of most organizing drives.  To a large 
extent, 1199 participated in the ‘organizational,’ as opposed to ‘class,’ definition of the 
struggle.  This was particularly apparent in its approach to organizing semi-
professional and technical employees.  Aware of their sensitive relationship to 
professional employees and the system of credentialism as a whole, the union 
developed a corporatist rhetoric which celebrated the idealized notion of professional 
institutions and their social mission.  At its most politicized, union rhetoric suggested 
that a union was an organization aimed at countering the power of other organizations.  
On the whole, however, the unionization movement did not wander too far from the 
concepts and vocabulary of the prevailing ideological formation.  What this suggests is 
that the key factors in the health care’s class conflict – including individualization, 
workplace fragmentation, and institutional autonomy – were not simply prefigured in 
the political development of the larger social structure.  Rather, they were actively 
created and reinforced by concrete political organizations in a particular historical 
conjuncture.   
The Strike of 1976 and Beyond 
When unionization finally came to Columbia-Presbyterian, there, as elsewhere, 
it accelerated a complete rationalization of labor relations.  Special administrative 
posts and departments were assigned to manage employee relations.  Wage rates, 
benefits, and grievance procedures were codified and made more public.  Even jobs 
themselves were renamed and reordered.  Where earlier there had been sewing maids 
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and puller loaders, pantry girls and an ice cream man, there were now employees in 
Service categories I through V.106    
Negotiation of collective bargaining contracts, investigation of employee 
complaints and other union matters were skillfully handled through special offices in 
the administration and committees of the professional and academic staff.  Even union 
strikes were taken in stride, with a set of specified procedures and mechanisms 
developed for this exigency.  The hospital’s bulletin, issued a few days before the 
announced strike, calmly informed the staff that “[a] Strike Control Center with a 
multidisciplinary staff qualified to make all necessary decisions on Hospital operations 
will coordinate and control activities.”  Things that only a few years ago were 
trumpeted as matters of life and death were now just inconveniences for which the 
staff had to be prepared for.  A pre-strike bulletin for doctors with private offices in 
the Medical Center, for example, reminded that “[t]he following points must be kept in 
mind:” 
 
No receptions or nursing attendants 
No laundry deliveries.  Please conserve. 
No stationery or other supplies. 
Personnel and doctors parking only in Main Parking Lot. 
Only Main Dining room open, schedule to approximate the present one. 
Live-in accommodations available on a priority basis.107 
 
By the mid-seventies both collective bargaining and strike management in 
New York’s non-profit sector were firmly established on a city-wide scale.  Local 
1199 held an overwhelming majority of union contracts in the non-profit hospitals and 
medical centers.  For their part, unionized hospitals formed the League of Voluntary 
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Hospitals and Homes of New York to conduct joint bargaining and develop common 
strategy on labor relations issues. 
Behind the apparent rationalization and even pacification of hospital labor 
relations were many signs of continuing strife.  Individual institutions and the 
voluntary hospital industry as a whole were steadily accumulating experience with 
unionization campaigns, as well as strategies for their thwarting.  An entire niche in 
the consulting business emerged to take advantage of the hospitals’ willingness to 
spend large sums of money on fighting unionization.  Both New York State legislation 
and, especially, the 1974 amendments to the federal labor relations law concerning 
non-profit hospitals and health care organizations, contained multiple loopholes which 
hospitals could exploit to defeat or delay union elections.  Institutions under collective 
bargaining contracts also adopted a more aggressive stance in resisting union demands 
for increases wages, benefits, and job security. 
To a large extent, the hardening of the hospitals’ positions reflected the 
changing political realities of hospital and health care financing.  Throughout the 
1960s, the drive to organize hospital workers was made easier by growing public 
spending on health care.  In New York, municipal administration showed time and 
again its willingness to mediate hospital conflicts and, more importantly, to underwrite 
the higher wages and benefits demanded by the unions.  As one of the hospital 
administrators recalled, during the sixties and early seventies “collective bargaining 
between the union and hospitals entailed little more than finding out how much the 
government was willing to pay.”108  By the mid-seventies things have changed.  
Increasing concern with health care costs brought both federal and state-level efforts 
to reduce hospital reimbursement rates.  In New York, the new climate of financial 
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stringency was exacerbated by the general fiscal crisis, which forced the City to 
declare quasi bankruptcy and come under the influence of corporate and financial 
leaders.  In March of 1976, the New York legislature passed a law allowing the state’s 
commissioner of health to reduce Medicaid reimbursement rates to hospitals.  Since all 
previous negotiations between the union and the City’s League of Voluntary Hospitals 
and Homes turned on the state’s willingness to offset the cost of settlements, the new 
legislation held serious implications for the future dynamics of hospital labor 
relations.109   
The settlement of the 1976 hospital strike – the longest and largest in the City’s 
history – poignantly reflected these emerging trends.110  During the build-up to the 
strike, the City’s administration firmly rejected any increases in its reimbursement to 
the hospitals, from which to meet union’s demand for wage hikes.  In view of the 
city’s new stringency, the hospital league adopted an intransigent stance as well.  In an 
ironic twist for a militant union like 1199, the union staged its largest and longest 
strike ever to fight not for any concrete level of welfare for its members, but for 
binding arbitration which the hospitals also refused.  Although an awesome display of 
union power, from start to finish the strike seemed to have a pessimistic tone.  The 
strikers eventually prevailed and forced the hospitals to accept binding arbitration.  
The arbitrator, however, was not only convinced that no additional public funds were 
forthcoming, but also found no internal sources for increased wages.  Even the very 
modest wage increase granted in the arbitration award was to be offset by cuts in the 
hospitals’ contribution to the union’s ‘unproductive’ educational and re-training 
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funds.111  Redistribution of hospitals’ internal pay hierarchies or reconsideration of 
their investment priorities was out of the question.112 
Calls for a more systematic solution to the hospital crisis, issued with some 
regularity since 1959, were heard with renewed frequency during the 1976 walk out.  
Political moderates addressed themselves to politicians and concerned social elites, 
calling for an overhaul of “the city’s chaotic and wasteful health care system” and the 
creation of “a fully integrated health care system for New York that will coordinate 
both public and private facilities for maximum service and efficiency.”113  More 
radical voices placed their hopes with the striking workers, urging other health care 
workers – doctors, nurses, and students – to support the strikes in order to form a 
common front against the retrenchment of health care services, which they saw as part 
of a “larger attack on the living standard of the people of New York” unleashed by 
“the Emergency Financial Control Board and the banks it represents, who are now 
running the City directly.”114  
Unfortunately, as federal and state governments were cutting their health care 
expenditures without any fundamental restructuring of health care provision, the 
fragmenting institutional terrain of unionization struggle was bound to become only 
more balkanized.  When the strikers accepted the arbitration settlement 11 days after 
their walk-out, Byron Nichols, an attendant in the intensive care unit at Columbia-
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Presbyterian, told the newspaper reporter that he was “elated” that the strike was 
finally over but thought that “hospital workers will always be underpaid in capitalist 
society.”  At another hospital, a weary hospital administrator complained how hard it 
was to run a non-profit hospital under prevailing reimbursement rates.  “There is no fat 
in this hospital,” he added, “but the strike [proved] there are some areas where we can 
make do with a lot less (sic) people.”115  That was indeed one of the main ways, in 
which the hospitals would try to balance their books over the next decade.116 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS OF VOLUNTARY REFORM: 
THE COMMUNITY HEALTH PLANNING INITIATIVE, 1970-1976 
Introduction 
There has been a long tradition in American politics of achieving public goals 
by stimulating private and voluntary initiative.  American health care presents one of 
the more conspicuous examples of such a mixed, public-private approach to social 
provision.  The period between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s, during which a 
cluster of issues under the rubric of ‘community health planning’ predominated in 
both public policy and private efforts, was no exception in this respect.  Vague yet 
evocative, community health planning pointed toward a voluntary effort to rationalize 
the predominantly private system of health care provision, conducted through a 
partnership between community leaders and representatives of hospital, medical, and 
other relevant groups.  Representatives of private non-profit health care institutions 
played an important role in the formulation of governmental policy and public policy, 
in turn, encouraged predominantly private and voluntary planning efforts.1  An 
explosion of social protest and grassroots organization, which marked this period of 
American history, set the community health care movement apart from more placid 
periods of elite and interest group politics.  Both politicians and private institutions 
had to contend with protest-bound citizenry, grassroots organizing, and new 
community leaders pressing for reforms in health care delivery.  
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Located amidst the rapidly declining urban areas, Columbia-Presbyterian 
Medical Center and its parent University were abundantly subjected to all those 
pressures which contributed to the perception of crisis in the American health care 
system.  Appalling conditions in hospitals’ outpatient clinics, rising protests among 
students and staff, and the waves of ghetto riots were all signs of deepening problems.  
Nevertheless, auspicious conditions for an institution-wide response to these pressures 
did not arise until 1970, when Columbia’s Medical School underwent a significant 
changing-of-the-guard in its top administrative and academic positions.   
Nearly two years elapsed between the early discussions and the launch of 
Columbia’s community health initiative.2  During this time, what appeared at the 
outset as a spectrum of progressive ideas turned into an essentially conservative, 
limited, and technocratic proposal.  The founding assumptions and choices underlying 
Columbia’s Center for Community Health Systems (CCHS), which became the 
initiative’s primary organizational form, inclined the initiative toward instrumental, 
contractual, and private relationships with external institutions, and against broader 
and genuine alliances.  Not surprisingly, the Center’s efforts to engage the affiliated 
hospitals were complicated and largely unproductive, while its relationship with 
community groups did not progress past suspicion and conflict.  After the middle of 
the decade, the Center was conspicuously reorienting itself toward a new ‘movement,’ 
health services research.  This new field was a good bet, an area of research that would 
survive and grow.  As an outgrowth of the community health movement, however, it 
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signified the final abandonment of those aspirations which the word ‘community’ both 
evoked and disguised.  By the end of the 1970s, the Center was moved to the School 
of Public Health: community health planning was no longer a concern of the Medical 
Center as a whole. 
As the larger period in the American health care politics of which it was a part, 
Columbia’s community health planning initiative can be viewed as a loss of a liberal 
opportunity.3  Why and how was this opportunity lost?  Existing analyses of this 
period in American health care politics emphasize institutional fragmentation of the 
health care sector and the largely symbolic nature of the American democratic 
process.4  These explanations, however, reveal only part of the story, focused on the 
inter-institutional and formal-political levels.  From an intra-institutional perspective, 
such as the one taken here in regard to the politics of one of the nation’s oldest and 
largest academic medical centers, the answer includes organizational and occupational 
power structures, operating both within individual institutions and across the larger 
matrix of American medicine and health care.  
Early Visions and the Power Struggle 
The earliest reflections pertaining to Columbia’s community health planning 
initiative articulated three views on what should be done and how it could be 
accomplished.5  All three perspectives had in common an insistence on doing 
something practical to contribute to solving the problems plaguing the American 
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Wealth, especially Chs. 10 and 11. 
5
 Unless otherwise noted, all information pertaining to Columbia’s community health planning initiative 
comes from the Health Sciences Division Archives, Dean’s Code 190, folders labeled “Center for 
Community Health Systems (CCHS)” spanning the period between 1970 and 1976. 
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health care system and all three insisted that the way to start was to change the way of 
‘doing business’ at the Medical Center.  Despite their common tone of resolve, the 
views differed on how the needed change could be brought about.   
One view put forth an essentially technocratic vision of the process, where the 
necessary changes were to be implemented through competent analysis of the 
problems, cogent proposals to correct them, controlled experimentation, and inter-
institutional borrowing of winning models.  Describing the mission of the proposed 
office for health care planning, one early communication suggested that “[i]ts purpose 
would be to propose change in the way of doing business, support these proposals 
with rational arguments to allow estimates of the costs and benefits, and provide a 
proposed schedule and means of the evaluation of the change.”  In this way it would 
be possible “to have a progressive package which could be understood and approved 
by the personnel of the participating hospitals and by the Board of Directors.”6      
The second position on the emerging initiative advocated the establishment of 
a new academic and professional field in ‘community medicine.’7  Noting a growing 
movement among the medical schools in this direction, this view presented 
community medicine as a field that would shortly become indispensable to medical 
practitioners and the system of health care provision as a whole.  This view’s 
proponents helped that development of this new field could contribute significantly to 
solving current problems in health care provision.  Increasing teaching and research 
efforts in primary care settings would serve as the medical schools’ immediate 
                                                 
 
6
 Richard L. Garwin, IBM Fellow, Columbia University to Dr. Robert Glaser, Dean of Medical School, 
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, April 6, 1970.  In another revealing line, the author insisted that if  
“the development of health care is going to advance at all, most of the ‘innovations’ ... will be largely 
copying of what has been established elsewhere and not a true experiment.” 
7
 The Office of Urban and Community Health Affairs, George I. Lythcott, M.D., Associate Dean, 
“Community Medicine: A Study of Several Medical School Programs in the USA,” submitted by 
Bernard Challenor, M.D., Judith Wicks, B.A. 
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contribution to improving community services, while the training of future doctors in 
community medicine would exert a long-term effect on the nation’s health care 
system. 
The third and, arguably, most radical view presented a political understanding 
of the problem, arguing for the need to alter the structure of power and prestige within 
the Medical Center and academic medicine as a whole.  “The Trustees,” insisted its 
proponent, “must be willing to commit themselves to a total reorganization of health 
care delivery at the Medical Center during the 1970s” aimed at creation of an 
essentially one-class system of care.8  This goal could hardly be achieved, however, if 
the practice of general community medicine remained the least prestigious and 
rewarded of medical fields.  One-class health care required medicine that did not have 
its own professional underclass.  The task, then, entailed a redistribution of prestige 
and rewards from private specialized medicine to community primary care. 
While this explicitly power-centered analysis of the problem was a 
distinguishing characteristic of the last perspective, all three proposals included 
elements of political understanding of the community health planning movement.  The 
‘technocratic’ perspective, for instance, was explicit that, within the medical centers, 
community health planning was a cause of the more progressive elements and would 
likely arouse resistance from those with vested interests in the current system.  
Fortunately for Columbia-Presbyterian, in early 1970 “there [were] 14 departmental 
chairmanships and key staff positions vacant in the medical complex,” which meant 
that “the College [did] not have at this moment precisely the same problem of strong 
                                                 
 
8
 “Privileged Communication,” undated, probably Spring of 1970.  Although unsigned, the document 
can be attributed with high certainty to Dr. Robert E. Canfield.  The strongest evidence of his 
authorship is provided by an almost identical discussion of a plan for reorganization of health services 
at the Medical Center that appeared in Dr. Canfield’s correspondence (Canfield to Henry Aranow, 
Acting Chairman, Department of Medicine, August 13, 1970, Appendix pages 13 and 14.) and is also 
suggested by the general views expressed in his numerous letters and documents. 
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departmental interest interfering with progress toward the development of health 
care.”9   
The ‘community medicine’ view was also importantly premised on the 
understanding of the political context, from which the new field stemmed.  The study, 
in which it was laid out, pointed to students and communities as primary forces 
compelling the universities’ response.  “A sizeable and increasing number of medical 
students,” the study noted, “feel that the medical profession and medical schools have 
been unresponsive to the real needs of their patient populations, and particularly those 
in poverty area,” and “rightly resent the continuation of a dual system of health care, 
one for rich and another for the poor.”10  Rising protests among the urban poor were 
another factor compelling initiation of community medicine programs.  “Residents – 
particularly those living in lower socioeconomic areas adjacent to medical schools – 
have clearly voiced their dissatisfaction with the treatment they receive in teaching 
hospitals and with the medical schools’ disregard for their own needs.”  Medical 
centers, urged the study, had to find some ways to begin to “resolve these 
antagonisms.”11 
                                                 
 
9
 Garwin to Glazer, April 6, 1970. 
10
 “Community Medicine,” p. 66-67. 
11
 Ibid., p. 67.  It is not unreasonable to think that the deeper personal views underlying these three 
positions were closer than written articulations suggest, since they were communicated in different 
formats and to different audiences.  In fact, the degree of political boldness expressed in a given 
position was inversely related to the confidentiality of the document, in which they were 
communicated.  The ‘political’ view was laid out in the unsigned, highly confidential memo.  The 
‘technocratic’ view was spelled out in a letter addressed to the Dean of another medical school.  The 
‘community medicine’ position was developed in a study of such programs in medical schools across 
the country  that was likely intended for broad internal circulation within the medical school and the 
university as whole.  Thus, it is possible that Dr. Lythcott’s personal views were more radical than the 
study let on or that Dr. Canfield’s position would inevitably have to be ‘toned down’ or ‘camouflaged’ 
for the purposes of more public dissemination.  It is also possible, of course, that the differences 
between the positions were based on divergent assessments of the situation, in which the initiative 
would have to be launched.  More hopeful and radical positions, expressed in the ‘political’ and 
‘technocratic’ perspectives may have been undergirded by certain assumptions, such as the continuing 
pressures for health care change from the side of the government or consumers or both.  The 
‘community medicine’ perspective, in contrast, may have assumed a different estimate of the balance of 
forces within the academe, which dictated a less conflictual approach. 
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Consideration of external political forces was thus present in all three early 
views.  Whether the solution advocated entailed rational planning, academic 
recognition, or an institutional shake-up, both the emergence and future success of 
community health movement, they were saying, depended on sustained pressure in the 
larger polity.  All three views implicitly acknowledged that university ‘liberals,’ 
pushing for community health planning, had important ‘allies’ outside of the academe, 
including the students, poor and minority groups, and progressive professionals and 
public figures. 
Unsurprisingly, the academic ‘progressives’ calling for community health 
planning occupied somewhat peripheral positions within the structure of the academic 
medicine.  The ‘technocratic’ view, for instance, was articulated from a position 
outside of the Medical School proper, reflecting a growing interest of the academics in 
various liberal disciplines, as well as certain professional fields, such as business, 
social work and urban planning, in health care issues.  These academic interests were 
still rather undeveloped and did not command resources and recognition comparable 
to those of the traditional bio-medical and clinical disciplines.   
The ‘community medicine’ perspective, emanated from the recently created 
Office for Urban and Community Health Affairs, headed by Dr. George I. Lythcott in 
the position of Associate Dean.  Although formally recognized as being at the top of 
the medical school’s administrative structure, Dr. Lythcott’s position was actually at 
some remove from the most prestigious and powerful areas within the Center’s 
organization.  Dr. Lythcott held a clinical appointment at the Harlem Hospital, one of 
the several public institutions that P&S was affiliated with, and such appointments 
were both less prestigious and less lucrative than those at Presbyterian or other private 
affiliates.  Arising, as it had, from an institutional location in an affiliated public 
hospital, which was both geographically and organizationally removed from the 
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medical school’s center, Dr. Lythcott’s Office had effective ‘jurisdiction’ primarily 
over Harlem and other public affiliates.  The heart of Columbia’s medical center, the 
Presbyterian Hospital, as well as its other private affiliates were unlikely to come 
under its influence and direction.12   
The third, ‘political’ perspective was rooted in the professional frustrations of 
physicians providing ambulatory and emergency services at the urban academic 
medical center, a problem with which its chief proponent, Dr. Robert Canfield, was 
very familiar and which he and a group of his colleagues tried to address for several 
years.  Starting in the late 1960s, the group tried to alarm both the Hospital and School 
administrations that the situation in the outpatient clinic “has reached a deplorable 
state in which the practice of medicine is conducted in a poor fashion that sometimes 
borders on malpractice.”  The immediate reason was that, over the past decade, the 
number of patients presenting themselves at the outpatient clinic had grown 
dramatically, while the level of staffing, as well as mechanisms of accountability, had 
deteriorated.  In the group’s opinion, it was “unethical to subject patients to medical 
care as it is presently being delivered in that area.”13  Dr. Canfield and his colleagues 
were well aware that outpatient medicine was completely shorn of the trappings of 
professional prestige compared with other branches of academic medicine.  It 
generated less income, served lower socio-economic groups, had inadequate facilities, 
and attracted little or no research funding.  Those who served or headed ambulatory 
                                                 
 
12
 City-owned Delafield Hospital was another hospital with which Dr. Lythcott’s office was expected to 
be directly concerned.  Conceivably, two smaller voluntary hospitals – St. Luke’s and Roosevelt – with 
which P&S had affiliation contracts, might have also become sites for several activities pursued by Dr. 
Lythcott’s office but that was still unclear.  What seems clear is that the Presbyterian Hospital was not 
subject to any considerable influence and direction of the Office of Urban and Community Affairs, the 
fact which indicates its de facto marginality within the organizational structure of the Columbia-
Presbyterian Medical Center. 
13
 “Resume of November 3rd and November 10th meetings,” November 14, 1967 (“Present: Doctors 
Buchanan, Canfield, Kimberg, McConnell and Neu.”); Canfield to Aranow, August 13, 1970. 
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departments also did not have institutional power comparable to heads of other 
departments and thus had little capacity to improve the situation. 
Although situated in the marginal domains of academic medicine, during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, Columbia’s ‘progressives’ were in a more powerful 
position than at any other time in past two decades.  The wave of social upheaval had 
reached inside the urban medical centers and many, including Columbia-Presbyterian, 
were undergoing significant change in their upper echelons.  Both the vacancies and 
the new appointments reflected a new political climate surrounding academic medical 
centers and the new leadership was considerably more open to the need for change.  
If the early reflections on community health care problem might have 
suggested that Columbia’s ‘progressives’ had a common cause, a personal conflict that 
emerged early in the process of planning shattered this impression.  In the spring of 
1970, Dr. Canfield was allegedly offered the leading role by the new Dean.14  The 
preliminary understanding was that the initiative would be: (1) established as an 
Office of Health Care Planning, (2) attached to the Office of the Dean, and (3) headed 
by a new position of an Associate Dean for Health Care Planning.  Dr. Canfield 
accepted, albeit with some reluctance, related more, as he recalled, “to the vagueness 
of the situation than to any lack of personal commitment.”15   
On May 20, 1970, Dr. Canfield presented his first proposal for Columbia’s 
community health planning initiative at a small meeting. (See Figure 7.1.)  At the 
center of Dr. Canfield’s early proposal for the structure and functions of the Office of 
Health Care Planning was a Division of Medical Methods Research.  
 
                                                 
 
14
 Canfield to Paul A. Marks, Dean, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, June 11, 
1971. 
15
 Ibid. 
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Figure 7.1. Original Organizational Schema for Columbia’s Community Health 
Planning Initiative Proposed by Dr. Canfield.  Source: R. E. Canfield, Proposal, 
5/19/70, attached to Canfield to Marks, May 20, 1970. 
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The Division was conceived as a broad new field of research and teaching, centered in 
and around ambulatory care, with additional involvement of the Department of Public 
Health.  As might have been expected, Dr. Canfield’s proposal thoroughly 
‘camouflaged,’ if not altogether submerged, his earlier more radical (and confidential) 
views.  On its face, the proposal did not suggest any direct restructuring of the 
professional and academic hierarchies, nor the reallocation of resources from the 
private patient care to community health services.  Of course, the creation of a new 
academic division, centered on ambulatory care, was related to his earlier insistence 
that ambulatory care must be re-created as a respected and well-supported field of 
research and teaching.  The proposed ‘hospital councils’ were also conceivably related 
to his earlier position on changes necessary at Columbia-Presbyterian.  Dr. Canfield’s 
proposal, then, seemed to retain some of the means from his earlier position, even as 
its ends were now moot. 
At the meeting, both Dr. Canflied’s organizational scheme and his personal 
qualifications for leadership came under vigorous attack from Dr. Lythcott.  His most 
frequent objection to Dr. Canfield’s scheme was that it bore no relationship to the 
Office of Urban and Community Affairs office and/or proposed to duplicate and usurp 
that Office’s established functions.16  Worse than that, in Dr. Lythcott’s opinion, was 
                                                 
 
16
 While no official record of the meeting’s discussion can be found, the substance of Dr. Lythcott’s 
attack could be gleaned from a memo outlining his criticisms of Dr. Canfield’s proposal written a day 
after.  (“Confidential Draft,” Lythcott to Marks, attached to “Proposal, R. E. Canfield, 5/19/70;” both 
attached to a handwritten note, dated September 10, 1970, from Lythcott to Fred [Putney, Assistant 
Vice President in Charge of Medical Affairs, Faculty Medicine, Columbia University] with a note: 
“Fred – I found this rummoging (sic) through some old correspondence.  Tennis anyone!”)  It appears 
that this letter had not been sent, but it is reasonable to assume that it outlined precisely those criticisms 
which Dr. Lythcott directed at Dr. Canfield during the meeting.  Apropos the ‘Affiliated Hospital 
Health Care Programs’, Dr. Lythcott said that “[t]his chart shows no relationship to me or my office.”  
Regarding the ‘division of medical methods research,’ he protested that “even in this extremely delicate 
area there is no organizational or administrative relationship to me or my office.”  About the ‘joint area 
health care planning and corporation,’ he said that “[t]he corporation has already appointed a task force 
to develop comprehensive systems or patterns of health care development and planning under the 
direction (chairmanship) of Dr. Van Dyke of the School of Public Health.”  Moreover, “my office is 
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that “Canfield has carved out for himself a niche in Health Care Planning, with no 
regard for broad based community health programs, maximizing the skills he does 
possess in a very small part of the equation, and minimizing and usurping the input of 
others who have considerably more experience, knowledge and expertise in this much 
larger equation of community medicine and health.”  Judging the proposal to be “a 
disaster,” Dr. Lythcott saw “no total role for Canfield in this area of Community 
Medicine except in the area of the division of Medical Methods Research as an arm of 
and resource person to the Chairman of the Department of Community Medicine, and 
clearly under the direction of the Chairman.”17     
Following the meeting, a new organizational schema appeared in the Dean’s 
files, dividing the coming ‘kingdom’ of community health planning in two.  (See 
Figure 7.2.)  In contrast to Dr. Canfield’s chart, where the direction over the proposed 
initiative was centralized under an Associate Dean for Health Care Planning, the new 
organizational structure was centralized only under the Dean of the Medical School 
and the Vice President for Medical Affairs.  Otherwise, it was a dual structure, split 
between the Office of Health Care Planning, presumably headed by Canfield, and the  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
already working actively and meaningfully with this task force” and Canfield’s schema “completely 
ignores this already developed fact of our lives.” 
The severity of the criticisms is consistent with the impression Dr. Canfield received from the 
meeting and recorded in his letter to the Dean. (Canfield to Marks, May 20, 1970.)  “I thought this 
morning’s meeting was extremely useful,” he wrote diplomatically, “and brought to the surface a 
number of matters that I have sensed as problems and that you must resolve.”   In particular, it became 
clear that “George [Lythcott] has great opposition to me and the approaches I represent.”  The feeling 
that Dr. Canfield took away from the meeting was that “[he] clearly [was] not the man for the job at this 
time” and asked the Dean not to introduce him in any official capacity at the upcoming public meeting.  
He said he would also “bow out” of the job of planning the physical reorganization of the ambulatory 
clinic, as soon as the Dean found someone else to do it. 
17
 Ibid., emphasis in the original, via underline.  Dr. Lythcott’s own preferred organization of the new 
initiative – Department of Community Medicine – did not have a broad support either because the Dean 
and several other figures involved expressed the notion that, to be successful, the community health 
care initiative had to be an overarching, inter-departmental activity, rather than a function of any one 
department.  (Marks to Bryant, December 28, 1970.)  For the most part, then, Dr. Lythcott’s vigorous 
opposition to Dr. Canfield had an effect of acknowledging the prerogatives of his Office of Urban and 
Community Health Affairs in the evolving plans. 
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Figure 7.2.  Revised Organizational Schema for Columbia’s Community Health 
Planning Initiative Intended to Attenuate the Conflict between Drs. Canfield and 
Lythcott.  Source: Attachment to Canfield to Marks, May 20, 1970. 
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It was in this tense and uncertain atmosphere that the planning of Columbia’s 
community health initiative continued over the summer.  Dr. Canfield’s thinking, 
conveyed in several drafts of a proposal he was working on, appeared to further retreat 
from his earlier radical position.  In contrast with his earlier communications, the 
community health planning initiative was now presented as a sort of conflict-free, 
School-wide undertaking, rather than a problem the solution to which would have to 
impinge on some of the vested interests within the medical faculty.  The role of the 
university medical faculties was now glorified and elevated over that of other social 
actors.  At present, read one of his drafts, “[m]ost of the policy decisions that concern 
health care planning in this country ... are being made by politicians and 
administrators” who “may accept short term solutions that significantly compromise 
the professional excellence that University hospitals must maintain in the future.”18  If 
universities failed to provide leadership, they “may be compelled to accept 
disagreeable policy decisions made by public agencies and it is unlikely that these 
agencies will act in concert with what the University believes to be the proper 
priorities.”  The medical faculties’ preeminence, argued Dr. Canfield, had its 
foundation in their historical record as “the ethical, if not the political leaders in 
medicine,” quite a stretch from an individual who had just recently declared that 
Columbia’s medical faculty allowed the outpatient clinic under its professional control 
to reach “a deplorable state ... [bordering] on malpractice.”19 
The new drafts also directly repudiated Dr. Canfield’s earlier view that any 
serious change in health care access necessitated a redistribution of power and prestige 
within the Medical Center and medicine at large.  On the contrary, conscious 
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 Robert E. Canfield, M.D., “Confidential Private Copy,” undated. 
19
 Ibid.; Canfield to Aranow, August 13, 1970. 
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preservation of the existing organizational structure was recommended.  “At the 
present time,” he wrote, 
our faculty is largely composed of two groups: a full-time salaried staff that 
devotes its principal attention to fundamental research problems and a clinical 
faculty that sustains itself by devoting its principal attention to the private 
practice of medicine.  Ideally, and practically, both groups are performing their 
needed functions well and it would be unreasonable to suggest a dramatic 
alteration in the level of support for the professional “way of life” for either 
group.  Thus the first principle of health care planning at the University will be 
that new programs should be largely staffed by new, younger, faculty members 
who are specifically recruited for these programs.20 
To his credit, Dr. Canfield still insisted American health care was in crisis and 
that, over the next decade, academic medical centers would have to adapt to “a social 
revolution which is asserting that every individual should have equal access to 
excellent medical care.” This transformation, however, appeared no longer linked to 
any fundamental restructuring of academic medicine’s power structure. 
While the outcome of the feud between Drs. Canfield and Lythcott remained 
uncertain, another figure interested in the leadership of Columbia’s community health 
planning initiative appeared on the scene in the middle of the summer, in the person of 
Dr. John H. Bryant, who accepted a position of the Associate Dean of the School of 
Public Health and Administrative Medicine.21  As with Drs. Canfield and Lythcott, Dr. 
Bryant’s new position in the organizational matrix of the Medical Center and 
academic medicine at large was at some remove from the true centers of money, 
power and prestige.  Marginalization of public health in favor of private medicine and 
of preventive medicine in favor of therapeutic methods was a long-established socio-
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 Canfield, “Confidential Private Copy.” 
21
 Report of the Vice President in Charge of Medical Affairs and the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine, 
CPMC Annual Report 1970.  Prior to his appointment, Dr. Bryant served as a director of programs in 
health care delivery at te Rockefeller Foundation and his recruitment to Columbia was clearly linked to 
the evolving initiative. 
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political fact in American health care.  At Columbia, this fact was institutionally 
expressed in the de facto subordination of the School of Public Health to the medical 
school, as well as highly disparate resources of the two schools.22  Like other 
proponents of community health planning, those in the field of public health hoped 
that the current crisis in American health care might increase resources and prestige 
accorded to their field.  Public health faculty could claim, and quite justifiably so, that 
community health care belonged to the intellectual heritage of their discipline and that 
its goals were closely linked to the need to correct the woeful neglect of public health 
in favor of private medicine.23    
While Dr. Bryant was still away, a small group of individuals who were most 
closely involved with the community health initiative, gathered for a planning 
conference at Martha’s Vineyard on August 9, 1970.24  Among those present was Dr. 
Eli Ginzberg, then Professor of Economics at Columbia University School of Business 
and Director of the Conservation of Human Resources Project.  As someone already 
actively engaged in policy-relevant health care research, Dr. Ginzberg’s involvement 
reflected a growing interest on the part of many academics outside of medical schools 
in problems and issues pertaining to health care.  Not surprisingly, Dr. Ginzberg was 
an advocate of including faculty from the social sciences and other non-medical 
disciplines in Columbia’s community health planning effort.25  Along with the other 
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 The  School of Public Health, for instance, did not have its own Dean but only an Assistant Dean 
subordinated to the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine.  (Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, 
Combined Annual Report 1970.)  Although formally a separate school, public health had a status of a 
department, and not a favored one at that. 
23
 In May of 1970, there was issued a 38-page “A Discussion of Columbia University’s Role in Public 
Health,” prepared by the School of Public Health and Administrative Medicine.  The document 
discusses at length the history, activities and resources of the School, with a special emphasis on the 
unmet needs of the School which hampered it playing a more useful role. 
24
 “Notes on Conference on Community Health Services Program for P&S,” Rough Copy, undated.  
(“In attendance were Drs. Eli Ginzburg, (sic) Lang Burwell, Fred Putney, Robert Canfield, George 
Lythcott and Paul Marks.”) 
25
 Ibid., pp. 12-13.  Mrs. Nora Piore, for instance, who would become one of the Center’s principal 
investigators, was recommended by Dr. Ginzberg. 
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figures in the University, Dr. Ginzberg saw the early 1970s as an opportune time to 
introduce substantial changes in the University’s relationship to the medical center and 
the medical center’s relationship with the community.26  Overcoming the medical 
school’s traditional aloofness from the rest of the university – both in institutional and 
epistemological terms – was a major part of this task.   
At the conference, realistic goals and a pragmatic approach took center stage in 
the discussion and Dr. Ginzberg’s input, in particular, appeared to be the voice of 
caution.  According to the transcript of the meeting, a recognition was urged that “one 
can not force a pattern on a group of physicians or consumers” and that, in planning 
for improved community health care, “one must start with the existing facilities, 
personnel and consumers.”27  The task was to “use the present system, but at a higher 
level of productivity.”28  The conferees felt that “perhaps the most novel aspect of a 
Community Health Service Program to be developed at P&S would be the effort to put 
together a program with the existing physician-patient relationships in our Community 
and the potential resources of the University-affiliated hospitals.”  Such an approach 
would be different from and superior to other initiatives in the country.  It would avoid 
the pitfalls of the Harvard Medical Plan, which conferees felt “attempted to create a 
wholly new fabric of health care delivery services and ... sell it to the community as a 
program super-imposed on the existing health care delivery programs in that 
community.”  It would also differ from the Kaiser Permanente model, where 
“consumer-doctor relationship were not incorporated and used as a base for improving 
health care delivery.”29   
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 Garwin to Glazer, April 6, 1970.  
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 “Notes on Conference,” p. 8. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., p. 7. 
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The question of whether the medical school could contribute significantly to 
developing new, community-oriented forms of health care was addressed only in 
regard to requisite resources.  An attempt to “catalog the major facilities available to 
P&S with respect to potential in a community health services program” yielded, as top 
items, the several private and public hospitals affiliated with P&S, boasting impressive 
numbers of beds and staggering patient loads.  However, all of these hospitals were, in 
fact, independent institutions, staffed but hardly controlled by the medical school and 
its parent universities.  The jewel in the Columbia’s medical crown, Presbyterian 
Hospital, was the most problematic of all.  Even during the most hopeful, early stages 
of planning, it was largely concluded that Presbyterian could not be counted upon for 
participation in community health planning in the near future.  The most promising 
hospital, at the time, was Delafield, a municipal facility with bed capacity equal to one 
eighth of that of Presbyterian and with no outpatient department.30 
The view that the community health planning initiative should not 
fundamentally change the ‘way of life’ of currently practicing physicians was also 
affirmed.  Whatever initiatives were to be undertaken at Columbia, it was hoped that 
“particularly the younger members of our staff might be interested in becoming 
involved in the Program.”  Along with young doctors, it was also “appropriate, indeed 
imperative, to begin by developing mechanisms for involving non-affiliated 
community physicians in a mutually beneficial, dignified, and meaningful manner in 
the health services system.”31  The new ‘community’ physicians were to be backed up 
by an expanded paraprofessional labor force.32  For obvious, albeit unstated reasons, 
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 “Notes of Conference,” pp. 3-4. 
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 Ibid., p. 6. 
32
 In order to cut the costs of community health services, the planners agreed that “[a] heavy emphasis 
would also have to be placed on incorporating allied health professional man-power output into this 
program.”  They stressed, however, that the incorporation of greater number of “paramedicals” should 
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the Center’s traditional staff could not be expected to provide the kind of services 
which make up the bulk of community medicine idea.  The actual work of community 
medicine would have to be done by people other than and different from those 
currently associated with the Medical Center. 
The main message of the conference was to avoid ‘over-promising’ and “to 
stay close to the present realities of health care delivery from the point of view of the 
consumer as well as the deliverer.”  Dr. Ginzberg in particular argued that the 
approach should be “one that [aimed] toward a less ambitious but more replicable 
program.”33  In his own summary of the conference, he reiterated the need to limit the 
scope of the initiative and avoid assuming actual responsibility for providing health 
care services to a specific population.  “The word comprehensive should not be used;” 
he counseled, “an expanded, improved community health service program is broad 
enough.”  It would be easier to “try to put together part of the total package by linking 
patients and physicians now organized in HIP; taking in families with Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield and/or GHI and selling them some supplemental coverage; getting a group 
of welfare cases paid for by the city rather than to go out and sell brand new 
coverage.”  Noting the growing interest of the private insurance companies, Dr. 
Ginzberg thought it “desirable to map in one or more private insurance companies to 
experiment with new forms of insurance for ambulatory services.”34  
The overall vision that emerged during the conference was both conservative 
and marginal to the core structures of Columbia’s medical empire.  At the most, what 
it implied was redeployment of the bottom twenty percent of physicians within the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
be accomplished “without it involving any significant net loss of income to physicians.”  (“Notes on 
Conference,” pp. 11, 10.) 
33
 Ibid., p. 1. 
34
 Eli Ginzberg, “Memorandum for Paul Marks, Subject: Planning for Health Care Delivery System,” 
August 20, 1970. 
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new community health care practice, along with the infusion of additional unaffiliated 
and paramedical personnel, while the existing organization and levels of income for 
the top eighty percent of the medical profession were preserved.  All of the change 
was to be concentrated at the bottom of the professional pyramid, the base of which 
could be lowered, in terms of power and income, and expanded by recruitment and 
training of personnel drawn from the lower socio-economic groups.  The bulk of the 
professional edifice would be left untouched, in the foreseeable future at least.35 
Significantly, however, the project under discussion was still an actually 
functioning program of health care services.36  In fact, the theme of caution and 
pragmatism, sounded particularly by Dr. Ginzberg, appears to have been genuinely 
motivated by a desire to see Columbia’s initiative actually embodied in a working 
program of community health services, rather than remaining on the level of theory.  
Although the program was contrasted with Harvard’s and Kaiser-Permanente, the 
contrast was not between service and research projects, but between different concepts 
of actually functioning programs. 
                                                 
 
35
 The emphasis on utilizing younger and so-called community physicians (i.e. local practitioners 
without university affiliations) – as well as the need to do so in a ‘dignified’ manner – was only a thinly 
veiled suggestion that community health services would have to rendered by physicians willing to 
accept, for lack of better options, considerably lower incomes and less prestige than those in either 
private practice or academic medicine.  In the urban areas, the least prestigious medical practice was 
fast becoming a preserve of foreign medical graduates, many from rapidly growing Third World 
economies like India and the East Asian countries.  (See Starr, “The Social Transformation of American 
Medicine,” p.  363.)  If American minorities could be admitted to medical schools in greater numbers, 
while facing discrimination in professional practice, they, too, could be candidates for practice in urban 
‘ghettos’!  Third world doctors for second-rate citizens of the first world country!  While vehemently 
opposed to acceptance of foreign medical graduates, American medical profession clearly profited from 
a permissive immigration policy which enabled most American-born and -educated physicians to 
practice in ‘dignified’ conditions.  
36
 Even if much less ambitious than earlier plans, the initiative was still conceived as a practical 
exercise, presupposing actual facilities, staff, and patients.  Delafield Hospital, publicly-owned but 
under professional staffing contract with P&S, was identified as the most likely site for the development 
of  “our Community Health Services Program.”  Certain specific elements of the program were 
discussed, such as “the desirability to structure a program so as to provide each consumer with ready 
access to a primary physician.”  The ‘team’ approach to health care services, “including the concept of a 
primary physician in relation to a nurse practitioner, medical assistants and medical technicians,” was 
mentioned as a possible model.  (“Notes of Conference,” pp. 9-10.) 
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Planning, Funding, and the Launch 
Although at the conference Drs. Bryant, Canfield and Lythcott were identified 
as three individuals who would be most directly involved in the planning process, this 
‘collegial’ vision quickly disintegrated.37  Upon his arrival at Columbia, Dr. Bryant 
asserted his claim to control the preparation of the proposal, refusing collaboration 
with Dr. Canfield.38  During the Fall of 1970, it was also decided that the proposed 
Office would be headed by a director, rather than a new associate dean, and Dr. Bryant 
was appointed to the post.  The work of the Office would be guided by an Executive 
Committee the chairmanship of which was given to Dr. Lythcott.  Dr. Canfield, alas, 
was informed that there would be no place for him either on the staff or on the 
Executive Committee.  Despite his efforts to stay involved, he was effectively 
expelled from participation and no one appears to have protested.39   
As Dr. Bryant assumed control over the preparation of the proposal, the theme 
of caution with respect to the scope of Columbia’s initiative evolved to preclude any 
practical involvement at all, at least not until further research suggested an appropriate 
methodology for restructuring health care services.  Columbia, it was now suggested, 
should avoid “efforts to establish entirely new and highly innovative systems of health 
services which run the risk of failure as an experiment in system design or in its 
replicability or both.”  Instead, the initiative’s primary goal would be “to develop the 
methodology for designing feasible change,” placing it at no less than three degrees of 
separation from any practical undertaking.40   
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 Ibid., p. 11. 
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 Canfield to Bryant, August 17, 1970. 
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 Canfield to Marks, June 11, 1971. 
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 “A Proposal for Establishing a Capability for Planning, Development, and Evaluation of Health 
Services,” Columbia University, Faculty of Medicine, from the Office of the Vice President for Medical 
Affairs and Dean of the Faculty of Medicine, draft, August 1970, p. 3.  With minor changes, this draft 
formed the basis of the version of the proposal completed in November of 1970 and circulated for 
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The Office of Research and Planning of Community Health Systems 
(ORPCHS), as a proposed body was now called, was envisioned as a primarily 
research undertaking.  While it was intended that the Office would have “the 
capability of contributing substantially to the design of new managerial approaches,” 
the actual management of heath care programs would be “the responsibility of the 
administration of the agency or institution involved, e.g. Presbyterian Hospital, a 
community-group practice corporation, and so forth.”41  With no direct involvement in 
health care provision, ORPCHS would represent “an institutional resource” for those 
institutions which are or will be responsible for delivery of actual health care services.  
In spite of this largely consultative role, it was hoped that the initiative’s impact would 
be “consistent with overall health services systems development and long-range 
planning.”42 
At the same time, the language of Columbia’s proposal was also beginning to 
align itself with the key terms of conservative assimilation of the health planning 
movement, including the renewed appreciation of the ‘pluralistic’ nature of American 
medicine and the concomitant commitment to work within existing institutions.43  
                                                                                                                                            
 
comments.  The three degrees of separation are: (1) the methodology for (2) designing (3) feasible 
change. 
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 “A Proposal for Establishing a Capability for Planning, Development, and Evaluation of Health 
Services,” Columbia University, Faculty of Medicine, undated, probably March 1971, pp. 2-3.  The 
proposal stated that the Medical School’s proposed involvement in community health services would 
consist primarily in “[s]tudying existing systems and advising responsible agencies” and 
“[p]articipating with responsible agencies ... in studying and experimenting with health services 
programs.”  Only “[o]ccasionally, perhaps unusually,” would the Office “develop a health services 
program independently of existing health services agencies, but the reasons for acting independently 
should be clear, the ultimate disposition of the program understood, and the relevance for city-wide and 
nation-wide programs established.”  (This formulation first appears in a draft, Bryant to Marks, 
February 11, 1971.)  Specific virtue was found in this new vision of Columbia’s involvement, namely, 
that the Office was “not intended ... to preempt or control other institutional activities relating to 
community health systems, and it should have no veto over other health services activities.” 
42
 “A Proposal,” March 1971, p. 2. 
43
 A call to preserve the “pluralistic” nature of American health care and to avoid “simplistic solutions,” 
–  with both terms signifying a thinly veiled opposition to ‘socialistic’ models adopted by Great Britain 
or Sweden – appeared, for instance, in the 1968 Barr Committee Report on hospital planning.  Although 
set up by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Committee was composed of the 
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Columbia’s proposal now insisted that “rapid or substantial changes cannot be 
expected in a system with the complexity and inertia represented in the interaction of 
society and its health services.”  It was proposed that through ORPCHS, the Faculty of 
Medicine would “seek to establish or relate to carefully selected health care settings or 
situations that collectively represent the spectrum of health services problems” 
necessary for research and the teaching of health care planning. 
This pluralistic approach to the institution’s involvement in health service 
systems could include, for example, an urban ghetto community, an urban 
middle-class community, a suburban community, a rural community and when 
resources are available, a community of a less developed country.  In selecting 
these health settings, the Faculty of Medicine feels strongly that it must begin 
with the population as it is, the problems as they are, and the system of health 
services as it exists.44  
All traces of the earlier, political understanding of the health care crisis were 
now eliminated, replaced with a narrow, technical-managerial view of the problems.  
Technical problems implied technical solutions, and academic research, in this 
increasingly self-referential narrative, was ideally suited to take the lead in finding 
them.  One of Dr. Bryant’s drafts, for example, opened with an acknowledgement of a 
deep crisis gripping the American health care system.  “The factors that contribute to 
the nation’s health crisis,” he wrote, “are numerous and complex” but for “simplicity 
in presentation” could be organized under the headings of “inadequate health care” 
and “inadequate education and training of health personnel.”  As the subheadings 
portended, what followed was a laundry list consisting almost entirely of so many 
“inadequate,” “poor,” and “lacking” moments of the existing health care 
arrangements.  Numerous features of the “faulty health care systems” were “poorly 
                                                                                                                                            
 
major figures in the hospital industry and associate health care fields.  (Stevens, “In Sickness and In 
Wealth,” pp. 306-307.) 
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 “A Proposal,” August 1970, pp. 6-7. 
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designed,” “inefficient,” “ineffective,” “poorly distributed,” and “non-adaptive.”  The 
systems lacked “data systems for planning and evaluation” and an “experimental 
approach to system improvement,” while the resources were both “poorly distributed” 
and “poorly used.”45  Amidst this barrage of bold assessments, one question was 
conspicuously absent.  What exactly accounted for this state of affairs?  How did it 
come to be like that?  Alas, the rest of the document offered no clue. 
Even this very ‘technocratic’ discussion of health care crisis, however, was 
eventually eliminated from the proposal.  After reviewing Dr. Bryant’s draft as it stood 
in November of 1970, Dr. Ginzberg told Dean Marks that he was “quite disturbed by 
it” and thought “it should be substantially scrapped.”  He warned the Dean of “the 
impatience of most foundation executives that [he knew] with generalized background 
info and/or broad philosophical propositions.”  The whole discussion, he said, was a 
“windup but ... no pitch” and urged a “much shorter hard hitting document.”46  In 
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 “A Proposal,” August 1970, pp. 3-4.  There were, to be sure, a few surprising items on this laundry 
list of problems.  Early in the list of factors contributing to the “faulty health care systems,” there was a 
“lack of community participation in decision making.”  The term ‘decision-making,’ however, clearly 
did not fit with the thoroughly de-politicized litany of problems and was struck out and replaced with 
“planning, implementation, and evaluating.”  Thus edited, it turned into an almost comical proposition 
that the fault lay with the community’s failure to engage in the work of rational/technical planning of 
health care systems.  At the end of the list under “inadequate education and training of health 
personnel,” several factors were suddenly restated in terms of institutional structure, rather than bad 
management, suggesting that it was the “University structure [that did] not facilitate integrated teaching 
of different health personnel” and “University structure and custom [that did] not facilitate inter-
disciplinary, problem-oriented approaches to health services and educational problems.”  The final item 
on the list was most surprising of all, bearing a moral, rather than technocratic, judgement of 
professional career structures.  “Health personnel,” wrote Dr. Bryant, “[was] specialized without regard 
for pressing needs and areas of outrageous neglect of society.”  These departures, however, were few 
and far between to change the overwhelmingly technocratic tone of the document.   
46
 Ginzberg to Marks, “Personal,” December 14, 1970.  Not everyone shared Dr. Ginzberg’s view and a 
set of comments from another member of the Center’s Executive Committee, the Dean of the School of 
Social Work, pointed in the nearly opposite direction.  Here, the main criticism was that the proposal 
“refer[ed] to a ‘health crisis’ and ‘health problems,’ but [did] not specify their nature, extent or cause.”  
It would not be easy “to think out and set down the assumptions about what is wrong, together with 
such evidence as can be brought to bear,” but the exercise would really help to “tie together other parts 
of the proposal in a theoretical and practical whole.”  [Mitchell I. Ginsberg, Dean, School of Social 
Work, Columbia University to Marks, April 12, 1971.  (The comments were actually made by the 
Assistant Dean Sam Finestone, whom Dean Ginsberg asked to review the proposal in his stead, for lack 
of time.)]  These recommendations, alas, went unheeded. 
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subsequent versions of the proposal the ‘broad philosophical propositions’ were 
trimmed to a short and none-too-explicit paragraph, stating that “the various elements 
of health services [were] both incomplete and uncoordinated” and that “[s]olutions 
[were] required at different levels in the larger system – at the level of system 
elements, and at the level of planning for the overall system.”47  
While yielding to Dr. Ginzberg’s insistence to scrap the long introduction, Dr. 
Bryant resisted outlining specific projects the Office would undertake.  In a memo 
discussing preparations for the meeting with foundation representatives, Dr. Bryant 
insisted that “[w]hile we can be explicit in describing the kinds of problems with 
which ORPCHS will be concerned, it would run counter to the institutional 
philosophy on which the development of ORPCHS rests to make a series of 
programmatic decisions at this time.”  In his view, the Office was intended to be “the 
main institutional mechanism whereby the University and its affiliated institutions 
become engaged in the health care problems of our society.”  Consequently, “to make 
programmatic decisions at this time would not only preempt decision-making 
authority that is intended to be vested in the structure of ORPCHS itself, but also 
would tend to weaken the very process ORPCHS is intended to foster, namely, that 
process whereby a university examines the health problems of society and determines 
what the best use of its own resources would be in order to achieve maximum benefit 
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 “A Proposal,” March 1971, p. 18.  More regrettable than the elimination of Dr. Bryant’s mostly 
technocratic discussion of health care crisis was the loss of several passages where he argued that 
community participation was crucial because “self-determination was essential to every segment of 
society and is particularly important to those who are caught in what can be described as modernized, 
institutionalized poverty.”  (“A Proposal,” August 1970, p.10.)  Other passages that disappeared were 
those suggesting that Columbia’s initiative should be oriented to what is basically a “one class patient-
care,” where the differences may involve “room size, meals, etc., but they should not involve basic care, 
not should they make the distinction that now exists in the ambulatory care facilities.” (Unsigned 
document, “Community Health Services,” August 29, 1970, p. 4.)  A quaint proposition that “[o]ne 
might make, perhaps, a good case the fact that top priority should be placed to improving the level of 
nutrition in our population” was also never to be seen again. (Ibid.) 
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for society.”48  The result of this low-level struggle between Drs. Ginzberg and Bryant 
was that the proposal ended up containing neither commitments to specific practical 
goals, nor a coherent view of the problems’ nature. 
A series of conflicts and struggles which surrounded the initiative’s planning 
affected its organizational form as well.  Competition for leadership and participation, 
combined with a rather secretive planning process, dashed the initial hopes for an 
institution-wide, multi-departmental undertaking.  The early visions of the initiative’s 
organization emphasized two interrelated propositions.  First, the initiative was going 
to be an office with an actual mandate to undertake institution-wide or even area-wide 
planning.  Second, to carry out this mandate legitimately and effectively, it would rely 
on a multi-departmental, or even multi-institutional, structure of agenda-setting and 
decision-making.  In the end, neither of these objectives was realized.   
As the erstwhile Office was renamed the Center, its mandate to undertake 
institution-wide planning was re-imagined as a kind of a leadership by inspiration.  
The Center’s staff, it was now envisioned, would be drawn from numerous 
departments, holding joint appointments in the Center and in their departments, and “it 
would be largely through their academic identification and activity within those 
departments that change required within the School would evolve.”49  The 
questionable new method of effectuation the initiative’s goals was made even more 
problematic by the fact that the actual composition of the Center’s staff fell far short of 
the interdisciplinary vision outlined in the proposal.  The final version of the proposal 
listed, under the Center’s proposed personnel, specialists in 14 academic fields and 5 
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 “Notes Relating to Further Discussion on the Proposal to Establish an Office of Research and 
Planning of Community Health Systems in Columbia University Faculty of Medicine,” August 11, 
1971. 
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 “A Proposal,” March 1971, p. 24.  The Center’s suggested structure was described as “the 
administrative framework through which the departments could operate in one or another community 
health service programs,” as well as “a technically competent resource group.” 
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clinical disciplines but the actual staff engaged during the Center’s first two years was 
much less interdisciplinary.50  Out of the twelve members with academic appointments 
anywhere within the Columbia University, ten were with the School of Public 
Health.51 
The composition of the Center’s Executive Committee was more 
representative in terms of academic fields but it, too, was a far cry from the earlier 
vision, especially in terms of including the interests from outside of the Medical 
School.52  (See Figure 7.3.)  Out of the 24 members, 18 held professional or 
administrative positions at the University, with 15 of them being in the Faculty of 
Medicine.  There were only 6 members from outside of the University: 5 
administrators of the affiliated hospitals and one representative of the Health Services 
Administration.53  While ‘community’ and ‘regional planning groups’ were listed as 
members of the Committee as late as 1974, none of their representatives had in fact 
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 Ibid., pp. 35-37.  The fields listed under the Center’s required personnel in the final proposal were: 
management science, health economics, systems analysis, health planning and evaluation, 
epidemiology, biostatistics, health care administration, urbanology and the environment, political 
science, sociomedical sciences, nursing and allied health sciences, educator-curriculum development, 
information systems, social work, and the clinical departments (pediatrics, medicine, psychiatry, 
obstetrics and gynecology, dentistry). 
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 “CCHS Annual Report 1973,” pp. 24-26.  The other two were in the Departments of Pediatrics and 
Dentistry.  Several other fields of expertise were represented among the other staff members but, 
without the academic or professional appointments at the University or the Medical Center, they could 
not be supposed to have much influence on the participation of the departments corresponding to their 
field of knowledge.  There were seven individuals with masters degree (or research focus) in city 
planning, business administration, anthropology, public administration, public nursing, sociology, 
biostatistics; a post-doctoral fellow in operations research and math theory; two PhD candidates in 
architecture and in operations research and engineering.  One member held academic appointment at the 
Albert Einstein College of Medicine.  One individual with an M.D. was identified only as consultant in 
pediatrics.  The remaining 10 staff members were supporting personnel, community coordinators, 
research associates and others with a bachelor’s degree or less.  By the end of 1973, total staff 
numbered 34. 
52
 Ibid., pp. 6-7.  Among the members of the Executive Committee were chairmen of 5 clinical 
departments (medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, pediatrics, and psychiatry), 3 professors of 
public health, and 3 faculty members from outside of the Faculty of Medicine (professors of social 
work, economics, and biological sciences).  The Center’s perceived failure to engage clinical 
departments, despite their representation on the Executive Committee, is discussed below. 
53
 Ibid.  One of the 18 held an academic appointment at the Medical School and was a director of a 
hospital. 
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Figure 7.3. Final Organizational Form of Columbia’s Community Health Planning 
Initiative.  Source: “The Place of CCHS in the Organizational Structure of the 
University,” CCHS Annual Report 1973. 
 
ever been included.54  Inclusion of the representatives of the student body, the health 
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York City County Medical Society, which was initially envisioned, was no longer 
even discussed.55 
More problematic than its composition was the fact that, contrary to its name, 
the Executive Committee ended up having an advisory, not an executive, relationship 
to the Center.  Given its limited power to direct the Center’s work, participation of 
some members on the Committee seemed to be entirely pro forma, a matter of 
organizational courtesy, rather than actual interest.  Although the chairmen of five 
clinical departments were included, the virtual absence of any clinical faculty on the 
Center’s staff did not bode well for actual, practical cooperation.  Participation of 
hospital representatives also did not in fact signify any programmatic commitments.56  
Compared to initial plans, the Center was likely to have considerably less influence on 
the University and the hospitals, just as the University and the hospitals would, in turn, 
have less influence over the Center.  Here, then, was a classic compromise yielding yet 
another insular organizational niche.   
As the search for external funding for the Center began, it appeared that Dr. 
Ginzberg may have been right in regard to some foundation executives.  One 
prospective sponsor, the President of the William Lightfoot Schultz Foundation, Mr. 
George L. Schultz, responded very much in the way Dr. Ginzberg had predicted, 
criticizing the proposal as a whole as “a grandiose plan” and its objectives as “too 
general, too long-range and idealistic.”57  The lack of specificity did not, however, 
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 “The Advisory Committee on Planning for Health Affairs would be composed as follows ... ,” 
undated, filed March 1971. 
56
 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see the section on the Center’s relationship with the hospitals 
below. 
57
 George L. Schultz, President, The William Lightfoot Schultz Foundation, Clifton, NJ to Marks, May 
25, 1971.  Asked to comment on the proposal from a ‘business’ point of view, Mr. Schultz frankly 
doubted that “any good businessman or firm would support the proposal as outlined.”  One of his 
criticisms was that “the explanation of how the function (ORPCHS) can be supported in future years 
from internal sources [was] hazy and not convincing.”  He also questioned “whether a ‘systems 
approach’ to such an analysis [was] warranted,” but if so, recommended finding “an experienced firm 
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appear to phase the three big foundations – Carnegie, Commonwealth, and Rockefeller 
– which gave a half a million dollars each to underwrite Columbia’s new initiative.  
The foundations did, however, communicate their preference that “there be no 
publicity initiated at this time by the Medical School with regard to the source and 
amount of funding for the Center.”  The Office’s Executive Committee “concurred 
with the foundations’ positions in this regard and felt that at an appropriate time a 
suitable mode of strategy would be the issuance of a press release by the foundations 
announcing the Center’s existence [and] detailed description of its focus and goals.”  
Once the Center was functional, “announcements could be released periodically 
describing [its] projects with an added statement concerning the foundations’ backing 
of the project without necessarily revealing dollar amounts of their support.”58  
Evidently, the foundations were leery of publicizing such a considerable expenditure 
without a clear statement of what the investment would ultimately yield.59  
Receipt of generous initial funding on the basis of an essentially open-ended 
proposal created a clear opportunity to rethink the Center’s mission: with financial 
worries quieted for a while, there was an opportunity to raise the ‘hard questions’ 
again.  The first two post-funding meetings of the Executive Committee, however, 
dashed the hope that the conservative, technocratic drift of Columbia’s initiative might 
be reversed.  At the center of the discussion was a work paper requested from Dr. 
Bryant by the Committee at the December 16, 1971 meeting.  It was decided at the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
instead of hiring your own experts.”  Finally, he was bothered by “the repeated warning that the design 
of new systems will involve extensive and complex financial, organizational and administrative 
problems.”  In his experience, “those who begin a project convinced of its complexity find just that and 
never produce a practical solution. The simplest approach to problems seems to work out best – almost 
always.” 
58
 Minutes, Executive Committee, CCHS, December 21, 1971. 
59
 When the Commonwealth Foundation did announce its financial support to CCHS, the description of 
the Center’s mission and expected projects was rather ambitious and contained at least one inaccurate 
statement asserting that the Center’s Executive Committee included representatives from urban 
communities.  (The Commonwealth Fund Annual Report 1972.) 
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meeting that CCHS should “relate its efforts largely to the New York City setting, 
particularly upper Manhattan, [and] focus on relatively few projects in order to have a 
substantial impact on the health system of that region.”60  To help select specific 
projects for the Center’s immediate involvement, the Committee requested a working 
paper containing: “(1) an analysis of the existing situation, i.e., the health system, how 
it functions and what its problems are; (2) a projection of the health care system we 
think would be desirable and feasible for five to ten years in the future; [and] (3) 
identification of the areas of action by the CCHS that would be most likely to 
contribute to the evolution of the health care system in the desired direction.”61   
Facing an assignment too heavy for a one’s week time, Dr. Bryant took the 
liberty of choosing an alternative approach, developing “a simple inventory of the 
major problems of the system ... weighted or scored in terms of their importance,” 
“their vulnerability to improvement over the next five to ten years” and “the extent to 
which the CCHS, with its special and limited resources, might effect improvement” in 
these various problem areas.62  Abbreviated, Dr. Bryant’s list is shown in Table 7.1, 
with 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest score. 
Understandably, education of health care personnel received the highest score 
across the board as the area where medical faculty could make the greatest impact   
Other high scorers were ‘bad linkages between parts of health care system and bad 
regionalization,’ ‘payment mechanisms leading to overuse or misuse,’ ‘bad linkages 
between parts of the system’ in their relation to generating high health care costs, and 
‘lack of fiscal and professional accountability.’  The most remarkable result of this  
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 Working paper submitted by Dr. Bryant for the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the 
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Table 7.1. Inventory of Health Care Problems Rated in Terms of Importance, 
Vulnerability to Improvement, and Suitability as Potential Projects for Columbia’s 
Community Health Planning Initiative, 1971 
 
Health Care Problems Importance 
as Problem 
Vulnerability 
to 
Improvement 
Suitability 
for CCHS 
Those problems contributing primarily to lack of effectiveness 
Access to care limited in terms of time of day and 
location 3 3 4 
Limited outreach and follow-up 4 2 4 
Bad linkages between parts of the system; bad 
regionalization 5 4 5 
Resources misallocated; too little goes to preventive, 
primary care 4 3 4 
Education of health care personnel 5 5 5 
Limited acceptability of care 3 3 4 
Consumer education  4 2 3 
Quality review 2 2 3 
Socio-economic-environmental factors 1 1 1 
Those problems contributing primarily to high cost 
Payment mechanisms leading to overuse or misuse  5 3 5 
Linkages between parts of the system 4 4 4 
Consumer education 4 2 3 
Lack of fiscal and professional accountability 3 3 5 
 
Source: Working paper submitted by Dr. Bryant for the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of 
the Center for Community Health Systems, Faculty of Medicine, Columbia University, December 21, 
1971. 
 
tabulation, however, was an uninterrupted row of straight 1’s assigned to ‘socio-
economic-environmental factors.’  A footnote explained that “[w]hile these problems 
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are of great importance to society and influence health in strong ways, they are largely 
outside of the health system as such.”63 
Having identified ‘systems planning and regionalization’ as the most 
promising problem to work on, Dr. Bryant’s paper suggested “that CCHS initiate as 
one of its major projects the study and continuous monitoring of the health care 
system of upper Manhattan.”  Sensing the impatience of the Executive Committee to 
define practical areas of involvement, he suggested that, while waiting for the result of 
this major undertaking, the Center should select several areas of involvement “on the 
basis of general knowledge of health care problems,” citing ambulatory care as a 
likely point of departure.64  A question, which arose during the previous meeting, was 
whether it was “possible for the CCHS to contribute to the evolution of a more 
effective and financially viable system of health services in upper Manhattan that 
involves the coordination and collaboration of health services provided by various 
institutions, practitioners and community groups.”  In other words, could the Center 
successfully promote ‘systems planning and regionalization’?  Dr. Bryant’s answer 
was elusive.  The goal behind the idea of regionalization could be expressed as “the 
allocation of services in such a way as to allow for the provision of care to the right 
person, at the right time, in the right place, and for the right reason.”  At the level of 
institutions, regionalization implied an “attempt to balance the need for 
decentralization of resources with the centralization required for their efficient usage.”  
Given “the highly pluralistic character of the current health system,” Dr. Bryant 
believed that “an intimate and continuously expanding understanding of that system 
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will be required to make wise decisions on how the CCHS can contribute most 
effectively to its improvement.”65     
A remarkable thing about this answer was that, not too long before, Dr. Bryant 
took a very different approach to analyzing whether regionalization efforts could 
succeed.  In a January 1971 memorandum to Dean Marks, concerning the two pieces 
of federal legislation known as the Regional Medical Planning (RMP) and the 
Community Health Planning (CHP) initiatives, Dr. Bryant pointed out that both 
programs “lack[ed] the power of implementing decisions they might make” and, 
therefore, “[would] probably fail.”  Neither was likely to reach its objective because 
“the decision-making power that actually determined the patterns and levels of health 
care [had] been untouched by these steps.”66  In regard to allocation of health care 
resources, hospitals remained the most powerful actors, while the utilization of 
hospital and ambulatory services continued to depend on the decisions of  the 
practicing physicians.   
The political ‘toothlessness’ of these bills was related to the manner of their 
creation, bearing the heavy hand of the organized medical profession.  “The RMPs 
have ended up as funding agencies with specific legislative injunction (of AMA 
origin) against changing present patterns of practice,” while “[t]he CHP programs 
(with similar injunctions) have relied on existing political machinery, but have not had 
the power of implementation.”  With their powers largely untouched by the 
regionalization bills, physicians and the hospitals were unlikely to undertake health 
care planning voluntarily.  Under any regional plan, individual hospitals “stand to gain 
or lose according to how a plan of regionalization adds to or detracts from their 
programs and resources” and would therefore oppose all efforts which hurt them.  
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Physicians were also unlikely to change their decisions controlling utilization of 
hospital and ambulatory services because “their system of practice and payment [was] 
not conducive to regionalization.”67  
Did not a similar conclusion – or at least a similar manner of analysis – equally 
applicable to Columbia’s health planning initiative?  Was it likely, for instance, that 
the CCHS would have significant powers to implement the changes it deemed 
necessary?  How influential – or even independent – was the Center vis-à-vis hospitals 
and physicians, in structural terms?  Was the CCHS going to be any more successful 
in promoting ‘regionalization’ than the ‘doomed’ CHP or MPR bodies and, if not, 
could both be strengthened by an alliance?  Although general questions about the 
Center’s likely influence were still raised from time to time by some members of the 
Executive Committee, the inclination and capacity to answer them honesty appears to 
have been lost quite some time ago.  Elimination of any and all political analysis from 
the conceptualization of Columbia’s initiative and recasting the problem in strictly 
technocratic terms appeared quite final. 
By January of 1972, the evolution of Columbia’s community health planning 
initiative from tentative discussions to an official undertaking was complete.  Less 
than two years after the planning began, the initiative stood substantially different 
from the initial visions.  The goal of reforming the organization and delivery of health 
care services at the Center gave way to an understanding that “rapid or substantial 
changes cannot be expected.”  The idea of creating an actually functioning program of 
innovative services was put off until “the methodology for designing feasible change” 
was at hand.  The demand to redistribute professional rewards from private to 
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 Ibid.  Dr. Bryant also pointed out that “[l]acking actual power, [CHPs] have often sought it through 
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community medicine was rescinded in favor of preserving the medical faculty’s “way 
of life,” while the calls for a one-class system of health care were displaced by a 
renewed appreciation of America’s “pluralistic” health care system and rejection of 
any “simplistic approaches.”  In the end, all openly political and moral understandings 
of America’s health care system fell silent before the steady drone of politically 
‘neutral’ technocratic discourse.    
While, in the beginning of the journey, academic ‘progressives’ appeared to 
have a common cause, the initiative’s development was marred early on by inter-
personal and inter-departmental conflicts which all but destroyed the possibility of a 
genuinely co-operative effort.  That the mechanisms to prevent the conflict – or to 
bring it out in the open for an institution-wide discussion and mediation – did not 
exist, or were not engaged, bespeaks the weakness of the presumed structures of 
academic ‘collegiality.’  Closed-circle decision making throughout the entire 
conceptualization of the community health initiative, was implicitly justified by the 
existence of powerful forces of opposition within the Medical Center.  How much was 
gained by the secrecy is unclear but, certainly, much was lost.  Just when the political 
climate finally enabled the Center’s ‘progressives’ to press their agenda, they chose 
instead to fight among themselves.  Using the old means of decision-making and 
power-sharing to generate the new ends of community health care was a crucial 
mistake of the planning process, indicative of the failure to understand the complicity 
of the basic organizational structures of American academic medicine in the very 
processes that precipitated the community health care crisis.  
The initiative’s irreversible slide into the technocratic conservatism signified 
more than simply a triumph of one interest over others.  It pointed to a systematic 
effect of the institutional power on professional work, prevailing even in the more 
militant climate of the early 1970s.  Both career-motivated power struggles and the 
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general imbalance of power in a hierarchically structured organization inclined the 
early contenders to purge more radical moments of their views, especially those 
pertaining to internal politics of academic medicine.  Suppression of the political 
understanding, in turn, allowed the planners to skirt many crucial issues pertaining to 
the nature of the health care crisis.  Although the technocratic turn was strongly 
motivated by disincentives to internal institutional critique and reform, it had 
important consequences for relations with external forces.  The early understanding of 
the community health planning initiative as a matter of internal reform suggested that 
academic progressives had a shared cause with those outside of academic medicine 
who demanded or worked for reform, including communities, students, and 
progressive public figures.  When internal conflict of interest became taboo in the 
thinking about the community health planning initiatives, the interest ‘lines’ were 
restored to their traditional shape, binding participants to their immediate personal 
career interests.  This assertion of institutional power, which forced an increasingly 
inward view of the community health initiative, also discounted and ignored external 
forces and actors.  The refusal to know, therefore, was dual, encompassing both self 
(i.e. one’s institutional, professional and social location) and others (external actors).  
In a nearly classic Hegelian manner, the planners’ failure to know themselves had as 
its corollary an instrumental, exploitative relationship to external others, including 
those with whom academic liberals might have been expected to form a unified front 
for social change.  
Community Health Care and the Community 
‘Community’ was one of the central terms of the health care reform movement 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s and usually connoted a dual concern of improving 
community health care services and establishing mechanisms for community 
participation.  Judging from the views expressed by the initiators of Columbia’s 
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initiative, there existed a foundation for a broad consensus on the issue of community.  
All the key figures, including Drs. Bryant, Canfield, Ginzberg and Lythcott, agreed 
that, like other urban medical centers, Columbia University and its affiliated hospitals 
had been legitimately criticized for their indifference to the community in which they 
exist.  All of the planners felt that the University and the Medical Center could no 
longer maintain their traditionally aloof stance and had to devote more attention and 
resources to serving the surrounding community.  Most importantly, everyone seemed 
to agree that the ‘community’ in question consisted primarily of those lower socio-
economic groups that were so inadequately served by the urban medical centers and 
the health care system as a whole.68   
On the question of the community’s participation in the health planning 
process, however, there were some differences among the key players.   For Dr. 
Canfield and his colleagues, establishing community participation was not a central 
issue, not because its input was unimportant, but because responsible physicians and 
administrators knew full well what needs to be done to improve community services.69  
For Dr. Bryant, in contrast, community participation was a crucial issue, rooted in an 
understanding that “[s]elf-determination is essential to every segment of society and is 
particularly important to those who are caught in what can be described as 
modernized, institutionalized poverty.”70  For Dr. Lythcott, the issue of inviting 
community participation was also a central element of the health planning initiative, 
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even if a difficult task at the same time.  In his view, community participation 
“inevitably entail[ed] a significant degree of confusion and conflict” because  there 
was “no easy way for two groups – the community and the medical school – with 
conflicting goals and priorities to resolve their differences.”71   
The medical school’s recent experiences with inviting community participation 
seemed to confirm Dr. Lythcott’s assessment.  Early efforts by the Office of Urban 
and Community Affairs to generate community support for the feasibility study of an 
HMO program, for example, uncovered an impressive intensity of “hostile feelings 
and suspicion against the motives and alleged past practices of Columbia University.”  
As one of Dr. Lythcott’s colleagues reported, the majority of community organizations 
“have greeted us with suspicion, distrust, or outright hostility” and securing their 
collaboration has been very hard. 
Many [organizations] have agreed to work with us only on condition that we 
form a committee representing all interests involved – provider and consumer, 
but dominated by consumers – which will collectively carry out all further 
investigations and planning for the project.  Agreement with this demand has 
been the only means by which even minimal community acceptance could be 
achieved.  Several groups have re-quested, additionally, that all agreements 
made be ratified by the University in writting (sic); others have refused or 
balked at participating entirely.72  
In the two areas “around which the future of the Center for Community Health 
Systems and other activities of ours will depend” – the Morningside-Riverside and the 
Washington Heights – the situation with community relations was likely to be further 
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complicated by the growing ethnic polarization between the African-American and 
Puerto-Rican communities.  As difficult as the situation was in Harlem, noted Dr. 
Lythcott, it was “made easier by the fact that [his] office is substantially Black, and 
‘Brothers’ just naturally do business better with ‘Brothers’; not to take anything away 
from the hard work of many people who have brought the relationship to where it 
is.”73  The only way out of this situation was to engage in “open and active 
cooperation, participation and communication” between the University and the 
community groups and to position the community health planning initiative as “a 
group effort acting collaboratively with, but not attempting to dominate or manipulate 
in any manner, such community groups.”74 
These understandings notwithstanding, around the time of its launch, 
Columbia’s community health planning initiative appeared to be moving away, not 
toward, greater cooperation with the community.  Dr. Bryant’s lofty language about 
‘self-determination,’ as well as such unambiguous terms as ‘community participation 
in decision-making,’ were deleted from the proposal.  In a break with the initial 
discussions and plans, no community representatives were included in the Center’s 
structure in any capacity.  A proposal to include community service as a factor in 
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faculty promotion received only tepid support from the CCHS leaders.75  Not 
surprisingly, the Center’s relationship with community groups began on a note of 
confrontation.   
In March of 1972, CCHS was contacted by a group calling itself the 
‘Organizing Committee for Comprehensive Health Planning (CHP) – Manhattan 
North.’76  The group informed Dr. Bryant that, about a month before, they learned 
that, for over a year, CCHS had been working on an Emergency Services (ES) project 
and expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that, although the Center had been meeting 
with community groups, the existence of the ES project had been neither discussed, 
nor publicly announced.77  While “any improvement in emergency room care [would] 
be welcome,” the group said, the project had implications reaching “far beyond the 
hospital ER” and the community had a legitimate interest to be informed about its 
scope and goals.   
Manhattan North held the view that ‘neighborhood health services,’ rather than 
hospital outpatient clinics, should be given the highest priority in the efforts to 
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improve community health care.78  They suspected, however, that the Center’s project 
would focus exclusively on the hospitals’ outpatient departments and might therefore 
be detrimental to the development of neighborhood health centers.  Outraged that the 
community was not consulted in this important matter, Manhattan North Organizing 
Committee issued an open letter to the CCHS, requesting clarification of the ES 
project and the Center’s policy in regard to community participation.   
Two meetings were held between the leaders of Manhattan North and the 
CCHS, at which Dr. Bryant agreed to issue a statement addressing the questions posed 
in the open letter.  The main thrust of Dr. Bryant’s statement was that, in his view, the 
goals of CCHS and Manhattan North were “complementary, not competitive.”79  
Improvement of primary health care services in upper Manhattan was a common 
concern of both the CHP and the CCHS.  Determining the best way to approach the 
problem, however, was “a complex issue.”  
All of us agree that primary care is not always well handled, and there are 
many idea about the best approaches to be taken.  The CHP Committee is 
looking toward family-oriented community services, possibly in neighborhood 
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family care centers.  The CCHS is studying one specific part of the primary 
health system, the emergency services.80 
While saying that it was “reasonable that a substantial amount of care can be provided 
outside the hospital setting, possibly in family oriented community health facilities,” 
Dr. Bryant was elusive on whether the ES study actually included non-hospital 
primary care settings in its purview.  Although it study was apparently “concerned 
with all facets of urgent and non-urgent ambulatory care all the people in upper 
Manhattan, whether this care is given inside or outside hospitals,”  the statement 
identified five hospitals to be studied, but no non-hospital settings.81 
Not surprisingly, Manhattan North did not find Dr. Bryant’s statement to be 
very forthcoming on the main issue of interest to the group, the study’s relationship to 
the neighborhood health centers.  “Dr. Bryant’s June 2 statement,” they commented, 
“is the first mention of studying ‘the availability of community resources outside the 
hospitals’ but increasing this availability is not given as a goal, and it is not explained 
how this project will aid this goal.”  On the basis of this statement, the group could not 
recommend a specific position that the community might want to take in regard to the 
ES project or the CCHS as a whole, warning that 
[c]ommunity benefit depends upon community participation in setting goals 
and in guiding any project toward community goals.  Otherwise community 
involvement will simply be used as false testimony that the community 
participated.82 
Indeed, one of the novel and sensitive elements of the community health care planning 
was that the demonstration of community support was required of all projects applying 
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for federal funding.83  While the community groups continued to disagree on how they 
should relate to Columbia’s new initiative, CCHS was making no suggestions of its 
own regarding the establishment of mechanisms for community participation.  If 
community groups continued to engage the Center, pressing it to “[s]pecify the 
neighborhood services now being studied and [to] show how the project can 
strengthen these services,” the Center chose to leave these requests unanswered.84 
It is this pattern of unresponsiveness that may have finally led the community 
organizations to try a more radical strategy.  In October of 1972, Manhattan North and 
three other community organizations decided to convene a public meeting to establish 
a community policy toward the CCHS and to propose that the Center be placed under 
public governance.85  In a public statement issued before the meeting, the groups 
argued that “[the Center’s] mission to improve community health care delivery in 
Harlem, Northern Manhattan and the Upper West Side requires that these 
communities be given a decisive voice in defining goals, setting priorities, selecting 
projects and personnel and evaluating performance.”  The essence of their position 
was laid out in the following passage: 
 
The CCHS seems to be an Agency for improving community health 
systems through research financed with public money.  Both the spending of 
public money and its use to change health care should be guided by 
consideration of the public interest.  The public interest should be the first 
consideration in picking projects and hiring staff for them, in setting goals and 
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planning research projects, in carrying out its recommendations and evaluating 
results.  
Who is best able to judge the public interest? Professional health workers 
are an important part of the decision-making team.  They draft alternative 
proposals and advise about likely consequences of a choice, but they are often 
not in a position to judge the public interest.  It is easy for them to confuse 
personal career interests, and the interests of their institution, with the public 
interest.  Many health professionals never even consider the public interest.  
The way in which the CCHS has handled its first project, the Emergency 
Services study, seems to illustrate the dangers when decisions affecting the 
public interest are made without adequate safeguard of the public interest.  The 
public interest should be determined by people who are deeply concerned, but 
who have as little conflict of interest as possible, people who listen to their 
neighbors and who see themselves as the trustees of the public interest.  This is 
why Federal Law defines the CHP “Partnership for Health” as a joint decision-
making body including concerned health professionals, but with a consumer 
majority.86  
 
The community organizations’ experience with the Center’s ES project offered 
strong evidence for the need to establish community control over its work.  Not only 
did CCHS initiate the project without consulting or informing the community but, 
even when pressed, it failed to openly discuss the parameters and aims of the study.  
The Center’s secretive process, combined with an exclusive focus on well-established 
institutions, were hardly in the public interest.87 
The call to place CCHS under public governance propelled relations between 
the Center and the community groups to a new level of intensity.  Columbia’s evasive 
tactics – in everything, from defining its projects to establishing the mechanisms for 
community participation – were the main bone of contention during several face-to-
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face meetings that followed.  Responding to criticism that the CCHS did not invite 
sufficient involvement of the community in their work, a member of the staff said that 
the Center “hoped to have the active participation of the community in the future 
directions of the ES Study, and hoped through meetings such as this to gain an 
understanding of the community’s priorities.”  To this platitude, community members 
retorted that “the Center could learn about community priorities by attending 
community meetings, such as the regular CHP meetings.”  As another community 
representative summed it up, their deeper fear was that “Columbia seems to be looking 
for the community to play an advisory role, leaving the institution in a position to do 
what it wants with the advice.”  Unfortunately, he added, 
[t]he community is tired of playing advisory roles.  Talk to us as true partners.  
If you are expecting only advice, that’s one thing; true community support is 
another.88 
“Our concern,” said another representative, “is based on past relationships with 
Columbia; we want to make sure we aren’t being used.”89 
Frustrated with the academics’ carefully calculated statements, community 
leaders confronted the academics with a few basic facts which the Center’s leaders 
studiously hid from themselves nearly from the start.  “The unstated goals of the 
Center are also important” to elucidate, insisted one community group representative: 
The Emergency Care Study is being used as a club with which the liberals at 
the Medical Center hope to get the hospitals to change.  Why should the 
community help them fight their battles?  The Center is trying to show the 
community who has power at the Medical Center.  It functions as a middle-
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class employment agency.  It doesn’t ask political questions.  There is no 
public accountability.90 
While victory by ‘the liberals’ at the Medical Center might be something to desire, 
commented another community leader, bringing decent primary care services to the 
neighborhoods was a cause “more important to this community than administrative 
changes in the hospitals.”  The Center could be much more useful to the community if 
it focused its ES study on the neighborhood family care centers (NFCCs), insisted the 
community leaders.  “If the NFCC comes to the Center for assistance, the Center 
would be glad to give it to them,” said the Center’s representative, in a thinly veiled 
reminder of who the experts were and who, therefore, had to come to whom.  The 
response from the other side was that “the community must be in control; they need 
hired help, not someone to tell them what to do.”91 
The conflict was not, however, simply one of power and control, but also of 
substantive views on health care reform.  If the Center’s leaders had concluded that no 
radical changes could be expected in American health care and decided to stay close to 
the realities of the current system, the community leaders thought that new institutions 
and approaches should be developed.  Whereas CCHS ostensibly decided to work 
within and with the existing health care institutions, the community groups maintained 
that “American emergency services are generally out-dated, and according to the 
Federal Government many die needlessly.”  Citing as one interesting an example 
“[s]everal foreign countries are now saving lives with special mobile emergency units 
which bring the doctor to the patient, start treatment promptly, and then take the 
patient to the right hospital.”92  The community groups insisted that the basic decision 
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for this ES project was whether looking at these new ways or limiting the project to 
improving emergency services in Columbia-affiliated hospitals. 
The unsettled state of the Center’s community relations was increasingly 
becoming a matter of contention among the members of the Executive Committee, 
both as an issue in itself and as a stand-in for other conflicts.  The committee’s 
‘radicals’ insisted that improving the Center’s relationships with the community was 
not a matter of hiring special ‘community coordinators’ or issuing public relations 
literature, but of actually improving the health care service the Medical Center delivers 
to the community.  “They [the community] feel the Medical Center takes care of 
Kings, Queens and celebrities from all over the world,” said one member, “[w]hy 
can’t they receive better service.”93  ‘Moderates’ countered by asking “[w]hat [was] 
meant concretely by the Center improving the services ‘to this community’ that is 
made up of a large number of sub-interests?”94  Representatives of the clinical 
departments, for their part, were upset that the issues of community relations, 
consumer attitudes, and patient perceptions, etc., were taking the focus off the 
practical work to reform the Center’s ambulatory and emergency services.95   
Despite the intensified external criticism and internal dissent, the Center’s 
leadership avoided addressing the fundamental issues, preferring a ‘management’-type 
approach.  Although the Center’s relations with the community groups were 
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deteriorating, giving up on them was not an option.96  As one internal communication 
put it, these relations were important because “of the substantial contributions 
communities can and should make in our understanding of problems and our 
developing effective approaches to those problems, and because community support is 
necessary for funding purposes.”97  In light of these understandings, the Executive 
Committee decided to hire two individuals to fill the positions of ‘community 
liaisons.’98 
Although some progress was noted during the following months, a 
comprehensive report issued in May of 1973 by the chief ‘community liaison,’ Ms. 
Vicki Garvin, showed little improvement in the Center’s relations with the 
community.99  According to the report, a major problem in the relationship was the 
primarily research-oriented nature of Columbia’s community health care initiative.100  
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“[A]lthough there is some recognition of the validity of study projects,” wrote Ms. 
Garvin, “it is apparent, in terms of priority, that because of the inner city’s urgent need 
for better health care and delivery, there is relatively little interest in supporting the 
activities of an institution geared mainly to research, especially if the results are long-
term in realization.”  As a members of the research center’s staff, she added 
diplomatically, “[w]e here more fully appreciate the necessity and importance of 
research planning because we, too, wish to effectuate needed changes.”  The 
community, however, is afraid that the Center will inevitably “follow a traditional 
pattern of research organizations which call upon consumers to participate for the 
‘nth’ time to document a need for reform” without any assurance that the findings will 
“have some real possibility of being implemented.”  The community believed that the 
current crisis in urban health care required not more research into organization of 
health services but rather increased “budget appropriations by Federal and local 
governments for delivery of services.”  In this view, noted Ms. Garvin, the solution 
“lies in political activity by the masses of people directly affected, a cause which 
logically deserves whatever assistance we can add.”101  
Another serious issue standing in the way of better relations between the 
Center and the community was the latter’s suspicion of the true institutional and class 
interests motivating the Center’s creation and activity.  “[I]t has been brought to my 
attention,” wrote Ms. Garvin, “that a number of people question our sincerity and 
commitment to the goal of genuine community participation in the belief that we are 
making superficial gestures in order to comply with fund granting requirements.”   
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As they see it, the burden of proof to the contrary is upon us in light of their 
previous experiences.  Occasionally some of us are even branded as a 
professional elite, collecting high salaries, raising false hopes and using them 
as a facade for academic explorations to enhance our own image. 102 
The Center’s most recent efforts to improve community relations presented a 
mixed picture.  CCHS “took the first concrete step forward at the tail end of our 
preparation of the Emergency and Primary Health Care Proposal when we invited last 
minute input from the three main community organizations.”  Since this was done last 
minute, however, only Manhattan North CHP accepted the invitation to comment.  
The Center also made the right choice to invite broad community input of its Child 
Health Care Proposal.  Unfortunately, community organizations showed little interest 
in the Center’s suggestion that they organize community meetings in their areas to get 
input from parents, teachers, and other interested people and the Center had to take 
upon itself the organization of the meetings.  Despite considerable publicity, only 30 
persons attended, mainly parents, seven or eight of whom expressed interest in the 
follow-up information.  The deeper issue revealed in all these instances was that, 
despite greater efforts to involve the community, “the question of our formal structural 
relationship with the community – their regularized participation in the Center’s 
activities” – remained unresolved.  Garvin stated that despite the Center’s “willingness 
to have some [community] representation on our Executive Committee. . . the 
mechanism has not yet been set up.”103   
In light of these problems, it was hardly surprising that some organizations 
simply refused to deal with the Center altogether. The West Side Health Action 
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Coalition, for example, has given “no response whatsoever to our attempts to involve 
the Coalition directly in formal comments on our two major projects.”  In Ms. 
Garvin’s assessment, “until a formal structure is set up for community participation in 
the Center’s activities which is acceptable to the Coalition, this group prefers not to be 
associated in any respect.”104  The Center’s relations with the Harlem Health Alliance 
were “at a lower pitch but not without strain, probably because in several instances 
Columbia University has played a positive, supportive role.”105  Relations with the 
strongest, “most vocal” and “most politically ambitious” of all area community groups 
– Manhattan CHP – were difficult as well.  Despite a great deal of respect for the 
“dedication, hard work and leadership” of  Dr. Rothschild, both among members and 
other community groups, CCHS’ leadership and staff typically found the group’s ideas 
“provocative” and its tactics in regard to the Center “intemperate and high-handed.”106   
The report’s overall conclusion was that “although we are inching along, the 
Center is by [no] means over the hump as of now in establishing satisfactory working 
relations with our total community.”  The situation could and should be improved, Ms. 
Garvin believed, “provided we patiently persevere in our sincere commitment to react 
positively to reality, that is, the rising demand of those we aim to serve to be a part of 
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decision-making.”107  Although at the time of this report, Ms. Garvin has served only 
several months as a ‘community liaison,’ her assessments were remarkably consistent 
with the criticisms made by the community organizations themselves.  The groups 
indeed questioned the Center’s emphasis on research, its institutional and class 
interests, as well as its ability to see that its findings actually influence the health care 
system.  The issue of ‘formal participation’ was indeed a central one for community 
organizations because, as they frequently said, they were not terribly interested in an 
‘advisory role’ which can all too easily be used as ‘false testimony’ that the 
community participated. 
For a period of time following the Report there emerged an impression on the 
part of the community organizations that their formal membership in the Center’s 
Executive Committee would soon be realized.108  Although some community leaders 
still wondered if the Executive Committee had real power over the substance of the 
Center’s work and whether “membership on the E.C. would help the community guide 
the direction of the Center’s projects,” they agreed to take the necessary steps to 
achieve representation.109  For its part, the Center’s leadership was apparently 
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preparing to extend an official invitation to community representatives to attend the 
meeting of the Executive Committee with a view towards establishing formal 
membership.110  
Just a month later, however, strong internal opposition to any form of 
community representation on the Center’s Executive Committee came from an 
unlikely source, Dr. Lythcott.  In a confidential letter to the Acting Dean of the 
Medical School and Vice President for Health Sciences, Dr. Lythcott wrote that he had 
been following for a while the development of the relations between the community 
and the Center and was very distressed at the course it was taking since the 
appointment of Mr. Joseph Terenzio as the President’s Special Advisor on Community 
Affairs.  He was concerned that “in the absence of our taking an official position as an 
administration (from which we could negotiate, if necessary), while the community is 
developing its own position and in the absence of certain facts that we may find 
ourselves dealing from a position of weakness rather than strength when the ultimate 
decision about relationships must be made.”  His own position was that: 
... C.C.H.S. is an academic arm of the Health Sciences campus, not unlike the 
Institute of Nutrition, the Institute of Human Reproduction, the Cancer Center, 
the proposed Heart/Lung Center, etc.  Within this context, then, the policy 
directions for the Center are developed by the Director in concert with the Vice 
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President, the Dean and other administrators and faculty as designated by the 
Vice President. ... Since the C.C.H.S. deals with many matters that directly 
affect the community in the development and execution of it’s [sic] (C.C.H.S.) 
programs, the community should serve as a resource to the Center and clearly 
should have an advisory role.  This role of the community can under no 
circumstance be extended, however, to setting policy for the Center or, as some 
have suggested, put the C.C.H.S. under public governance.111  
He had tried, he wrote, “to make this point to Jack Bryant and Joe Terenzio on 
several occasions, but [he was] not sure that either, especially Joe, really understands 
this basic premise.”  In this case, “Joe’s understanding [was] especially important 
since he [was] the person who ‘negotiates’ for the University with the community.”  
Thus, there was an urgent need for the administration to “meet with Joe Terenzio, and 
Jack and Vicki Garvin and give them clear guidance as to the position from which we 
will not move.”112   
Dr. Lythcott’s insistence that CCHS was not unlike other centers and institutes 
at the medical school was telling.  After all, none of the three centers mentioned 
presupposed community participation as a part of their mission or functioning.  An 
advisory role – a function which the community groups specifically rejected as 
contrary to the community’s interest – was all that would be offered.   
Two years after its launch, then, the Center’s relations with community 
organizations hit a dead end.113  If Columbia’s initiative failed to meet the community 
demands, could it at least do something constructive as a resource for the established 
health care institutions? 
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Health Planning and the Hospitals 
Securing the interest and cooperation of major health care providers was the 
second great challenge for Columbia’s health planning initiative.  Although new forms 
of health care organization – like the neighborhood health centers – had been actively 
tried during this period, CCHS had been oriented from the start to working with and 
through the Columbia-affiliated hospitals, hoping, no doubt, to use its formal 
institutional connections to foster its mission.  The fact remained, however, that CCHS 
was launched as an endeavor of the Medical School and not as a joint undertaking 
between the School and its affiliated hospitals and possible difficulties with the 
hospitals were noted early in the planning process.  Still, as the Center was launching 
its first project – the Emergency Services study – its leaders were hopeful that they 
would be able to secure the active interest and participation of the affiliated hospitals.  
In Dr. Marks’ words, emergency care was “a perfect area for initial involvement,” not 
least because it was “a universal problem affecting all of the affiliated hospital and the 
communities they serve.” 114   
The optimistic assumption of the hospitals’ interest was soon placed in doubt.  
The cooperation of Columbia’s primary affiliate, Presbyterian Hospital, was especially 
problematic.  Although agreeing to serve on the Center’s Executive Committee, 
Presbyterian’s Executive Vice-President, Mr. A. J. Binkert, carefully distinguished his 
own participation from the Hospital’s institutional commitment.  “It is my 
understanding,” he clarified in a note to Dean Marks, “that any proposal from this 
group (ORPCHS) involving the hospital, its professional staff, and the care of patient 
would first come the hospital and go through the appropriate administrative and 
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professional channels, particularly the Medical Board, before any commitments are 
made.”  The Hospital’s administration, he explained,  
is spending a great amount of time trying to solve current operating and 
financial problems which are certainly acute.  The hospital’s patient care is 
totally underfinanced at the moment and we are faced with severe problems 
and decisions.115  
Although Presbyterian’s troubles seemed like the very tasks the CCHS was created to 
work on, the Center’s help was not actively sought. 
Six months later came another less than encouraging sign when Presbyterian’s 
Director of  Emergency Medical Services applied for foundation funding for a project 
very congenial to the CCHS mission – without seeking either the Center’s 
participation or even mentioning it as a resource. 116  More than a year later, with a 
new person in charge of the Hospital’s outpatient and emergency services, CCHS still 
had not received any promises of cooperation.  The new director of ambulatory 
medicine expressed interest in CCHS, but noted that the uncertainties of fiscal and 
administrative arrangements  prevented him from clearly committing to a certain level 
of participation in the work of the Center.117 
With minor exceptions, the Center’s mission to involve the affiliated hospitals 
in the restructuring of the ambulatory services never got off the ground.  By the 
middle of the decade, the erosion of interest on the part of the hospitals had reached its 
lowest point.  Although the elusive promises and the barely veiled brush-offs were the 
                                                 
 
115
 Binkert to Marks, April 21, 1971  Similar, if more irritated letter was sent earlier to Dr. Canfield, 
Binkert to Canfield, February 25, 1970. 
116
 John V. B. Dean, M.D., Director, Emergency Medical Services, to George P. Berry, M.D., 216 
Nassau Hall, Princeton, NJ, July 14, 1971. (Cover letter and preliminary proposal for consideration by 
the Whitehall Foundation).  The project’s aim was to “develop a demonstration model of a primary 
medical care system of the highest quality in the setting of a large metropolitan teaching hospital in 
behalf of patients with varied ethnic, financial, and environmental backgrounds.” 
117
 Bryant to John L. Roglieri, Director of the Division of Ambulatory Medicine, Department of 
Medicine, January 4, 1973; Roglieri to Bryant, March 14, 1973. 
  428 
typical manner for conveying the refusals to participate, the Executive Vice President 
of St. Luke’s Hospital chose at some point to state his reasons openly.  Responding to 
the call from the Medical School concerning St. Luke’s possible financial support of 
CCHS, Mr. Gary Gambuti wrote that his first reaction was that “there is a real need for 
the Center,” particularly if its work emphasized “more practical applications, 
especially in relation to the problems of the affiliated hospitals.”  Specifically: 
the delivery system in terms of ambulatory care; the division of the West Side 
into catchment areas for each of the affiliated hospitals and the provision of 
primary care and the sharing of specialty clinics; the duplication of 
unnecessary services; the organization of teaching services vis-a-vis the impact 
of a national health insurance; the increased cooperation between institutions 
in relation to the decreasing research dollar; the need for brainstorming 
sessions in terms of full-time hospital based physicians versus billing for third 
party payment; etc.  
He was also in agreement with the premise that “the involved institutions due to the 
volume of services rendered, their quality and prestige, have a quasi-moral obligation 
to objectively examine what they are doing, make improvements and report these in an 
academic fashion to the community at large.”118 
His second reaction to the Dean’s request, however, was uncertainty as to 
whether St. Luke’s would “get a return for the investment it was asked to put in the 
School.”  The question was particularly sensitive since, at present, the Hospital simply 
did not have “an extra $50,000 in the budget.”  To make an investment in CCHS, it 
would “either have to take [the money] from somewhere else or project the year-end 
deficit to be that much greater.” 
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 One solution mentioned was the “buy-sell” concept; that is, we contract from 
the Center for those services needed and pay for them.  While this has great 
administrative appeal from my point of view, I can understand your reluctance 
since it would be almost impossible to stabilize a budget and maintain the 
necessary growth and development in staff that the Center needs.119  
Responding to the dilemma, Mr. Gambuti finally decided to examine more 
closely “the role of the Center, its organizational structure, and its potential for 
influencing change.”  His conclusions, alas, were not encouraging and delivered, in an 
abbreviated form, an analysis of the Center’s political position which its leaders had 
studiously ignored since its planning stages. 
First, the Center is located in the University.  By its very nature it will always 
be and probably should be, somewhat theoretical.  Secondly, the financial 
problems of hospitals and the whole health system are so great and complex 
that at the present time the only changes hospitals are going to make are those 
to help maintain solvency.  These changes will be individually related to the 
circumstances in each hospital.  Any major changes in the delivery system will 
be governmentally and politically oriented.  The delivery system will be 
changed by the advent of National Health Insurance and the implementation of 
1974 Health Planning and Resources Development Act.  Finally, and probably 
the most pathetic of all, is the realization that even if the Center made a study 
on duplication of services or on any other significant area where the affiliated 
hospitals through cooperation might reduce costs and at the same time deliver 
a better service, the Center, being located in the University, has no “clout”.  
The institutions involved have not shown, at least up to this point, their 
willingness to phase out programs or to cooperate significantly on any logical 
basis.  This also will not come about until we are forced to do so by the 
government.120   
In light of this understanding, he was sorry to say, Mr. Gambuti could not 
recommend to St. Luke’s trustees the commitment of $50,000 per year over four years 
for the CCHS.  The Hospital, in his reckoning, was already subsidizing the Medical 
School in the amount of over $200,000, which included losses incurred by the 
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Hospital for the Columbia Health Service, free space for classes and offices, as well as 
direct financial assistance to the Nursing School.121 
Although clearly colored by some ‘accounting’ issues between the institutions, 
Mr. Gambuti’s analysis of the CCHS was both incisive and principled.  It was also, in 
its main thrust, not new.  Although repressed during the planning and launching stages 
of the initiative, this political, cross-institutional understanding of health care reform 
had been increasingly voiced as a major critique of the Center, by individuals both 
outside and inside its formal structure.  Community groups, as well as the Center’s 
community liaisons, repeatedly wondered if the Center had thought out realistic 
mechanisms, by which to affect actual change within health care system.  The need to 
reach out to other institutions (preferably with something other than urgent funding 
requests), as well as the need to engage with the political system, were also frequently 
raised issues.122  Not only did the Center fail to engage with other institutions and the 
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for the indigent.  Mr. Terenzio, in particular, insisted that financing solutions had to be sought on the 
state or national levels, proposing that the Center “should be addressing [itself] to developing a 
consortium of various health care institutions that could present a model proposal for delivering health 
services to the state.”  Dr. Ginzberg countered that “it would be hard for the Center to get some leverage 
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agencies” and without such new arrangements “the situation [was] frozen.”  Mr. Terenzio’s suggestion, 
he thought, “would engage you in a very serious and complicated organizational consortium 
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research.”  Although skeptical, Dr. Ginzberg agreed that it was questionable “whether you can do any 
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arrangements among providers.”  Mr. Terenzio replied that it could indeed be “very complex but we 
first must define parameters of what we are trying to do.”  If CCHS wanted to engage in actual 
planning, then the interaction on the broad inter-institutional and political level was unavoidable.  “If 
we are concerned about screening programs,” he added, “then we confine our activities to a smaller 
scale.” (Minutes of the Center for Community Health Systems, Executive Committee Meeting, 
February 20, 1973.)  Although Dr. Ginzberg generally supported the narrow, pragmatic approach, even 
he was beginning to urge engagement with other institutions and the political system.  Criticizing the 
Center’s lack of self-direction and passive acceptance of outside projects, he insisted that is CCHS 
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political structures, its record of building internal relations was likewise less than 
impressive.  Aside from Pediatrics, CCHS has not joined any other clinical 
departments in any programs geared toward changing “their teaching and service 
activities.”123 
Despite concerns about the hospitals’ increasing lack of interest, the Center’s 
leadership failed to take the deeper message of these critiques to heart.  Instead of 
looking hard into the Center’s mission, capacities, and methods, the new Director’s 
reaction to the lack of enthusiasm from the affiliated hospitals was to reach for ultra-
traditional ways of doing academic business – through private deals with members of 
the social elite.  Distressed over “the erosion of support from those institutions which 
were said to be committed, [like] St. Luke’s, Roosevelt and Harlem,” Dr. Weiss 
thought that “the only way we can get this solved is to set up a meeting, probably a 
dinner meeting, at which have Magill (sic) invite Eaton, Choate, Kerst, and the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
wanted to “make a real difference,” it would have to “be able to convince the City to introduce some ... 
significant changes in how it uses its health resources in the Washington Heights area” and “be 
instrumental in developing new linkages among key institutional providers.”  These, Dr. Ginzberg 
realized, were ambitious aims, each being “a formidable, perhaps an impossible task,” but “unless one 
tries,” he argued, uncharacteristically, “one will never know one has failed.” (Ginzberg to Lythcott, 
October 31, 1973.) 
123
 Ginzberg to Lythcott, cc Bryant, Marks, December 26, 1973.  Toward the end of 1974, internal 
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Allen S. Ginsberg was appointed Deputy Director of CCHS and the search for a new Director of the 
Center was underway, with active participation of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. [The first 
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CCHS to Donald F. Tapley, Associate Dean of Faculty Affairs, P&S,  January 2, 1974.  Several notices, 
dated February 24, 1975, announced Dr. Bryant’s request to be relieved from the duties of the Director 
of CCHS and appointment of Dr. Allen Ginsberg as Acting Director.  Dr. Robert J. Weiss was recruited 
to serve as the Center’s second Director, beginning in the Fall of 1975. (“Report of the Dean of the 
Faculty of Medicine,” CPMC Annual Report 1975.)]  Detailing his views on the problems facing the 
Center, Dr. Eli Ginzberg told the Foundation’s Vice President, Miss Margaret Mahoney, that “with 
relatively few exceptions,” the present CCHS staff was “not of the quality it should be” and was also 
“much too large.”  In his view, the Center would be much more successful with “a relatively small core 
staff of strong people with a continuing interest in social medicine,” capable of being “the PI’s 
[principal investigators] of significant ongoing problem-oriented research.”  The choice of a new 
director was crucial and this person “must be first capable of running a quality research staff, not be an 
empire builder and have the potentiality for linking both the clinical departments and the social science 
departments.” (Ginzberg to Miss Margaret Mahoney, Vice President, The Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, May 13, 1974.)  
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Presidents of the Boards of Trustees and administrators of St. Lukes and Roosevelt.”  
If the Medical School’s top brass attended this meeting and if he “made a presentation 
of the problems facing the hospitals, the University’s commitment to the solution of 
the problems and the need for continuing support by the hospitals as clients of the 
Center, Dr. Weiss reasoned that there might be “a chance to really bring it off.”124 
For Dr. Weiss, well-crafted presentations and private deal-making could well 
substitute for the broad political changes the hospitals needed to induce them to 
collective reform.  “The hospitals are facing bankruptcy,” he admitted, “and I believe 
we can bring Blue Cross and the United Hospital Fund along if the hospitals make a 
commitment with the University.”  The new director was quite sure that at least one 
potential donor “would come forward with the money for support of specific projects” 
and “the same would be true from many other sources.”  Although certainly 
‘concerned’ with the problems facing the hospitals, Dr. Weiss had a few pressing 
issues of his own.  The Center was running out of money and his worry about the 
hospitals was “intensified by the fact that the Health Services grant will be greatly 
influenced by the ability of the Center to demonstrate that it has real clients i.e., the 
hospitals and Blue Cross.”125  His proposal, it seems, has thrown the Center’s 
problems together the problems of financing health care for the indigent, with little 
distinction between the two.126 
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 In the Fall of 1975, a deficit of $300,000 per year was projected if no new money was found. (Weiss 
to Tapley, Schoenberg, Putney and Toy, October 2, 1975; Weiss to Tapley and Schoenberg, April 12, 
1976.) 
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Scholarship and Proposals 
Whether the criticisms of the Center’s failings to engage other institutions and 
the political system were fair in view of their human and financial resources is hard to 
say.  But even the Center’s scholarly output was unimpressive.  The findings of the 
Center’s two major studies reported in the Center’s Annual Report for 1974 are case in 
point.  Even the typically inflated language characteristic of the official reports failed 
to prevent the impression that the studies’ findings were, at best, duplicative of the 
already existing knowledge and, at worst, not very useful or usable.  The “Community 
Hospital Ambulatory Care Project,” requested by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, yielded results that could not be distilled even for the purposes of the 
annual report.  “The field of hospital ambulatory care,” read the abstract, “appears to 
be in a considerable state of flux; experts differed in their experiences and opinions, 
and the subject did not readily lend itself to any neat division of issues and problems.”  
The project, which now appeared under the name of “Health Care for the Poor,” 
reported findings that were commonly known and assumed at the outset of the 
community health care initiative.  “The work of the project staff to date,” read the 
report, “supported potentially important findings: (1) a large proportion of the poor 
and near poor rely on institutionally-based resources for most of their health care; and 
(2) there are many serious problems with institutionally-based ambulatory care.”127  
Even after the rebuttal from St. Luke’s, the main thrust of the Center’s 
scholarly work became more, not less technocratic.  A short prospectus prepared for 
the urgent fundraising effort and entitled “New Directions for the Center for 
Community Health Systems” registered a notable shift from ‘community health care,’ 
which has been the key term during the early 1970s to ‘health services research,’ a 
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new term designating presumed maturation of a new field of knowledge holding a 
promise of better health care.  With the issue of community participation in the 
Center’s work nowhere to be found, the promise of the new approach was described in 
terms of the knowledge it has allegedly already produced. 128    
“In its relatively short history,” asserted the CCHS prospectus, “health services 
research has produced principles which should form the basis of future efforts to 
restructure the health care system and resolve some major problems.” 
Document after document has confirmed the inadequate accessibility of 
ambulatory health care; the high cost of delivery of all health care; and the 
fragmentation of the delivery system.  And from comprehensive efforts like the 
British National Health System or the Swedish system, it is clear that no single 
model has yet been devised which provides a total answer for the myriad of 
interlocking problems confronting the health care system. It is also clear that 
the financing of the health care system is beset by, and causes, many problems.  
These multiple problems will not be solved by a single step such as National 
Health Insurance.129  
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Restatement of the problems commonly known for over a decade and a resounding 
affirmation of the usual ideological position on public welfare programs was 
apparently all that the science of health services research had to offer.   
“The urgent, overriding present requirement,” read the prospectus, “is to 
design, and experiment with, a number of pluralistic models.”  Experimenting with 
one system of health care provision is a formidable task but experimenting with highly 
disparate, fragmented systems, if they can even be called that, comprising American 
health care could strike one as a hopeless proposition, not to mention that mere 
experimentation held no promise of institutional change in accordance with 
experimental findings.130  
The survival of the largely private, two-class system of care – for which 
‘pluralistic’ was a word of choice here – was a foregone conclusion and the Center’s 
mission was perfectly calibrated to this “inevitability.” 
Given the heterogeneity of patients and providers, we must develop guiding 
principles which can be generalized to different organizational structures, with 
different manpower mixes, financing arrangements, and populations.  This 
Center sees as its primary mission the development of these principles, which 
will emerge only from carefully planned and evaluated demonstration and 
experimental projects along a number of lines – befitting the inevitability of a 
pluralistic approach, and incorporated in whole or in part into the actual 
delivery system.  We are dedicated to implementation of research results in 
operating agencies; publication is a necessary but not sufficient goal.131  
Some of the elements of the ‘inevitably pluralistic’ approach were already emerging, 
thanks to the Center’s indefatigable efforts.  For subscribers of a health insurance 
company and University students and their families, comprehensive care within the 
framework of a health maintenance organization was in the works.  For the urban 
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poor, there was being developed “a model of pediatric and perinatal care provided in 
the inner city through the use of trailer-based clinics placed at readily accessible 
sites.”132 
Nevertheless, St. Luke’s Vice President’s candor may have had some effect on 
the Center’s approach after all.  A year later, the Center prepared a proposal to address 
the problems with the out-patient services at the Columbia-affiliated hospitals.  The 
document was notable for its unusual openness in regard to the role of class inequality 
in precipitating the current crisis.  The proposal’s political awareness was reminiscent 
of some of the early views which emerged in connection with the community health 
planning initiative.  The solutions it offered, however, were much less radical than its 
analysis of the problem.    
Contrary to the early hopes for substantial improvement of hospital-based 
outpatient clinics, on which the urban poor increasingly depended for most of their 
primary care, in the middle of the decade the hospitals’ strongest incentive remained 
to minimize care of those who cannot pay.  In the absence of political solutions to raise 
the share of resources spent on the health care of the poor to the level comparable to 
privately-insured patients, inner city hospitals were keenly interested in reducing the 
share of the ‘medically indigent’ in their patient mix.  This understanding formed the 
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basis of the Center’s proposal, developed in the Fall of 1976, aimed at rekindling 
relationships with the affiliated hospitals.133   
Gross inadequacies of health care available to the urban poor, which in a 
‘health services research’ view were attributable to the loss of office-based 
practitioners, overcrowded hospital outpatient departments and general 
disorganization of health care systems, had their corollary in the problems experienced 
by the urban private hospitals.  According to the proposal, “[a]ll of the Columbia 
hospitals [were] experiencing difficulties in maintaining a steady flow of private 
patients and an erosion in the ranks of attending physicians in private practice in the 
upper class and upper-middle class sections of the city.” The urban poor, on the other 
hand, made heavy “use of hospital-based outpatient departments and emergency 
rooms for large amounts of primary and non-urgent medical care.”  This constituted 
not only an inappropriate use of resources, but also created substantial losses for the 
hospitals due to the burden of treating the un- and under-insured and the hospitals’ 
inefficiency in providing routine care.134   
Subordinating the problems of the inner city poor to those of the urban 
hospitals, the Center’s proposal defined the task as follows: “to establish a system of 
ambulatory care which will serve both the inner city population ... as well as providing 
[for the hospitals] the access to the market of middle and upper-middle income 
patients in order to retain a mix of patients in our Columbia hospitals.” The key to the 
solution lay with the practicing physicians.  “It is clear,” the proposal stated, “that 
physicians are motivated and rewarded by economic and other considerations.” 
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A major source of gratification in the practice of medicine is the personal 
interaction between physicians and patients.  Middle class physicians have 
difficulties in establishing this kind of interaction with lower class patients 
with totally different life experiences and concerns.  It is impossible to expect 
that even the most highly idealistic physician will remain in practice in the 
inner city seeing multi-problem patients 8 hours a day, 5 days a week all year 
long. 
This hypothetical inner city physician, then, faces the same problem as the 
inner city hospital: too many lower-class patients, treating whom is neither pleasant, 
nor profitable.  The solution is “to provide a way for physicians as well as hospitals to 
be exposed to a mix of patients so as not to be overwhelmed by the problems of a 
single class with whom they have difficulty identifying on a personal level.”  
Theoretically, the hospitals should be more keenly interested in implementing one or 
another kind of a solution to this problem because, unlike individual practitioners, they 
cannot very easily move out of their present locations.135   
The proposal’s specific suggestion called for an establishment of a network of 
ambulatory care centers around the Columbia-affiliated hospitals under separate non-
profit management.  The centers would be located in several parts of the city, such 
that, together, they would attract about equal numbers of middle- and upper-middle 
class patients, on one hand, and low-income patients, on the other.  One of more 
groups of physicians would be hired on a salary basis and with limited hospital 
privileges to staff this network.  The work assignments would be arranged in such a 
way that “physicians in the group would spend two days one week in an upper middle 
class or middle class ambulatory center, and the following week would reverse the 
time spent.”  Laboratory test and specialty consultation support would be provided by 
the hospitals, while the centers, in turn, would “ensure a steady flow of patients from a 
population group large enough to keep the hospitals operating at optimal capacity.”  
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Such a system “would permit physicians to live outside of the City and still maintain 
the kind of practice that would cover the population.”  Innovations such the use of 
nurse practitioners for home visits in the middle class areas where safety in not a 
major concern ... could also be experimented with.”136   
The main advantage of the proposed system for the hospitals was the 
opportunity of “divesting themselves of what is totally different business than the 
inpatient business – namely ambulatory care – and assuring better stability as well as a 
proper share of the market.”  Apparently, the proposal was inspired by the success of a 
for-profit management group – the American Practice Management, Inc. – which has 
established Medicaid clinics under such a system and offered management with 
private capital raise in the commercial money markets.  If this company could do it, 
said the proposal, “then a non-profit corporation ought to be able to function 
delivering better care without its goals being distorted by a profit motivation.”  
American Practice Management has already approached St. Luke with a proposal for 
establishing and managing the hospital’s primary care center and the firm’s materials, 
including some financial statistics, were appended to the proposal.  Essentially, the 
hospitals were encouraged to enter into a variety of a ‘Medicaid mill’ business, albeit 
with purer motivations expected to prevail even in the face of their dire fiscal 
situation.   
Why would middle-class, let alone upper-class, patients choose to utilize the 
ambulatory centers, instead of their regular hospital-affiliated, office-based physicians, 
remained unexplained.  Clearly, the social and professional prestige of the physicians 
who were to staff such ambulatory clinics would be much lower than that of most 
current hospital-affiliated practitioners.  Even if their practice among the lower-class 
                                                 
 
136
 Ibid. 
  440 
clientele were to be limited to half their work time, only the less advantaged 
physicians – either recent immigrants or those coming from lower- and lower-middle 
class backgrounds – would likely be amenable to recruitment into such arrangements.  
If these questionable presuppositions did not hold, the only thing left of the Center’s 
proposal was a not-so-subtle recognition that the private hospitals might want to divest 
themselves of ambulatory care for the poor in any way they could.137 
The proposal’s focus on the class issues involved in urban health care crisis 
was an explicit admission that the Center’s professed concern with health care services 
of Upper Manhattan could not be understood without the reference to the structures of 
socio-political inequality.  The Center’s record in this task, however, was patchy at 
best.  The early, class-conscious understanding of urban health care crisis, articulated 
primarily by Dr. Canfield, was suppressed in favor of a politically ‘neutral,’ 
technocratic approach.  Explicit invocation of class issues by community organizations 
– pertaining both to health care problems and the Center’s own function – were for the 
most part simply ignored even as the Center’s researchers found it difficult to 
articulate the health situation of the Upper Manhattan’s poor and minority populations 
in non-judgemental, class-neutral terms.138  
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Conclusion 
In retrospect, the Center’s unexpected return, after the middle of the decade, to 
‘straight talk’ about the role of class in structuring health care was too little, too late.  
The Center’s reputation as an insular research outfit, oriented toward discrete and 
preferably paying projects, was already made.  The Center repeatedly argued that 
socio-economic problems were outside of the health system as such and, therefore, 
outside of the Center’s activity.  It had also refused to align itself with those external 
groups and institutions, whose cooperation could have insured more principled and 
effective activity.  Even this late awakening was still largely deaf to the repeated 
suggestion that the Center’s work cannot be limited to technocratic tinkering with 
separate services of separate institutions but had to extend to inter-institutional, 
broadly social, and political problems. 
Although structurally complicit in the fragmented, chaotic system of health 
care delivery, even some private hospital leaders knew better than to tweak with 
individual services and institutions one at a time.  Numerous criticisms pointed the 
Center toward a broader view and a wider aim.  Engagement with the city 
government, state agencies, hospital associations, professional societies – any of these 
would have been better than ‘courting’ the individual hospitals.  But even if CCHS did 
not have such capacities – due to limited human or financial resources, say – there was 
still a better option of simply advocating, in a scholarly manner, approaches that might 
have actually worked.  Alas, the Center preferred to work on supposedly ‘concrete’ 
and ‘practical’ projects that in practice rarely went beyond duplicative research.   
Most of the problems which plagued the Center had been foreseeable before 
the launch, in the highly compromised manner and result of its design.  Was it 
inevitable?  Hardly.     
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Entrusting the conceptualization of the initiative to the people who did not 
have much to gain from it, career-wise, would have been helpful.139  Establishing a 
clear and open process of proposal-making, discussion, and review would have ruled 
out some of the uglier moments of the story.  Initial reliance on internal funds, rather 
than making the launch of the initiative dependent on receipt of external funding, 
could have also eased the need to conform to external agendas.  Such a decision would 
have also signaled that the initiative was undertaken upon a principled internal 
decision, rather than a desire to get a fair share of the new source of grant funds.  
Finally, cultivation of institutional mechanisms and incentives for internal criticism, 
democratic decision-making, and equitable distribution of power, participation, and 
rewards would all have been beneficial, even if impossible to achieve in the short-
term.  
A conspicuous lack of self-reflection and criticism – both during the planning 
and consequent functioning of the Center – was perhaps the most remarkable element 
of this university-based initiative.  Contrary to conventional assumption, the most 
intense censure actually occurred in the narrow circle closest to the leadership of the 
initiative.  The further away one went from the small group of contenders seeking to 
control the initiative, the more likely it was that the really important questions were 
raised.  Clearly, the career- and power-conflict which surrounded the launch of the 
Center was poison to free thinking and expression.  The prototype of an open, 
democratic process, embodied in the work of the Center’s Executive Committee, 
suggested a viable way of overcoming the pathology of the personalistic, secretive, 
career-driven mess, in which the Center’s planning was caught up. 
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Without question, the most productive moments of this story were those 
critical understandings that came out from the confrontation between the Center and 
its internal interlocutors – the community organizations and the hospital 
representatives.  To be sure, these exchanges did not yield immediate palpable results.  
Despite several opportunities, the Center failed to own-up to the real motivations and 
limitations of its work and to adjust its mission and goals accordingly.  In turn, both 
the angry community organizations and the hard-pressed hospitals did not care for 
predictable platitudes and questionable promises of the Center’s technocratic 
approach.  Still, interactions between the Center, on the one hand, and community 
organizations and hospital representatives, on the other, were by far the most 
potentially valuable forums of the entire process, pointing to the value of engaging 
separate institutions and groups in constructive dialogue.   
When viewed in such excruciating detail, this small piece of the larger 
community health planning movement may seem to blur, rather than sharpen the view 
of the larger politics.  Where did the main lines of cleavage lie?  How much of this 
was so much petty personal scraps?  The analysis presented here indeed does not 
confirm conventional accounts.  The assumptions of institutional analyses, which 
privilege organizational boundaries, are placed in question by the centrality of intra-
institutional conflict and general vagueness of institutional boundaries within the 
sprawling academic medical empires.  The verities of traditional class analysis are 
equally undermined by the narrowness of interstitial divisions activated in this 
struggle.  How do we conceptualize distinctions between hospital administrators, 
academic physicians at elite private hospitals and those at struggling public 
institutions, free-floating public health specialists, and ‘dissident’ academics, like Dr. 
Rothschild?  Clearly, these ‘identities’ stem neither from the inter-institutional 
divisions nor from broad socio-economic categories but rather from an infinitely more 
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nimble matrix created by the interpenetration of basic structures of social mobility and 
institutional organization.  These are precisely those structures in which most struggles 
occur among occupants of adjacent social positions – in a continuous and spatially 
diffused manner – rather than between large and differentiated groups.  It is also the 
structure that it tightly interwoven with the basic mechanisms of social discipline, 
particularly those of the labor markets, educational system, and professional careers. 
The account presented here mitigates, however, against the cynical structuralist 
interpretation of the course and outcome of social politics.  To link the motivations of 
the main actors to their institutional positions and their actions to the structures in 
which they act is not to suggest the necessary or binding relationship between them.  
To champion organizational change, as most of our protagonists had, was still an 
individual choice, involving considerable risks and uncertain pay-offs.  In the 
upwardly mobile professional world, one is hardly ever ‘tied’ to one’s place and a 
career advancement by conventional means – not by organizational critique – is 
unquestionably the faster way to move out of the disagreeable positions and 
departments.  Thus, the choice to speak up, to lead the movement for community 
health planning, was just that, a choice, and deserves respect for going considerably 
beyond simple self-interest. 
Not only individual agency, but also the structural features of particular 
institutions – and not only those of the larger society-wide structures – constituted 
intervening variables in the course and outcome of this struggle.  It is precisely the 
contrast between the courage and honesty of some of the individuals and the corrupt 
structural channels and mechanisms of decision-making that is so striking.  As far as 
such personal matters can be ascertained, the path that was chosen did not reflect the 
better sentiments of the members of Columbia faculty which initiated and developed 
the community health planning initiative.  It was, however, strongly favored by the 
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structure of individual and institutional incentives that permeated their efforts.  The 
account of Columbia’s community health planning venture is a cautionary tale about 
the capacity of professional and academic institutions, as they have been structured 
during the second half of the past century, to lead their institutions along clear and 
intended political paths.  Viewed in isolation, the Center’s role in health care politics 
may seem fortuitously negligible.  When projected across space, embodied in 
hundreds of similar processes of interaction among academic centers, health care 
institutions and marginalized communities, Columbia’s story ceases to be trivial, 
pointing to the endemic structural conflicts in the American polity which can not help 
prevent us from moving forward.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE NEW (INSTITUTIONAL) CLASS STRUGGLE:  
ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTERS AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE POLITICS 
Introduction 
In her recent study of feminist politics in the church and military, Mary 
Katzenstein noted that identity politics – long associated with public action, protest, 
and advocacy groups – have quietly moved inside institutions.  Workplaces, religious 
organizations, and other institutions of the economy and civil society are now crucial, 
if less visible, battlegrounds for equality.  Identity politics, however, is not the only 
arena in which institutions have been overlooked as sites of political struggles.  The 
calls for greater attention to institutions have been sounded in the areas of scholarship 
as diverse as political participation and the welfare state.  The problem Katzenstein 
identifies goes beyond recent trends and identity politics.  Institutions where 
Americans work, pray, and join together have always been important, yet frequently 
neglected sites of politics and policy-making. 
In the study of American welfare and health care systems, this problem is 
complicated by a tendency to draw the boundaries of the discipline in a way that 
includes the ‘public’ sphere of government and formal political processes, while 
excluding the ‘private’ sphere of the economy and civil society.1  While the 
institutions and policies of government have been studied extensively, the role of 
economic and social institutions was largely neglected.  The results of this one-
sidedness have been especially dire for the study of American health care politics.  
                                                 
 
1
 The terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ are placed in single quotations marks to indicate that the distinction 
between these realms has been frequently criticized by scholars working within several orientations of 
political theory, including Marxist theory, political economy, and feminist thought.  
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Compared to other advanced democracies, the United States has an extremely 
privatized system of health care provision and a failure to consider private and non-
profit institutions leaves many questions unanswered.   
In the last two decades, the narrow focus on public institutions and programs 
has been increasingly criticized.  Several studies have demonstrated that most systems 
of social provision include both public and private elements and that the American 
system, in particular, cannot be understood without considering the enormous size of 
its private social benefits and provider institutions.2  This critique is especially 
germane to the study of American health care politics.  The American health care 
system has become only more privatized and inequitable over the past quarter century.  
The failed effort to create a national health insurance system in the 1990s has dimmed 
the prospects for large-scale federal health care reform, while state-level reforms are 
constrained by limited resources and authority.  In contrast, the role of corporate 
capital and the private sector has grown tremendously, unleashing nothing less than a 
revolutionary transformation of American medicine.   
                                                 
 
2
 For comparative analyses, see: Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater, eds., Public/Private Interplay in 
Social Protection: A Comparative Study (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1986); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Sven 
Steinmo, Taxation & Democracy: Swedish, British, and American Approaches to Financing the 
Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Michael Katz and Christoph Sachsse, eds., 
The Mixed Economy of Social Welfare: Public/Private Relations in England, Germany and the US, 
1870s-1930s, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996).  Works focused on the United States are: Beth Stevens, 
Complementing the Welfare State: The Development of Private Pension, Health Insurance and Other 
Employee Benefits in The United States (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1986); Neil Gilbert and 
Barbara Gilbert, The Enabling State: Modern Welfare Capitalism in America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989); Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw, and Philip L. Harvey, America’s 
Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities (New York: Basic Books, 1990); 
Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); 
Steven A. Sass, The Promise of Private Pensions: The First Hundred Years (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1998); Marie Gottschalk, The Shadow Welfare State: Labor, Business, and 
The Politics of Health Care in the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Michael 
Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State (New York: Henry Holt, 2001); 
Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public and Private Social Benefits in the 
United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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The deepening privatization of American health care poses a challenge to 
political scientists who have focused almost exclusively on the role of the government 
and public policy in the health care field.  American medicine and health care system 
have always been more privatized than those of other advanced capitalist democracies 
and an exclusive focus on public actors and structures misses a big swath of health 
care politics.  In recent decades, however, the government’s role in health care may 
have been even further reduced by the corporate restructuring of medicine and the 
hegemony of market approaches.  The dynamics of path dependence and policy 
feedback may well ensure that the United States will have a highly privatized system 
of health care for the foreseeable future.3 
Private Institutions, Path Dependence, and Health Care Policy 
The concept of ‘path dependence’ has had a growing impact on social sciences.  
In economics, where the term was first popularized, “a path-dependent sequence of 
economic changes is one of which important influences upon the eventual outcome 
can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by 
chance elements rather than systematic forces.”4  The phenomenon of ‘increasing 
returns’ provides a central mechanism in path dependence and arises when large fixed 
costs, learning curves, network effects, or adaptive expectations are involved.  
Although cases involving technology are best known, economists have applied the 
concept of path dependence to a wide range of issues, including industrial geography, 
                                                 
 
3
 Historians and sociologists studying medicine and health care have long recognized the highly private 
character of these fields in the Unites States.  The newest publication by a leading historian of 
American health care signals an explicit adoption of the hybrid, ‘public/private’ formulation: Rosemary 
Stevens, The Public-Private Health Care State: Essays on the History of American Health Care Policy 
(Transaction Publishers, 2006). 
4
 Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of Qwerty,” American Economic Review 75 (1985): 332-337, 
p. 332. 
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economic development, and international trade.5  Of particular significance for 
political science has been Douglass North’s application of path dependence to 
institutional analysis.6  North argued that institutional development is path-dependent.  
Established institutions generate powerful inducements that reinforce their stability 
and further development, while new institutions involve high start-up costs and other 
obstacles to their emergence. 
In political science, the concept of path dependence has been elaborated by the 
scholars working within the framework of historical institutionalism.  Paul Pierson, in 
particular, clarified the nature of path-dependent political processes as those which 
trigger feedback mechanisms which, in turn, reinforce the recurrence of a particular 
pattern into the future.  The high ‘switching costs’ are at the heart of path-dependent 
political processes.  As Skocpol and Pierson explained, “once actors have ventured far 
down a particular path, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course [and] 
the political alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably 
lost.”7  Several implications flow from the application of the concept of path 
dependence to political analysis.  First, in a path-dependent sequence, early events and 
choices are far more consequential than the later ones.  Secondly, at the early stage of 
political processes, several alternative outcomes are equally feasible.  Thirdly, political 
outcomes which appear inevitable and logical may result from trivial and unintended 
choices.  Finally, path-dependence entails institutional inertia and inadequacy.  After a 
                                                 
 
5
 Brian W. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994); Paul Krugman, “History and Industry Location: The Case of the 
Manufacturing Belt,” American Economic Review 91 (May 1991): 80-83; Paul M. Romer, “Increasing 
Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (October 1986): 1002-1037. 
6
 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) and “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics,” Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 2 (October 1990): 355-67. 
7
 Theda Skocpol and Paul Pierson, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science” in 
Political Science: State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2002), p. 665. 
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certain point of development, existing institutional arrangements and policy 
approaches are likely to persist, as long as the costs of switching course remain high.  
Thus, present institutions and programs may be both inadequate to current problems 
and out-of-step with shifting interests.     
Jacob Hacker clarified the likelihood of path dependence in the formation of 
social policy.  He argued that possibilities for path-dependence are greater to the 
extent that the following conditions hold true:   
First, a policy creates or encourages the creation of large-scale organizations 
with substantial set-up costs; second, a policy directly or indirectly benefits 
sizable organized groups or constituencies; third, a policy embodies long-lived 
commitments upon which beneficiaries and those around them premise crucial 
life and organizational decisions; fourth, the institutions and expectation a 
policy creates are of necessity densely interwoven with broader features of the 
economic or society, creating interlocking networks of complementary 
institutions; and fifth, features of the environment within which a policy is 
formulated and implemented make it harder to recognize or respond to policy 
outcomes that are unanticipated or undesired.8   
Hacker found that these conditions hold true for many public policies and 
institutions.  More arrestingly, he argued that private welfare provision, and the 
institutional arrangements surrounding them, may be “more prone to path dependence 
than public social programs.”  Privatized systems of social benefits create “resourceful 
and mobilized vested interests with strong incentives to monitor and respond to 
threatening policy developments.”  Because they tend to rely on third parties, 
privatized approaches typically garner support not just among their beneficiaries but 
also among private organizations that subsidize or deliver benefits.  Moreover, 
reduced “visibility, traceability, and political control” of privatized approaches provide 
additional barriers to change, allowing even costly or undesirable systems to endure 
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 Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public and Private Social Benefits in the 
United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 55. 
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over long periods of time.  Private systems of social provision are also likely to attract 
greater support from the business community which exerts a disproportionate 
influence in the political arena.9   
Hacker’s fundamental conclusion, and the one that received very little attention 
in the literature on social policy, is that “privatized approaches may be a source of 
‘policy-feedback’ no less powerful than public programs, profoundly shaping politics 
and policy development.”10  This thesis is particularly relevant to the analysis of 
American health care politics, dominated as it has been by private institutions and 
privatized policy approaches.  The growing recognition of the hybrid, public/private 
character of American health care and welfare systems, combined with the fruitful 
extension of the ‘path-dependence’ theory to the effects of private programs and 
institutions, requires that we deepen the analytical agenda.  As Hacker noted, “private 
social provision … creates policy ‘capacity’ in the private sector that rivals the 
capacities of state administrators.”11  Thus, it is incumbent on political scientists 
studying health care politics to look “more closely than analysts usually do at the 
interests, demands, and structure of the private organizations.”12  Yet, the tendency to 
view formal political processes and public policies as decisive factors will not be easy 
to overcome.   
In regard to the system of health care provision in the United States, the 
presumption of the privileged role of government action and public policy is not 
justified.  Until the passage of Medicare/Medicaid programs in 1965, government 
                                                 
 
9
 Ibid., pp. 56-57.  Hacker noted that, while the effects of path dependence in the private sphere of 
social provision may be even stronger than in the public sphere, the character of path dependence is 
likely to be different.  Specifically, “because privatized approaches allow much greater discretion on the 
part of private actors, they are likely to foster a more dynamic sphere of benefits, allowing substantial 
changes within the confines of existing policy.” [Ibid.] 
10
 Ibid., p. 58. 
11
 Ibid., p. 284. 
12
 Ibid., p. 23. 
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action and public policies were not in any way primarily responsible for shaping the 
American health care system.  To be sure, state and local governments helped promote 
private health care provision through subsidies and tax exemptions to hospitals and 
other institutions.  Most other decisions about the organization and practice of 
medicine, as well as access to and costs of medical services, were largely left in the 
hands of the medical profession and private initiative.  With the exception of the 
veterans’ hospitals, public health care institutions have been decidedly few in number 
and residual in purpose, treating those classes of patients whom the private institutions 
refused.  
When it comes to American health care, private institutions and policies cannot 
be studied as a realm that is secondary and complementary to public programs and 
policy.  Such an approach would be in direct contradiction with the preponderance of 
historical evidence of the predominantly private nature of American health care 
institutions and the extraordinary extent of private power and leadership in medicine 
and health care.  The unusually large size of private health care in the United States is 
itself the overarching factor in the ‘path-dependence’ of American health care politics, 
characterized by the persistence of largely private systems of health care provision and 
insurance.  Thus, private health care institutions must be approached as fundamental 
and still predominant forces of health care politics. 
In contradistinction to conventional concepts, it is necessary to recognize that 
private institutions and approaches do not only stem from, or interact with, public 
policy.  Private institutions and their actions are themselves sources and expressions of 
policy.  In political science, it is conventional to reserve the term policy to describe the 
decisions and practices of governments and public agencies.  Nevertheless, in regard 
to those fields of social provision dominated by private institutions, this convention is 
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of limited usefulness.  It overrates the degree of public control and underestimates the 
significance of private action. 
In constructing the notion of ‘privatized policy approaches,’ Hacker suggests 
but does not complete the full range of policy action that takes place in hybrid, 
public/private spheres of social provision.  In his conceptual framework, the primary 
distinction is between the ‘public policies of social provision’ and ‘privatized policy 
approaches.’  The former are understood as government-funded, publicly-administered 
programs, while the latter mean those programs which are privately provided but are 
also subsidized by tax exemptions and subsidies.  If this distinction is meant to suggest 
a full range of policy types in the public/private system of social provision, both ends 
of the range are open to critique.  The public end of the range (public policies) does 
not fully reveal the historical and present significance of private-sector forces and 
interests in shaping and re-shaping ‘public’ policy.  The private end of the range is 
even more problematic.  It seems to suggest that private social provision is always 
conditioned by the enabling public policies and that there is no such thing as primarily 
private social provision.  In the sphere of health care provision, this conclusion is not 
warranted by historical evidence.  Not only are there many instances of primarily 
private institutional developments, many public policies must be seen as 
accommodations of, and adjustments to, the overwhelming private power.13   
It is necessary to recognize that in the hybrid, private/public systems of social 
provision, private institutions and organizations are policy-makers in their own right.  
This is not to say that they are autonomous from public actors.  On the contrary, this 
approach would recognize the mutual constraints that both public and private 
institutions impose on each other.  Most of the time, private policy-making is 
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 There are many examples of this but FDR’s decision to exclude health care insurance from the New 
Deal agenda may be paradigmatic. 
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constrained both by public forces and by competing private interests.  When 
conducted at the level of separate institutions, private policies would be characterized 
by the dynamics of diffusion and influence quite different from those of public 
policies.  They will be more similar to those processes of technological and 
institutional path dependence that have been ascribed to economic processes and 
institutions, because private health care institutions are decentralized to a much greater 
extent than government institutions and programs.   
Academic Medical Centers and the American Health Care System 
The research presented in this dissertation provides evidence that academic 
medical centers, as well as private health care institutions more generally, make 
policies and shape health care politics.  One qualification needs to be made before 
summarizing my findings.  The ability of any one institution, or even one sector of 
economy and society, to shape the political environment is necessarily limited.  This, 
however, is also true of all levels of government: local, state and even federal.  In and 
of itself, the existence of constraints is not a disqualification from the political realm 
and policy-making capacity.  What is decisive is whether institutions exercise 
significant freedom in shaping important areas of their functioning and development 
and if some of their crucial decisions become either path- or pattern-setting.  In this 
sense, academic medical centers, both singly and jointly, have had a great influence on 
the making of the American health care system.  
Academic medical centers have been practically and symbolically central to 
modern American health care.  Emerging during the early decades of the twentieth-
century, academic medical centers embodied the aspirations of both professional and 
social elites involved with medicine and health care.  As massive agglomerations of 
financial, technological, and human resources, as well as exclusive sites of 
professional training and clinical research, academic medical centers exercised 
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enormous structuring influence on the entire medical and health care field.  The first 
institution of its kind in the nation, Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center was 
centrally involved in some of the crucial struggles which shaped American academic 
medicine.  Its institutional practices and policies influenced the entire field of its sister 
institutions, as well as a broader sphere of American medicine and health care.    
The first ‘path-setting’ struggle took place when the Columbia-Presbyterian 
Medical Center was just being created.14  At issue was whether all of the medical 
school faculty – including those in clinical departments – should be required to hold 
‘full-time’ appointments.  Such ‘full-time’ appointments would mean that the faculty 
members would have to devote all of their time to research, teaching, and professional 
services in the teaching hospitals and forego their often lucrative private practice.  One 
of the pivotal episodes in the struggle over the ‘full-time’ requirement took place at 
Columbia-Presbyterian between 1910 and 1925.  So serious was the conflict that it 
nearly derailed the building of the nation’s first Medical Center.  Although nominally 
confined to medical schools and their affiliated hospitals, the outcome of this struggle 
had profound consequences for the overall organization of health care provision in 
America.  At stake was the class and organizational character of academic medicine.  
In the larger scheme of things, the full-time requirement was part of an attempt to 
restructure American medicine from a ‘small-business’ to ‘corporate’ model and to 
make more physicians ‘employees’ rather than ‘independent entrepreneurs.’   
The ‘full-time’ struggle presents a perfect example where ‘path-setting’ policy 
is negotiated entirely in the private sector by private actors.  The conflict pitted the 
elite medical schools against two powerful philanthropic foundations.  Like the larger 
process of the modernization of American medicine, this struggle unfolded as a 
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predominantly private-sector affair.  Both the foundations and the professional elite 
did not favor governmental involvement and the governments did not get involved.  
The resulting policy, however, had an enormous and path-setting impact on both 
private and public medical schools and on the field of health care provision at large.  
Ever since the 1920s, when academic physicians fought to preserve their stake 
in private practice, medical centers were compelled to expand their involvement in 
providing care for private patients, both to allow their faculty members to enjoy higher 
incomes and to use a part of the profits to support institutional purposes.  In the 1980s 
and 1990s, when the medical centers’ hypertrophied clinical services were occupying 
more and more of their human and financial resources, while giving little back to 
education and research, the ultimate price of that fateful choice was becoming 
apparent.  With a slowed growth of federal support, the maintenance of the enormous 
research capacities, built up after the war, required new methods of financing.  In a 
radical break with traditional tenets of academic ethics, medical centers and individual 
investigators began to accept corporate sponsorship in exchange for patent rights to 
their intellectual work and to form their own for-profit biomedical research 
companies.  Although, through these and other methods, the medical centers stayed 
afloat, all three elements of their original mission – charitable care, medical education, 
and scientific research – may have suffered permanent damage through their ruthless 
exposure to the strictures of the market.  
The actual construction of the Medical Center, as well as the first two decades 
of its institutional development, presents more evidence that the choices of private 
organizations can have profound policy consequences.15  Providing adequate treatment 
and insurance for low- and middle-income Americans have been persistent challenges 
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of our health care system.  These failings are typically understood to stem from the 
highly privatized and commercialized nature of American system of health care 
provision but a closer look reveals more precise mechanisms of their institutional 
structuring of these issues.   However, the inadequacy of the outpatient services for 
low-income patients and the inpatient services for the middle-income patients were 
importantly structured by the institutional choices.  Who was typically appointed to 
serve these patient groups, how appointments were structured and compensated, and 
whether they held research and career-building potential were all important factors 
structuring the quality and availability of these services.  Disparities in health care 
access were not simply reflections of the differential social status of different patient 
groups: they were also linked with specific institutional arrangements of academic 
medicine.  The two structures interacted: unequal patients created unequal doctors and 
unequal doctors created unequal citizens.  This process was partially clear to some 
actors within academic medicine and the way institutions reacted to these problems 
created lasting patterns of health care provision.   
The patterns of health care provision in academic medicine were created in 
both internal and external relationships which the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical 
Center forged during this era.  During the first two decades of its existence, the Center 
added several specialized hospitals to its site, while affiliating with a dozen other 
regional institutions.  Its relationship with public institutions was especially 
noteworthy in its reinforcement of the long-lasting public/private division of labor in 
American medicine.  Class, race, and immigration were fundamental social issues 
shaping health care provision during this period.  Their specific expression was 
mediated and particularized by the intervening structures of institutional power and 
professional interests.  Both patient and provider positions must be understood as 
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‘institutional class positions,’ stemming from complex interaction and intersection of 
class, race, immigration, occupational and organizational factors.     
Who staffs the various positions in the occupational and organizational terrain 
of health care provision is an important determinant of both health care disparities and 
even social structure more generally.  Until the 1960s, governments were not actively 
involved in structuring the composition of medicine and other health professions.  The 
issue was decided largely at the level of medical institutions, the medical profession, 
and the forces of civil society which fought to defeat or uphold inequality and 
discrimination in medical school admissions and in the medical profession more 
generally.16  Academic medical centers played an active role in constructing a system 
of medical training and practice that was simultaneously divided by class, gender, 
race, and ethno-religious identity.  Different, yet intersecting methods of 
discrimination were practiced against women, African-Americans, and Jewish and 
Catholic applicants.  In regard to different groups, exclusion was accomplished at 
different points in the progression toward the medical profession, at different 
institutional locations, and by different mechanisms.  Even when nominally included, 
the marginalized groups were relegated to the ‘institutional class of their own.’  Even 
after the decisive entrance of the federal government into the battle against 
discrimination, academic medical centers continued to shape the ease or difficulty 
with which the marginalized groups could enter particular schools, medical specialties, 
and the profession as a whole. 
While the decade of the 1960s greatly increased the role of the government in 
structuring and regulating the health care system, private institutions remained 
powerful actors as well.  The struggle to unionize health care workers testified to the 
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continued power of private health care organizations.  During the 1960s and early 
1970s, New York City was the epicenter of a drive to unionize non-professional health 
care workers, a political struggle with far-reaching consequences for the nonprofit 
sector as a whole.  Although the conflict prompted a series of governmental 
interventions, the crucial battles took place at the level of individual institutions and 
their organized opponents.  As a result, the structure and politics of particular 
institutions played a significant role in shaping the course and outcome of the struggle.  
The decisive cleavages were not prefigured in the organizational and social structure 
of the medical centers, but were constructed in the process of struggle by the rhetorical 
and practical strategies of the rival organizations.17 
The policy-making (and breaking) capacity of private organizations was 
underscored in another important development during this period.  Between the early 
1960s and the mid-1970s a cluster of issues under the rubric of ‘community health 
planning’ dominated both public policy and private efforts to solve a health care crisis 
in the lower-class, minority neighborhoods.  While the federal government sought to 
encourage community solutions to growing health care crisis, the fate of this policy 
initiative was decided at the level of specific institutions and regional health care 
systems.  Like the larger movement, Columbia’s community health planning initiative 
was both short-lived and largely unsuccessful.  The fragmented, hierarchical, and 
insular structure of the Medical Center was largely responsible for the initiative’s 
failure.  Institutional marginality of primary medicine, public health, and public 
hospitals in American health care handicapped the initiative from the start, 
determining the way in which the initiative was eventually assimilated.  Competition 
for leadership and participation marred the planning of the initiative, reinforcing 
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already powerful incentives driving individual advancement and institutional 
conformity.   
Dynamics of Politics and Policy-Making in Academic Medicine 
The simple formulation of my first contention – that medical centers make 
health care policy – is actually misleading because the policies medical centers make 
are themselves articulated in the process of conflict and struggle.  Medical centers are 
not mini-leviathans; rather, they are sites where influential actors are located, 
important interests are articulated, significant conflicts unfold, and far-reaching 
settlements emerge.  Like most organizations, medical centers are headed by powerful 
elites, yet they do not act monolithically.  Their politics and policies are accompanied 
by conflict and contestation and the outcomes of internal struggles cannot be assumed 
as given.  As institutional sites, rather than closed organisms, medical centers are 
permeated by varied co-presence and influence of other organizations and institutional 
forces.  It is this complexity which makes their politics less predictable than is 
commonly held.  It also allows a possibility of institutional change with significant 
political implications.    
The conceptual framework developed to understand the politics of the 
academic medical builds on two theoretical approaches: the neo-Durkheimian theory 
of micro-classes and the theory of intersectionality.  Proposed by David Grusky and 
his collaborators, the neo-Durkheimian approach calls for greater attention to the 
micro-level of social organization and stratification.  In this view, “the labor market is 
indeed organized into classes, albeit in a more detailed level than is conventionally 
allowed.”18  To capture these structuring effects, Grusky and his collaborators propose 
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to disaggregate conventional ‘large-class’ categories and to focus on the occupations 
and occupational associations which actually exhibit many characteristics typically 
ascribed to classes.  The principle advantage of a disaggregate approach is a greater 
realism of the resulting ‘micro-classes.’  Occupations are deeply embedded in our 
economic, legal, educational and demographic institutions, while conventional 
aggregate classes lack comparable institutional grounding and thus remain rather 
abstract and theoretical concepts. 
The call for disaggregation is particularly valuable for the analysis of intra-
organizational politics in that it enables us to apply the fundamental socio-political 
categories at the micro-level.  However, an exclusive focus on occupations as ‘micro-
classes’ is inadequate for understanding the politics of academic medical centers and 
other similar organizations.  Both particular occupations and the larger system of 
occupations are significantly structured and divided by multiple dimensions of 
difference, including race, gender, class, as well as by the organizational structures of 
employment, and education.  While several areas of scholarship attempted to relate 
multiple dimensions of organizational structure, the most systematic articulation of 
multi-dimensional approach has been offered by the theory of intersectionality.  Its 
central contention is that social structure must be viewed as a multidimensional and 
varied terrain shaped by race, class, gender, sexuality, nationality, religion and other 
systems of social division.  Each of these structuring principles is partly autonomous, 
yet also intertwined with and complicated by others.  The manner and degree to which 
each dimension of difference shapes concrete social positions varies within historical, 
cultural, and institutional contexts.  It is these context-bound intersecting systems that 
account for the growing complexity of social structure and political processes. 
Five dimensions of inequality were singled out as central to the analysis of the 
structure and politics of academic medical centers: social class, gender, race, 
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occupational divisions, and organizational hierarchies.  Far from a complete set of 
differences structuring the many areas of academic medicine, these are the most 
frequent and general elements at play.  Other and related concepts, such as ethno-
religious identity, citizenship, immigrant status, and career, were added as necessary to 
analyze specific cases.  The term ‘institutional class positions’ was proposed to denote 
those varied and contingent positions that emerge at the intersection of the five 
structuring dimensions. 
My research confirmed that the politics and policies of the academic medical 
centers have been importantly structured by the varied intersections of the five major 
dimensions of institutional structure.  Table 8.1 summarizes rates the salience of the 
five dimensions of difference in each of the five cases I studied.  All dimensions were 
found to be highly or moderately salient in three or more cases of intra-organizational 
politics investigated in this study.  Moreover, the measure of immediate salience does 
not reveal the full significance of race, gender, and class.  For instance, race and 
gender were not immediately salient in the conflict over the ‘full-time requirement’ 
only because women and minorities were already excluded from faculty positions at 
the elite medical schools.  Thus, in its immediate content, the conflict did not focus on 
issues of race and gender.19  Similarly, the low immediate relevance of class to the 
structure of medical school admissions resulted from the wholesale exclusion of the 
lower-class applicants accomplished by the modernization of the American medical 
education, as well as from the close intertwining of class with race and ethno-religious 
identity.  Where particular institutions are able to exclude the entire groups, the 
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salience of the categories of exclusion must be sought in a broader or different 
institutional terrain. 
 
Table 8.1. Immediate Salience of Class, Race, Gender, Occupational Division, and 
Organizational Hierarchy in Five Cases of Intra-Organizational  
Politics and Policy-Making 
 
Chapter 3 4 5 6 7 
Case 
Description 
The conflict 
over the 
proposed 
restructuring 
of all medical 
faculty 
appointments 
on a full-time 
basis without 
private 
practice 
Conflicts over 
patient 
services 
segregation, 
specialty mix, 
public/private 
division of 
labor and 
community 
obligations 
Admission of 
women and 
minorities to 
medical 
school, post-
graduate 
study, and 
institutional 
appointments 
The struggle 
for the 
unionization 
of the various 
groups of 
workers 
employed by 
the medical 
school and its 
clinical 
affiliates 
Institutional 
conflict over 
the proper 
response to 
the urban 
health care 
crisis and the 
community 
health 
planning 
initiative 
Period 1910-1926 1922-1945 1891-1980 1958-1976 1970-1976 
Class *** *** * *** *** 
Race  ** *** *** *** 
Gender  ** *** ***  
Occupation ** *** *** *** *** 
Organization *** *** *** *** *** 
 
Notes: *** = highly salient, ** = moderately salient, * = somewhat salient 
 
My analysis allows me to articulate two contributions to the theories of 
intersectionality and micro-class analysis.  The first concerns the process of refraction 
within the intersectional structure and the second highlights the phenomenon of 
institutional cross-cutting in the structuration of institutional micro-classes. 
  464 
That the intersection of two or more dimensions of difference can change the 
character of one or both of them has been a foundational insight in the study of 
intersectionality.  Focused on the juncture of race and gender, early proponents of 
intersectionality pointed out that gender is racialized and race is gendered for the 
bearers of multiple oppressions.  This mutual alteration is akin to refraction, when one 
line of division is refracted after its intersection with another line.  Race and gender 
are powerful and fundamental dimensions of social structure and their capacity to 
refract any number of social divisions is not in doubt.  In my research, however, I have 
found that even occupational divisions and organizational hierarchies may also be 
capable of refraction.   
In the struggle to unionize the workers at Columbia-Presbyterian, gender was 
refracted by occupational, organizational, and class dimensions.  At Presbyterian 
Hospital, an all-female social work department was at the forefront of a protracted 
struggle for unionization, but a predominantly female clerical unit at P&S had the 
highest percentage voting against representation by any collective bargaining 
organization.  In both institutions, women in technical and service positions were as 
likely to be actively involved in organizing and union activities as men, whereas at the 
professional level only one and predominantly female occupational category was 
mobilized into the struggle.  Although both social work and nursing could be 
classified as ‘feminized semi-professions,’ their members acted very differently in 
regard to unionization.  The explanation for this difference lies in the refracting effects 
of organizational and occupational positions.  Some of these roles, such as secretarial 
and clerical positions integrated female workers into organizational structures, albeit 
on highly subordinated and personalized terms reminiscent of gender relations in the 
patriarchal family.  Other careers, such as social work, segregated women from men in 
the lower-paid, less prestigious occupational categories with an unsure claim to 
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professionalism and its attendant perks.  Still other jobs at both hospitals and medical 
schools preyed on the low social status of minority and immigrant women, exploiting 
the dual basis of that status.  These different, yet distinctly feminized class locations 
placed their occupants in different relationships to their superiors and employers, 
affecting unsurprising differences in their ability and inclination to defy organizational 
power in their workplace.   
The difference between social work and nursing, for example, had to do with 
very different degree of incorporation into academic medicine and subordination to the 
Center’s professional and administrative leaders.  Within medicine, social work was 
both insignificant in size and marginal in function.  Thus, the ties of inclusion and 
subordination linking social work with the medical center were rather weak.  The 
situation of nursing was much the opposite.  It has been a crucial part of the hospitals 
and its subordination was firmly established.  Yet, another crucial difference lay 
outside of the Medical Center and had to do with nursing’s and social work’s 
respective occupational associations.  Social work could probably count on and 
actually received support for its occupational association.  In contrast, nursing 
associations remained extremely cautious in regard to the unionization question. 
In each of the positions that emerged during unionization struggle, gender was 
a crucial structuring factor, yet its actual expression in the unionization struggle was 
refracted by the intersection with occupational factors (such as support of the 
occupational association) and organizational position (such as degree and character of 
work subordination) 
Another example of refractory influence of occupational and organizational 
structures is the so-called ‘semi-private’ patient problem investigated in Chapter 4.  
While it is expected that the availability and quality of health care would vary with the 
social class of the patient, the direct and linear relationship is broken by the 
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peculiarities of institutional arrangements.  During the period I investigated, this was 
the case for middle-income patients who needed hospitalization; today, this 
phenomenon is observed in the unavailability of health insurance to the working poor 
who find themselves in the gap between private, employer-sponsored insurance and 
Medicaid.  Unwilling to go to the free wards and unable to pay for private rooms, the 
‘semi-private’ patients arguably faced the highest barriers within the system of class-
differentiated hospital care.  The reason for this refraction of the expected influence of 
class lies in organizational and occupational structure of academic medicine.  Unlike 
private practitioners, who were always more interested in higher class patients, 
academic physicians interested in two groups of patients: the very wealthy for their 
private practice and the ward patients for their research and teaching purposes.  
Middle-income patients into this gap and were of interest only the young academic 
faculty who hoped to build lucrative private practices but had to start with such a 
middling clientele.  Outside of the medical center, concerns of the middle-income 
patients were beginning to be heard by both governments and fledgling insurance 
companies.  Young professionals, however, are in perpetually weak situation vis-à-vis 
their employing organizations, while the influence of both governments and insurance 
companies over the structure of health care provision was still very weak at the time.  
Thus, both internal and external institutional factors refracted the influence of class on 
health care access and quality. 
Along with refraction, the notion of institutional cross-cutting emerges as an 
important theoretical contribution of my research.  Both vertical and horizontal forms 
of organization have been shown to be prominent in modern societies.  The vertical 
entities, exemplified by capitalist firms and bureaucratic organizations, are said to be 
the “communities of unequals,” combining members of different classes and social 
statuses.  The horizontal bodies, such as occupational associations, trade unions, or 
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status groups, unite individuals occupying same or similar socio-economic positions.  
Within the scholarship on social stratification, there have been many tendencies to 
privilege either vertical or horizontal organization and to deemphasize the importance 
of the other one.  Class theorists, for example, highlighted the historical significance 
of the horizontal organizations.  Non-class theories often emphasized the robustness of 
the vertical structures instead.20  The neo-Durkheimian micro-class theory is no 
exception in this regard.  It proposes to conceptualize classes as occupational 
associations, emphasizing their homogeneity as horizontal forms of social and 
economic organization.   
My research does not support privileging either horizontal or vertical forms of 
organization.  Instead, it calls for attention to widespread institutional cross-cutting so 
evident in the structure and politics of academic medicine.  While ostensibly studying 
a single institution, what I often discovered was the palpable presence – to the point of 
intrusion – of other institutions into the organizational space of the medical center.  
Sometimes, other institutions made their presence felt through multiple memberships 
of the staff, for instance, in professional associations.  At other times, external 
institutions attempted to incorporate the center’s staff into their ranks, most notably 
labor unions.  Finally, some institutions – particularly foundations, government, and 
pharmaceutical companies – made their presence felt through funding or legal-
political authority.  The overlapping, multiple organizational fields is what I call 
institutional cross-cutting.  If academic medicine can be imagined as a series of 
relatively standardized vertical organizations (the academic medical centers), other 
organizations – such as professional societies, labor unions, or financing and 
regulatory entities – cut across the institutions of academic medicine and, in the 
                                                 
 
20
 See, for instance, a discussion in Erik Olin Wright, “Class and Occupation,” Theory and Society 9, 
no. 1 (1980). 
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process, carve out their own institutional presence within the sector.  One of the 
implications of institutional cross-cutting is that the cells which emerge at the 
intersections of primary and secondary institutions are some of the most visible and 
influential in political struggle.  This is not surprising, since this is where we would 
find competition between institutionalized, organized opponents.   Another inference, 
however, is that as-yet unorganized cross-cutting layers can become organized and 
that important changes can be expected from the process of such cross-institutional 
organization.21 
Looking to the Past to Understand the Present 
The theme of the Presbyterian Hospital’s 1995 Annual Report was 
‘metamorphosis.’  Only two years prior, the Hospital had come perilously close to 
extinction, posting a $22.5 million deficit and prompting industry watchers to predict 
its demise in the era of managed care.  But the dour predictions proved wrong.  In 
1995, Presbyterian finished with a nearly balanced budget, increased the number of 
discharges, reduced the average length of stay, and boasted a high occupancy rate.  
Still, tremendous challenges lay ahead, brought on by an erosion of support for 
academic medicine and “a Darwinian race toward market-driven health care.”  While 
no longer facing extinction, the Hospital had to undergo a transformation – a 
metamorphosis – in order to survive.22 
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 For example, a pioneering struggle for unionization launched by the Presbyterian’s Department of 
Social Work, which I detail in Chapter 6, illustrates this phenomenon of institutional crosscutting.  
While this path-breaking drive of a small, all-female department was undoubtedly rooted in a specific 
occupational, gender, and class identity of the group, the protracted battle came to involve a host of 
cross-cutting institutions, most notably the National Association of Social Workers and the New York 
State Labor Relations Board.  Interestingly, the social workers did not succeed until a much larger, non-
professional segment of the Hospital’s labor force won union recognition, highlighting another facet of 
cross-cutting institutional influence.  In contrast, the nurses’ professional associations had a cooling 
effect on their unionization drives at CPMC and elsewhere.  In general, the example of related 
occupational enclaves, situated at other institutions, had a significant effect on the dynamic of the 
unionization struggle. 
22
 Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York, Annual Report, 1995. 
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The report argued that Presbyterian was in the midst of the most radical 
transformation in its history, surpassing even its historic alliance with Columbia 
University College of Physicians and Surgeons in 1911, a union that created the 
nation’s first medical center.  The transformation required serious changes to the 
hospital’s institutional model.  As the lead article starkly noted, “[t]he days of the 
stand-alone teaching hospital, focused exclusively on research, education, and patient 
care, are over.”  Located in the poorer section of Manhattan, an independent teaching 
hospital was not financially viable in the era of tightening budgets and growing 
competition among providers.  Controlling costs, modernizing billing and ordering 
systems, establishing clinical branches in higher-income parts of the city, and 
increasing clinical revenues from the hospital affiliated physicians were all part of the 
survival strategy.  The central piece of the plan, however, was creating a regional 
network of providers that could offer a “marketable insurance product.”23   
The formation of this alliance was in its early stages in 1995, but the goal was 
to bring in 25 to 30 affiliated institutions within a few years, including specialized and 
community hospitals, outpatient facilities, physician networks, long-term-care 
facilities, home-care agencies, and freestanding diagnostic sites.   The aim was to 
create a regional integrated health-care network, providing “a continuum of care from 
checkups and vaccinations to hip replacements and health transplants.”  To be 
competitive, the network had to combine high quality, low cost and wide geographical 
distribution.  Ultimately, the objective was to be able to say to any employer in the 
metropolitan area that the network had a hospital or a physician within ten minutes of 
every one of its employees.  To contain costs, the new entity had to deliver as much 
care as possible in the lower-cost facilities, limiting the use of expensive, specialized 
                                                 
 
23
 Ibid. 
  470 
hospitals to procedures which could not be performed anywhere else.  A patient 
needing a heart transplant, for example, would receive preoperative care and testing in 
the community hospital near her home, and then would enter Presbyterian to undergo 
the transplant.  Once stabilized, she would return to the local hospital for postoperative 
period and rehabilitation.  By creating its own comprehensive network, Presbyterian 
was hoping to recapture some of the clinical revenue being lost to increased 
competition and lower reimbursements.  It was hoped that the ‘profits’ of this novel 
venture would go towards subsidizing graduate medical education, clinical research, 
and care of the uninsured.  In the cost-conscious era of the managed care and the 
dwindling state support, this was seen as the only way to maintain the hospital’s 
historic academic and philanthropic missions.24 
Only three years later, on January 11, 1998, another momentous transformation 
took place.  The teaching hospitals of Columbia and Cornell merged to form one of 
the most comprehensive university hospitals in the world, the NewYork-Presbyterian 
Hospital.  Affiliated with two Ivy League medical institutions, Columbia University 
College of Physicians & Surgeons and Weill Medical College of Cornell University, 
the new hospital became a part of not one, but two academic medical centers.  Besides 
capturing top ranks in surveys of the nation’s hospitals and physicians, the new entity 
continued to develop a network of integrated regional health care services.  Named the 
NewYork-Presbyterian Healthcare System, this federation of renowned hospitals, 
specialty institutes, and continuing care centers in New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut delivers a wide range of medical services to the tri-state community.25  By 
2005, the network had grown to include 51 institutional members, including 30 acute 
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care hospitals, 14 continuing care facilities, and several ambulatory and specialty care 
facilities.26  
What is remarkable about the tremendous changes which Presbyterian had 
undergone in the 1990s is how singularly they were focused on health care services.  
Neither the needs of research, nor the goals of medical education were central to the 
series of affiliations and mergers that had transformed Columbia’s teaching hospital.  
Although the stated goal was to preserve the institution’s historic mission of research, 
education, and charity care, the entire focus of reform was to create a new, radically 
expanded package of clinical services.  Research, of course, was not being abandoned.  
The year of the New York and Presbyterian merger was the first of five-year doubling 
of the National Institutes of Health medical research budget and Columbia saw a 
sixteen percent increase in its NIH grants.  But research was now much more squarely 
a province of the medical school, while the hospital’s attention was on health care 
services.  There were also notable changes in how the mission of scientific research 
was carried out.  The very first achievement mentioned in the medical school’s 1999 
annual report was that “Columbia University will earn more income in the coming 
year from its intellectual property that any other university in the country.”27 
While there continues to be a lively discussion about the wisdom of the 
strategies of merger and affiliation by the academic medical centers, it is clear that 
they were undertaken in response to real changes in the overall system of health care 
provision in the United States.28  In fact, many scholars have not hesitated to 
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pronounce these recent developments in academic medicine and the health care system 
as a whole to be nothing short of revolutionary.  Kenneth Ludmerer argued that at the 
end of the twentieth century American medical education has entered a second 
revolutionary period.  Among the major characteristics of this period are “the erosion 
of the clinical learning environment, the diminishing of faculty scholarship, and the 
reemergence of a proprietary system of medical schools in which the faculties’ 
financial well-being was placed before education and research.”29  Almost twenty 
years earlier, Paul Starr had rather presciently predicted a rise of corporate enterprise 
in health services, resulting in “greater disunity, inequality, and conflict throughout the 
entire health care system.”30  The corporate transformation has largely been realized in 
the three decades since the publication of his classic work.   
In these accounts, the sense of crisis and change is heightened by the 
institutional success and stability achieved during academic medicine’s golden age.  In 
Ludmerer’s view, the mid-century medical centers had achieved a remarkable 
harmony among their three goals – of research, medical education, and patient care – 
and fulfilled the social contract by earning public trust and capturing public 
confidence.31  For Starr, the development of academic medicine was firmly guided by 
the near sovereign power which the organized medical profession achieved over its 
ranks and its field of work.32  Both of these conditions began to unravel during the 
1970s.  The relationship between research, education, and care became decidedly 
unbalanced in favor of the last and to the detriment of the first two.  Academic 
medicine was also losing its cultural authority and public goodwill.  While still 
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worried about government control, the autonomy of physicians and hospitals was 
threatened by another force altogether.  Poised to enter a variety of other health care 
businesses, corporations began to integrate a previously decentralized system of 
independent providers and to consolidate ownership and control over emerging health 
care networks.33  Medical care was once again facing a major transformation in its 
institutional structure, comparable in its extent to the developments of a century ago.   
While not disputing the seriousness of recent changes, the perspective 
developed in this dissertation perceives more continuity with previous trends.  In part, 
this is because it discerns less balance and harmony in that past than is commonly 
found.  The conflict among the goals of research, education, and care – which most 
scholars locate in the 1970s – was present at the very founding of the first medical 
centers.  As I discuss in Chapter 3, it was so serious as to threaten the entire enterprise 
of building the nation’s first medical center.  The eventual outcome constituted not so 
much a genuine resolution of conflicting interests as an inevitable compromise 
reflecting the relative power of the rivals.  Institutional integration and corporate 
rationalization of American medicine are likewise not new, as both were the engines 
fueling the emergence of the medical centers during the early twentieth century.   
The unity and power of the medical profession also appear exaggerated from a 
perspective that focuses on long-standing conflicts, rather than eventual compromises.  
While the profession’s elites achieved a remarkable coherence in the system of 
medical education, licensing, and accreditation, struggles among various specialties, 
between public health and medicine, and between the medical profession and other 
institutions and occupations in the health care field were notable throughout the 
century.34  The effect of professional unity was also aided by the more standardized 
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and hierarchical education and career paths, which powerfully subordinated the 
younger and less successful members of the profession and marginalized women, 
minorities and lower-class applicants.35 
The concept of institutional class positions is an effective antidote to myths of 
coherence and unity prone to grow around successful organizations and professional 
groups.36  It recognizes that most institutions are not only collections of disparate 
groups but are also crosscut by the influence of other institutions.  An in-depth study 
of the politics and history of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center undertaken in 
this dissertation suggests a limited usefulness of abstractions such as a ‘social 
contract’ or ‘professional authority.’  This study documents the extent of internal 
diversity and conflict inconsistent with unitary conceptions of academic medical 
centers underlying the imagery of ‘professional dominance’ or institutional coherence 
of the golden age.  An image of the academic medical center as a discrete institutional 
body capable of entering into a ‘contract’ with its underlying society is also 
contradicted by the porous and externally-invested picture emerging from my work.  
The very creation of medical centers has been crucially dependent on the leadership of 
corporate elites, the patronage of private patients, the trust of working class patients, 
and, after WWII, the massive public investments in research and infrastructure.   
To discern greater continuities between current troubles and past decisions is 
not to underestimate the seriousness of present threats.  They are real enough and 
should be a cause for concern for citizens and policy-makers alike.  The causes of the 
present troubles, however, may not be very different from those which created the 
open conflicts and half-hearted accommodations of the past.  Most importantly, the 
problems of academic medical centers are not just institutional difficulties but are 
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intimately linked with the problems of our social, economic and political organization.  
The dynamics and composition of the medical centers’ workforce and patient pools 
are deeply reflective of the socio-economic stratification created by our economic, 
social, and health care policies.   
The outcomes of the current problems in American academic medicine carry 
implications that extend far beyond its sphere.  Many writers agree that the country’s 
health care system represents a ‘prism’ of the larger concern about America’s position 
in the world.  In Ludmerer’s apt assessment, “[t]he underlying problems that led to 
turbulence in medicine – the earlier acceptance of the myth of unbridled resources and 
national capacity, the preoccupation with short-term rather than long-term thinking, 
the emphasis on immediate gratification, the difficulty of retaining purpose and values 
in a culture that champions greed and material excess, and the dilemma of providing 
for public goods and human needs through a private market system beholden only to 
owners and shareholders – were the same problems that jeopardized other aspects of 
the country’s prosperity.”37   
Over the past century, the United States has built up truly awesome institutions 
of academic medicine.  As concerned citizens, we naturally wish that these vast 
resources should yield the highest social returns in the framework of optimal 
international collaboration.  In the perspective developed in this dissertation, 
prescriptions for success differ from those commonly offered.  While the institutional 
leadership within academic medicine is certainly necessary, even more important 
might be the leadership of an ascending class coalition whose vision of social progress 
gives medicine a prominent place.  Restoring the mythical balance among research, 
education and patient care is not enough.  What is necessary is a reduction of class-
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institutional differences within academic medicine and medical profession as a whole 
which is, in turn, dependent on reducing class inequality in access to, and the ability to 
pay for, health care.  Finally, the tendency of our system to favor and reward short-
term over long-term success must be addressed.  Providing longer, healthier and freer 
lives to all will be a key moment of the process. 
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